raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 6, 2024 20:25:10 GMT
This is not an uncommon scenario, but what if the US does not join into WWI, especially in 1917?
To make things clear, I'll specify exactly what changes from our actual history to make it not happen.
World events in Europe, World War I and its various fronts, North America including the USA and Mexico, and every place else run almost precisely as they did in real history up through 1916, including Wilson's reelection in November that year.
The slight divergence from our timeline that starts happening in 1916 is an elevated level of petty personal political drama in the military circles around the Kaiser, that turns out to have consequences that are not so petty, but are policy relevant, after all.
They start in the mind of Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Alexander_von_Müller) Chief of the German Imperial Naval Cabinet and personal friend of the Kaiser, and distress he feels over the increased tension in early 1916 that led to the resignation of Alfred Von Tirpitz as State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office on March 15, 1916. The famous Tirpitz, aligned with the Kaiser for years as a booster of the large fleet, had increasingly been at odds with the Kaiser and Bethman-Hollweg over restrictions on U-Boat rules of engagement in the aftermath of the Lusitania sinking and the American negative reaction to it. Tirpitz agitated against restrictions in the press, and threatened to resign multiple times before doing so, causing the Kaiser stress, and thus causing Muller stress.
In this timeline, his protectiveness of the Kaiser, and his anger at Tirpitz prima donna self-aggrandizing style, angers Muller a great deal and makes him warier of prima donna Admirals and Generals trying to push around the Kaiser.
Admiral Muller like OTL takes care of personal naval/military management and briefing of the Kaiser, along with his Army counterpart Generaloberst Moriz Von Lyncker, and they see it as their duty to keep the Kaiser's spirits up, keep him engaged in affairs of state and public appearances, but well-advised in his and the state's best interest, which both Muller and Von Lyncker see as the same thing.''
But the Tirpitz drama turns both men off to out-of-control, prima donna flag officers, and encourages them, especially Muller, to cultivate their own information and support networks in their services.
In Muller's case, this means over 1916 learning more about the U-Boat service and its operations. U-Boat production. Tactics. Talks with skippers. One of the first things he learns by spring or summer 1916 is how, despite how enthusiastic Tirpitz was unrestricted submarine warfare by 1915 and 1916, he did very little pre-war, or even up until the day he resigned, to build very many of them for a mass unrestricted campaign, compared to other ship types. This increases Muller's distaste for the man.
Over the rest of the year he learns other things, from engagements with U-Boat Captains/skippers. The difference between following Cruiser rules and unrestricted rules actually is not that urgent to them, and most of the time, for the armament they have cruiser tactics are what they naturally use, because they are better armed and can more effectively see what they are doing against targets when they surface and use their guns rather than their sparse number of torpedoes. It's also good for crew exercise and morale when they get to surface and storm aboard a captured prize. This is contrary to Muller's expectation, when it turns out that it is more the Admirals, not Captains and crew, who chafe at the ROE restrictions.
This further adds to Muller's skepticism of the unrestricted submarine chorus, now being championed by Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, head of the Imperial Admiralty Staff, and the popular Generals of OberOst, Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
Muller makes contact with naval intelligence people, who on the one hand are supporting "analysis" naval figures like Holtzendorff are using to purport that unrestricted ROE would be a huge factor in crippling British tonnage for vital imports, but also obtains reports and data on German interned merchant tonnage in US ports, US fleet strength including in destroyers, and the role of US and other third party and western hemisphere ports in any successful blockade breaking Germany is accomplishing. Much or all of this material being left on the cutting room floor when being ultimately prepared for and presented by Holtzendorff.
Ultimately, Muller's efforts, pre-briefing of the Kaiser at opportune moments and making allies in the navy and sowing doubts alters the bureaucratic battle within the German fleet and military that led to the presentation of unrestricted submarine warfare as a "miracle cure" for Germany's desperate war effort by the end of 1916.
en.wikipedia.org 9 January 1917 German Crown Council meeting - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
While it would be dramatically fun to have Muller present a counter-memo to Holtzendorff debunking his memo, Pless conference - Wikipedia
Muller probably would have had to do groundwork beforehand to undermine it, pointing to its blindspots or errors which included:
Underestimating the amount of *immediate* assistance the US Navy and customs authorities could start providing to the Entente blockade Underestimating the amount of interned German and Austrian shipping the Americans and Entente could almost *immediately* put into service supplying the Entente, undoing at least a few months worth of U-Boat campaigning in terms of tonnage sunk Underestimating the amount new escort vessels, including destroyers, that would become available from the US Navy from nearly the beginning of hostilities that would negate some positive effects of U-Boat campaigns. Over-estimating the additional marginal tonnage sunk and cargo voyages prevented by indiscriminately targeting all shipping including neutrals Underestimating the decent progress of the current campaign Underestimated the number of boats needed to achieve the cargo losses promised per Holtzendorff. Therefore, with the waters sufficiently muddied and unrestricted U-Boat warfare no longer a "slam dunk" military/naval solution but for "scruple" and "diplomacy", but from a hard effectiveness point of view, the Germans do not decide to adopt it on 9 January 1917.
…but they don't rule it out either.
In a compromise, they keep up the current "sharpened" U-Boat campaign against Allied merchant vessels, virtually all armed at this point. They also commit to shift naval construction allocations to enhance numbers of submarines and their torpedo capabilities of submarine for unwarned sinkings for that option and under waterline damage.
With a greater focus in mind on the naval, and not just military, implications of the USA entering the war against Germany in reaction to an unrestricted U-Boat campaign, the idea that in our timeline led to the Zimmerman Telegram, an offer of alliance to Mexico, and then through Mexico, to Japan, is pursued. But, the whole matter is handled with greater care and security. No messages are sent to Zimmerman over wireless or the wires, even encrypted. Instead, only encrypted *written* instructions delivered in another voyage of the cargo submarine Deutschland, set for January-February 1917 to America and to be courier conveyed to Carranza, with the overture to Japan discussed in Mexico City, in their embassy if possible.
The intention is to line up the contingent alliances with Mexico and Japan *before* authorizing unrestricted submarine warfare, and not authorizing it beforehand. And the hardcopy/in-person delivery method makes sure Britain's Room 40 never sees any of the discussion, which almost certainly dead-ends without conclusion. From Muller and like-minded people's point of view, Japan with its Navy is the more important of the two, to offset a possible entry of the US Navy, However, Japan switching sides is ultimately even more outlandish than Mexican-American war. Without signals intercepts, the British and Americans hear nothing of the German overtures to Mexico or Japan, except the vaguest rumors, or whatever those two countries choose to share. The Mexicans would say nothing and keep mum I'd say. And while the Japan would report an offer, at the same time, playing loyal while highlighting their value and options, it might not just be regarded in British circles as Japanese self-aggrandizement for diplomatic leverage.
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 6, 2024 20:25:57 GMT
OK – so Germany is going into January, February, March, 1917 operating its ground and naval forces consistently. No new crisis with the USA, and bam! we have the February Revolution in Russia overthrowing the Tsar.
In April 1917 we have the Nivelle Offensive and then mutinies by French troops.
I will go ahead and make another interpretive leap. The Entente will figure out how to survive 1917 financially and economically.
There are some thoughts they could not, and they were running out of backing collateral in North America for loans. And indeed, the Wilson Administration was advising lenders not to make unsecured loans to overseas borrowers.
Certainly, without declaring war, which is not happening, the US government is not guaranteeing Entente loans or granting unlimited credit. Nor can it present a "Liberty Loan" as a patriotic duty or sell war bonds for US defense or Entente purposes. And there were internal British memos about running out of financial liquidity at some point in spring 1917.
However, these British memos were likely based on maintaining certain fiscal and trade orthodoxies and assumed non-imposition of different types of austerity and rationing that Britain's coalition government would have been willing to do rather than lose the war, even if the measures would have been anathema to an Asquithian Liberal government following its 1914 and beforehand principles.
Additionally, while American creditors could in theory start calling British and other Entente loans short, and strictly to account, and then seizing British-owned collateral for non-payment, causing a run on that, resulting in its liquidation and a drying up of credit, that may not be the most likely thing to happen. Banking and industrial concerns were not as strictly separated then, and big lenders would know abruptly pulling credit, rather than extending and stretching out repayment terms, could kill export markets expected for the quarters ahead instantly. So some concerns with cross-ownership across different sectors may literally continue to bank on British and Entente victory, having sunk so much business and investment in them already, convinced they will win, and counting on them as product markets in the near-term.
In any case, the British do still have their shipping resources, untapped, as-yet-untaxed resources and even if running into difficulty getting credit for purchases in the US, can still make vast food and raw material purchases and some light manufacturing purchases from their Dominions and to some extent Latin America.
Now British and Allied shipping should still face a hard time from the German U-Boat campaign, even as it remains under restrictions. It should get worse from them through June-July-August, even if never as bad as it got in real history. And I would expect the British would start convoying by the time they need to, when they calculate that is the more efficient and sustainable overall alternative.
In any case, in real history, and in this timeline, Germany and Austria and the Ottomans were *utterly unable* to go over onto the offensive on *land* against the western powers at any point between August 1916 and March 1918 (a whole 20 months!) or against Italy between August 1916 and October 1917 (14 months) and I don't see what would make that change here. From August-December 1916, all the Central Powers could accomplish on land in Europe was holding off the Brusilov offensive, mounting a counterattack to it, and counterattacking the Romanians and squeezing them out of Wallachia and Bucharest. Any other successes by the Bulgarians and Ottomans were defensive stalling, and in Anatolia/Caucus, the Turks were failing at that.
In 1917, the Central Powers, despite the rot and end of discipline and motivation in the Central Powers and the mutinies against senseless offensives in France, were unable to mount any land offensives from January through August of the that year. And they had to fend of persistent British assaults in Flanders from May or June through November, the brief French Nivelle offensive in April, some Italian offensives in the summer, a feeble sally from Salonika that year, a successful British advance in Mesopotamia, and British gains in southern Palestine and Jerusalem by the end of the year along with Arab Revolt actions.
And this was all in our timeline before US troops were really in the trenches in any quantity. So the absence of US forces from the war and the trenches through August 1917 does not look at all like it provides Germany or the Central Powers a war-winning opportunity in that time.
What Germany was able to do in 1917 was mount a defense and counter-attack that manhandled Russia's June Kerensky offensive, and sent Russian morale further plummeting.
