DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 19, 2023 21:46:30 GMT
Well, how will Hitler apportion what he has to throw out in the late summer and fall of 1940, going into the winter of that year, against Britain and Norway, and with what effect? This is point. But more important is "how" rather than "with what". Remember Germany devoted OTL a lot of units and ressources to secure Norway against an expected landing on its coasts, could they deploy more in Northern Norway? In addition, the front line near Bodø is very short and the area is montaneous and impassable to motorized vehicules. I didn't figure out yet how the Germans could try to break the front (this is the major reason why I didn't go further in this uchrony). Regarding he situation in Mediterranean Sea, I don't see a lot of change until the fall of 1940 as Italian are not involved in Norway and British are less affraid of an invasion as long as Germans are stuck in Norway. British will be replaced by the Poles and the norwegian army will ramp up quite quickly. Once again, attackers will have a hard time to break through and it's a long, long way to Tromsø... That means the first impact will be on Luftwaffe that would have to maintain big units on the Polar Circle that won't be available to attack Great Brittain or to help Italians in North Africa (esp. X. Fliegerkorps). If Britain is seeking to maintain a N Norway bastion then does it had the resources spare for Operation Compass and/or actions against Italian East Africa? If only one which does it choose? Here again, no major change and if one theater have o be priorized, it would be Egypt as the defense of Suez Canal is of the utmost importance to the defense of the Empire and Arabian oil fileds. Compass will occur as IOTL. Then all the questions about English and German involvment in Greece are relevant. At sea Britain is going to be more drained as its going to have to supply the Norway bastion and also protect those supply lines. Which will be vulnerable to subs, air units based in southern Norway and possibly raids by German surface ships. Something like one of the twins let alone Bismarck when available could mean every convoy needs substantial heavy gun escort even if their just a threat. Not sure the RN needs to allocate too many ships to Norway. Remember the twins are out (one for a while and the other sunk) and the Bismarck not yet ready. Until september, U-boots will be at risk on Norwegian Sea due to long day light and Allied air cover will be much more efficient than during the ill-fated PQ-17 journey... Plus German will have to chose Norway or Western Approaches... Can't be strong anywhere. Elsewhere how does the other big players react, especially Japan, the US and possibly Stalin, who might be even more complacent or possibly approach Hitler offering support against Norway, which of course would mean a Soviet presence in N Finland at least? Would Adolph be willing to throw the Finns to the dogs - especially if possibly he's expecting to crush the Soviets withing a year? Stalin knew Hitler will attack Soviet Union at the end. Helping him in Norway, meaning declaring war to United Kingdom, was the last thing to do for him. And the Finns was not really willing to be on German side, it was only when all western aid was out after the fall of Norway that Finland gradualy asked for Germany help. ITTL, United Kingdom and USA could provide more economical and military ressources than the Axe. Finland and Sweden will remain neutral but closer to the Allies. Plus Northen Norway was supplied through Sweden IOTL and not Finland from Norway. In terms of Germany how does Hitler allocate resources? Does he give an higher priority to seeking to force Britain to terms - by air attack and threat of invasion - or clearing up the Norway bastion - or being Hitler decide to do both? Does either of the two latter routes make a difference to the war over Britain as I would expect at least some level of attack on Britain. "Les deux mon Général !" (French common joke) Hitler will likely give high priority to both: Norway started earlier than Western invasion and have to be finished and making peace with Great Brittain will free him to swap to USSR. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Jul 20, 2023 1:06:47 GMT
ITTL, United Kingdom and USA could provide more economical and military ressources than the Axe. Finland and Sweden will remain neutral but closer to the Allies. UK and US can help Finland more than OTL, which was zero, but it is through a pretty thin and tight and sparse logistical pipeline of Northern Norway, with the fighting Norwegians getting first pick of anything that can be sent. Nice update and response! |
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 20, 2023 5:51:01 GMT
Logistics Considerations
I have tried to make an estimation of the logistical effort to supply Northern Norway.
Civilian needs:
Food: based on an estimation of 500 kg per inhabitant and per year, and a 150,000 inh. in Finnmark, Troms and Nordland, the total amount is 75,000 tons per year or 6,250 tons per month that is two medium cargo ships to fully feed the local population, not taking into account the then self sufficient subsistance farming.
