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Post by raharris1973 on Apr 30, 2023 1:23:34 GMT
It should be noted that OTL see here, that France refused a German demand for its neutrality Well indeed, France has multiple reinforcing reasons in terms of national aims and precautionary diplomacy to both mobilize and to side with Russia in war, despite the additional shares of the public who may oppose entering the war if it starts in the east and not against France, and their greater willingness to speak their mind to this effect. However, whether France decided to fight or stay neutral, it would never agree to a German demand to stay neutral or allow its decision to appear forced rather than coming from France's own decision based on its own interests. German demands to not do this or that only make those steps more likely. [Note - I have heard before about the German prewar ultimatum to France, but then I've also heard that it was written but never actually sent. So the record is confusing on this one!] On 31 July, Britain sent notes to Germany and France, asking them to respect Belgian neutrality; France pledged to do so, Germany did not reply OK, good and important data point that Britain was doing so by this date. Obviously, with Germany altering enough to do an east-first strategy coupled with the idea of maximally neutralizing Britain diplomacy, Germany would also apply in the affirmative to the British note. [of course, if all sides had more hints about the east first strategy, Britain might not send the note about Belgium, not wanting to put the French on the record, anticipating their Entente partner might be the first of the two in Western Europe to violate Belgian territory] presumably not attacking Luxembourg either? That would logically go along with the no initial aggression in the west approach. If Britain does stay out I would expect it to declare the Channel closed to combatant warships, other than those of the French but probably denying them access to the North Sea. This was part of an agreement to protect France's northern coastline and also important to avoiding conflict in the Channel which was so important to British shipping. Relations with Germany, already tense because of the German building programme and openly spoken intent of challenging the RN will be heightened but a lot will depend on what naval tactics Germany deploys. Attempts to enter the Channel with warships or early use of USW are likely to cause a strong reaction from Britain. Agree with all the above that Britain has every chance of selecting or declaring some limiting or exclusion of certain German naval movements or behaviors as its form of flexing its muscle during this European crisis. It may substitute for declaring war on Germany and send an Expeditionary force to support France, or not. Also agree that Germany would find such a pro-Entente imposition on its naval freedom of action vexing and annoying. It may have the perspective if that's the limit of what Britain is doing that it's the cost of doing business and preferable to having Britain be in the war or delaying British participation in the war. So if the British make some maritime declaration the Germans will in some form protest its legitimacy, but they would probably comply unless they come to view their surface fleet as the critical missing ingredient shaping the war with France. USW, especially in terms of attacks on neutral and non-French shipping, is extremely unlikely. The Germans and French can harass each other's commerce per cruiser rules, and neither can enforce a close, or distant, blockade on each other without British participation in that blockade. Also he seems to expect Serbia to be crushed a lot quicker than OTL - for whatever reasons is unclear. Well this is not much of a logical leap to imagine as a consequence of Germany throwing its heaviest offensive weight east. Serbia lasted as long as it did because of its own tenacity and Austrian screw-ups in part related to them being told by about the Schlieffen Plan last minute, reorienting to sending more forces against Russia hastily, setbacks against the Russians drawing in more Austrians, and so on. Fundamentally, the Russians by holding the offensive initiative in 1914 prevented Austrian offensive concentration on the Serbs. But if the Germans are throwing serious Schlieffen-esque offensive weight against the Russians, the Russians won't be able to hold the offensive initiative against the Austrians. The Russians will be defending themselves in the field, trying to do so in fortresses and fortified zones, or trying to do the 'retreat and draw the enemy in' thing. But the one thing they can't do with any of those approaches, especially that last one, is threaten Austrian Galicia, so frees Austria to concentrate forces for relentless assaults to batter down the Serbs in 1914. e) As such I would expect a longer war, at least 18 months or so and unless the Germans overreach themselves deep in Russia - which they might well do if the Russians are careful - the CPs will start looking for a massive victory which is likely to force British intervention against them, or the threat of that to prompt a less decisive but still clear CP victory. A more protracted struggle, with everybody holding out longer, looking for a plan B, waiting for fortunes to change, really does seem more in line with human nature than reaching a relatively simple and clean bargain registering and validating the combatants limited battlefield gains to date after just a few months. |
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on Apr 30, 2023 7:06:47 GMT
a) France will support Russia because it has to else its very isolated. If I recall it had already made commitments to Russia to this effect. It should be noted that OTL see here, that France refused a German demand for its neutrality in a CP war with Russia and ordered a general mobilization but delayed a dow on Germany. Germany declared war on France on the 3rd of August so Skallagrim's mention that France 'only declared war on the CPs on the 12th August sounds odd. As said above: It was Poincarè who set a possible french DoW against Germany - in case they won't attack France as the germans wouldn't ITTL - on the 12th August due to waiting for the begun mobilisation to unfold in the time it needed to do so and due to the 'formality' of THEN calling the National Assembly required by the constitutional laws for a DoW. All this he told Iszvolsky at night from 1st to 2nd August when the latter came crying about the german DoW against Russia of 1st August and as he reported to Sazonow (to be found in : " Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, edited by Otto Hoetzsch" which can be found here). By the OP: no ... onlx if the french would start an attack what won't happen before 12th August the earliest without german aggression from its western borders. ... how long took it Joffre and the french top brass IOTL to review their acrtual operational gogma of "attach à outrance" and assigning any artillery if at all more than a the infantiy's attack supporting role? While I well agree on the first sentence here the citation of the wiki site shold be taken with the one or other grain of salt (asteroid size at least) 1. It 'nicely' keeps from calling who these 'senior cabinet ministers' were and how many senior cabinet ministers were against intervention - esp. at the time of 19th to 31 st July 2. It claims a 'committment to support France' there simply aren't any sources for - esp. at the time of 19th to 31 st July 3. It is - to be polite - simply 'not fully correct' regarding Grey request about respecting belgian neutrality. The german Foreign Secretary DID answer the british ambassadors request but was evasive in it for an assumed reason of by him not to be shared with foreigners possible military recuperations as well as a the known reason: having first to ask out