Then, in September, taking advantage on ongoing rot/melt of Russian forces, the Germans took Riga.
Then in October-November, the Germans and Austrians together battered the Italians at Caporetto and threw them out of much of Venezia back to the Piave.
Without America in the war, there's not an apparent opportunity for the Germans to advance to an enemy capital in 1917 to claim a victory, but things can't be better for the Allies either. The Allies' offensives are failing.
It is a legitimate question if the Russian Provisional Government even *attempts* an offensive. In our timeline, the Provisional Government was being prodded forward and pep-talked into not only keeping in the fight, but attacking by the mission of American Elihu-Root, who made clear that American financial largesse was on offer for Russia *if* it fought for victory, but "no fight, no loan". Without the Yankee carrot, the British and French alone might not have enough to offer the Russians to motivate a real offensive from them, even if the Russians would not yet be ready to make a separate peace. Indeed, if Wilson is still on the outside, not wanting a German victory, but not wanting *anybody's* victory, and supporting a negotiated peace, Wilson might be finding the Russian democratic socialist parties, with their presence in the Petrograd Soviet and in some Provisional Government posts, with their talk of" no annexations and no indemnities" among the most receptive among any politicians in any belligerent state.
*Without* the US having declared war on the Central Powers, and that being noted as a growing danger for them, it is an open question whether or not the Center and Social Democratic parties in the Reichstag voice support for a negotiated peace in July 1917 as they did in our timeline. It is also an open question whether Pope Benedict is moved to offer is August 1917 mediation proposal, which some have interpreted as motivated by the danger to the Catholic Habsburg monarchy by this point in time.
I imagine Britain's blockade would continue to tighten around Germany, although be little less airtight, a little more leaky, with the USA not a belligerent. It would still get harsher.
But unless things change to somehow produce a negotiated end to the war by November 1917 – not absolutely impossible, but still requiring a near-miracle, and highly unlikely, we would likely have a Bolshevik Soviet revolution pulling Russia out of the war by this point in time.
That would probably ease pressure in Germany for unrestricted submarine warfare, though it still wouldn't be ruled out, and even though the blockade would be stinging.
The persistent effects of blockade, even without American participation in the war and prospect of ever-growing numbers of American troops, probably would *still motivate* Germany to invest in a spring 1918 do-or-die offensive in the west.
This would have to follow a punishment expedition in the east to stop dilly-dallying and get the Bolsheviks to sign the Brest-Litovsk peace.
By March 1918, we do have some questions about how the Allies have postured themselves defensively, not having American troops in France or on the way.
Q1: Have the French raised significantly greater numbers of colonial troops from North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Indochina, trained them, armed them, and put threm in the battle-lines in France or at least in the fields and factories of France in numbers far exceeding our timeline?
Q2: Have the British sent significantly more of their own men, Dominion men, and possibly men from non-white colonies like India, the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa to fronts in the Middle East, Salonika, and France?
Q3: Is that helping keep manpower in terms of battalions comparable to our timeline or not?
If not, why not?
Q4: Have the British or French in any manner found something sufficient to bribe Japan with to send a Japanese Expeditionary Force (JEF) to Europe to fight with them? Has it even been discussed? Has Japan mentioned a price? Did the Allies turn away horrified at the price or think about it? –Ultimately, I think any such bargain is really unlikely.
Given the technology of the time, and the tactics, I don't think a decisive breakthrough and exploitation of Allied lines, gaining either the Channel ports, or Paris, is likely in 1918, and failure to meet these objectives will be devastating to German morale.
However, there is an important question remaining.
Q4: Would the British and French need to pull back and abandon peripheral fronts, or starve them, to survive the 1918 German offensive?
For example, pull out of Salonika, dismount the troops in Marseilles or the Channel ports, and head to the lines. Pull back any troops sent to Italy after Caporetto. Strip the forces in the Mideast fronts, Palestine and Mesopotamia, to the bare minimum, and get them back to France?
Q5: [Also, would none of the British, French, nor Italians have any troops to spare to intervene in Russia to guard supplies or help the White Russians? I would not see the Americans involved in Russia, even in Siberia, if they are not already in WWI. This leaves only the Japanese to possibly involve themselves.]
Possible implication 1) If the Allies have to do this to survive, they stop the Germans, but they are too exhausted to immediately launch non-stop counter-attacks beating the Germans back. The Allies have to cut off the most threatening forward positions, build up colonial reinforcements and supplies, build up gas and tanks and aircraft, keep up the blockade, and be ready to have a go in 1919.
Possible implication 2) And thanks to withdrawals in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Italy, the Central Powers of the Ottomans, Bulgarians, and Austro-Hungarians will be under less pressure along with Germany and they'll all make it through another nasty winter and New Year.
Possible implication 3) – If on the other hand, the Allies are able to halt the Germans in the west through external/colonial/home reinforcements, German logistical over-reach, while *not* stripping down the other fronts, it is a different story.
The Allies without the Americans would probably have too thin a manpower buffer to prosecute the OTL 100 days offensive of hammer blows in the west. But the men in the west who survived the German onslaught and building up for 1919 will be cheered a bit by good battle news in the fall in September from the Middle East, and then the Balkans from Vardar Macedonia, as in October and November the Bulgarians, then Ottomans, and then Austro-Hungarians collapse.
To the surprise of almost all, the decisive campaigns entering German soil over the winter months of 1918-1919, and compelling German surrender and setting off German revolution are not on the western front, they are rather the efforts led by Armando Diaz crossing Austrian Tyrol, Austria proper, Vienna, and Salzburg, to advance to Munich, and parallel advances by Franchet D'Esperey's L'Armee D'Orient of Frenchmen, Serbs, and Greeks, riding the Austro-Hungarian rails, soon joined by Czech and Polish volunteers, collecting in Prague, advancing into Saxony and Silesia, and then on to Berlin and Brandenburg from the south. The role of the hard-worked western front armies is to keep contact with and pressure on the German western front forces and collect increasing numbers of PoWs.
In Germany's increasingly desperate situation, there are attempts to shift forces to close the wide open breach in the south and east at the tail end of the war, by transferring troops and units from the western front via the rails to Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg. However, success is limited. Because of the late start, Allied forces are reported breaching the Reich borders at Berchtesgaden, Bavaria, before much in the way of any transfers have been completed. Some local commanders who haven't lost faith resist redeployments, not wanting their sectors in the west to break. Other units embarked on the rails and roads, "get lost" on their way to the other fronts as soldiers desert and wander home to check on family rather than stay in order or mass on the other border. Some troops resort to minor self-wounding, self-maiming to avoid further duty. Others in more exposed positions, especially as bad news from the southeast spreads, surrender to the nearest Allied forces to get rations and a dry cot.
These forces all add up to total disintegration of the German position before the winter is over, possibly before the end of February, definitely before the end of March, 1919.
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 6, 2024 20:26:31 GMT
What we haven't discussed or covered very well so far is the likely altered politics and diplomacy of a situation, starting from 1917, where there is no new German unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, no Zimmerman Telegram, and no US belligerency.
So, here's the header:
The altered politics of 1917-
An early item this political year is the leader of the largest neutral power, Woodrow Wilson, opining about what he thinks peace should look like, in his "Peace without Victory" speech:
Woodrow Wilson, Peace Without Victory, 1917
Unlike our timeline, in this alternate universe, this is not followed up by the rapid succession of events bringing America into the war on the Entente side.
The next, much more important, political development is Russia's February (old calendar) Revolution, from March 8-16, overthrowing the Tsar.
In the military sphere, the Germans retrench their western front back to the Hindenburg Line from February 9 - March 15, 1917 - no reason this should change. The British should seize Baghdad also from the Ottomans in March.
On March 24th, 1917 - Emperor Charles of Austria will give an encouraging reply to the alleged French terms reported to him by Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma. - no reason this should change.
On March 27th, under pressure from the Petrograd Soviet's publication of "An Appeal to All People's of the World", the Russian Provisional Government proclaims its war aims do not include any "annexations or indemnities" but somewhat contradictory do include carrying out treaty agreements. The last part at least intended to signal Russia won't be rushing off to sign a separate peace even if willing to negotiate a peace (as a group with its Allies) with the enemy. [Of course, Russia's Allies have a list of desired reparations and territorial discussions as a starting point for any peace talks. So, there is an impasse.]
In a situation diverging from our timeline a bit, American President Woodrow Wilson, who is not on the verge of bringing his own country into war but still trying to mediate a "peace without victory" in line with his January speech, loudly applauds the public position taken by the Russian Provisional Government disavowing aggressive, acquisitive war aims that could be obstacles to early peace, and challenges other belligerents, on both sides, to follow suit.
In the short term, the sound in response is crickets chirping amid silence, or evasive comebacks and excuses.
On April 3rd, Lenin arrives back in Russia and propounds his April theses, calling the earlier calls for peace by everyone else not good enough, the dual power not good enough, an immediate end to the war, and all power to the Soviets.
On April 18th, Pavel Milyukov writes his letter to the Western Allies basically saying the inter-Allied secret treaties are still valid, and Russia's claims to Constantinople and the straits contained in them are still valid. This gets intercepted and exposed in print on the 20th and causes a public scandal and mass demonstrations in Petrograd that forces Milyukov to resign, and a change in composition of the Provisional Government to let in non-Bolshevik Socialist Ministers.
The Nivelle offensive is launched and fails badly from April 16 to May 9th in France. It coincides and is followed by troop mutinies in France.
A key political question for the rest of spring/summer 1917 - Britain and France are just like our timeline, pressing for Russia to, at a minimum, stay in the war, and discounting any aspirations of any Russian parties to negotiate peace, except basically on terms of Central Powers surrender. They also want to encourage, if at all possible, a Russian offensive this year to keep the pressure on Germany and Austria-Hungary to keep them from turning west and south, and possibly defeat them by concentric attacks from multiple directions. They certainly will convey that their amount of support for Russia is contingent on how much Russia is fighting and how committed it is to the war.
