Germany Goes East first in 1914, British politics aspects only discussion

So I want to discuss once again an old standby.

Germany goes east first in 1914, not doing an offensive campaign in the west, and not violating Belgian and Luxemburg neutrality. Germany is hoping to avoid altogether, and at the very least significantly delay, any British participation in the war against Germany and its ally Austria-Hungary while these two Central Powers absolutely manhandle Serbia and settle the Balkans to their satisfaction and sharply defeat the Russians, at least throwing them out of Poland and Lithuania and buffering Austrian Galicia.

However what I would like to focus on in this thread, pretty much to this exclusion of other sub-topics, is British Cabinet and Parliamentary politics about handling the war in Europe, or entering it.

So I absolutely do not wish to debate or discuss the (im)plausibility of the Germans making the strategic decision written above, and will ignore posted commentary along those lines. I am mostly uninterested, at this moment and in this thread, in the probable course of military campaigns on mainland Europe on the German and Austrian borders with Russia, the Balkans, and the Franco-German border.

If you happen to have any posted commentary on French Presidential, Cabinet or Parliamentary politics, or Belgian, affected by this PoD, I may be interested.

The other postulate or ground rule I have is that the Liberal Cabinet, as consistuted in the early days of August 1914, will not declare war on Germany pursuing this east first course of action, and leaving Belgian territory inviolate, and that also does not send its fleet units into the English Channel for anti-French operations. [and Germany complies with that naval restriction] I postulate that any attempt by Asquith or Grey or any other Cabinet member to obtain a declaration of war, brings about a sufficient number of objecting Liberal Minister resignations to bring down the Cabinet and force a new election.

That said,

A) How long could a Liberal Asquith Cabinet refraining from declaring war in 1914 for many weeks while the CP attack east and south and the French attack east, remain in power without being forced to face an election?

A1) Would Grey resign over Britain remaining a non-belligerent?

A2) Who else would resign from the Cabinet over Britain remaining a non-belligerent, and would that number be sufficient to force a new election?

B) How soon (measured in days) could an election be held, and who would win the majority, Conservative, Liberal, or a forced Coalition?

C) In a spot election campaign, would the Conservative Party campaign, basically undivided, on a platform of 'Go to war with Germany, yesterday, for God, King, Country, the Empire, the Royal Navy, and the sacred Balance of Power'? [insert whatever slogan you may wish - poor little Serbia or our Gallant Gallic guypals would do as well]

D) How soon (measured in days) would the new Commons be filled and Cabinet selected?

E) If a Conservative majority Cabinet or Conservative-led coalition (presumably dominated by 'go to war with Germany' voices) would new Cabinet both inevitably, and promptly declare war on Germany? Or would there be time for the new Cabinet to deliberate, for Parliament to debate, or to form second thoughts, or to respond to second thoughts about entering the war if such emerged from public opinion, newspapers, or new backbenchers?

Since I'm not quite familiar with Parliamentary mechanics, procedure and tactics, and each individual in play, I can't be precise about timelines, but my honest ballpark estimate of the military situation that any British government, old or new, would be observing, anywhere from one week to the three months from the start of the conflict in August, would have the following features:

1. No belligerent's capital would be occupied or seriously menaced besides Belgrade
2. No belligerent would have surrendered, with the possible exception of Serbia
3. No belligerent's Army would have suffered a final, decisive, annihilating blow, except possibly Serbia
4. France would be attacking into German Alsace-Lorraine, but suffering heavy losses (and inflicting heavy ones too) while making ever more meagre returns; or this may have shift to the Germans counter-attacking, to the Germans at most successful having repelling the French back over their own frontier, but with the German counter-offensive now making ever more meagre returns
5. Russian losses would be no more than one or two armies of several
6. Russian territorial losses would be limited primarily to Congress Poland and perhaps some of Lithuania, with core Russia and Ukraine scarcely touched

To most neutral observers, in other words, the war map would not show an image of Teutonic arms sweeping all before them, but instead a grind of fairly evenly matched foes, in a tight grapple.

Interventionists, and Anti-Interventionists in the UK, I imagine, will interpret that, and its meaning, or lack of it, for the balance of power and other British interests, as they will. I'm inclined to seeing the even matching and tight grapple make British intervention seem *less* urgent while the battlefield losses make the war uglier and less glamorous and attractive. But that may be my 21st century detachment talking. It's not like domino theories, jumping to conclusions, panic, and manic policy improvisations haven't happened before, so interventionists could somehow use all the same circumstances to say why Britain must leap in to break the tie.

Thanks for reading, those of you still with me. 

Looking forward to your responses!