stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2023 15:59:47 GMT
If Russia, before or after early heavy defeats withdraws inland and doesn't collapse in morale terms - which OTL needed 3 years of heavy casualties, largely in costly attacks on CP defences to take pressure off their western allies so is unlikely here then Germany is facing a serious problem, especially if Britain does join the conflict and hence a reliable blockade is practical. There are no real air or motorised transport, especially at the start of the war and provided Russia can seriously prevent/hinder German use of the few railways that needs masses of horse drawn wagons carrying just about everything east with heavy losses. One of the crippling factors that prompted the collapse of German agriculture in the war was that as well as insufficient attention to civilian needs by the military leadership they stripped agriculture not only of many of its best manpower but also much of the horses that did the heavy work. Trying to advance deep into the Russian interior while the latter still have the will to fight will be hugely costly all around. Napoleon's army had a better position as it was far, far less dependent on heavy loads hauled across hundreds of miles. Even OTL the advance from Riga to the approaches of Petrograd was only really possible in 1917/18 due to the collapse of the Russian army. See MAP.   Now imagine, that you are the master of the world ocean in 1914, and you can ship all the rifles, artillery and ammunition that Russia needs to stay in the war. Imagine that your admirals and generals actually know geography and economics? Imagine your politicians know their Napoleonic Wars? Imagine that? Staying on topic, WHY does Britain need to bleed away a million men in France? Ship 3 billion pounds sterling worth of munitions and supplies to Russia, send them a few competent generals, if you can find any, to teach them how to fight the proper way. *(The only high command who were worse in 1914 were the Germans, matched by the imbecilic 1917 Americans. M.), and let the WWI Russians be the anvil, as the Napoleonic era British used them. Then play defense everywhere else until the British and mainly FRENCH technologists figure out the airplane and the tank and (British) sea-power does its siege work. It was not that hard. Because it was done in actual history twice.
Imagine that someone knew history. There are a number of problems with this 'idea'. a) Because of the fact that weapons are a hell of a lot more complex than in the Napoleonic period and a relative decline in British technological capacity, plus France having to recover from the loss of much of its industrial heartland. Coupled with the shell shortage which was partly the massive number of shells needed and the similarly massive demand for cordite which again was a problem with the weakness - or large scale lack of - a chemical industry in Britain. It took 2-3 years to really get both quantity and quality of production up to the demands of modern large scale warfare.
b) Those weapons and supplies are a lot heavier as well which means moving them is a lot more difficult. The Baltic through which materials could reach Russia in Napoleon's time is now closed. As are the Turkish straits. Its possible to send supplies to Archangel or Murmansk, although the weather is a serious problem. However IIRC there are zero railways to the rest of Russia at this time so getting them to the Russian heartlands, let alone the front is a major problem. You face the same issue that you highlighted in terms of the Germans seeking to advance deep into Russia. That's why one of the 1st interventions after the Bolshevik coup in 1917 was to send allied forces to Murmansk to guard the large stockpiles of allied equipment and supplies that have built up there because they couldn't be shipped south fast enough.
c) Your proposal also requires that France is willing to sit on the defensive for several years while Russia single-handed fights the Germans, Austrians and Turks to exhaustion. This is not likely to be acceptable to the French who want the liberate the large amounts of French territory lost in 1914 and definitely not in the interests of the Russians who are likely to be less than happy with the idea. Especially given also the excessive role of privilege and corruption in the Russian leadership and the poor level of education of much of the rank and file. It took the French and British 2-3 years before they really started to understand the key roles of combined arms and methods such as locating enemy artillery in a suitable time period for reliable counter battery fire so that you can cripple the main killers of soldiers - at least in actual combat terms as disease was probably still No. 1 overall. It should be noted that a British army was heavily involved in many campaigns throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and continued casualties were suffered. It would be politically impossible to sit back totally, even when British interests were seriously and directly threatened [Suez Canal, Persian oil and the Gulf region weren't directly threatened. Any level of fighting on the western front would be costly simply because of the sheer firepower involved. A decently organised and lead Gallipoli campaign might have been the big changer as it would probably have shortened the war by at least a year, probably more than than but its unlikely that Britain would have been able to avoid a sizeable involvement on the western front.
d) Furthermore it also relies on the enemy doing what you want them to do. If as Germany did in 1916 there is a major attritional attack on France then their unlikely to be able to hold on their own and if France is forced to surrender then the entire allied position is gravely undermined.
e) As you say the British high command is mixed in quality and we lost two of the best early on - Grierson who was considered the British expert on the German army and its methods and Smith-Dorrien, lost due to French's petty vindictiveness and then disease. Unfortunately the position was worsened by the dire French and the political and short sighted Haig dominating the western front which costs us heavily. Furthermore if we did offer such officers how likely is it that the Russians would accept or that they would actually be able to do much within the Russian system where their likely to be ignored or blocked in a lot of things?