However, the western Allies in this timeline will lack the "carrot" of American financial aid and material resources, backed by American emissaries like Elihu Root, saying, "you want goodies, gotta fight!", encouraging offensives in addition to remaining firmly part of the coalition. The upside promise of Entente coalition membership is looking a little less attractive on balance, and a little less like a guaranteed long-term bet, from a Russian point of view, without the Americans in. In fact, the Americans they do see, are applauding Russians peace talk and encouraging everyone to pledge to explicitly minimize their war aims like the Russians have, and then get started on peace talks. The Americans, unlike in our timeline, are not impeding their own Socialists and labor leaders from meeting with international ones in Russia or Europe, or trying to use them to propagandize hanging tough in the war, which is what they used Samuel Gompers of AFL and some moderate Socialists for by summer of 1917. While present and future (reconstruction) British and French aid appears to hinge on continuing the war, American future (reconstruction) finance does not seem to hinge on war continuation one way or the other.
At the same time, the downside of making a separate peace with Germany, of risking German victory over the western Allies and domination of the continent and further adjustment of any settlement more in favor of its militarist regime, remains just as bad as ever. And non-Bolshevik Socialist politicians and theoreticians remain ideologically committed as ever to the idea that Russia is not ready for the immediate social, proletarian revolution, but that it must remain at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and so not endorse mass, illegal seizures of land, factories, and homes without due process of bourgeois law after the Constituent Assembly.
So, in this changed circumstance, does the Russian Provisional Government still mount 1917 "Kerensky Offensive"? If it does, does it still do it in June?
Whether or not it does this offensive, does it avoid making a separate peace or switching to a volunteer or contract army until November 1917, and fall in the face of a second, Bolshevik Revolution?
Or do the Provisional Government Ministers, Kerensky and others, see their odds as different enough that they refuse the offensive and stand pat on the defensive? Or they make an ultimatum to their Allies, peace talks with the enemy by X date, with you or without you?
Or do the Russians or their Allies work out alternate expedients in summer 1917 or fall 1917 knowing their situation is more desperate? For example: a) Holding the Constituent Assembly early, in the late summer or fall, to rebuild governing legitimacy and allow decisions b) Emphasizing their dire situation to their Allies, and insisting on Allied troop intervention or augmentation to stiffen their front, by any means necessary- sending in western troops through Persia, the north, or the Trans-Siberia, sending in second-rate colonial troops from India or the Entente powers colonial possessions, funding a Japanese force to come in via the Trans-Siberian Railway, to help fight against the Germans and Austrians, paying Japan not only in money for mercenaries, but trading away Russian properties and influence like the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria and protectorate over Outer Mongolia c) Evacuating the Provisional Government capital from Petrograd to Moscow, in anticipation of an inability to hold Petrograd against the Germans (and secretly, against internal disorder)
So, 1917 will feature plenty of opportunities for alternate permutations of politics.
There will also be a different propaganda and PR environment, especially within the western Allied countries, as the USA is not joining in as a western ally, using all the techniques of the advertising industry and nascent Hollywood in the service of pro-Allied, anti-German propaganda of the Creel Committee. US private business will still be supporting the Entente. Americans will still be making loans, at increasing interest - but the American government won't be promoting bond drives as a matter of *patriotic duty* in the US in 1917 and 1918, so that's less liquidity for the common Entente pool.
Instead, the US on the outside looking in, is trying to play peacemaker and mediator. Unless something changes his motives, from August onward, the Pope will start trying to play peacemaker and mediator also, largely out of concern for the Austro-Hungarian empire and the fate of the Poles and Belgians. [There is a chance he may maintain silence longer if America is not in, and this superficially makes Austria-Hungary appear less vulnerable in August 1917].
These international political factors will add political complexity to the challenges of pro-war governments in Britain, France, and Italy, and encourage the peace camps in these countries to speak up. This will only increase if the Bolshevik revolution occurs on schedule, and the Bolsheviks reach an armistice with the Germans in December and later a peace and reveal the secret treaties.
The British, French, and Italian governments can plausibly resist domestic and international peace pressures, by mainly calling the peace advocates naive or ill-informed, and by justifying their expressed war aims based on ethnic, territorial, linguistic, and historical basis (especially in the case of France and Italy), and for reparation on the basis of real, viscerally felt damage. And Bolshevism in Russia would be a double-edged sword. It would mobilize radical workers seeking social change and peace, but fear of social change at home, and becoming chaotic or turning society upside down like Russia can be used to reinforce the commitment of the middle and upper classes and capitalists and traditionalists of all kinds, religious and cultural, to patriotism and winning the war. Presuming the Central Powers still ultimately impose the territorial losses of Brest-Litovsk on Bolshevik Russia, the Entente Powers can use that as superb propaganda that the Germans seek only a peace of domination and must be defeated. Indeed, Wilson would condemn those terms, and Entente leaders would make political capital out of that, both at home, and with Americans.
Assuming all these political factors only change how different people around the world talk and write about the war, but that it changes no material outcomes of the war, then we are still led back to our most likely or least unlikely default endgame scenario for the war of the Entente finishing off the Germans and Central Powers in early 1919, without the Americans.
----But this world should have some postwar politics significantly different from our own world. One would think that there would be less closeness at the end of the war between the USA at government levels and British and French officialdom and elites, with a good bit of actual resentment over Wilson's policy throughout the war of unhelpful peace posturing, even as American business sold war material at handsome profit. The Americans could be seen as unwelcome meddlers on the political level, almost like Bolsheviks-lite with bad, destructive political ideas. Their only saving grace would be they're a rich Uncle, whose trade is indispensable in the postwar. The German public and officialdom would also have resentment of the Americans at being the arsenal of its enemies. But at the same time, likely less resentment, for the US not having come into the war. As neutrals through and through, the Americans would not have intervened in Russia against the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks would still hate them as capitalists but perhaps not rate them as quite as pernicious as the British, French or Japanese, and consider Americans more potentially *useful*.
America, as a never-belligerent neutral, would not have the standing to deny Italy its claims from the Treaty of London or to press Britain and France to deny Italy its claims from the Treaty of London, unless Britain and France came up with their own stupid reasons for frustrating Italy. Nor would America have the standing to deny China its claims to the German concessions in Shandong province Chinese, in the short-term, or the long-term. Going forward, it would have far less standing to strong-arm the British Empire into abandoning the Anglo-Japanese alliance.
In place of a League of Nations, as Wilson envisioned it, the immediate postwar Eurasian order would be led by a four -power pact of Britain-France-Italy-Japan. It would have minor partners like Belgium, the new, only partly satisfied, Yugoslavia, Romania, a new Poland, the new Czechoslovakia, Portugal, Greece. This would not rule out a later, open to every nation, international organization, but while Wilson is President, he would not regard the four-power pact, or an extension of it, as a satisfactory start for a sound League of Nations and would likely stand aloof. He could quite rightly criticize the exclusion of large countries representing hundreds of millions of people including China and Russia, and sizeable industrial countries from the defeated powers, like Germany.
A potential positive effect of going into the 1920s with an international order centered around a four-power pact or continued Entente, could be that London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo could all be careful to coordinate with each other, deal with each other pragmatically, and avoid conflicts of interest or breaches with one another becoming irrevocable, leaving them in good shape to remain at peace with one another for several decades ahead, and well-positioned to avoid ruinous arms races. London, Rome and Tokyo might look with understanding, sympathy, and non-obstructionism on Paris's priorities for containment of German power and enforcement of reparations. London, Paris and Rome might be tolerant of Japan's defense and sometimes forward assertions of its "rights" in China as long as they are not totally excluded from economic opportunity there. London, Paris, and Tokyo may let Rome do its own thing in Africa, including the Horn of Africa, the Adriatic, and the Balkans, without particular friction. The British Empire may be unharassed by Rome, Tokyo, and Paris over its Ireland and India and Egypt and Middle East (Palestine and Iraq and Arabia) policies, and its imperial policies towards openness or restriction toward external immigration or trade.
On the other hand, lack of near-term, compelling common interests may see these four powers drift apart, as may a desire to distance themselves from the pain of the war (in the case of Britain and France), from the strains of democratic/parliamentary instability (in the case of Italy), or specific policy disagreements over geopolitical questions such as reparations and possible occupation of the Ruhr (between the Franco-Belgians and the British) or mutual suspicions about intentions and agendas in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Greece, and Turkey (between France and Britain)
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 6, 2024 22:36:04 GMT
An interesting set of suggestions. Definitely a possible line of events. A few points and questions coming to mind. a) If the Provisional Government avoids its OTL summer 1817 offensive and the heavy losses how much longer might it last before Lenin's mob takes over? While it does and especially if making a call for a defensive war to protect the motherland its going to be impossible for Germany to pull back substantial forces for any attack in the west. That could disrupt events in both Russia and elsewhere. After all without the worsening situation you could see Lenin arrested or no apparent march on Petrograd by an army general which prompted the fall of Prince Lvov's government and the Soviet councils gaining a lot of influence. The longer the PG holds out the less resources Germany can get from the east and the more troops they have to keep there.
b) OTL the US had only landed a few units in France by spring 1918 but they were then tied up with a prolonged period of training. As such the actual effective strength of the allies on the western front as measured at the time won't be significantly different. If, despite a) above the German offensive comes as OTL it will very likely held as OTL and its only really the strength of the allied 1918 offensive that will be affected. Given the doctrines being developed, the exhaustion and demoralization of the Germans after the failed attacks and that the allies will probably still have a similar level of material superiority as they won't be supplying the numbers of US forces arriving in France the initial offensives could go off roughly as OTL but may not have the same stamina. - This of course assumes that nothing drastic changes in the west or elsewhere.
As such I don't think that the allies are likely to withdraw forces from Salonika or Palestine although the OTL offensives in those regions may be weakened or delayed. As it is the British nearly took Gaza in Mar 1917 until a mix up prompted the withdrawal of forces from an overwhelming position. Avoid that and the Palestine campaign is probably advanced by 6-8 months. Even if that change doesn't occur its likely that Jerusalem is taken by the end of the year and as a singular clear success that's unlikely to be withdrawn from for political/prestige purposes.
c) Assuming the allies still win, which does seem likely it could still be in late 1918 but probably is more likely to be in early 1919. Which will leave all the combatants weakened but possible especially Germany if that doesn't collapse into even larger levels of social disorder.
d) With the US absent from the peace settlement Britain will probably play less of a moderating role on French and Belgium desires for greater security. There may or may not be an allied intervention in Russia if the Bolshevik coup still occurs and leads to the civil war. If it is it will be weaker and later and as you say it probably won't include US forces. However that would also remove the main restraint on the Japanese intervention in Siberia which could send things in all sorts of directions.
e) Agree its likely there would be some attempt at establishing some system to avoid future such conflicts but it will be smaller and more Europe orientated, although including Japan as a major player but not the US nor, if in civil war Russia. This might however mean it lacks some of the structural problems that hindered the OTL League of Nations so might be able to take a more robust result to any rise of fascism.