the Kaiser about - as reported back to Grey by Buchanan (can be found in the "BRITISH DOCUMENTS on the origins of the great war, vol. XI" but not furthered by Grey to the cabinet. Given the IOTL attitude of the Kaiser even recalling and withdrewing troops from Luxembourg I would render it rather probably that they won't enter ITTL from the beginning. ... as even Tirpitz was IOTL quickly ready to condece on 3rd/4th August. ... well I perceived the PoD for this ATL would be rather shortly before OTL events (aka July 1914) and tehrefore there won't be much of any forerun the russians might have been able to react to. ...e sp regarding constructive measures (may it be railways or fortresses). And regarding general military planning ... the 'plans' for russian deployments and their operational usage were almost as 'fixed' as they were for the germans. The last date they would have been able to 'switch' from one of their prepared plans to the other was Mob day 6-7. The hussle around the russian mobilisation IOTL - partial or general or again partial or again general - was not at least due to the technicalities of the mobilisation and deployment processes. And ... for these plan of operation ... the russians did not have a defensive concept in 1914 at all. These were rescinded in 1912 with the adoption of accordingly named plan 1912. Until then they actually had quite a defensive )only) concept that between other things included a deliberat neglecting of esp. railways in poland and from some factions within the russian top brass also the fortifications (was quite some internal struggle going on about). Now ... for plan 1912 and its two iterations "A" fro Austria and "G" fro Germany. Bothw were 'agressive' plans fro attacking both opponents - Germany as well as Austria. Only the weighting of troops and focus of the attacks changed (by one army only). It is MYTH only too often spread in kinda 'wishfull' reinterpretation tah plan "G" was a defensive one. For sources on my assertions: The writings of and about Sergei Dobroloski- then chief of department of Mobilisation, Vladimir Sukhomlinov - then war minister, Yuri Danilov - then Quartermaster General Mennings "Bayonets before Bullets - The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914 Hamilton and Herwigs "War Planning 1914" ... as the first that come to my mind ... as I now have to attend my family ... maybe later more 
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Apr 30, 2023 11:54:54 GMT
It should be noted that OTL see here, that France refused a German demand for its neutrality Well indeed, France has multiple reinforcing reasons in terms of national aims and precautionary diplomacy to both mobilize and to side with Russia in war, despite the additional shares of the public who may oppose entering the war if it starts in the east and not against France, and their greater willingness to speak their mind to this effect. However, whether France decided to fight or stay neutral, it would never agree to a German demand to stay neutral or allow its decision to appear forced rather than coming from France's own decision based on its own interests. German demands to not do this or that only make those steps more likely. [Note - I have heard before about the German prewar ultimatum to France, but then I've also heard that it was written but never actually sent. So the record is confusing on this one!] On 31 July, Britain sent notes to Germany and France, asking them to respect Belgian neutrality; France pledged to do so, Germany did not reply OK, good and important data point that Britain was doing so by this date. Obviously, with Germany altering enough to do an east-first strategy coupled with the idea of maximally neutralizing Britain diplomacy, Germany would also apply in the affirmative to the British note. [of course, if all sides had more hints about the east first strategy, Britain might not send the note about Belgium, not wanting to put the French on the record, anticipating their Entente partner might be the first of the two in Western Europe to violate Belgian territory] presumably not attacking Luxembourg either? That would logically go along with the no initial aggression in the west approach. If Britain does stay out I would expect it to declare the Channel closed to combatant warships, other than those of the French but probably denying them access to the North Sea. This was part of an agreement to protect France's northern coastline and also important to avoiding conflict in the Channel which was so important to British shipping. Relations with Germany, already tense because of the German building programme and openly spoken intent of challenging the RN will be heightened but a lot will depend on what naval tactics Germany deploys. Attempts to enter the Channel with warships or early use of USW are likely to cause a strong reaction from Britain. Agree with all the above that Britain has every chance of selecting or declaring some limiting or exclusion of certain German naval movements or behaviors as its form of flexing its muscle during this European crisis. It may substitute for declaring war on Germany and send an Expeditionary force to support France, or not. Also agree that Germany would find such a pro-Entente imposition on its naval freedom of action vexing and annoying. It may have the perspective if that's the limit of what Britain is doing that it's the cost of doing business and preferable to having Britain be in the war or delaying British participation in the war. So if the British make some maritime declaration the Germans will in some form protest its legitimacy, but they would probably comply unless they come to view their surface fleet as the critical missing ingredient shaping the war with France. USW, especially in terms of attacks on neutral and non-French shipping, is extremely unlikely. The Germans and French can harass each other's commerce per cruiser rules, and neither can enforce a close, or distant, blockade on each other without British participation in that blockade. Also he seems to expect Serbia to be crushed a lot quicker than OTL - for whatever reasons is unclear. Well this is not much of a logical leap to imagine as a consequence of Germany throwing its heaviest offensive weight east. Serbia lasted as long as it did because of its own tenacity and Austrian screw-ups in part related to them being told by about the Schlieffen Plan last minute, reorienting to sending more forces against Russia hastily, setbacks against the Russians drawing in more Austrians, and so on. Fundamentally, the Russians by holding the offensive initiative in 1914 prevented Austrian offensive concentration on the Serbs. But if the Germans are throwing serious Schlieffen-esque offensive weight against the Russians, the Russians won't be able to hold the offensive initiative against the Austrians. The Russians will be defending themselves in the field, trying to do so in fortresses and fortified zones, or trying to do the 'retreat and draw the enemy in' thing. But the one thing they can't do with any of those approaches, especially that last one, is threaten Austrian Galicia, so frees Austria to concentrate forces for relentless assaults to batter down the Serbs in 1914. e) As such I would expect a longer war, at least 18 months or so and unless the Germans overreach themselves deep in Russia - which they might well do if the Russians are careful - the CPs will start looking for a massive victory which is likely to force British intervention against them, or the threat of that to prompt a less decisive but still clear CP victory. A more protracted struggle, with everybody holding out longer, looking for a plan B, waiting for fortunes to change, really does seem more in line with human nature than reaching a relatively simple and clean bargain registering and validating the combatants limited battlefield gains to date after just a few months.