As an aside there were a lot of generals far worse than the British or Germans on average, at least in military terms. Italy, Austria and Russia all had appalling high commands and it was only really when Ludendorf got pretty much supreme power in Germany that their position really worsened due to his myopia.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 17:46:24 GMT
See MAP. Now imagine, that you are the master of the world ocean in 1914, and you can ship all the rifles, artillery and ammunition that Russia needs to stay in the war. Imagine that your admirals and generals actually know geography and economics? Imagine your politicians know their Napoleonic Wars? Imagine that? Staying on topic, WHY does Britain need to bleed away a million men in France? Ship 3 billion pounds sterling worth of munitions and supplies to Russia, send them a few competent generals, if you can find any, to teach them how to fight the proper way. *(The only high command who were worse in 1914 were the Germans, matched by the imbecilic 1917 Americans. M.), and let the WWI Russians be the anvil, as the Napoleonic era British used them. Then play defense everywhere else until the British and mainly FRENCH technologists figure out the airplane and the tank and (British) sea-power does its siege work. It was not that hard. Because it was done in actual history twice.
Imagine that someone knew history. There are a number of problems with this 'idea'. a) Because of the fact that weapons are a hell of a lot more complex than in the Napoleonic period and a relative decline in British technological capacity, plus France having to recover from the loss of much of its industrial heartland. Coupled with the shell shortage which was partly the massive number of shells needed and the similarly massive demand for cordite which again was a problem with the weakness - or large scale lack of - a chemical industry in Britain. It took 2-3 years to really get both quantity and quality of production up to the demands of modern large scale warfare.
b) Those weapons and supplies are a lot heavier as well which means moving them is a lot more difficult. The Baltic through which materials could reach Russia in Napoleon's time is now closed. As are the Turkish straits. Its possible to send supplies to Archangel or Murmansk, although the weather is a serious problem. However IIRC there are zero railways to the rest of Russia at this time so getting them to the Russian heartlands, let alone the front is a major problem. You face the same issue that you highlighted in terms of the Germans seeking to advance deep into Russia. That's why one of the 1st interventions after the Bolshevik coup in 1917 was to send allied forces to Murmansk to guard the large stockpiles of allied equipment and supplies that have built up there because they couldn't be shipped south fast enough.
c) Your proposal also requires that France is willing to sit on the defensive for several years while Russia single-handed fights the Germans, Austrians and Turks to exhaustion. This is not likely to be acceptable to the French who want the liberate the large amounts of French territory lost in 1914 and definitely not in the interests of the Russians who are likely to be less than happy with the idea. Especially given also the excessive role of privilege and corruption in the Russian leadership and the poor level of education of much of the rank and file. It took the French and British 2-3 years before they really started to understand the key roles of combined arms and methods such as locating enemy artillery in a suitable time period for reliable counter battery fire so that you can cripple the main killers of soldiers - at least in actual combat terms as disease was probably still No. 1 overall. It should be noted that a British army was heavily involved in many campaigns throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and continued casualties were suffered. It would be politically impossible to sit back totally, even when British interests were seriously and directly threatened [Suez Canal, Persian oil and the Gulf region weren't directly threatened. Any level of fighting on the western front would be costly simply because of the sheer firepower involved. A decently organised and lead Gallipoli campaign might have been the big changer as it would probably have shortened the war by at least a year, probably more than than but its unlikely that Britain would have been able to avoid a sizeable involvement on the western front.
d) Furthermore it also relies on the enemy doing what you want them to do. If as Germany did in 1916 there is a major attritional attack on France then their unlikely to be able to hold on their own and if France is forced to surrender then the entire allied position is gravely undermined.
e) As you say the British high command is mixed in quality and we lost two of the best early on - Grierson who was considered the British expert on the German army and its methods and Smith-Dorrien, lost due to French's petty vindictiveness and then disease. Unfortunately the position was worsened by the dire French and the political and short sighted Haig dominating the western front which costs us heavily. Furthermore if we did offer such officers how likely is it that the Russians would accept or that they would actually be able to do much within the Russian system where their likely to be ignored or blocked in a lot of things?
As an aside there were a lot of generals far worse than the British or Germans on average, at least in military terms. Italy, Austria and Russia all had appalling high commands and it was only really when Ludendorf got pretty much supreme power in Germany that their position really worsened due to his myopia.
