What if no German Unrestricted Sub Warfare, Zimmerman Note intercept, US DoW on Germany in 1917?

End result is Entente collapse in total in 1918 probably.

You know me, I'm used to being the odd man out lol. 

Specifically for U-Boat tactics alone, I'm not sure that's the case. British shipbuilding in 1917 consisted of 1.16 million tons and in 1918 it was 1.35 million tons. Even under Prize Rules, the U-Boats were able to sink 1,298,000 tons from October of 1916 to January of 1917. Averaged out, that comes to ~325,000 tons a month. From January of 1917 to January of 1918, this would've resulted in 3,894,000 tons lost to U-Boat action. In other words, From October of 1916 to January of 1918 in this ATL, total tonnage lost would've been 5,192,000! This prompted Admiral Beatty to remark on January 27th-four days before the start of USW-that the question of the war was now whether the Germans would blockade the British to peace before the Royal Navy could do the same to the Germans.

Outside of U-Boats, I generally take the joint report of the British Government at face value. The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pacific Historical Review , May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:

Problem is the convoy system is non-viable without American entry. The U.S. DoW immediately added roughly ~100 destroyers to the Entente total, which is why convoys were able to start becoming a thing in the Summer-Fall of 1917. Even more deadly for the Entente is that, without access to American oil, the Royal Navy is effectively wiped off the board. In 1914, the Royal Navy had 212 Destroyers. Of these, the following are oil powered:

HMS Swift
Tribal-class (12)
Acorn-Class (20)
Acheron-class (23)
Acasta-class (20)
Laforey-class (20)
Admiralty M-class (2)

At 98 ships, this constitutes nearly half of all available destroyers in 1914. Note, I'm just counting the ones that were operational in 1914, with all other destroyers under construction, such as the the two remaining Laforey and the 83 Admiralty M ships also being oil powered. The crisis also doesn't end with the destroyers, but extends to the rest of the fleet too. The eight vessels of the Arethusa-class and the two of the C-class completed in 1914 means that half of the Royal Navy's light cruisers in 1914 are also oil powered. The newly arrived Queen Elizabeth class battleships as well as the Revenge class are also oil powered, meaning the newest and most powerful battleships of the Royal Navy are now removed from the board.

In effect, not only is convoying not possible, the naval balance in the North Sea is now almost even between the Imperial German Navy and Royal Navy. The Home Fleet still has a slight edge in numbers, but the HSF has more modern, powerful units with the QEs and Revenge class off the board for the British. The lack of escorts also means the Home Fleet would be very, very exposed to German U-Boats in the event of a sortie effort to challenge an HSF sortie.


The Entente very well could try to destroy their economies via hyper-inflation, but the issue is that the U.S. did not and would not accept purchases in their own currencies anyway; all loans were secured via collateral, either in the form of Gold or American-based securities. As the Joint Report of the British Government said, there was no alternatives to the United States from which purchasing could be done:

The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4

At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5​


We don't have to speculate on this point because in November of 1916, Wilson cut off the possibility of unsecured loans via the Federal Reserve. The Deluge by Adam Tooze, Pages 51-55:

Throughout October 1916 the banking house J. P. Morgan was in urgent discussions with the British and the French over the future of Allied finance. For their next season of campaigning, the Entente proposed to raise at least 1.5 billion dollars. Realizing the enormity of these sums, J. P. Morgan sought reassurance both from the Federal Reserve Board and from Wilson himself. None was forthcoming.3 As Election Day on 7 November approached, Wilson began drafting a public statement to be delivered by the governor of the Federal Reserve Board warning the American public against committing any more of their savings to Entente loans.4 On 27 November 1916, four days before J. P. Morgan planned to launch the Anglo-French bond issue, the Federal Reserve Board issued instructions to all member banks. In the interest of the stability of the American financial system, the Fed announced that it no longer considered it desirable for American investors to increase their holdings of British and French securities.

As Wall Street plunged and sterling was offloaded by speculators, J. P. Morgan and the UK Treasury were forced into emergency purchasing of sterling to prop up the British currency. 5 At the same time the British government was forced to suspend support of French purchasing.6 The Entente's entire financing effort was in jeopardy. In Russia in the autumn of 1916 there was mounting resentment at the demand by Britain and France that it should ship its gold reserves to London to secure Allied borrowing. Without American assistance it was not just the patience of the financial markets but the Entente itself that would be put at risk.7 As the year ended, the war committee of the British cabinet concluded grimly that the only possible interpretation was that Wilson meant to force their hand and put an end to the war in a matter of weeks. And this ominous interpretation was reinforced when London received confirmation from its ambassador in Washington that it was indeed the President himself who had insisted on the strong wording of the Fed's note.​


"Our financial agents tell us in effect that, by the use of every available device, and possibly at the cost of postponing payments by bank overdrafts, we shall still be solvent on 31st March [1917]. They cannot tell us how this result is to be achieved, but they hope and believe it will be possible."