Overall the world would be poorer but there might be more structures to maintain a level of stability in world trade as its in everybody's interests, other than outsiders such as the US and Russia/USSR.
Two questions coming to mind. f) The US will have still started a naval race with Japan and without involvement in WWI - hopefully it might remain The Great war here - those ships will be markedly more advanced in construction but probably somewhat less sophisticated. [Especially the Lexington class BCs which in early designs were rather bizarre with a lot of boilers in armoured citadels above the main deck because there wasn't the room to have the power necessary for the desired speed otherwise]. This is also going to force tension with Japan while any British response would be later than OTL - unless the other three Hoods were completed to an improved design - but the sheer number of new ships likely to be constructed is likely to either prevent a naval treaty or mean its with markedly higher tonnage levels for both Britain and Japan than OTL. Which is going to have a lot of impacts.
g) Are you assuming the two waves of the flu pandemic still occurs and has the same level of spread and death tolls? Without the US in the war and spending large numbers of men to France its possible the spread of either wave out of the US could be delayed somewhat and possibly treated differently?
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 10, 2024 2:24:43 GMT
Great set of points stevep. I will get around to addressing at length before too long.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 10, 2024 2:28:14 GMT
In the meantime, here is a more detailed projection of how things may go, during the war and through 1920:
A few summary points, four days into this thread:
Based on feedback and my own consideration, I will make some "calls" on how I think some major things would have likely gone down in this scenario.
1917
Despite American continued neutrality, and lack of financial incentivization of Russian belligerency and offensives in 1917, and American applause for the statements of the Petrograd Soviet and later the Provisional Government disowning "Annexations and Indemnities" as war aims, and Wilson's continued overtures at peace mediation, Russia will remain committed to the Entente and launching a summer 1917 offensive. The Russian summer 1917 offensive will be a dismal failure like in OTL, and plunge Russia into political crisis, and further erode military discipline and order. Despite the lack of unrestricted submarine warfare ROE, the simple increase in German U-Boats on station operating according to prize rules and sharpened rules in some cases against armed Allied merchant ships and in certain waters like the Mediterranean will lead to steady increases in sinkings of Allied merchant tonnage from February through August 1917, perhaps even into September or October 1917, just not by as much as OTL. The Entente merchant fleets will bleed from it a few months longer before deciding that adopting convoys as a response is worth the cost, after which merchant losses will abate. Wilson applauds and encourages the general concept, if not all the particulars, of Papal Peace mediation effort of August 1917. He also permits in the fall, American Socialists to travel to Stockholm for the international Zimmerwaldist Socialist peace conference, while Entente countries block their Socialist delegates or pressure them to renounce intentions to attend. The Germans will drive the Russians from Riga in September 1917 The Austrians and Germans will batter the Italians back through Friuli and Veneto with the October-November Battle of Caporetto. The Bolshevik Revolution will occur basically on time in November, per the western calendar, followed by a CP-Bolshevik Russian armistice in December 1917. Wilson will applaud the fact of armistice but encourage general talks between all belligerents and encourages "Peace without Victory". Likewise, his endorsement of Bolshevik peace policy is qualified, it is not endorsement of their revolutionary methods or the chaotic and unparliamentary actions after their coup. The Germans/CPs more and more start to consider Wilson a "useful idiot" with his peace talk, thinking they can insulate their own forces and people from it by battlefield victories over opponents one-by-one. The Entente powers are more and more irritated with Wilson and his peace talk, worried it affects parts of their public too much, and is a stalking horse with middle-class liberals, progressives and non-radicals for Bolshevik peace propaganda. The counter-propaganda the center-right Entente governments hasve to offer is based on "unmasking" imperial and domineering German ambitions for why peace cannot be had without victory over Germany first, insisting on national rights and claims for their own countries and gallant allies, bemoaning and condemning the perverse combination of Bolshevik social disorder, political tyranny, and dishonorable and unfaithful defeatism, and promises of domestic reforms, and social security for veterans and the average citizen making the home country "a land fit for heroes". While Wilson is considered a naive irritant in Entente circles, America is a land of useful and necessary, idiots for the Entente, whose exports and financial markets are essential for Entente war efforts, and who leaders think will be important for postwar reconstruction. The Entente powers also play up German and CP villainy in occupied countries like Belgium, occupied France, Serbia, Poland, Greece, and try to sway international opinion with measures like the Balfour Declaration and by highlighting Turkish atrocities against Armenians, other Ottoman Christians, and expulsions of Palestinian Jews. Over 1917, the Entente countries ask for more naval aid from Japan in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean against the U-Boat threat. The Entente blockade and economic constriction of the CPs will still tighten, despite lack of direct American support/participation. In November-December the Palestine campaign finally yields the prizes of Jerusalem and Jaffa.
1918
Feeling a tightening blockade and worsening economy and knowing its Central Powers partners are feeling it just as badly, the Germans are resolved to concentrate a maximum effort on a spring 1918 western front offensive and do mass troop transfers from the east to support it. The Germans and Austrians, sick of Bolshevik dilatory negotiating tactics, launch a February offensive against the Bolshevik Russians to force them to a settlement. They brush aside ineffective and unwilling Russian forces and seize vast amounts of territory rapidly, setting up ethno-national administrations throughout western Russia. This operation compels the Bolsheviks to sign away vast territorial cessions and in-kind contributions in the early March humiliating Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Western Allies condemn both sides for the Treaty, the Germans for cruelly imposing it on the "Great Russian people" and the Bolsheviks for swallowing these unpatriotic terms and "feeding the insatiable Teutonic beast". But they are in many ways elated by settlement since as a political/propaganda matter, and troop transfers had been occurring in great numbers already. The humiliating treaty is a great cudgel against domestic radicals and pacifists at home and abroad, allowing Entente government leaders to vigorous illustrate the price of defeat, indeed the price of failing to win. Wilson condemns the Germans/CPs for the Treaty in more unmixed, sincere terms, for German/CP rapacity and acquisitiveness territorially and economically. His interactions and correspondence with German/CP interlocutors cool considerably, and with Entente interlocutors he wishes them luck defending themselves. The sequential German offensive against the Channel, then Paris, are lacking in focus and burn up the Storm Troops at prodigious rates, and overrunning Allied trenches where it occurs both raises and depresses morale, because while it provides a sense of accomplishment and yields good loot, it reveals the great superiority of the Allied supply situation compared with German. The pressure of the German western offensives from March through July compels the Allies to suspend offensive actions on peripheral fronts like Italy, Salonika, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and suspends any force and supply build-ups, but does not compel any retreats or abandonment of positions. The German offensives are checked, their offensive impetus spent, by late July, with increased numbers of German PoWs and deserters collected from then onward. The Entente powers adopt a policy of gradually pushing back the enemy from the salients he created, and straightening lines by eliminating enemy positions from forward high-ground and seizing control of some of the nearest lateral railways in enemy hands through cautious, meticulously prepared, methodical campaigns, over the autumn months of 1918. From late July, the "peripheral fronts" outside the west are getting more reinforced and resupplied more generously, in preparation for offensive action before the winter sets in. It is also notable the submarine threat is considerably abated. This is a consequence of continued improved and more efficient Entente shipbuilding, reduced losses from convoying, and accumulated attrition to U-Boats and U-Boat crews. Campaign-level offensives are launched after a couple months of build-up and preparation in Macedonia, Palestine, and Macedonia in September 1918, with Entente forces rapidly breaking out into the Vardar Valley, forcing the Bulgarians to capitulate, liberating Serbia by the end of September, and crossing the Danube and frontiers of Hungary in October. Meanwhile in October, a portion of the Macedonia campaign force turns east towards Thrace and invests Constantinople. Forces from central Palestine and the Jordanian desert leap ahead to seize Haifa, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, while forces in Mesopotamia reach Kirkuk and then Mosul. These broad advances, combined with the reduction of Constantinople's defenses, cause the Ottoman Turks to sue for peace by the end of October. In October, trying to beat winter weather, Armando Diaz leads the Italians on a massive offensive against the Austrians, which regains all the ground lost since Caporetto, and then pushes on in early November into Trentino and Istria, as the Austrian Army begins to fall apart. The Italian offensive continues into Austria proper in November and into early December, while the multinational offensive continues into Hungary over the same period while the Dual Monarchy suffers from ethnic and social mutinies and uprisings. Romanian forces largely gone to ground for most of 1918 since Brest-Litovsk, also rise up, re-enter the war, and attack Hungary. These developments compel both parts of the dual monarchy to sue for peace by December 5th, 1918, and to throw open the use of their transportation and communication networks to the Allied powers. One notable deviation from OTL is that there has been much less Entente military involvement, and zero American military involvement, in the Russian Civil War and on behalf of the White Movement, reducing the maximum footprint those armies ever achieve. The British, with some Canadians and other foreign contingents have a small force guarding Entente supplies around Archangel in far northern Russia that establishes a perimeter around the port and supplies but does not really connect with White Armies in the Ural country, Siberia, or Caucasus and southern Russia. "Dunsterforce" and Norperforce (Northern Persia Force) are small British forces that operate out of northern Persia and briefly intervene against Turkish and Bolshevik forces in Baku before retiring back to Persia. The British presence distracts the Bolsheviks for a period and slows their concentration on other White forces, but does not ultimately save them. Stories of the successful Czechoslovak mutiny and takeover of the Trans-Siberian railroad get out and the Allies wish to help them, but only the Japanese have troops to spare for the job in summer 1918. With a moderate level of exclusively Japanese commitment, the Czechoslovaks and Japanese, upon contact, quickly agree on promptly extracting the Czechoslovaks through Vladivostok for shipment to Europe's fighting fronts via the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Suez Canal to the Italian front, where they can come into contact with their Austrian archenemies and fight their way home. Despite some Western Entente and White Russian Generals advocating Japanese and Czech retention of the TSSR and advancement to the Urals in support of Whites for reconstitution of an anti-German eastern front, the western Allies are in no position to back this up, the Czechs primary commitment is to getting home, and the Japanese are reluctant to commit themselves into the Russian landmass west of Lake Baikal. The end result is to leave the Bolsheviks much less pressured by combined White/Entente resistance on their eastern/Asian front for a shorter amount of time compared to OTL. The Turkish capitulation opens up the Black Sea to anti-Bolshevik interventionary operations, but operations bringing about Austro-Hungarian, and then German defeat, the latter of which extend through March 1919, preoccupy the French as the leading power, and leave the French and their Balkan Allies too exhausted to intervene and local southern Russia/Ukrainian Whites and Cossacks in poor shape to benefit from help. Armando Diaz's final winter push before the Italians need to take a several weeks pause sees the Italians, using cavalry and also highways and Austrian rail, cross the Austro-German border to occupy Berchtesgaden, and then advance element occupy Munich and Bavaria up to the Danube, while other advance elements occupy Vienna. Exuberant repatriated Czech forces attached to the Italian theater leap ahead of general Italian lines to make it to Bohemia by New Years 1919 Meanwhile the French-led, but Balkan polyglot L'Armee D'Orient sets up a winter quarters at Buda at the bend of the Danube before pausing.