Hmmm. Imagine that someone knew history. To all of this commentary above, I point out a few things: 1. If you can make a Mosin Nagant, you can maintain a Lee Enfield. 2. Same goes for imported artillery. Krupp, Vickers, or Bethlehem Steel it all works on the same fundamentals. The Russians know and could do that themselves. See 3 and 4. 3. AMERICA. Happy neutral willing to make 1 and 2 plus half the shells the Entente used, because we did it.\ 4. Well; about that France on defense argument offered? It happened. 5. Thanks for pointing out how incompetent the generals were. I previously covered that item. So I am glad we agree on this one point. 6. Disease was a problem that was not properly addressed at all. Proof? Influenza epidemic was troop imported into France and then troop exported globally. |
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 2, 2023 17:56:35 GMT
Point is that they did build it, but it took until ~1916 to get the port built, connected by rail and up and running. There absolutely was a port and railway there is 1941. The Sweden/Norway map is both drifting and grasping at a few straws, given that there would need to be a big old rail building programme in Finland to support any massive shipping through neutral Narvik. The simpler option was Murmansk, but this isn’t an instant panacea. This influenced part of the background rationale for the Dardanelles idea. Thanks for the Baedeker, by the way. I’ll have to have a look in July when I have some spare time. In 1914, they didn’t have the 3 billion in arms, nor a viable sealink to Russia. Even if they had both, Russia was sufficiently buggered up that it couldn’t work as a Napoleonic anvil. a. They built it. b. Of course the railroad is a massive effort. Murmansk was. So this Narvik to Oulu route would be. The point is that it could be done.   c. With Nicolas II and his rotten regime, I have a historical counterargument... Stalin and his far more corrupt and incompetent regime. The difference of result was a massive infusion of "foreign experts" and economic assistance. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2023 20:01:40 GMT
If Russia, before or after early heavy defeats withdraws inland and doesn't collapse in morale terms - which OTL needed 3 years of heavy casualties, largely in costly attacks on CP defences to take pressure off their western allies so is unlikely here then Germany is facing a serious problem, especially if Britain does join the conflict and hence a reliable blockade is practical. There are no real air or motorised transport, especially at the start of the war and provided Russia can seriously prevent/hinder German use of the few railways that needs masses of horse drawn wagons carrying just about everything east with heavy losses. One of the crippling factors that prompted the collapse of German agriculture in the war was that as well as insufficient attention to civilian needs by the military leadership they stripped agriculture not only of many of its best manpower but also much of the horses that did the heavy work. Trying to advance deep into the Russian interior while the latter still have the will to fight will be hugely costly all around. Napoleon's army had a better position as it was far, far less dependent on heavy loads hauled across hundreds of miles. Even OTL the advance from Riga to the approaches of Petrograd was only really possible in 1917/18 due to the collapse of the Russian army. See MAP. Now imagine, that you are the master of the world ocean in 1914, and you can ship all the rifles, artillery and ammunition that Russia needs to stay in the war. Imagine that your admirals and generals actually know geography and economics? Imagine your politicians know their Napoleonic Wars? Imagine that? Staying on topic, WHY does Britain need to bleed away a million men in France? Ship 3 billion pounds sterling worth of munitions and supplies to Russia, send them a few competent generals, if you can find any, to teach them how to fight the proper way. *(The only high command who were worse in 1914 were the Germans, matched by the imbecilic 1917 Americans. M.), and let the WWI Russians be the anvil, as the Napoleonic era British used them. Then play defense everywhere else until the British and mainly FRENCH technologists figure out the airplane and the tank and (British) sea-power does its siege work. It was not that hard. Because it was done in actual history twice.
Well I thought I had posted a reply to this but it seems not to have worked?? There are a number of serious problems with your proposal. - Sorry duplicate post as for some reason I couldn't see the 4th page so missed my earlier reply had gone through. Could you please delete this Lordroel?
a) Due to the decline in much of British industry and the fact that France has lost its core industrial base in 1914 there simply isn't any spare resources to send east, let alone in the amount your suggesting. It took several years to make up the shortfall, especially in items like artillery and shells, both in quality and quantity and then the army had to learn how best to use them,
b) As Simon has since pointed out there isn't a railway from Murmansk and it takes time to build one. The Baltic isn't an option as it was in Napoleonic times. Nor is the Black Sea with the straits blocked and Persia is as similarly undeveloped as the northern route and in some disorder with assorted groups fighting over it. This is compounded by the fact that the sheer of artillery units especially and the far higher size of armies overall so hauling all this equipment over rough terrain without a rail link is going to be a huge task. You should realise this as its one of the factors we're both given for why it would be dangerous and difficult for Germany to advance deep into Russia while the Russian army is still in a decent condition.