In agreement but on the point of Serbia it was also a good defensive position, Serbian tenacity and poor Austrian leadership. None of those are likely to change. If Germany is going east and informs its ally then Austria might sent its reserve south against Serbia and that might make a difference. However it might still concentrate them against Russia in the hope/expectation that they can, along with Germany crush the bulk of the Russian regular forces quickly.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Apr 30, 2023 12:16:53 GMT
a) France will support Russia because it has to else its very isolated. If I recall it had already made commitments to Russia to this effect. It should be noted that OTL see here, that France refused a German demand for its neutrality in a CP war with Russia and ordered a general mobilization but delayed a dow on Germany. Germany declared war on France on the 3rd of August so Skallagrim's mention that France 'only declared war on the CPs on the 12th August sounds odd. As said above: It was Poincarè who set a possible french DoW against Germany - in case they won't attack France as the germans wouldn't ITTL - on the 12th August due to waiting for the begun mobilisation to unfold in the time it needed to do so and due to the 'formality' of THEN calling the National Assembly required by the constitutional laws for a DoW. All this he told Iszvolsky at night from 1st to 2nd August when the latter came crying about the german DoW against Russia of 1st August and as he reported to Sazonow (to be found in : " Die internationalen Beziehungen im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, edited by Otto Hoetzsch" which can be found here). By the OP: no ... onlx if the french would start an attack what won't happen before 12th August the earliest without german aggression from its western borders. ... how long took it Joffre and the french top brass IOTL to review their acrtual operational gogma of "attach à outrance" and assigning any artillery if at all more than a the infantiy's attack supporting role? While I well agree on the first sentence here the citation of the wiki site shold be taken with the one or other grain of salt (asteroid size at least) 1. It 'nicely' keeps from calling who these 'senior cabinet ministers' were and how many senior cabinet ministers were against intervention - esp. at the time of 19th to 31 st July 2. It claims a 'committment to support France' there simply aren't any sources for - esp. at the time of 19th to 31 st July 3. It is - to be polite - simply 'not fully correct' regarding Grey request about respecting belgian neutrality. The german Foreign Secretary DID answer the british ambassadors request but was evasive in it for an assumed reason of by him not to be shared with foreigners possible military recuperations as well as a the known reason: having first to ask out the Kaiser about - as reported back to Grey by Buchanan (can be found in the "BRITISH DOCUMENTS on the origins of the great war, vol. XI" but not furthered by Grey to the cabinet. Given the IOTL attitude of the Kaiser even recalling and withdrewing troops from Luxembourg I would render it rather probably that they won't enter ITTL from the beginning. ... as even Tirpitz was IOTL quickly ready to condece on 3rd/4th August. ... well I perceived the PoD for this ATL would be rather shortly before OTL events (aka July 1914) and tehrefore there won't be much of any forerun the russians might have been able to react to. ...e sp regarding constructive measures (may it be railways or fortresses). And regarding general military planning ... the 'plans' for russian deployments and their operational usage were almost as 'fixed' as they were for the germans. The last date they would have been able to 'switch' from one of their prepared plans to the other was Mob day 6-7. The hussle around the russian mobilisation IOTL - partial or general or again partial or again general - was not at least due to the technicalities of the mobilisation and deployment processes. And ... for these plan of operation ... the russians did not have a defensive concept in 1914 at all. These were rescinded in 1912 with the adoption of accordingly named plan 1912. Until then they actually had quite a defensive )only) concept that between other things included a deliberat neglecting of esp. railways in poland and from some factions within the russian top brass also the fortifications (was quite some internal struggle going on about). Now ... for plan 1912 and its two iterations "A" fro Austria and "G" fro Germany. Bothw were 'agressive' plans fro attacking both opponents - Germany as well as Austria. Only the weighting of troops and focus of the attacks changed (by one army only). It is MYTH only too often spread in kinda 'wishfull' reinterpretation tah plan "G" was a defensive one. For sources on my assertions: The writings of and about Sergei Dobroloski- then chief of department of Mobilisation, Vladimir Sukhomlinov - then war minister, Yuri Danilov - then Quartermaster General Mennings "Bayonets before Bullets - The Imperial Russian Army, 1861-1914 Hamilton and Herwigs "War Planning 1914" ... as the first that come to my mind ... as I now have to attend my family ... maybe later more
In terms of the British stance then: a) There had been moral commitments to support France if they were attacked and a realization that Britain could not afford to see Germany crush its continental rivals. As such a number of leading members of the government probably saw British involvement as necessary if war came.
b) Albeit that they knew many of their colleagues in the Liberal government disagreed. Also, although they had no binding role on the government there had been informal discussions between army officers over the probable role of the BEF in the event of a German attack. This would still be the case if such an attack was seen as likely - which would be the case if the German drastic change in war plans was occurring as late as your suggesting, although that seems unlikely. The army and - given the continued aggressive comments from Germany over their navy - the RN along with most of the Conservative leadership were markedly more committed to such a war.
c) I would say the OTL evasiveness of the German ambassador would be because he knew that any such promise he made would be quickly broken. TTL if the German policy change is made some time before the crisis he might know that no such attack is planned by Germany and be willing to give at least a provisional commitment. Coupled with the availability of telegrams it wouldn't take long to get such a conformation from the Kaiser if he wished to give one.
As to Russia then I would be very doubtful about such a late change of plan by Germany. They had put considerable effort into preparing for the attack west including building a number of railway stations in largely empty country simply to manage the movement of masses of men, equipment and supplies to the border for the invasions of Belgium and France. I think it would be very unlikely that the conservative German military would be willing to risk changing everything at the last moment as that would mean almost immediately changing thousands of railway trips to go in a totally different direction and unload supplies basically in the middle of nowhere in some cases. I suspect any such decision would have almost certainly been made at least a couple of years earlier.