1919
The Germans attempt some reshuffling of forces to plug the wide-open breaches on their southeastern frontiers between December 1918 and March 1919, but it is not too effective. Western commanders want to keep their forces in order as they slowly give ground. Released troops often desert and get lost in transit. Germany faces escalating riots, strikes and demonstrations, in addition to ethnic uprisings in Polish-majority areas. On March 1st, the Allies end the charade, opening up a combined offensive across the whole front prepared with hurricane and gas bombardments, breach trench lines in several places, bag tens of thousands of prisoners, and push back the front 100km in less than 5 days, at which point the German revolutionary government sues for peace. German capitulation in March allows British penetration of the Baltic, and British coordination with Estonians, and Latvians that helps them remain independent.
Postwar -
The altered timing of the end of the war, and the fact that the USA was never mobilized, and altered and probably reduced spreads of Spanish (likely Kansas) influenza, changes some of the patterns of postwar recession, recovery and depression in the immediate postwar years.
The victorious Entente powers still standing, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, dominate the peace conference, with the USA having no more than an observer role. Germany and the Central Powers are there to be dictated to, not negotiated with.
Instead of a League of Nations, Eurasian/world affairs is dominated by the former Entente, the Quadripartite alliance (London-Paris-Rome-Tokyo). "The Quad" makes key decisions.
In the interest of Quad harmony, in the peace conference, China is not given any platform to protest Japan's inheritance of German rights in Shandong. Just as well, as China never became a belligerent or abandoned neutrality. The Chinese cry in their beer in Washington, and later in Moscow when the Bolsheviks start deciding to host normal diplomats. Understanding the importance of the Quad to hold Germany down without Russian support, nor American support, Britain and France concede the Italians everything granted by the Treaty of London, and they can get away with seizing Fiume too, if the Rome government tries it. The Italians have earned it, being the first power to breach Germany, and the Serbs/Yugoslavs should be glad they were rescued even as their original Russian rescuers fell to pieces. The Peace Conference agenda sticks to pragmatic and territorial issues, so there is no real occasion for the Japanese to bring up a racial nondiscrimination proposal, which the Dominions signal they want *off* the agenda regardless. There is no mandate system set up, former German colonies are simply redistributed in trust and compensation to the victors. Even without the mandate system in the Middle East there are bilateral public declarations between the British and French and Arab and Jewish parties about self-rule or long-term intent for independence, because that's what local politics and diplomacy demanded. In Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa, such pledges are not really necessary.
In Europe, new nation states are set up from territories of the defeated, with acknowledgement of their national rights, simple recognition of the facts on the ground established by peoples and factions themselves, and acknowledgement of their ties and loyalties to the victors.
In America, the Wilson Administration has not alienated many domestic supporters with wartime measures. He kept the country out of war, and catastrophe did not come, for the USA. He is visibly and audibly critical of the peace, but proud of his own country and his own values. Citizens are mainly relieved. Politically, there is an aspect of "I told you so" he can use against wartime hawks, and he can still correctly say America is continuing to build a fleet second to none, and he kept peace through strength, as well as principles, by standing up to Germany on the submarine issue. There will be a quick postwar recession as Allied orders quickly drop-off but then there will be a recovery.
The Democratic Party may not be badly positioned for the 1920 Presidential election. The voters may have some party fatigue or an 8-year itch, but they will not have war-related acrimony or letdown. The timing of recession and recovery will probably not be so that it is particularly bad in summer/autumn 1920.
The victorious powers of the Entente will be glad to see the back of Woodrow Wilson personally. They'll find his preachy brand of foreign policy annoying and unhelpful, and they won't like their debt bill. But they will have to weigh carefully their behavior relative to the USA, because of their desire for US market access and for US credit finance into the future for reconstruction.
While there will certainly be an anti-revolutionary Red Scare to some extent, because of dislike of radicalism in general, it won't be as bad as OTL, without its threat to a war effort. It could well be, especially if Wilson has a Democratic successor, that once Bolshevik Russia gets over its initial revolutionary exuberance and starts the NEP and pragmatic diplomatic deals and trade treaties like Rapallo, that it will establish diplomatic relations with the USA in the early 1920s.
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Post by Max Sinister on Jul 10, 2024 15:02:08 GMT
Fun fact: According to the diaries of Harry Graf (count) Kessler, the idea for the Zimmermann telegram actually was by a certain Kemnitz - Hans Arthur von Kemnitz, I guess. Zimmermann just was so stupid to send it.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 10, 2024 15:14:10 GMT
Right, initial thoughts. a) Sounds like no pandemic, although it could come later. That would save a hell of a lot of lives around the world - seen some estimates that it killed more people than WWI.
b) Wondering, other than Italian gains what differences would be in terms of borders and other details in the European peace treaties. IIRC France was pushing for not just a demilitarized Rhineland but also it being detached from Germany and becoming a French protectorate. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL or do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent. Ditto with borders between Germany and Denmark, Poland, Belgium etc. Assuming that an Austro-Germany union is still banned and that most of the monarchs inside Germany go.
There might be a possible except or two for the latter. If there's going to be an attempt to split up Germany, or at least Prussia might other changes be made to strengthen other German states at Prussian expense? For instance the restoration of Hanover as a state - whether as a monarchy or republic, trying to hive off the eastern Rhineland - which contains so much of Germany's industrial base and possibly Saxony being restored to its 1814 borders which would make it stronger and Prussia weaker. Its something that might be considered.
c) The Baltic states have their independence supported by the British but what's the status of Finland, especially if the Bolsheviks are stronger - because of less support for the whites - and given its close proximity to Petrograd/Leningrad which possibly might stay the capital here?
d) You mention the Japanese don't want to advance west of Lake Baikal but, given the lack of an American presence to oppose them does that mean they stay there, possibly establishing s protectorate under formal White Russian leadership? Especially since the rest of the allies may be more willing to support such a state.
e) Without a stronger western presence in the Caucasus region what happens here. Depending on the situation you might not get the OTL agreement between the Turks and Soviets on a partition of the region, instead leading to more fighting between the two.
f) This might also depend on whether the Greek-Turkish war occurs and if so does it end differently. Which it could if say King Alexander, assuming he is made king, avoids his rather unlikely death.
g) Assuming also that the partition of German colonies around the world and Ottoman lands in the ME are similar/identical to OTL?
h) Also assume that there will be widespread unrest in Ireland but are there any butterflies. Would assume that the rebels still insist on partition but might be some changes and is there then a civil war between relative moderates and hard liners - albeit that was a bit later than we're reached yet.
Which also leaves questions about internal politic in the European great powers and how they might differ. Does Italian territorial gains strengthen their imperial designs or might it undercut the rise of Mussolini. Does Britain still have a general election, probably now in 1919 which has a similar result as OTL with Lloyd George as basically a lame duck PM dependent on Conservative support and hence curtailing hopes of post war reform or does the slightly longer war and final dramatic successes with advances into Germany itself mean that the 'land fit for heroes' idea can't be largely abandon as it was OTL? What happens in Germany as it sounds like democratic forces will be blamed by the militaristic for the 'defeat' although the more total collapse might counter this. Similarly with France, Japan, 'Russia' and Poland say.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 10, 2024 15:14:46 GMT
Fun fact: According to the diaries of Harry Graf (count) Kessler, the idea for the Zimmermann telegram actually was by a certain Kemnitz - Hans Arthur von Kemnitz, I guess. Zimmermann just was so stupid to send it.
Not just to send it but to admit to it afterwards. ![;)](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/wink.png)
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 12, 2024 3:40:27 GMT
Right, initial thoughts. a) Sounds like no pandemic, although it could come later. That would save a hell of a lot of lives around the world - seen some estimates that it killed more people than WWI.
b) Wondering, other than Italian gains what differences would be in terms of borders and other details in the European peace treaties. IIRC France was pushing for not just a demilitarized Rhineland but also it being detached from Germany and becoming a French protectorate. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL or do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent. Ditto with borders between Germany and Denmark, Poland, Belgium etc. Assuming that an Austro-Germany union is still banned and that most of the monarchs inside Germany go.
There might be a possible except or two for the latter. If there's going to be an attempt to split up Germany, or at least Prussia might other changes be made to strengthen other German states at Prussian expense? For instance the restoration of Hanover as a state - whether as a monarchy or republic, trying to hive off the eastern Rhineland - which contains so much of Germany's industrial base and possibly Saxony being restored to its 1814 borders which would make it stronger and Prussia weaker. Its something that might be considered.
c) The Baltic states have their independence supported by the British but what's the status of Finland, especially if the Bolsheviks are stronger - because of less support for the whites - and given its close proximity to Petrograd/Leningrad which possibly might stay the capital here?
d) You mention the Japanese don't want to advance west of Lake Baikal but, given the lack of an American presence to oppose them does that mean they stay there, possibly establishing s protectorate under formal White Russian leadership? Especially since the rest of the allies may be more willing to support such a state.
e) Without a stronger western presence in the Caucasus region what happens here. Depending on the situation you might not get the OTL agreement between the Turks and Soviets on a partition of the region, instead leading to more fighting between the two.
f) This might also depend on whether the Greek-Turkish war occurs and if so does it end differently. Which it could if say King Alexander, assuming he is made king, avoids his rather unlikely death.
g) Assuming also that the partition of German colonies around the world and Ottoman lands in the ME are similar/identical to OTL?
h) Also assume that there will be widespread unrest in Ireland but are there any butterflies. Would assume that the rebels still insist on partition but might be some changes and is there then a civil war between relative moderates and hard liners - albeit that was a bit later than we're reached yet.