c) Your assuming that the enemy will do what you want it to - always a dangerous idea. What happens when German launches a Verdun like attack? France after its earlier losses can't sustain the western front on its own and Britain would then have to assemble forces and rush them to France without much in the way of training and preparation, which is a recipe for even higher losses than OTL.
d) Your similarly assuming that France will sit on the defensive while a lot of its territory and people are under occupation for several years. Even more that Russia is both able and willing to be the punchbag fighting Germany, Austria and Turkey virtually unaided. Not going to happen. Plus given the poor quality of the Russian officers in many cases and the limited education on many of the men where are they going to get enough people to operate the necessary technical aspects - artillery, logistics, intelligence and communication and the like?
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars Britain did send armies to the continent and by the end had a sizeable force in southern France. Its going to need to make a contribution here as well to keep its allies willing to carry the bulk of the burden and given the sheer size of the conflict that is going to be a lot of troops and of casualties.
e) As the link you posted said Britain did have some very capable generals. Unfortunately we lost two of the best early on with Grierson's sudden death and then Smith-Dorrien to French's personal vendetta and then disease. However how likely is it that any British generals, especially assuming no real experience in this massive conflict would be accepted by the Russians to command or even influence their own armies. Matters of prestige and national interest as well as corruption and infighting would make it unlikely and even in an advisory role its doubtful that they would be listened to unless their views matched that of the Russian commanders.
As a side issue I would say that apart from the strategic incompetence of people like Ludendorf the German army had some of the best generals at military command. Definitely better in most cases than the disasters in charge for Austria, Russia, Italy and Turkey. Britain had some good ones but the problem was at the top level with 1st French's general incompetence and later Haig's obsession with deep break-through's and unwillingness to listen to others. Unfortunately due to his contacts with the royal family and the Tory party it proved impossible for the government to remove him.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 2, 2023 20:18:49 GMT
Imagine that someone knew history. There are a number of problems with this 'idea'. a) Because of the fact that weapons are a hell of a lot more complex than in the Napoleonic period and a relative decline in British technological capacity, plus France having to recover from the loss of much of its industrial heartland. Coupled with the shell shortage which was partly the massive number of shells needed and the similarly massive demand for cordite which again was a problem with the weakness - or large scale lack of - a chemical industry in Britain. It took 2-3 years to really get both quantity and quality of production up to the demands of modern large scale warfare.
b) Those weapons and supplies are a lot heavier as well which means moving them is a lot more difficult. The Baltic through which materials could reach Russia in Napoleon's time is now closed. As are the Turkish straits. Its possible to send supplies to Archangel or Murmansk, although the weather is a serious problem. However IIRC there are zero railways to the rest of Russia at this time so getting them to the Russian heartlands, let alone the front is a major problem. You face the same issue that you highlighted in terms of the Germans seeking to advance deep into Russia. That's why one of the 1st interventions after the Bolshevik coup in 1917 was to send allied forces to Murmansk to guard the large stockpiles of allied equipment and supplies that have built up there because they couldn't be shipped south fast enough.
c) Your proposal also requires that France is willing to sit on the defensive for several years while Russia single-handed fights the Germans, Austrians and Turks to exhaustion. This is not likely to be acceptable to the French who want the liberate the large amounts of French territory lost in 1914 and definitely not in the interests of the Russians who are likely to be less than happy with the idea. Especially given also the excessive role of privilege and corruption in the Russian leadership and the poor level of education of much of the rank and file. It took the French and British 2-3 years before they really started to understand the key roles of combined arms and methods such as locating enemy artillery in a suitable time period for reliable counter battery fire so that you can cripple the main killers of soldiers - at least in actual combat terms as disease was probably still No. 1 overall. It should be noted that a British army was heavily involved in many campaigns throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars and continued casualties were suffered. It would be politically impossible to sit back totally, even when British interests were seriously and directly threatened [Suez Canal, Persian oil and the Gulf region weren't directly threatened. Any level of fighting on the western front would be costly simply because of the sheer firepower involved. A decently organised and lead Gallipoli campaign might have been the big changer as it would probably have shortened the war by at least a year, probably more than than but its unlikely that Britain would have been able to avoid a sizeable involvement on the western front.
d) Furthermore it also relies on the enemy doing what you want them to do. If as Germany did in 1916 there is a major attritional attack on France then their unlikely to be able to hold on their own and if France is forced to surrender then the entire allied position is gravely undermined.
e) As you say the British high command is mixed in quality and we lost two of the best early on - Grierson who was considered the British expert on the German army and its methods and Smith-Dorrien, lost due to French's petty vindictiveness and then disease. Unfortunately the position was worsened by the dire French and the political and short sighted Haig dominating the western front which costs us heavily. Furthermore if we did offer such officers how likely is it that the Russians would accept or that they would actually be able to do much within the Russian system where their likely to be ignored or blocked in a lot of things?