I don't know why your commenting that the OTL Russian plan wasn't defensive because its well known it wasn't? It was aggressive because the German plan to strike France 1st was well known and Russia - encouraged by France - had the basic aim of mobilizing quickly so forces could be sent west to take some pressure off France - as they actual did to a small degree albeit that the shambolic 1st and 2nd armies and their squabbling commanders had been defeated before the forces transferred east could reach E Prussia IIRC. Here if Russia is expecting to receive the main weight of both German and Austrian armies then their likely to have much more defensive plans, whether their fighting from prepared defensive or a fighting withdrawal into the interior.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Apr 30, 2023 12:18:31 GMT
As usual with such threads we're getting rather off topic as the OP requested discussion only on what happens in the UK and its policies as a result. However to a degree that's unavoidable as with a massive conflict just across the channel that will definitely impact British decision making.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Apr 30, 2023 12:22:11 GMT
As usual with such threads we're getting rather off topic as the OP requested discussion only on what happens in the UK and its policies as a result. However to a degree that's unavoidable as with a massive conflict just across the channel that will definitely impact British decision making. Do we now what the British political parties view on war with Germany was before the outbreak, did some push for war and other wanted no war. |
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Post by halferking on Apr 30, 2023 21:09:40 GMT
Asquith became leader of the Liberal Party in 1908 following the resignation of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Campbell-Bannerman led his party to a massive landslide victory in 1906 with 397 seats to the Conservatives’ 156 seats, but he resigned due to ill-health in 1908 and died a few days later. Henry Herbert Asquith was a rising star within the party and was tipped to take over. He became leader and Prime Minister.
The Asquith ministry was beset by issues – frustrated radicals in his party and a belligerent House of Lords which constantly worked to thwart the government programme. Things came to ahead in 1909 when Asquith’s Chancellor – David Lloyd-George – introduced the ‘People’s Budget’ a plan to tax the wealthy to fund new social welfare programmes. The House of Lords was in the hands of the wealthy Conservative Peers who took exception to the finance bill and vetoed it, which triggered a crisis. Asquith was forced to call an election in order to secure a mandate to force the Lords to support the budgetary legislation. Calling a general election is a gamble, but this had the added complication of being held winter. There are two reason we don’t have winter elections – (1) the weather and (2) lack of daylight. It is thought that both factors tend to dissuade voters from turning out. The February 1910 election however saw a huge voter turnout of 86.8%. Unfortunately this did not translate into a majority for the Liberals, but they did come out the other side as the largest party in the hung parliament and therefore had first go at forming the government. Asquith was successful and as agreed the Lords accepted the money bill in April 1910. This was a victory for Asquith, but it did not resolve the underlying issues between the Asquith ministry and the Lords and again Asquith decided to go to the people for a second time in the hope of being able to decisively deal with the problematic upper chamber. King Edward VII died on 6 May 1910 and to avoid a crisis in early days of George V reign the general election was put off until December.
The December 1910 election was another disappointing result for Asquith despite the high turnout (81%). The Liberals won 272 seats and the Conservatives 271 seats resulting in, yet another hung parliament. What both results from the two snap elections seem to show us is the country appeared to be moving away from the Liberals and towards the Conservatives. The Conservatives won the popular vote in both elections – 2,919,236 (Cons.) to 2,712,511 (Libs) in Jan. 1910 and 2,270,753 (Cons.) to 2,157,256 (Libs.) in Dec. 1910.
Asquith however used his ministry to implement the Parliament Act 1911, which limited the powers of the Lords and introduced a five-year term limit for a parliament i.e., whilst it was still within the Prime Minister’s gift to go to the people to seek a mandate to govern, he had to do so within five years of the last election. The outbreak of war intervened, and the next general election was held in 1918.
Asquith formed a Coalition Government of Liberals, Conservatives, Labour, Irish Unionists and an Independent to lead the country through the conflict. This Coalition did not last with the Conservatives leaving in 1915 in anger what was perceived to be a complete chaos in conducting the war most notably the shortage of munitions and the Gallipoli Campaign. Asquith was forced to resign in December 1916.
Given the politically instability and a growing hostility towards Germany, which forced George V to change the name of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to the House of Windsor, a senior minister resigning would be a blow – potentially fatal for Asquith – it seems that the darling of the party had had his fifteen minutes of fame and politicians being politicians reverted to their natural instinct – survival- then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, may be enough to trigger a domino effect in Cabinet. With Asquith haemorrhaging Ministers it would be difficult for him to stay on as Prime Minister. Combined with the perceived ineptitude in conducting the war, the disappointing results and the failure of the war time coalition government Henry Herbert Asquith would be forced to resign. Given the conflict on the continent it would be prudent to delay the general election so a continuity government would probably be formed and given the weaken state of the Liberal Party the Conservatives may be able to take control with Lloyd-George effectively Prime Minister in name only.
If Asquith is removed before the outbreak of war, it is possible that the opposition could try to bounce the Liberals into another election before 1914. This would be an optimal outcome for the Conservatives because at worst people would be election weary and turnout would be low resulting in a hung parliament with them being the largest party, given the results of OTL elections and the people’s anger at the perceived failures of the Liberal government, or an outright majority if they stand on an anti-German platform.
A government can be formed within days if a party has an outright majority and given the expeditious need to establish political stability in face of the oncoming storm, I imagine that a week at most given the frantic behind the scenes horse trading.
