What if no German Unrestricted Sub Warfare, Zimmerman Note intercept, US DoW on Germany in 1917?

Comments on article on the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and the later German-British negotiations.

Chapter 1: - The oldest alliance
a) It was actually Edward III on the throne in 1373, not Edward II.

b) Most sources I've seen was that in return for subsides to make Charles II independent of Parliament resulted in English/British action against the Netherlands rather than Spain with Charles engaging in a war on the French side against the Dutch.  Fortunately for all concerned that failed miserably.

c) I notice it mentions Portuguese tolerance of Protestant English merchant but the author doesn't say whether that was reciprocated? Would be interest to know? I suspect so given the nature of the alliance.

d) Its somewhat misleading to say that Britain lapsed into a half century of isolationism after the final defeat of Napoleon. Its was active in many areas including aiding Greek independence and later aiding the Turks against 1st Muhammad Ali and then of course the Russians during the Crimean conflict. Its was also diplomatically active, although it played no part in the so called Holy Alliance and blocked French suggestions to aid Spain in regaining its American colonies in the early 1820s. To pick cases that immediately come to mind.


Chapter II – The 1898 negotiations.
a) The start seems a bit muddled as the author doesn't seem to realise what was going on. Previous major clashes to maintain the balance of power in Europe had had world wide impacts and fighting on multiple continents. However possibly the point he seeks to make is that with the rise of the USA and Japan for the 1st time any such world wide war would have to consider the involvement of great powers not based in Europe.  What he rather surprisingly doesn't mention was the relative decline in British power between ~1840-1914 which was also a major issue.   Partly inevitable given the development of industry and technology in other powers but also partly because of dire internal political and economic policies from ~1850 onward.

b) Yes the German navy and its open and clear targeting of Britain was the primary issue in pushing Britain into a loose relationship with the Franco-Russian camp but colonial issues were relatively unimportant in this other than being used as an excuse by German figures for a huge overwhelmingly short ranged navy that would do nothing to protect those colonies but everything to meet the desire of Wilhelm II and Tirpitz to threaten Britain. As such it wasn't a “logical” excuse for a large navy.  However while the navy was the initial threat Britain was also growing concerned about the increasingly aggressive stance of Germany in Europe itself, with its traditional concern about a single power or bloc controlling the continent.

c) I rather doubt that traditional friendly relationships between the British and Prussian royal families was a factor in persuading the Russians to make a defensive pact with the French. Far more important was the decision of Berlin to dump relationships with St Petersburg in favour of a clear support of Austria rather than friendly relations with both.

d) Splendid Isolationism, which I agree was not splendid was a relatively short lived period in the last couple of decades of the 19th century. I would disagree with the interpretation of British policy in the 19thC as stated on page 27/42 [1st is number page of the document, 2nd is the pdf page] of the document. Both in terms of muddling through being confused with opportunism as their two different things. Reacting to a crisis doesn't necessarily mean taking opportunities, especially if that weakens your longer term prospects. Similarly Palmerston simply stated a fact for all powers throughout the history of human diplomacy. Its just that some people and nations confused that with opportunism and looking for immediate gain despite the longer term costs. Again this is something the author fails to understand.

e) He again shows what looks increasingly like a bias when he states that “England had occurred the hostility of France in several incidents” without going into any examination of why the two powers had tensions. The implied suggestion is that it was Britain's fault in all cases.  See comments further below where its stated that the single largest source of tension between the two nations, Britain's predominance in Egypt was due to a French error.

Similarly the threat from Russia is overstated, although it did cause a lot of concerns in Britain. Russia had serious problems projecting power over long distances with poor logistics and its attempts to expand its borders by force against recognised states, specifically the Ottoman Empire and Qing China caused concern among multiple powers not just Britain.

f) Again he talks up tension with France but ignores that those matters were resolved. He also fails to mention that the final clash he mentions, which he doesn't identify but is obviously the Fashoda Incident was technically over land officially ruled by the Khadive of Egypt which the latter had lost control of during the Maudist revolt. Note the entry on this cites:-



i.e. that the decision not to accept a British offer for a joint protectorate over Egypt was recognised by many in France itself as a French error and that at the time there were many French people who were as unreasoning hostile to Britain as elements in Germany were later to become. Also that Fashoda had been an Egyptian settlement prior to the revolt so that the French had no legal claim to it, as well as it being totally unsupportable for them despite some of the delusional ideas mentioned above.

g) Not sure how he gets the idea that the crisis caused by Rhode's ill thought out Jameson Raid threatened the collapse of British power in southern Africa???  Although Britain was embarrassed by the event and it lead to the dismissal of Rhodes as PM of the Cape Province. - Unless he's talking about the fact that the removal of so many armed men from Rhodesia was one factor that l49 ed just a couple of months later to the Second Matabele War.

You should however note that he points out it was Wilhelm II that posted the telegram that heightened tensions with Britain and a couple of years later it was Germany that rejected an alliance proposal by Britain. He goes on to point out at the bottom of page 34/49 that German then effectively rejected prior agreements with Britain over the status of the Boer republics. - more on this below as its covered in more detail in the rest of the chapter.

On page 37/52 he then goes on to quote Wilhelm's clear hostility towards Britain and the frankly idiotic view that by threatening to keep Britain in isolation by rejecting friendly relations it would force it to submit to German terms for joining the Triple Alliance – which as we know elsewhere were for a German free hand on the continent. Especially stupid as with Britain's age old recognition of the importance of stopping any single power dominating the continent he fails to consider this would drive then to take the obviously better option that he himself mentioned of siding with France and Russia against the TA.