As an aside there were a lot of generals far worse than the British or Germans on average, at least in military terms. Italy, Austria and Russia all had appalling high commands and it was only really when Ludendorf got pretty much supreme power in Germany that their position really worsened due to his myopia.
Hmmm. Imagine that someone knew history. To all of this commentary above, I point out a few things: 1. If you can make a Mosin Nagant, you can maintain a Lee Enfield. 2. Same goes for imported artillery. Krupp, Vickers, or Bethlehem Steel it all works on the same fundamentals. The Russians know and could do that themselves. See 3 and 4. 3. AMERICA. Happy neutral willing to make 1 and 2 plus half the shells the Entente used, because we did it.\ 4. Well; about that France on defense argument offered? It happened. 5. Thanks for pointing out how incompetent the generals were. I previously covered that item. So I am glad we agree on this one point. 6. Disease was a problem that was not properly addressed at all. Proof? Influenza epidemic was troop imported into France and then troop exported globally.
1 & 2) You didn't read my post. I was talking about the problems of manufacturing the equipment and munitions that was needed not their maintenance. Also rifles may be OK, although the low educational levels of much of the Russian rank and file could cause problems but artillery, radios and other such equipment would be an issue. Plus there was an issue with the simple logistics of getting equipment and supplies to Russia you keep hand-waving.
3) For a price and at what quality. I have read of US shells found to contain sand rather than explosives. Plus given the US had an even smaller military manufacturing section than the UK its not surprising that France was the main military producer for the allies, although Britain might have overtaken it in the final year or so.
4) France wasn't on the defensive for large proportions of the war but even if it had been willing to do so its doubtful it could have sustained its defence without considerable British aid. That was the case OTL and is likely to be the case TTL if Germany launches a major attack against it such as Verdun. Albeit that here France hasn't lost a large chunk of its territory and industrial strength, which I admit I forgot in my previous post. So your wrong on both points.
5) If your talking about British generals I didn't. There were bad and good but overall markedly better than a number of other major nations in the conflict. What I did point out why your suggestion of sending British commanders to control Russian forces wouldn't work.
6) Again you missed my point, presumably because you didn't read either my comment or your own link. I was referring to why Smith-Dorrien was taken out of military service permanently. There were problems with disease, especially since it was still pre-antibotic days and the American flu was compounded by the problem that because the war was still ongoing deaths were not mentioned which prevented many doctors realising the size of the problem until too late.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 3, 2023 1:23:33 GMT
Stalin and his far more corrupt and incompetent regime. It was neither. It was far more brutal. You may apply other negative value-laden descriptors to the Stalin regime where it exceeded the Tsars' regime. Corruption and incompetence were not such characteristics. |
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Post by halferking on May 3, 2023 3:42:47 GMT
His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. The United Kingdom not able to enter the war to support France against Germany if they behave and do not invade Belgium most likely will also not be good for his health i assume. His eyesight was deteriorating and he was advised to reduce his reading and to a more healthier lifestyle. He complained of being 'inhumanly busy' and he even tried to secure leave for the staff at the Foreign Office to try and lift the burden. In 1915 Asquith said this "His pessimism and nerves are dreadful! /think he is off his head...It's a curious thing, but Grey had developed lately all the defects I thought I could never have! I hardly value his judgement at all now! He is so unstrung and self-enfolded." i.e., heading for a breakdown. From what I have read Asquith it seems was prepared to sacrifice his friend Grey was instrumental in winning over a divided Cabinet on the prospect of war by arguing that the trigger point for a declaration of war should be the violation of Belgian neutrality and not some questionable allegiance to France. The war weighed heavy on his mind it seems. He had no sons, but he did have a brother and two nephews. His brother, Charlie, was badly injured in British East Africa and had to have his left arm amputated and his nephews Cecil was taken prisoner in 1914 and Adrian who was killed at The Front in 1918. The sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania would haunt his waking hours and it is said that on Christmas Eve 1914 he awoke to the sound of Christmas Hymns being sung but for him he thought that the Germans had invaded. In the June of 1916 just before he stepped down Grey was recognised as being the longest serving Foreign Secretary and was sent a memo... He added to it this simple sentence "The war, though inevitable, will always marr the memory of it." Whether the delay in Great Britain entering the war or entering at all would have changed things - it seems that it would have certainly benefited his mental wellbeing. Grey was married twice apparently and although he had no legitimate children rumour had it he had two illegitimate children (extra-marital affairs). His first wife was Dorothy Widdrington whom he married in 1885, but she died in 1906. His second wife Pamela Adelaide Genevieve Grey nee Wyndham, Viscountess Fallodon died in November 1928 and Grey remained a widower until his death in September 1933 at the age of 71. |
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Post by halferking on May 3, 2023 4:08:04 GMT
a) A couple of points to mention that hasn't been covered in the preceding posts - unless I missed something.