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Post by raharris1973 on Apr 30, 2023 23:14:01 GMT
halferking - these all look like good and useful data points on the OTL course of British politics and a speculative alternative path, but to follow any logical pattern of events, the real ones, or the hypothetical ones, in case of the altered German initial strategy, I would need to see them in chronological order and time-stamped: Asquith formed a Coalition Government of Liberals, Conservatives, Labour, Irish Unionists and an Independent to lead the country through the conflict. [What date was this movement to a Coalition? My understanding was on the date of joining the war in 1914 at least, Asquith was still running a Liberal, not Coalition government - the last Liberal government there ever was]This Coalition did not last with the Conservatives leaving in 1915 in anger what was perceived to be a complete chaos in conducting the war most notably the shortage of munitions and the Gallipoli Campaign. Asquith was forced to resign in December 1916. so clearly this is an OTL event, and for the Conservatives to leave some sort of Coalition in 1915, some Coalition had to be started by that yearGiven the politically instability and a growing hostility towards Germany, which forced George V to change the name of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to the House of Windsor, This was a wartime development, am I correct? It was not something brought about by earlier rivalry and bad press? - So it happened in the early months of the war?a senior minister resigning would be a blow – potentially fatal for Asquith – it seems that the darling of the party had had his fifteen minutes of fame and politicians being politicians reverted to their natural instinct – survival- then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, may be enough to trigger a domino effect in Cabinet. Senior minister resignations in wartime would have been blows, potentially fatal for Asquith, but what about a resignation during the July 1914 Crisis if anti interventionary Liberal Cabinet members are adamant and unified and influence Asquith to not be as pro-Entente as Grey or other pro-interventionary, pro-Entente, anti-German Cabinet members want, and Grey or other 'hawks' resign in consequence?With Asquith haemorrhaging Ministers it would be difficult for him to stay on as Prime Minister. Combined with the perceived ineptitude in conducting the war, the disappointing results and the failure of the war time coalition government Henry Herbert Asquith would be forced to resign. This is a given, but is a question for way after the timeframe I was asking aboutGiven the conflict on the continent it would be prudent to delay the general election so a continuity government would probably be formed and given the weaken state of the Liberal Party the Conservatives may be able to take control with Lloyd-George effectively Prime Minister in name only. If Asquith is removed before the outbreak of war, it is possible that the opposition could try to bounce the Liberals into another election before 1914. [I hadn't even brought up or considered this possibility. What do you think could have brought it about? Domestic scandal? An early Irish blow up?This would be an optimal outcome for the Conservatives because at worst people would be election weary and turnout would be low resulting in a hung parliament with them being the largest party, given the results of OTL elections and the people’s anger at the perceived failures of the Liberal government, or an outright majority if they stand on an anti-German platform. [That would have been a popular vote getter before the invasion of Belgium, and even before the July Crisis. It's unclear what timeframe you were envisioning
A government can be formed within days if a party has an outright majority and given the expeditious need to establish political stability in face of the oncoming storm, I imagine that a week at most given the frantic behind the scenes horse trading. [Not sure if this speedy timing was meant to be an answer to my question from the OP about how fast the Liberal govt could be replaced, and you're saying it could be fast if Asquith is seen to be flailing or weak in an international crisis?
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on May 1, 2023 7:40:30 GMT
... then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, ... I somehow wonder why so many people seem to assume that Grey would resign undoubtly if he woudn't get an "Everything for France (even has to be in the basket as well) !" between 1st and 3rd August 1914 on 4th August the latest.
I had started a disuccion about that early this year ( you might have a look  ) and its outcome was rather ... different.
I should also not been forgotten to what condition he connected his thread of resignation: "... out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention ..."
At 2nd August at least the "doves" - or most of them - were already well prepared to make some concessions and setting up triggerpoints (like violation of belgian integrety in from minister to minister varying severeness). With making such concession to Grey - though the germans clearly fullfill ITTL the demands regarding Belgium - maybe including a 'demiklitarization' of the channel (enforced by the RN) would IMHO well fullfill Greys demands as stated above.
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nomommsen
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Post by nomommsen on May 1, 2023 8:09:01 GMT
In terms of the British stance then: a) There had been moral commitments to support France if they were attacked and a realization that Britain could not afford to see Germany crush its continental rivals. As such a number of leading members of the government probably saw British involvement as necessary if war came.
b) Albeit that they knew many of their colleagues in the Liberal government disagreed. Also, although they had no binding role on the government there had been informal discussions between army officers over the probable role of the BEF in the event of a German attack. This would still be the case if such an attack was seen as likely - which would be the case if the German drastic change in war plans was occurring as late as your suggesting, although that seems unlikely. The army and - given the continued aggressive comments from Germany over their navy - the RN along with most of the Conservative leadership were markedly more committed to such a war.
c) I would say the OTL evasiveness of the German ambassador would be because he knew that any such promise he made would be quickly broken. TTL if the German policy change is made some time before the crisis he might know that no such attack is planned by Germany and be willing to give at least a provisional commitment. Coupled with the availability of telegrams it wouldn't take long to get such a conformation from the Kaiser if he wished to give one.
As to Russia then I would be very doubtful about such a late change of plan by Germany. They had put considerable effort into preparing for the attack west including building a number of railway stations in largely empty country simply to manage the movement of masses of men, equipment and supplies to the border for the invasions of Belgium and France. I think it would be very unlikely that the conservative German military would be willing to risk changing everything at the last moment as that would mean almost immediately changing thousands of railway trips to go in a totally different direction and unload supplies basically in the middle of nowhere in some cases. I suspect any such decision would have almost certainly been made at least a couple of years earlier.