This is the British Treasury saying every means they have is only enough to get them to April, with nothing left past that. Too Proud To Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin, from which this is quoted, also includes the following on the state of the French:

"France had in October [1916] completely exhausted her gold and dollar resources, and in order to finance her American expenditures for the next six months needed at least £40,000,000 [about $200 million at 1916 exchange rates] from the British Treasury in addition to the sums already promised."

Further, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page by Burton J. Hendrick puts it succinctly:

"It should always be remembered, however, that Great Britain was financing not only herself, but her Allies, and that the difficult condition in which she now found herself was caused by the not too considerate demands of the nations with which she was allied in the war. Thus by April 6, 1917, Great Britain had overdrawn her account with JP Morgan to the extent of $400,000,000 and had no cash available with which to meet this overdraft. This obligation had been incurred in the purchase of supplies, both for Great Britain and for the Allied governments; and securities, largely British-owned stocks and bonds, had been deposited to protect the bankers. The money was now coming due; if the obligations were not met, the credit of Great Britain in this country would reach the vanishing point. Though at first there was a slight misunderstanding about this matter, the American government finally paid this overdraft out of the proceeds of the First Liberty Loan. This act saved the credit of the Allied countries. The first danger that threatened, the isolation and starvation of Great Britain, was therefore overcome."

Finally, what of the French situation with regards to oil?

"On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole. The immediate need was for tanker tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: "There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood."

Historically the U.S. had a downturn after World War I anyway between 1920-1921, so no real change in broad strokes IF that does happen. I'm sincerely doubtful it will, however, because the bubble that formed in the American economy was mostly a function of 1917-1919, when the U.S. undertook it's own efforts and funded that of its Allies. In other words, the bubble is much smaller so it popping will also be much less painful than historical. I could argue on this further, but it's kinda besides the purpose of this thread.



There was no drastic changes possible to make up for the fact the United States of America in the 1910s produced 70% of Global Oil production domestically and controlled another 10% via its companies in Mexico. You could replace the existing ruling classes in the UK and France with whomever you want, but they could not make oil appear to replace that of the United States, hence why the French said access to that would decide whether the French Army collapsed or not.



This has happened numerous times in history, most famously when Russia pulled out of the Seven Years War in the 1700s which allowed Prussia to survive and eek out a victory of sorts despite being mostly occupied by that point.



You don't have to take my word for it because the British and French Governments directly said they would collapse and the Germans would achieve decisive results in the case of the French. France had run out of gold and collateral to finance its war effort by August of 1916 and Britain was running out of its means by the Spring of 1917 according to its own internal analysis; Germany and its allies, as we know historically, made it into October-November of 1918, a year and half longer than the Entente would've been able to via American support.

If one side is able to show up and the other isn't, for over a year, that's a decisive victory by default for the former.

Nor was the claim that either, but rather that the withdrawal of Russia turned completely turned the situation around for Prussia. Frederick went from his armies destroyed and nation mostly occupied to effectively winning the war, despite the vast majority of Austrian and French territory never being occupied by his armies.

Given the situation in early 1917 is even better for the Germans and their allies than that which Frederick was in...



Except for the fact the British were already using Persia and it was only sufficient to meet 8% of their needs.



Now you can compare it to Global Production at the time:



There is no alternative to the United States in Global oil markets at this time. As for your suggestion about the British Navy:

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet had consequently been restricted. In early June Tothill said in a memorandum that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be convoyed.' On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern part of the North Sea.' Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the immediate future.



Actually they have access to Romania and Galicia as shown in the above charts, which together produced more than the British Empire and Persia combined in 1918.



Indeed, the British did all of that because of their access to the American market, which provided the funding and raw materials to make that expansion possible. Without said access, as the joint report of every department of the British Government said in their own words, their war effort would indeed collapse. The French, as I have shown, also said exactly the same given their dependence on the United States was just as strong as that of Britain.



Actually I did not say that all, and specifically outlined why I think it would not be that big of a hit. What I did say was that if it happened, it would be a short affair just as it was historically and thus no real change for the United States. I'm rather unconvinced the U.S. would experience anything more than a shallow recession in fact and that is debatable given domestic demand would be strong here and thus provide an off ramp for U.S. commodities to exit the boom.