The reason the Lord's blocking of the budget was so controversial was because there had previously been a tacit acceptance that a finance bills was the one category that wouldn't be blocked by the Lords. This was why the king eventually forced the Lords to back down by threatening if necessary to create a large number of new Liberal Lords to swap the long establish Tory majority and eventually legislation passed that limited the time the Lord's could block any government bill. To be fair IIRC Lloyd George did include some measures not normally in a finance bill, such as Welsh Disestablishment which the overwhelmingly pro-Anglican Lords had blocked in the past. It was more the ‘robin hood taxes’ that were the problem… www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseoflords/parliamentacts/collections/limehouse/The argument appears to have been a moral one. b) While after the 1910 elections the different in terms of MPs was very slim between the Liberals and Tories the primary reason the former stayed in power was because they had the support of the Irish Nationalist movement, which because Ireland was heavily over-represented in Parliament meant about 80 additional MPs. They were never likely to support a Tory government because the latter were bitterly opposed to Irish Home Rule so getting the Tories in power before 1914 - apart from any butterflies related to that occurring - would need a substantial change in opinion in the mainland UK against the Liberals - or more accurately in favour of the Tories as Liberal losses that didn't got to the Tories would probably end up with the early Labour who were also unlikely to prefer a Tory government. Minority governments are often forced to rely on the whims of lesser parties either in a formal coalition or a supply and confidence agreement. |
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Post by halferking on May 3, 2023 4:10:58 GMT
I think the hyperlink was incomplete the ‘k’ in look was not included in the address… I say gave up, but it was more like accepting the inevitability of events. Grey recognised that the time for diplomacy was over, and that the country was hurtling full steam towards open conflict. His health was also deteriorating apparently, he was nearly driven blind by the stress and the workload. He left office in December 1916. oke ... have tried to 'remake' the link. ... hope it works now It has worked. Thank you. I will give it a read and get back to you with my thoughts. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 3, 2023 15:21:28 GMT
a) A couple of points to mention that hasn't been covered in the preceding posts - unless I missed something.
The reason the Lord's blocking of the budget was so controversial was because there had previously been a tacit acceptance that a finance bills was the one category that wouldn't be blocked by the Lords. This was why the king eventually forced the Lords to back down by threatening if necessary to create a large number of new Liberal Lords to swap the long establish Tory majority and eventually legislation passed that limited the time the Lord's could block any government bill. To be fair IIRC Lloyd George did include some measures not normally in a finance bill, such as Welsh Disestablishment which the overwhelmingly pro-Anglican Lords had blocked in the past. It was more the ‘robin hood taxes’ that were the problem… www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/houseoflords/parliamentacts/collections/limehouse/The argument appears to have been a moral one. b) While after the 1910 elections the different in terms of MPs was very slim between the Liberals and Tories the primary reason the former stayed in power was because they had the support of the Irish Nationalist movement, which because Ireland was heavily over-represented in Parliament meant about 80 additional MPs. They were never likely to support a Tory government because the latter were bitterly opposed to Irish Home Rule so getting the Tories in power before 1914 - apart from any butterflies related to that occurring - would need a substantial change in opinion in the mainland UK against the Liberals - or more accurately in favour of the Tories as Liberal losses that didn't got to the Tories would probably end up with the early Labour who were also unlikely to prefer a Tory government. Minority governments are often forced to rely on the whims of lesser parties either in a formal coalition or a supply and confidence agreement.
That might be the case but I don't think it changes the fact that the previous unofficial rule was that the Lord's did not block fiscal bills. Must admit even with the specs I think that text too small for me to read easily but know there was a strong desire, especially among the radicals of which Lloyd George was the leading character to redress the imbalance in terms of wealth and spending and that was obviously an attractive idea for people who had so little in the way of resources themselves.