I don't know why your commenting that the OTL Russian plan wasn't defensive because its well known it wasn't? It was aggressive because the German plan to strike France 1st was well known and Russia - encouraged by France - had the basic aim of mobilizing quickly so forces could be sent west to take some pressure off France - as they actual did to a small degree albeit that the shambolic 1st and 2nd armies and their squabbling commanders had been defeated before the forces transferred east could reach E Prussia IIRC. Here if Russia is expecting to receive the main weight of both German and Austrian armies then their likely to have much more defensive plans, whether their fighting from prepared defensive or a fighting withdrawal into the interior.
ad a) I have to confess this ... "argument" about "moral commitments" or the (heavy) weight of moralistic considerations for political decisions are IMHO VERY MUCH overrated. ... almost everytime more a propagandistic fig leaf for the public than truly influencing the ususal 'game-of-power' (machiavellistic ?) considerations. Otherwise it would be problematic to argue about leading nations support and continuing 'dealings' with people and nations like Xi and China, Saddam Hussein in his time, Idi Amin in his time, Pinochet in his time, the differeing regimes on the korean peninsula in their times, the Shah in his time, ... Therefore also ITTL I would render such 'moral commitments' also rather as 'propagandistic fig leafs' even if is serves only to convince oneself.
ad b) The militaries were more ... much more 'pro-war' without a doubt but ... the 'politicians' aka Asquith had no problems at all to ignore them as he did on several occasions esp. with the Director of Military Operations Henry Wilson.
ad c) Even as Jagow very likely knew of Moltkes plan to invade Belgium (he was involved in formulation and sending the according instructions by messenger in a sealed envelope to the ambassador at Bruessels) he was also as unsure on what road to take and what decision actually under the Kaisers auspicies might be made. Kaiser Bill was rather flighty about war-or-not-war during the whole crisis. And ofc Jagow wasn't in a position to "just call over at the Palace" to get some decision of the Kaiser by acclamation. Therefore giving him time a day or so would have been ... reasonable instead of using it in cabinet without further comment as Grey did.
And commenting on Russia ... was due to the considered 'free choice' awarded the russian leadership eventually taking a defensive stance. Such considerations IOTL - aside in some tactical surrounding, definitly not on army level (if even on Corps level) - began entering STAVKA slowly only after the Gorlice-Tarnow catastrophy. ... not earlier. ... until then they 'hyped' the cult of the offensive not less than their french friends.
... and in general ... I still render the discussion here not depending on a german decision years before the OTL July-crisis which alone would have given the russian leadership as well as the french a chance of changing their preparations.
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Post by halferking on May 1, 2023 8:45:16 GMT
Asquith formed a Coalition Government of Liberals, Conservatives, Labour, Irish Unionists and an Independent to lead the country through the conflict. [What date was this movement to a Coalition? My understanding was on the date of joining the war in 1914 at least, Asquith was still running a Liberal, not Coalition government - the last Liberal government there ever was]The Asquith coalition ministry was formed in May 1915 and lasted until Asquith was formed to resign on 5 December 1916. This Coalition did not last with the Conservatives leaving in 1915 in anger what was perceived to be a complete chaos in conducting the war most notably the shortage of munitions and the Gallipoli Campaign. Asquith was forced to resign in December 1916. so clearly this is an OTL event, and for the Conservatives to leave some sort of Coalition in 1915, some Coalition had to be started by that yearThe Conservatives were given lesser roles in the coalition and Andrew Bonar Law was angry and continued his attacks on Asquith. The Conservative ministers began to resign until the coalition collapsed in 1916. Given the politically instability and a growing hostility towards Germany, which forced George V to change the name of the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha to the House of Windsor, This was a wartime development, am I correct? It was not something brought about by earlier rivalry and bad press? - So it happened in the early months of the war?Anti-German sentiment was not a new phenomenon. In fact early expressions of ‘Germanophobia’ appeared in the public consciousness in the late 1800s following the Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War for example in 1871 George Tomkyns Chesney wrote the Battle of Dorking an imaginary tale of a German invasion of England. I think the reigns of the Hanoverian Kings George I and George II in the 1700s also had something to do with the public’s opinion towards ‘Germans’. It wasn’t until war that anger grew to such heights that George V feared revolution and changed his family’s name. a senior minister resigning would be a blow – potentially fatal for Asquith – it seems that the darling of the party had had his fifteen minutes of fame and politicians being politicians reverted to their natural instinct – survival- then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, may be enough to trigger a domino effect in Cabinet. Senior minister resignations in wartime would have been blows, potentially fatal for Asquith, but what about a resignation during the July 1914 Crisis if anti interventionary Liberal Cabinet members are adamant and unified and influence Asquith to not be as pro-Entente as Grey or other pro-interventionary, pro-Entente, anti-German Cabinet members want, and Grey or other 'hawks' resign in consequence?It depends on how it plays out. If the ‘Doves’ in Cabinet are in the majority and are steadfast in their position, then the resignation of Sir Edward is a major inconvenience but would not be enough to dislodge Asquith. What might be is ‘public opinion’. The Conservatives could spin this to their advantage and proclaim that the country needs strong decisive leadership and instead we have a Prime Minister who can’t even convince his own Foreign Secretary of his course of action. This on top of what is perceived to be a pretty weak government – with two ‘failed’ elections under his belt if the Conservatives can prize apart the ‘Dove’ alliance then Asquith becomes more vulnerable. With Asquith hemorrhaging Ministers it would be difficult for him to stay on as Prime Minister. Combined with the perceived ineptitude in conducting the war, the disappointing results and the failure of the war time coalition government Henry Herbert Asquith would be forced to resign. This is a given, but is a question for way after the timeframe I was asking aboutThe Asquith ministry was beset by problems long before 1914. He had to contend with a rebellious Lords, radicals within his own party and a growing opposition. The result of the two 1910 elections were pyrrhic victories for Asquith – yes his party was returned to Parliament as the largest party, but his majority was effectively non-existent as he couldn’t necessary rely on the loyalty of his own MPs let alone try to make deals with an emboldened opposition to try and get his programme through. My point is that Asquith may be forced to resign before 1914, but this wouldn’t necessarily trigger a general election. What happened in OTL was a Coalition in 1915. If Asquith is removed before the outbreak of war, it is possible that the opposition could try to bounce the Liberals into another election before 1914. [I hadn't even brought up or considered this possibility. What do you think could have brought it about? Domestic scandal? An early Irish blow up?In OTL in 1909 The House of Lords blocked his money bill! The ‘People’s Budget’ as mentioned before, was essentially designed to tax the wealthy land-owning Conservative peers and they did not like that, so they vetoed the finance bill. This was a bold move by the unelected chamber that triggered a crisis - without money the government cannot function. This is why Asquith was forced to go to the country in 1910 not once but twice! The elections resulted in hung parliaments, but a Liberal victory in Jan 1910 – they formed the largest party - forced the Lords into backing down and they passed the bill in April 1910. I’m thinking, what if this wasn’t the case. What if the Lords saw the outcome of the January election and decided that Asquith was on the way out in the minds of the people, and they refused to accept the bill. It wasn’t until 1911 that Asquith was able to strip the Lords of their power to veto money bills. In May 1910 Edward VII dies, which throws a spanner in Asquith’s plans – can’t exactly have a general election during a period of mourning – not a good look PR wise and it would be bad form to hold a general election during the early days of George V reign, so Asquith was essentially, held hostage by the Fates, and was forced to go to the country again in December. The December election was worse – yes Liberals were once again returned as the largest party but their meagre majority of two seats won in the February election was reduced to just one. The Conservative Peers know they have the popular vote and could again veto the finance bill. This could cause an emboldened Conservative Party to table a motion of no confidence in the government. Given the Parliamentary maths it would be an easy route for the opposition to trigger a general election – they could defeat government amendments to the motion and if lucky a victory would topple the Asquith government and force a general election. If this happens in 1910 early 1911 then it takes about six weeks to hold a general election so a new government