Which also leaves questions about internal politic in the European great powers and how they might differ. Does Italian territorial gains strengthen their imperial designs or might it undercut the rise of Mussolini. Does Britain still have a general election, probably now in 1919 which has a similar result as OTL with Lloyd George as basically a lame duck PM dependent on Conservative support and hence curtailing hopes of post war reform or does the slightly longer war and final dramatic successes with advances into Germany itself mean that the 'land fit for heroes' idea can't be largely abandon as it was OTL? What happens in Germany as it sounds like democratic forces will be blamed by the militaristic for the 'defeat' although the more total collapse might counter this. Similarly with France, Japan, 'Russia' and Poland say.
a) Sounds like no pandemic, although it could come later. That would save a hell of a lot of lives around the world - seen some estimates that it killed more people than WWI. Yes, and I got this idea from you, because you persisted in mentioning the possibility, and there is a certain logic to it, because estimated origin points for this influenza virus are these days suspected to much more likely be troop training camps in Kansas, and a secondary theory of origin in China (when in doubt, always a safe bet to blame for any virus), rather than "Spain" or any European location. b) Wondering, other than Italian gains what differences would be in terms of borders and other details in the European peace treaties. IIRC France was pushing for not just a demilitarized Rhineland but also it being detached from Germany and becoming a French protectorate. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL or do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent. Ditto with borders between Germany and Denmark, Poland, Belgium etc. Assuming that an Austro-Germany union is still banned and that most of the monarchs inside Germany go. On changes to the European map, and France pushing....successfully, for a separatist Rhineland protectorate, the difficulty that I do not see going away, even if the USA is not a belligerent, Big Four Peace Conference leader and military occupier of part of the Rhineland is twofold: a) just as in OTL, French efforts to find indigenous support for Rhenish separatism fell entirely flat, and b) Lloyd George and Britain thought Rhineland separatism and excess territorial harshness of weakening of Germany was a bad idea...indeed they seemed to feel this way with even greater passion than Wilson and the Americans. Now I suppose the absence of the Americans still weakens the "front" of anti-punitive participants. But in terms of who is "carrying the load" for the absent Americans, while both the French and British are doing some of that substituted labor, resourcing, and sacrifice, I suspect the British Empire will be doing the lion's share and getting a commensurate phantom "inheritance" of influence that would have been American. On the other hand, the British, in a world where the Americans simply *never* came off the fence and fought by their side, and remained an aloof combination of hypocritical merchants of death but preachers of peace, may feel compelled to value their alliance with their French partners, and their French partners' opinions and desires, much more than in OTL. So just maybe the British end up deferring on a French-backed puppet Rhineland. But, I think the British would draw the line at letting their own troops be used to *enforce* that, which would make enforcement and the occupation of the whole of the Rhineland by an exclusively Franco-Belgian force, with no British nor American help, a pricey proposition for Paris. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL? Yes - and the Italians, if they dare a grab for Fiume could probably get away with it, though it was not promised in the London Treaty. Do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent? I do not see why they still would not be suckered, conned, not find it expedient to take part in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or Yugoslavist movement.... US involvement was not key to the concept of South Slavic federalism or unity. The border with Germany and Denmark should be pretty much the same, it was decently linguistic. On the German-Polish border, perhaps it varies from OTL. Perhaps if relevant fighting continuing through the winter and into March 1919 spreads that far and units L'Armee D'Orient actions with Polish risings it could affect things. Mere US absence has no clear pro-Polish or anti-Polish effect, because on almost all postwar German-Polish boundary questions in OTL, the general tendency was for France to take the most generously pro-Polish interpretation, Britain to take the most generously pro-German interpretation, and the USA to split the difference in the middle. Here the US isn't present to split the difference in the middle, so the British and French need to do it among themselves. I think we can safely assume an Austro-German union is still banned, and that Wilhelm is a goner. The Germans will want him gone nearly as much as the Allies. Chaos/regime change in the throes of defeat will likely bring about the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy as an institution even though, this world won't have Wilson dictating it as a condition of peace, but I would not rule out perhaps the dynasties persisting at the levels of the individuals states, and titles of nobility and princely ranks being retained. "If there's going to be an attempt to split up Germany, or at least Prussia might other changes be made to strengthen other German states at Prussian expense? For instance the restoration of Hanover as a state - whether as a monarchy or republic, trying to hive off the eastern Rhineland - which contains so much of Germany's industrial base and possibly Saxony being restored to its 1814 borders which would make it stronger and Prussia weaker. It's something that might be considered." ----the Germans will probably surrender before there would be an actual occupation to enforce such a change to German structure. Would there be support to have tommies and poilus continue to fight and die longer to keep marching well past the Rhine into Hanover to establish its separate statehood? Or are you envisioning Germany not split up into true separate sovereignties, but just reorganizing its states, to reduce Prussia's weight internally? c) The Baltic states have their independence supported by the British but what's the status of Finland, especially if the Bolsheviks are stronger - because of less support for the whites - and given its close proximity to Petrograd/Leningrad which possibly might stay the capital here? I mentioned Estonia having its independence thanks to British support, but in reality, Finnish independence and the victory of Finnish Whites was guaranteed earlier by German support, and there is no reason that should change. And initially in OTL, before German capitulation, it was German troops and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that was keeping Bolshevik rule out of the Baltics, not the British, and even post armistice, in much of Lithuania and Latvia or at least Courland, German Freikorps remained active and held off Bolsheviks, with Allied toleration, until they in turn were deposed by local nationalists, who were also anti-Bolshevik. So at this point I am probably sounding like a naysayer, because I am saying a lot of things do not have to be different from OTL, although many things could be. And I admit, that is a little bit of a bias on my part. I am not inclined to add extra little random small changes to the map if that is not the main focus of change in the scenario, if things could have as easily gone the same as OTL. d) You mention the Japanese don't want to advance west of Lake Baikal but, given the lack of an American presence to oppose them does that mean they stay there, possibly establishing s protectorate under formal White Russian leadership? Especially since the rest of the allies may be more willing to support such a state. Maybe - Although the Japanese had their own reasons, fiscal and social, to keep their commitment limited and that the commitment was unpopular. Like they might want to get British financing- which London couldn't afford--to do a high level of effort. And the lack of direct US involvement in some ways might make it seem less *relevant* to Japan's defensive needs. Their clients were fairly lame unpopular bandits too. But sure, I could imagine Japan's intervention in the Russian Far East, and certainly northern Sakhalin dragging on much longer. I doubt they would spend much time in a perimeter as far as Lake Baikal. Their furthest perimeter west for more than a year or 18 months would probably only go up to the Amur river itself on the mainland, thus only comprising the maritime province (which they left in 1922 I think). And northern Sakhalin is easy (they left it in OTL 1925).
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 12, 2024 3:54:25 GMT
e) Without a stronger western presence in the Caucasus region what happens here. Depending on the situation you might not get the OTL agreement between the Turks and Soviets on a partition of the region, instead leading to more fighting between the two. I was kind of imagining it wash out like OTL. Both Ataturk and Lenin fear the Brits and Allies much more than each other, even if the exact scope of their meddlesomeness has differed a bit. Britain's financial, naval, and symbolic power as the top-hatted, cigar-chewing reps of capitalism and imperialism is obvious. f) This might also depend on whether the Greek-Turkish war occurs and if so does it end differently. Which it could if say King Alexander, assuming he is made king, avoids his rather unlikely death. I think it would, but good point about the monkey bite factor. g) Assuming also that the partition of German colonies around the world and Ottoman lands in the ME are similar/identical to OTL? Yes h) Also assume that there will be widespread unrest in Ireland but are there any butterflies. Would assume that the rebels still insist on partition but might be some changes and is there then a civil war between relative moderates and hard liners - albeit that was a bit later than we're reached yet. Seems like similar issues would be at play. Does Italian territorial gains strengthen their imperial designs or might it undercut the rise of Mussolini. Mussolini and the Fascists hopefully can be derailed by the lack of the "mutilated victory" sentiment in Italy, and hopefully this can eliminate an Italian foreign policy of exaggerated seeking of glory and respect. But Mussolini and the Fascists still have a shot at power if Italian establishment and business types allow themselves to get hypnotized into an existential panic about the threat of disorder or militancy from the left. Does Britain still have a general election, probably now in 1919 which has a similar result as OTL with Lloyd George as basically a lame duck PM dependent on Conservative support and hence curtailing hopes of post war reform or does the slightly longer war and final dramatic successes with advances into Germany itself mean that the 'land fit for heroes' idea can't be largely abandon as it was OTL? Great question, and I don't know enough about British Party and electoral dynamics. I think to justify greater sacrifices, the land fit for heroes talk would have to be upsold, so that will create expectations dangerous to disappoint at home, and in the empire. The Conservatives might not realize it, but it will be true. I don't know if the 1919 victories, and the eastern and southern front advances into Germany proper will redound much to specific Liberal Party benefit. But probably more Colonial (Indian) manpower will be raised, accelerating Indian political activism.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 12, 2024 17:24:05 GMT
Right, initial thoughts. a) Sounds like no pandemic, although it could come later. That would save a hell of a lot of lives around the world - seen some estimates that it killed more people than WWI.
b) Wondering, other than Italian gains what differences would be in terms of borders and other details in the European peace treaties. IIRC France was pushing for not just a demilitarized Rhineland but also it being detached from Germany and becoming a French protectorate. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL or do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent. Ditto with borders between Germany and Denmark, Poland, Belgium etc. Assuming that an Austro-Germany union is still banned and that most of the monarchs inside Germany go.