Similarly with the 2nd point I can't see it affecting what I said. Given the total opposition of the Tories to Home Rule for Ireland they were never going to get the support of Irish Catholic parties which held a sizeable number of seats so it would take quite a swing in public opinion in the main part of the UK to enable the Tories to achieve a majority in the near term.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 3, 2023 15:25:25 GMT
The United Kingdom not able to enter the war to support France against Germany if they behave and do not invade Belgium most likely will also not be good for his health i assume. His eyesight was deteriorating and he was advised to reduce his reading and to a more healthier lifestyle. He complained of being 'inhumanly busy' and he even tried to secure leave for the staff at the Foreign Office to try and lift the burden. In 1915 Asquith said this "His pessimism and nerves are dreadful! /think he is off his head...It's a curious thing, but Grey had developed lately all the defects I thought I could never have! I hardly value his judgement at all now! He is so unstrung and self-enfolded." i.e., heading for a breakdown. From what I have read Asquith it seems was prepared to sacrifice his friend Grey was instrumental in winning over a divided Cabinet on the prospect of war by arguing that the trigger point for a declaration of war should be the violation of Belgian neutrality and not some questionable allegiance to France. The war weighed heavy on his mind it seems. He had no sons, but he did have a brother and two nephews. His brother, Charlie, was badly injured in British East Africa and had to have his left arm amputated and his nephews Cecil was taken prisoner in 1914 and Adrian who was killed at The Front in 1918. The sinking of the passenger ship Lusitania would haunt his waking hours and it is said that on Christmas Eve 1914 he awoke to the sound of Christmas Hymns being sung but for him he thought that the Germans had invaded. In the June of 1916 just before he stepped down Grey was recognised as being the longest serving Foreign Secretary and was sent a memo... He added to it this simple sentence "The war, though inevitable, will always marr the memory of it." Whether the delay in Great Britain entering the war or entering at all would have changed things - it seems that it would have certainly benefited his mental wellbeing. Grey was married twice apparently and although he had no legitimate children rumour had it he had two illegitimate children (extra-marital affairs). His first wife was Dorothy Widdrington whom he married in 1885, but she died in 1906. His second wife Pamela Adelaide Genevieve Grey nee Wyndham, Viscountess Fallodon died in November 1928 and Grey remained a widower until his death in September 1933 at the age of 71.
I knew he was struggling although not that badly and wonder if Britain not being in the war would have made a massive difference to his health? If we're outside and it looks like Germany is going to end up with military control of most of the continent, or at least weaken France and Russia so much that the challenge to Britain would be considerably increased and that its politically difficult to get Britain entering the war to influence that imbalance I suspect he's still going to feel a hell of a lot of stress.
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on May 3, 2023 20:35:57 GMT
Reply to sundries:
First note the opening post?
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
Posts: 7,470
Likes: 4,295
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Post by miletus12 on May 3, 2023 20:59:20 GMT
So I want to discuss once again an old standby. Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia. However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it. So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border. If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested. The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election. That said, A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election? A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent? A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election? B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition? C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well] D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected? E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers? Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features: 1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade 2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia 3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia 4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns 5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several 6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple. Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie. Thanks for reading, those of you still with me.  Looking forward to your responses! Reply to sundries who complain about manufacturing or that I do not know the WWI history. I actually do know that history, and I have I think demonstrated it to a degree. I am somewhat astonished that many here do not understand that history as to time and place. Nobody who participated in 1914 had the manufacturing base to sustain the armies they set in motion in 1914. It took the FRENCH two years to ramp up. It took the British one and a half years to ramp up, and a FULL YEAR to build a new army to replace the one the Germans destroyed in 1914. Into late 1915, erarly 1916 the main fight was France versus Germany. Let me remind you...  The first two years of the war were based on a decade or more stockpiles of legacy weapon systems and ammunition stockpiles at hand. That was as true for the British as any other participant. Everybody shot their munitions off by late 1914. We can measure two three month pauses in the fighting independent of the weather effects in 1915 as new munition stocks ran down and, new cohorts had to be trained to replace those killed off by the imbeciles leading that butchery. It was not until about March 1916 that the real 24/7 tempos kicked in for France. ================================================================================== Now look at the opening post conditions? The Germans head for Russia. France breathes a sigh of relief and goes to a war economy to prepare for the inevitable. The British are given the Napoleon problem in reverse. The Asquith government has a set of political and economic decisions based on the near certainty that the Germans will spread the war after their Russia venture bogs down in the mud in the autumn of 1914. They, the British, have that long by the OP to make their choices among three options. a. strengthen the fleet as best they can with resources