would be up and running well before the outbreak of hostilities. This would be an optimal outcome for the Conservatives because at worst people would be election weary and turnout would be low resulting in a hung parliament with them being the largest party, given the results of OTL elections and the people’s anger at the perceived failures of the Liberal government, or an outright majority if they stand on an anti-German platform. [That would have been a popular vote getter before the invasion of Belgium, and even before the July Crisis. It's unclear what timeframe you were envisioningThe 1910 December election. This election did not move the dial in Asquith’s favour – yes the Liberals were returned as the largest party in a hung parliament, but the thing is with minority governments (at this time you need at least 336 seats to form a majority government albeit a majority of one) they’re not particularly stable and unless they can form a coalition or at least an alliance in the form of a ‘supply and confidence pact’ then the opposition can use all manner of parliamentary procedures to frustrate the government and even seize control of the government agenda effectively taking power from the government and giving it to Parliament. The opposition could have the numbers to table the motion of no confidence. Asquith perceived ineptitude may even be enough to turn his own part against him… A government can be formed within days if a party has an outright majority and given the expeditious need to establish political stability in face of the oncoming storm, I imagine that a week at most given the frantic behind the scenes horse trading. [Not sure if this speedy timing was meant to be an answer to my question from the OP about how fast the Liberal govt could be replaced, and you're saying it could be fast if Asquith is seen to be flailing or weak in an international crisis?Yes. The opposition has a Shadow Cabinet which is the exact replicate of the Cabinet hence the name. They would be up and running as soon as they move into No10. Changes of government in the United Kingdom happen very fast – we don’t do coalitions that often so no need for backroom deals. The Conservatives would govern as a minority government too, but they may find the December 1910 parliament to be more friendly as would the Lords. Given the popular vote the Conservatives could risk going to the country to increase their numbers – risky but it has been known to work – i.e., 2019 election… |
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Post by halferking on May 1, 2023 12:41:38 GMT
Do we now what the British political parties view on war with Germany was before the outbreak, did some push for war and other wanted no war. Responses to Sir Edward’s speech on 3 August 1914: Andrew BONAR LAW (Conservatives)The right hon. Gentleman has made an appeal for support, and it is necessary I should say a word or two. They shall be very few. I wish to say, in the first place, that I do not believe there is a single Member of this House who doubts that, not only the right hon. Gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace, and I think we may be sure that, if any other course is taken, it is because it is forced upon them, and that they have absolutely no alternative. One thing only, further, I would like to say. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot on the political horizon. Everything he has said I am sure is true. I should like to say, further, that if the contingencies, which he has not put into words, but which are all in our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot, and that every one of His Majesty's Dominions beyond the Seas will be behind us in whatever action it is necessary to take. This only I shall add: The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am Leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country, they can rely on the unhesitating support of the Opposition. John REDMOND (Irish Nationalist Parliamentary Party)I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part, in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled, if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times when this Empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises, it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in the centuries of history, have been estranged from this country. Allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topic. By this I may be allowed to say, that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history have, I think, altered the views of the democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and to-day I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. There is a possibility, at any rate, of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American War, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish Volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah, how sad the reading of the history of those days is!—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of Volunteers, and yet, from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it towards the arming of their Protestant fellow countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled as brothers in arms with their fellow countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself. Today there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? I ought to apologise for having intervened, but while Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us, in comradeship with our brethren in the North, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. Ramsey MCDONALD (Labour) I should, bad circumstances permitted, have preferred to remain silent this afternoon. But circumstances do not permit of that. I shall model what I have to say on the two speeches we have listened to, and I "hall be brief. The right hon. Gentleman, to a House which in a great majority is with him, has delivered a speech the echoes of which will go down in history. The speech has been impressive, but however much we may resist the conclusion to which he has come, we have not been able to resist the moving character of his appeal. I think he is wrong. I think the Government which he represents and for which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong. We shall see. The effect of the right hon. Gentleman's speech in this House is not to be its final effect. There may be opportunities, or there may not be opportunities for us to go into details, but I want to say to this House, and to say it without equivocation, if the right hon. Gentleman had come here to-day and told us that our country is in danger, I do not care what party he appealed to, or to what class he appealed, we would be with him and behind him. If this is so, we will vote him what money he wants. Yes, and we will go further. We will offer him ourselves if the country is in danger. But he has not persuaded me that it is. He has not persuaded my hon. Friends who cooperate with me that it is, and I am perfectly certain, when his speech gets into cold print to-morrow, he will not persuade a large section of the country. If the nation's honour were in danger we would be with him. There has been no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appealing to their nation's honour. We fought the Crimean War because of our honour. We rushed to South Africa because of our honour. The right hon. Gentleman is appealing to us to-day because of our honour. There is a third point. If the right hon. Gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him. What is the use of talking about coming to the aid of Belgium, when, as a matter of fact, you are engaging in a whole European War which is not going to leave the map of Europe in the position it is in now. The right hon. Gentleman said nothing about Russia. We want to know about that. We want to try to find out what is going to happen, when it is all over, to the power of Russia in Europe, and we are not going to go blindly into this conflict without having some sort of a rough idea as to what is going to happen. Finally, so far as France is concerned, we say solemnly and definitely that no such friendship as the right hon. Gentleman describes between one nation and another could ever justify one of those nations entering into war on behalf of the other. If France is really in danger, if, as the result of this, we are going to have the power, civilisation, and genius of France removed from European history, then let him so say. But it is an absolutely impossible conception, which we are talking about to endeavour to justify that which the right hon. Gentleman has foreshadowed. I not only know but I feel that the feeling of the House is against us. I have been through this before, and 1906 came as part recompense. It will come again. We are going to go through it all. We will go through it all. So far as we are concerned, whatever may happen, whatever may be said about us, whatever attacks may be made upon us, we will take the action that we will take of saying that this country ought to have remained neutral, because in the deepest parts of our hearts we believe that that was right and that that alone was consistent with the honour of the country and the traditions of the party that are now in office. This should give you some idea of the mood of the country. I would guess that these statements reflect the broad views of their respective parties. Of course political parties can have different opinions. Statements are taken from HANSARD api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-grey#S5CV0065P0_19140803_HOC_70 |
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Post by halferking on May 1, 2023 13:20:13 GMT
... then the resignation of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, ... I somehow wonder why so many people seem to assume that Grey would resign undoubtly if he woudn't get an "Everything for France (even has to be in the basket as well) !" between 1st and 3rd August 1914 on 4th August the latest.