There might be a possible except or two for the latter. If there's going to be an attempt to split up Germany, or at least Prussia might other changes be made to strengthen other German states at Prussian expense? For instance the restoration of Hanover as a state - whether as a monarchy or republic, trying to hive off the eastern Rhineland - which contains so much of Germany's industrial base and possibly Saxony being restored to its 1814 borders which would make it stronger and Prussia weaker. Its something that might be considered.
c) The Baltic states have their independence supported by the British but what's the status of Finland, especially if the Bolsheviks are stronger - because of less support for the whites - and given its close proximity to Petrograd/Leningrad which possibly might stay the capital here?
d) You mention the Japanese don't want to advance west of Lake Baikal but, given the lack of an American presence to oppose them does that mean they stay there, possibly establishing s protectorate under formal White Russian leadership? Especially since the rest of the allies may be more willing to support such a state.
e) Without a stronger western presence in the Caucasus region what happens here. Depending on the situation you might not get the OTL agreement between the Turks and Soviets on a partition of the region, instead leading to more fighting between the two.
f) This might also depend on whether the Greek-Turkish war occurs and if so does it end differently. Which it could if say King Alexander, assuming he is made king, avoids his rather unlikely death.
g) Assuming also that the partition of German colonies around the world and Ottoman lands in the ME are similar/identical to OTL?
h) Also assume that there will be widespread unrest in Ireland but are there any butterflies. Would assume that the rebels still insist on partition but might be some changes and is there then a civil war between relative moderates and hard liners - albeit that was a bit later than we're reached yet.
Which also leaves questions about internal politic in the European great powers and how they might differ. Does Italian territorial gains strengthen their imperial designs or might it undercut the rise of Mussolini. Does Britain still have a general election, probably now in 1919 which has a similar result as OTL with Lloyd George as basically a lame duck PM dependent on Conservative support and hence curtailing hopes of post war reform or does the slightly longer war and final dramatic successes with advances into Germany itself mean that the 'land fit for heroes' idea can't be largely abandon as it was OTL? What happens in Germany as it sounds like democratic forces will be blamed by the militaristic for the 'defeat' although the more total collapse might counter this. Similarly with France, Japan, 'Russia' and Poland say.
a) Sounds like no pandemic, although it could come later. That would save a hell of a lot of lives around the world - seen some estimates that it killed more people than WWI. Yes, and I got this idea from you, because you persisted in mentioning the possibility, and there is a certain logic to it, because estimated origin points for this influenza virus are these days suspected to much more likely be troop training camps in Kansas, and a secondary theory of origin in China (when in doubt, always a safe bet to blame for any virus), rather than "Spain" or any European location. b) Wondering, other than Italian gains what differences would be in terms of borders and other details in the European peace treaties. IIRC France was pushing for not just a demilitarized Rhineland but also it being detached from Germany and becoming a French protectorate. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL or do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent. Ditto with borders between Germany and Denmark, Poland, Belgium etc. Assuming that an Austro-Germany union is still banned and that most of the monarchs inside Germany go. On changes to the European map, and France pushing....successfully, for a separatist Rhineland protectorate, the difficulty that I do not see going away, even if the USA is not a belligerent, Big Four Peace Conference leader and military occupier of part of the Rhineland is twofold: a) just as in OTL, French efforts to find indigenous support for Rhenish separatism fell entirely flat, and b) Lloyd George and Britain thought Rhineland separatism and excess territorial harshness of weakening of Germany was a bad idea...indeed they seemed to feel this way with even greater passion than Wilson and the Americans. Now I suppose the absence of the Americans still weakens the "front" of anti-punitive participants. But in terms of who is "carrying the load" for the absent Americans, while both the French and British are doing some of that substituted labor, resourcing, and sacrifice, I suspect the British Empire will be doing the lion's share and getting a commensurate phantom "inheritance" of influence that would have been American. On the other hand, the British, in a world where the Americans simply *never* came off the fence and fought by their side, and remained an aloof combination of hypocritical merchants of death but preachers of peace, may feel compelled to value their alliance with their French partners, and their French partners' opinions and desires, much more than in OTL. So just maybe the British end up deferring on a French-backed puppet Rhineland. But, I think the British would draw the line at letting their own troops be used to *enforce* that, which would make enforcement and the occupation of the whole of the Rhineland by an exclusively Franco-Belgian force, with no British nor American help, a pricey proposition for Paris. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary would borders other than Italian gains be roughly as OTL? Yes - and the Italians, if they dare a grab for Fiume could probably get away with it, though it was not promised in the London Treaty. Do states like Slovenia and Croatia become at least formally independent? I do not see why they still would not be suckered, conned, not find it expedient to take part in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or Yugoslavist movement.... US involvement was not key to the concept of South Slavic federalism or unity. The border with Germany and Denmark should be pretty much the same, it was decently linguistic. On the German-Polish border, perhaps it varies from OTL. Perhaps if relevant fighting continuing through the winter and into March 1919 spreads that far and units L'Armee D'Orient actions with Polish risings it could affect things. Mere US absence has no clear pro-Polish or anti-Polish effect, because on almost all postwar German-Polish boundary questions in OTL, the general tendency was for France to take the most generously pro-Polish interpretation, Britain to take the most generously pro-German interpretation, and the USA to split the difference in the middle. Here the US isn't present to split the difference in the middle, so the British and French need to do it among themselves. I think we can safely assume an Austro-German union is still banned, and that Wilhelm is a goner. The Germans will want him gone nearly as much as the Allies. Chaos/regime change in the throes of defeat will likely bring about the end of the Hohenzollern monarchy as an institution even though, this world won't have Wilson dictating it as a condition of peace, but I would not rule out perhaps the dynasties persisting at the levels of the individuals states, and titles of nobility and princely ranks being retained. "If there's going to be an attempt to split up Germany, or at least Prussia might other changes be made to strengthen other German states at Prussian expense? For instance the restoration of Hanover as a state - whether as a monarchy or republic, trying to hive off the eastern Rhineland - which contains so much of Germany's industrial base and possibly Saxony being restored to its 1814 borders which would make it stronger and Prussia weaker. It's something that might be considered." ----the Germans will probably surrender before there would be an actual occupation to enforce such a change to German structure. Would there be support to have tommies and poilus continue to fight and die longer to keep marching well past the Rhine into Hanover to establish its separate statehood? Or are you envisioning Germany not split up into true separate sovereignties, but just reorganizing its states, to reduce Prussia's weight internally? c) The Baltic states have their independence supported by the British but what's the status of Finland, especially if the Bolsheviks are stronger - because of less support for the whites - and given its close proximity to Petrograd/Leningrad which possibly might stay the capital here? I mentioned Estonia having its independence thanks to British support, but in reality, Finnish independence and the victory of Finnish Whites was guaranteed earlier by German support, and there is no reason that should change. And initially in OTL, before German capitulation, it was German troops and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that was keeping Bolshevik rule out of the Baltics, not the British, and even post armistice, in much of Lithuania and Latvia or at least Courland, German Freikorps remained active and held off Bolsheviks, with Allied toleration, until they in turn were deposed by local nationalists, who were also anti-Bolshevik. So at this point I am probably sounding like a naysayer, because I am saying a lot of things do not have to be different from OTL, although many things could be. And I admit, that is a little bit of a bias on my part. I am not inclined to add extra little random small changes to the map if that is not the main focus of change in the scenario, if things could have as easily gone the same as OTL. d) You mention the Japanese don't want to advance west of Lake Baikal but, given the lack of an American presence to oppose them does that mean they stay there, possibly establishing s protectorate under formal White Russian leadership? Especially since the rest of the allies may be more willing to support such a state. Maybe - Although the Japanese had their own reasons, fiscal and social, to keep their commitment limited and that the commitment was unpopular. Like they might want to get British financing- which London couldn't afford--to do a high level of effort. And the lack of direct US involvement in some ways might make it seem less *relevant* to Japan's defensive needs. Their clients were fairly lame unpopular bandits too. But sure, I could imagine Japan's intervention in the Russian Far East, and certainly northern Sakhalin dragging on much longer. I doubt they would spend much time in a perimeter as far as Lake Baikal. Their furthest perimeter west for more than a year or 18 months would probably only go up to the Amur river itself on the mainland, thus only comprising the maritime province (which they left in 1922 I think). And northern Sakhalin is easy (they left it in OTL 1925).
I mentioned the pandemic because it was such an huge impact, although largely forgotten today as not as glossy as the war itself. Modern thoughts have suggested it did start in Kansas but that could be avoided although the other thing is did the pandemic, as well as the huge level of deaths also given the survivors a level of resistance? I.e. that without it some new pandemic - albeit possibly less destructive - comes up somewhere down the line.
With what became Yugoslavia OTL given the greater Italian influence and that it is gaining much of the Adriatic coastline I wasn't sure whether places like Slovenia and especially Croatia, which being Catholic wasn't too happy at being ruled by an Orthodox dynasty might not end up under what was effectively a greater Serbia. This could mean they become independent - formally at least.
Frankly while France was pushing for a Rhenish protectorate I think it was a stupid idea. The idea of partitioning Prussia with the Rhineland being separated from it - which was suggested by at least one prominent local German OTL - would be more sensible I think and obvious other options would be restoring Hanover and also Saxony's restoration to its long held pre-1814 borders.
With Japan it could go either way. Seeking to establish a protectorate over a good sized chunk of eastern Siberia would be costly, both fiscally and politically but could have economic benefits and also be seen internally as keeping the reviled Bolsheviks at a greater distance. This would be more likely if the latter are seen as regicides assuming they still murder the Russian imperial family which is a clear possibility but not a certainty. If not where do the Romanov's end up? That was one question I forgot to ask before. - Not saying Japan will do this but they might and at least they could seek to preserve at least the Maritime Province and as you say N Sakhalin.
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 13, 2024 1:22:58 GMT
With Japan it could go either way. Seeking to establish a protectorate over a good sized chunk of eastern Siberia would be costly, both fiscally and politically but could have economic benefits and also be seen internally as keeping the reviled Bolsheviks at a greater distance. This would be more likely if the latter are seen as regicides assuming they still murder the Russian imperial family which is a clear possibility but not a certainty. If not where do the Romanov's end up? That was one question I forgot to ask before. - Not saying Japan will do this but they might and at least they could seek to preserve at least the Maritime Province and as you say N Sakhalin.