stockpiled, and prepare a blockade. b. shift to a war economy immediately. c. raise a land army to intervene decisively at a place of British choosing, hopefully one more sensible than the idiocy the Asquith government chose. d. aid Russia. I have discussed the aid options to Russia and I will not repeat them. Those options take one to two years to execute. No immediate war in France gives a three to six month window of German stupidity to be British clever about it. Then it is a year and a half buildup race to put enough iron into Russia to keep them killing Germans while a better war is "hopefully" fought in France, than the one those British stategic amateurs fought. Now I place you as the Asquith government. Do you open supply routes up, and do you ship the Russians available purchasable stockpiles on hand, and do you spend the time to prepare your manufacturing base to ramp your own stockpiles up? Every objection to what I proposed has been to me based on the fundamental misunderstandings of what actually occurred during 1914 and 1915. This was not 1916, people. You do have these options. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
Posts: 24,832
Likes: 13,222
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Post by stevep on May 3, 2023 21:21:06 GMT
So I want to discuss once again an old standby. Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia. However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it. So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border. If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested. The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election. That said, A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election? A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent? A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election? B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition? C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well] D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected? E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers? Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features: 1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade 2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia 3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia 4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns 5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several 6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple. Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie. Thanks for reading, those of you still with me. Looking forward to your responses! Reply to sundries who complain about manufacturing or that I do not know the WWI history. I actually do know that history, and I have I think demonstrated it to a degree. I am somewhat astonished that many here do not understand that history as to time and place. Nobody who participated in 1914 had the manufacturing base to sustain the armies they set in motion in 1914. It took the FRENCH two years to ramp up. It took the British one and a half years to ramp up, and a FULL YEAR to build a new army to replace the one the Germans destroyed in 1914. Into late 1915, erarly 1916 the main fight was France versus Germany. Let me remind you... The first two years of the war were based on a decade or more stockpiles of legacy weapon systems and ammunition stockpiles at hand. That was as true for the British as any other participant. Everybody shot their munitions off by late 1914. We can measure two three month pauses in the fighting independent of the weather effects in 1915 as new munition stocks ran down and, new cohorts had to be trained to replace those killed off by the imbeciles leading that butchery. It was not until about March 1916 that the real 24/7 tempos kicked in for France. ================================================================================== Now look at the opening post conditions? The Germans head for Russia. France breathes a sigh of relief and goes to a war economy to prepare for the inevitable. The British are given the Napoleon problem in reverse. The Asquith government has a set of political and economic decisions based on the near certainty that the Germans will spread the war after the Russia venture bogs down in the mud in the autumn of 1914. They have that long by the OP to make their choices among three options. a. strengthen the fleet as best they can with resources stockpiled, and prepare a blockade. b. raise a land army to intervene at a place of choosing, hopefully one more sensible than the idiocy the Asquith government chose. c. aid Russia.
The fact your talking about large scale equipment supplies to Russia from the western powers and then you admit that that equipment/munitions weren't available until 1916 suggests you have some confusion at least. That even the relatively small British army was desperately short of shells and initially even more so actual artillery units through 1915 and a good chunk of 1916 also shows that Britain was in no position to supply the huge amounts that the much larger Russian army would need. France would be in a better position in terms of simple production but would also be fighting heavily itself and have to consider becoming the primary target of a German attack at any point.
You still fail to respond to the other issues such as the logistical impossibility to get such massive supplies/equipment amounts to Russia, let alone persuading them to accept foreign command of their forces.
You present three 'options' you suggest for the British government. Leaving aside the TL assumes that Britain isn't actually at war with Germany their not alternatives as all three need to be considered if not actually implemented. Making sure the navy is powerful enough is essential. As is having an army ready to support allies. Plus it was not the government but the military that decided that the BEF would be deployed to France. Aiding Russia would be very useful, which is why it was tried historically, but simply isn't possible on the level your suggesting - albeit that a lot of equipment was being supplied by 1917.
The problem is that what you suggested is impossible but you seem to be unwilling to admit that. Flogging a dead horse here I think.
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Post by Max Sinister on May 6, 2023 9:07:00 GMT
Stalin and his far more corrupt and incompetent regime. It was neither. It was far more brutal. You may apply other negative value-laden descriptors to the Stalin regime where it exceeded the Tsars' regime. Corruption and incompetence were not such characteristics. I agree that the brutality is the main thing we should care about, but why do you think that way re: corruption and incompetence? |
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