He goes on to note that this deep seated hostility towards Britain was present before the Jameson Raid actually occurred. Also that Wilhelm sought to start a war with Britain but that this was prevented by a Portuguese refusal to allow German troops into the Boer lands through their territory. That the author seems to think that this would be a disaster for Britain shows how little he understands of the situation on the ground. At this point for all Wilhelm's desires Germany had a very weak fleet so any such forces set would be isolated as would other German possessions. Furthermore France and Russia know they had far, far more to fear from an aggressive Germany than from Britain so at best they would have been neutral, but probably aligned favourably toward Britain in a war that isolated Germany and its overseas trade. At worse you would have had WWI a bout 18 years earlier which would probably have ended with an allied success with far less bloodshed for all concerned. - As noted above he seems to realise later on that this was folly on Wilhelm's part so not sure why the hyperbola earlier on???

Chapter III – Steps toward an Anglo-German Colonial Agreement

a) The author starts this off by directly contradicting what he has said before. Chamberlain's initial approach was unofficial but I'm not sure this was clear to the Germans at the time and they didn't know what Salisbury's stance was. [Its a bit odd that he refers to this as being the Salisbury element of the British cabinet when Salisbury was the actual PM?]. The clear factor stated before was that Wilhelm was opposed to any such agreement other than solely on German terms.  Wilhelm had already rejected Russia as an ally and it had turned to an agreement with France for mutual defence against Germany-Austria. Also saying “Germany indicated that while a large scale understanding was impossible, there was still a potential for a settlement of specific minor matters” also doesn't it in with the views stated as being held by Wilhelm that he would press Britain until it accepted his terms, which seems to suggest he was still proposing some form of alliance, albeit not one between equals.

b) I find it strange that in the discussion on page 56/72 between Portugal and Britain that Germany could see that because of Mozambique's bordering German EA and the Boer Republic – presumably the Transvaal as there were two - “believed it to be in her sphere of influence by right of justice if not by law”? That's a strangely arrogant stance and since the colony bordered even more British colonies and areas they did have influence via treaty Britain could by the same argument have an even stronger claim.

This is especially since the proposed deal at the time was for a loan from Britain which would be repaid via revenues from Portuguese Mozambique, nothing to do with its actual transfer to Britain. Which is something the author does say later, on page 58/72.

c) On page 68/84 the author states that “The die was cast, An agreement was ultimately to be made by two external parties – Germany and Britain – for the possible ultimate division between then of a third party's insecure colonial possessions”. The key word here was possibly which makes clear it was still a matter up for discussion as does the fact that Salisbury was reluctant to make such a deal. Its noted that he would present the German proposals to the cabinet he says nothing about supporting such a deal. As such the suggestion he makes “left consideration of Portugal aside” is incorrect.


Chapter IV – The Anglo-German Treaty of 1898

I will admit that once Portugal withdrew its request for a loan, from any source that Salisbury should have made clear to Germany that any attempt to seize Portuguese or British lands as Germany proposed would cause a conflict. Why his government continued negotiations with Germany, especially given the extreme terms Germany proposed, all of Angola, the vast bulk of Mozambique, Portuguese Timor and also two British regions. - Talking here about the initial German proposals.

a) The author does say that, long after the event von Bulow, P77/94 was claiming that it was “merely a trial of British fidelity which the treaty found to be lacking.” Given how extreme the German claims were it could be said there were far more evidence of a lack of fidelity by Germany. As stated on the following page, when a threat to seek an agreement with Russia, which wasn't practical and anyway Russia had no influence failed to “make Britain jump into Germany's arms” Germany did pull back on its more extreme terms, dropping demand for British territory and – for the moment Timor but demanded even more of the Portuguese African colonies.

b) Its also noted that at the bottom of page 79/96 Salisbury is still making clear that Portugal should be kept informed of any treaty and attempts made to protect their interests. Obviously the British attitude is that such a deal would only be made in the event of a collapse of Portuguese capacity to maintain their empire. - This is a stance repeated clearly by Balfour who as Foreign Minister in Salisbury's absence took over negotiations with Germany – see page 86/103. - On the following pages Germany attempts unilaterally to renew its demands for Portuguese Timor.

It could be that the author's conclusion at the end of the chapter, that Salisbury wanted to play for time until the situation improved for Portugal and it never needed to take the Anglo-German loan that Berlin saw as the 1st step to annexation.


Chapter V The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1899 – AKA the Windsor Treaty.

a) Again the author seems to not understand in the previous chapter. Britain may have played a skilled hand to protect its old ally from German predication without needing to consider a potential military conflict but that's hardly “having one's cake and eating it”.

b) There's a strange and definitely dubious reference on page 103/121 about the “impending Boer holocaust” with is odd as I doubt it was clear at that point that the Boer states would start a war or how far they were willing to go to persecute it rather than admit defeat.

c) Interesting suggestion on pages 103-104/122-123 that the Germans having realised how hopeless their position was in an aggressive colonial war against Britain was intending on the attempt to force a deal over the partition of the Portuguese colonies because the government realised they couldn't support the Boers and wanted compensation for British influence in those regions. Of course their clack-handed approach and the long standing British-Portuguese friendship made that an unlikely issue and hence their failure.

d) Its probably a factor in the nature of German politics at the time that German politicians seems to believe that Edward Prince of Wales's visit to Portugal, for which he had considerable affection played a major role in frustrating Germany's designs on Portuguese colonies. See page 110/128 This is despite the fact the difference between the two parties made the agreement dead in the water almost immediately and the stated visit wasn't until two months later.  The monarchy did still have some influence but a lot less actual power than the Kaiser in Germany or other continental monarchies.

e) Interesting that Germany sought to make a separate agreement with Portugal itself, to obtain parts of Angola and also coaling stations in the Azores which was itself in breach of their 1898 agreement with Britain, p121/139.