This is a good point and genuine question for going forward. This reminds me of a China-Japan Far East related thing that has a decent chance of happening later on, at least a significantly higher chance than OTL, that was a little closer to happening in OTL than hardly anyone recognizes: A British-Japanese joint intervention against Chinese Nationalists (and Communists) later in the 1920s. Obviously I did not get into this because I hardly got beyond 1920. In OTL, some of the more hardline British "old China hands" based out of Hong Kong, Hankow, and Shanghai and the Admiralty, advocated in 1926-27 for British or international intervention to stop the march of the Chinese Nationalist, then allied with the Chinese Communist Party, "Northern Expedition" from Canton, which was associated with anti-foreign strikes, boycotts, riots, and other violence. The main international powers with assumed muscle and a stake in Chinese at the time were Britain, Japan, and America, and they all did increase their river and coastal patrols and Marine guards at this time. However, at that moment, 1926 and 1927, neither the Americans, nor interestingly the Japanese, then governed by a liberal democratic administration in the opening era of universal suffrage, were warm to British proposed ideas of confronting or crushing the Nationalists before they reached the Yangtze River, or before they reached the lower the lower Yangtze River's Shanghai and Nanking area. Japan ended up changing its non-interventionist tune before too many years, but the Japanese were pretty optimistic before 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek was a man who could be worked with. The Japanese and Americans were even more convinced of this argument after Chiang purged the Communists starting April 1927 and started to massacre them, and eventually even the British came around. In this ATL, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance persisting and both anti-Bolshevik, and neither with a particular alignment with the United States, both London and Tokyo may share a less patient and more wary and oppositional stance toward the KMT-CCP United Front, leading to an early confrontation on the Yangtze, possibly forcing the two parties to stick together longer, with proxy backing from Moscow [Moscow sees them as a way to break capitalist 'encirclement' of course]. And the result is a medium-large British-Japanese expeditionary intervention into central China from the late 1920s, possibly supported by some token French Foreign Legion/Colonial troops and even more token Italian Marines for solidarity, instead of what happened in OTL, mostly non-intervention, with the powers on guard for the short-term, with the Japanese building up frustrations that exploded into an all-out Holy War on China in the 1930s. Of course jumping to 1926-27 is getting a bit ahead of the game. But I think the ways things are structured, the idea of Soviet patronage of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalists, while also supporting a Communist Party, is still pretty natural. Also, there will be some sort of attempt at Naval Arms Control, like the OTL Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, and that issue will be interlinked with Far East and China security issues. Neither of those would go exactly as OTL. The US would have less budgetary urgency to restrain its naval spending for one. From a British point of view, the US would hardly have a leg to stand on demanding an end to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. China (and its US sympathizer) would not have a WWI-participation based case to make for why it should get the former German concessions of Shandong back from their current occupier, Japan. But differences of any alt-Washington Treaties should not alter the pretty much inevitable rise of Chinese nationalism and the northern expedition in China. You raised an interesting question earlier of how certain details could potentially differ in Ireland on the civil war treaty and then the possible civil war within the civil war over the acceptance of the treaty, and I can't predict for sure how any of it would go, or how subject to random change it would be.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 13, 2024 14:41:12 GMT
With Japan it could go either way. Seeking to establish a protectorate over a good sized chunk of eastern Siberia would be costly, both fiscally and politically but could have economic benefits and also be seen internally as keeping the reviled Bolsheviks at a greater distance. This would be more likely if the latter are seen as regicides assuming they still murder the Russian imperial family which is a clear possibility but not a certainty. If not where do the Romanov's end up? That was one question I forgot to ask before. - Not saying Japan will do this but they might and at least they could seek to preserve at least the Maritime Province and as you say N Sakhalin.
This is a good point and genuine question for going forward. This reminds me of a China-Japan Far East related thing that has a decent chance of happening later on, at least a significantly higher chance than OTL, that was a little closer to happening in OTL than hardly anyone recognizes: A British-Japanese joint intervention against Chinese Nationalists (and Communists) later in the 1920s. Obviously I did not get into this because I hardly got beyond 1920. In OTL, some of the more hardline British "old China hands" based out of Hong Kong, Hankow, and Shanghai and the Admiralty, advocated in 1926-27 for British or international intervention to stop the march of the Chinese Nationalist, then allied with the Chinese Communist Party, "Northern Expedition" from Canton, which was associated with anti-foreign strikes, boycotts, riots, and other violence. The main international powers with assumed muscle and a stake in Chinese at the time were Britain, Japan, and America, and they all did increase their river and coastal patrols and Marine guards at this time. However, at that moment, 1926 and 1927, neither the Americans, nor interestingly the Japanese, then governed by a liberal democratic administration in the opening era of universal suffrage, were warm to British proposed ideas of confronting or crushing the Nationalists before they reached the Yangtze River, or before they reached the lower the lower Yangtze River's Shanghai and Nanking area. Japan ended up changing its non-interventionist tune before too many years, but the Japanese were pretty optimistic before 1930 that Chiang Kai-shek was a man who could be worked with. The Japanese and Americans were even more convinced of this argument after Chiang purged the Communists starting April 1927 and started to massacre them, and eventually even the British came around. In this ATL, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance persisting and both anti-Bolshevik, and neither with a particular alignment with the United States, both London and Tokyo may share a less patient and more wary and oppositional stance toward the KMT-CCP United Front, leading to an early confrontation on the Yangtze, possibly forcing the two parties to stick together longer, with proxy backing from Moscow [Moscow sees them as a way to break capitalist 'encirclement' of course]. And the result is a medium-large British-Japanese expeditionary intervention into central China from the late 1920s, possibly supported by some token French Foreign Legion/Colonial troops and even more token Italian Marines for solidarity, instead of what happened in OTL, mostly non-intervention, with the powers on guard for the short-term, with the Japanese building up frustrations that exploded into an all-out Holy War on China in the 1930s. Of course jumping to 1926-27 is getting a bit ahead of the game. But I think the ways things are structured, the idea of Soviet patronage of Sun Yat-sen's Nationalists, while also supporting a Communist Party, is still pretty natural. Also, there will be some sort of attempt at Naval Arms Control, like the OTL Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, and that issue will be interlinked with Far East and China security issues. Neither of those would go exactly as OTL. The US would have less budgetary urgency to restrain its naval spending for one. From a British point of view, the US would hardly have a leg to stand on demanding an end to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. China (and its US sympathizer) would not have a WWI-participation based case to make for why it should get the former German concessions of Shandong back from their current occupier, Japan. But differences of any alt-Washington Treaties should not alter the pretty much inevitable rise of Chinese nationalism and the northern expedition in China. You raised an interesting question earlier of how certain details could potentially differ in Ireland on the civil war treaty and then the possible civil war within the civil war over the acceptance of the treaty, and I can't predict for sure how any of it would go, or how subject to random change it would be.
Interesting point about British concerns about the KMT and their anti-western programme, even aside from any link with the CCP. That might still happen but I would have to disagree on the conclusion that if a deal is made on naval arms control it will allow the Anglo-Japanese treaty to continue. From everything I've read the US was determined to end the alliance regardless of the fact it was solely defensive - plus the US had an out which could exclude them even if they were the aggressors. Else they would insist on a navy at least as large as the combine Anglo-Japanese fleets. I can't see this changing, especially since with no US involvement in the war their 1916 programme will be well under way giving them a what they will see as a major lead in large new post-war ships and Britain probably even more fiscally drained that OTL.
Also there seemed to be increasing doubts by Britain about the alliance - albeit that with Europe stable and secure as it would seem and the US definitely not willing to consider any political or other alignment with Britain, to which OTL the AJA was seen as a barrier. Also while Australia and New Zealand favoured renewal Canada was strongly against it because they feared the US reaction.
As such if the alliance does continue its likely that there would be no naval agreement. If there is a treaty then its likely that limits will be much larger in terms of both total and individual tonnage because of the size of the US ships probably already in the process of entering service. However going to be difficult to square the circle because Japan will want to build a lot more, larger ships to close the gap on the US which will in turn increase the demands on Britain to produce more.
The likely situation is that some markedly higher limit is reached on capital ships - along with rules defining such ships, tonnage and the like - and both US and Japan will complete much of their original programmes but then probably have a long pause. Britain is more likely to build steadily, say 2-4 ships over a number of years, possibly taking most of the decade. Which is likely to be much better for the British military shipyard capacity that OTL's prolonged famine.
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raharris1973
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 13, 2024 18:22:22 GMT
As such if the alliance does continue its likely that there would be no naval agreement. If there is a treaty then its likely that limits will be much larger in terms of both total and individual tonnage because of the size of the US ships probably already in the process of entering service. However going to be difficult to square the circle because Japan will want to build a lot more, larger ships to close the gap on the US which will in turn increase the demands on Britain to produce more. Really good points. Difficult to square a "whole bunch" of circles indeed! And, if the US is saying it is hell-bent on building Navy second to none, without specific dismantlement of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, how is the USA reacting to the concept I've proposed that the Entente sets up post war as the alternative to the League of Nations? The Quadripartite Alliance of Britain-Japan-France-Italy? The Quad World directorate, does Washington see it as less menacing, because it is not a specifically Anglo-Japanese deal "pincering" the USA in the Pacific and Atlantic, or does the USA just see it as an Anglo-Japanese alliance by another name, actually made a little worse by inclusion of the nontrivial French with their Atlantic, Caribbean, and Asia-Pacific assets, and the Italians? Do the Americans insist on building to the combined naval strengths of all 4 of the Quad powers? Would a widening of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, that does not actually reduce Tokyo and London's commitments to each other, or change them, but goes through a name change to a wider Quadripartite Alliance with the other two major Entente parties left standing at the end of the war, pacify American politicians, or enflame them? Will the Partisan affiliation of the American politicians at this point in time matter for the question? Furthermore, regarding practical building issues, the Americans can try to build to a four power standard, though they can kiss many presumed tax cuts goodbye in the 20s. The Japanese would have ambitions, in the absence of a deal, to build up a great deal, and then have huge difficulties in execution after the Kanto earthquake. Actually, a combination of an overly forward Siberian policy, no naval deal, high naval building, and trying to resume as much as possible even while doing naval construction, finally topped off near the end of the decade by a joint intervention in China with Britain against the KMT-CCP United Front, could bring forward many accumulated social strains in China (oops, I meant Japan) by the middle 1930s. With navalism, militarism and its hardships imposed on taxpayer and draftee unchecked, and not done in a defiant unilateral way, but as a henchman of white imperialists, Japan may be ripe for the outbreak of *left-leaning* mutinous disorder, perhaps with some resemblance to the Spanish Civil War, or the late stages of the Portuguese Empire in the 70s, that mixes classic Communist worker, peasant, tenant-farmer, and soldier sailor discontent, also with Pan-Asianism (why we working with Nigel Whitey instead of *with* the Chinese Nationalists and Proletarians?). Just a stream of thought, or a brainstorm. The pendulum doesn't need to swing the way it did in our world.
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