I should also not been forgotten to what condition he connected his thread of resignation: "... out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention ..."
At 2nd August at least the "doves" - or most of them - were already well prepared to make some concessions and setting up triggerpoints (like violation of belgian integrety in from minister to minister varying severeness). With making such concession to Grey - though the germans clearly fullfill ITTL the demands regarding Belgium - maybe including a 'demiklitarization' of the channel (enforced by the RN) would IMHO well fullfill Greys demands as stated above.
Your link hasn't worked. I think Grey tried his best but eventually gave up. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on May 1, 2023 14:15:45 GMT
A lot been happening in the thread - I was gaming last night with my mate until ~3:15 so only catching up with things here.
a) A couple of points to mention that hasn't been covered in the preceding posts - unless I missed something.
The reason the Lord's blocking of the budget was so controversial was because there had previously been a tacit acceptance that a finance bills was the one category that wouldn't be blocked by the Lords. This was why the king eventually forced the Lords to back down by threatening if necessary to create a large number of new Liberal Lords to swap the long establish Tory majority and eventually legislation passed that limited the time the Lord's could block any government bill. To be fair IIRC Lloyd George did include some measures not normally in a finance bill, such as Welsh Disestablishment which the overwhelmingly pro-Anglican Lords had blocked in the past.
b) While after the 1910 elections the different in terms of MPs was very slim between the Liberals and Tories the primary reason the former stayed in power was because they had the support of the Irish Nationalist movement, which because Ireland was heavily over-represented in Parliament meant about 80 additional MPs. They were never likely to support a Tory government because the latter were bitterly opposed to Irish Home Rule so getting the Tories in power before 1914 - apart from any butterflies related to that occurring - would need a substantial change in opinion in the mainland UK against the Liberals - or more accurately in favour of the Tories as Liberal losses that didn't got to the Tories would probably end up with the early Labour who were also unlikely to prefer a Tory government.
Also as stated the Tories were markedly more militaristic on the issue and hostile to German moves after the German rejection of British attempts at a defensive alliance prior to 1904 - which was a major factor along with Tirpitz's actions in prompting the Entente Cordial with France. As such if you want something to ensure Britain doesn't enter WWI in its early stages then a Tory government taking charge isn't going to work. Unless you assume that such a move and the resultant closing of the door on Home Rule prompts a major crisis - possibly even civil war in Ireland - which distracts London from a massive crisis on the continent. Which might work with Germany striking eastwards and seeking to avoid Belgium neutrality being affected.
In terms of nomommsen, comments about Russian strategy I have to differ that Germany would successfully decide on the fly to totally change their grand strategy. As such I think it would be a decision taken at least a couple of years ago prior to 1914. As such Russia is likely to get some inkling, especially with the amount of new construction work probably involved. This would mean Russia isn't seeking to relieve its threatened ally in the west and is aware that it faces probably overwhelming numbers with the bulk of the German forces and probably even more of the Austrian ones threatening its salient in Poland. [They won't know - assuming the same trigger path for war occurs - that a proportion of the Austrian army will be ending south to try invading Serbia.] As such there would be some expectation that they would consider either of the defensive strategies I proposed and very likely won't be considering a mad dash offensive against superior numbers of enemy units. |
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nomommsen
Chief petty officer
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Post by nomommsen on May 1, 2023 14:17:09 GMT
I somehow wonder why so many people seem to assume that Grey would resign undoubtly if he woudn't get an "Everything for France (even has to be in the basket as well) !" between 1st and 3rd August 1914 on 4th August the latest.
I should also not been forgotten to what condition he connected his thread of resignation: "... out-and-out and uncompromising policy of non-intervention ..."
At 2nd August at least the "doves" - or most of them - were already well prepared to make some concessions and setting up triggerpoints (like violation of belgian integrety in from minister to minister varying severeness). With making such concession to Grey - though the germans clearly fullfill ITTL the demands regarding Belgium - maybe including a 'demiklitarization' of the channel (enforced by the RN) would IMHO well fullfill Greys demands as stated above.
Your link hasn't worked. I think Grey tried his best but eventually gave up. ... strange ... link from here works fine for me ... lordroel ?
... what about did he gave up ? ... ITTL or IOTL ?
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) and its outcome was rather ... different.