Military:
Assuming a WWII infantry division needs are 300 tons per day in operation and there is an equivalent of two divisions on the front line, the total is 18,000 tons per month (that is probably far superior to the actual needs as there will be a static defensive front).
Aviation will be more involved and will require lots of ammunition. If we consider 500 kg per day for each bomber and 6 squadrons that is 0,5 x 6 x 12 x 30 = 1,080 tons per month.
Fuel:
The navy (Norwegian and Polish) will use four destroyers at an average one ton per hour at patrol speed, that is 100 tons a day or 3,000 tons per month.
Six fighter squadrons plus six bomber squadrons at an average 300 liters per day amount at 35 tons per day or 1,000 tons per month.
The route from Hebrides to Harstad keeping a safe distance (750 km) from Southern Norway is 1,200 nautical miles, five days at nine knots.
A convoy of six or seven cargo ships and one or two tankers will be more than enought to sustain intensive operations in N. Norway. Delivering additional equipment to refurbish Norwegian army and extend defensive infrastructures would add some other freighters from time to time. Not a big deal.
Dispatching for ten days each month one battleship, one or two cruisers and half a dozen of destroyers under the cover of long range Coastal Command patrol planes won't jeopardize Royal Navy's other missions.
We have to add the traffic to Sweden and Finland (oil, fertilizer, armament... in one way and ore, ball bearings... on the way back). British will probably help Finns to build a railway from Petsamo to Kolari (500 km) to connect the Arctic Sea to Southern Finland and divert this trade from combat area but it will take time.
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 20, 2023 6:44:29 GMT
UK and US can help Finland more than OTL, which was zero, but it is through a pretty thin and tight and sparse logistical pipeline of Northern Norway, with the fighting Norwegians getting first pick of anything that can be sent. There is only 40 km from Narvik fjord to Swedish border. The railroad could be quite easily repaired and is not a strategic target for German as the main supply harbour is Harstad, 50 km North-west, with final delivery by coastal freighters or trawlers. The Luftwaffe will likely be reluctant to divert and put at risk lots of ressources to cut trade with neutral countries, weakening diplomatic relashionships, instead of harrasing military logistic but who knows. On top of that, trucks could be used on that portion and will be more difficult targets at the expense of a lot more gas for Allies. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 20, 2023 15:55:42 GMT
Logistics ConsiderationsI have tried to make an estimation of the logistical effort to supply Northern Norway. Civilian needs:Food: based on an estimation of 500 kg per inhabitant and per year, and a 150,000 inh. in Finnmark, Troms and Nordland, the total amount is 75,000 tons per year or 6,250 tons per month that is two medium cargo ships to fully feed the local population, not taking into account the then self sufficient subsistance farming. Military:Assuming a WWII infantry division needs are 300 tons per day in operation and there is an equivalent of two divisions on the front line, the total is 18,000 tons per month (that is probably far superior to the actual needs as there will be a static defensive front). Aviation will be more involved and will require lots of ammunition. If we consider 500 kg per day for each bomber and 6 squadrons that is 0,5 x 6 x 12 x 30 = 1,080 tons per month. Fuel:The navy (Norwegian and Polish) will use four destroyers at an average one ton per hour at patrol speed, that is 100 tons a day or 3,000 tons per month. Six fighter squadrons plus six bomber squadrons at an average 300 liters per day amount at 35 tons per day or 1,000 tons per month. The route from Hebrides to Harstad keeping a safe distance (750 km) from Southern Norway is 1,200 nautical miles, five days at nine knots. A convoy of six or seven cargo ships and one or two tankers will be more than enought to sustain intensive operations in N. Norway. Delivering additional equipment to refurbish Norwegian army and extend defensive infrastructures would add some other freighters from time to time. Not a big deal. Dispatching for ten days each month one battleship, one or two cruisers and half a dozen of destroyers under the cover of long range Coastal Command patrol planes won't jeopardize Royal Navy's other missions. We have to add the traffic to Sweden and Finland (oil, fertilizer, armament... in one way and ore, ball bearings... on the way back). British will probably help Finns to build a railway from Petsamo to Kolari (500 km) to connect the Arctic Sea to Southern Finland and divert this trade from combat area but it will take time.
That's a lot less than I was fearing.  |
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 22, 2023 13:03:18 GMT
I would like to correct and refine my previous post. The overall estimation won't change but it's to be sure I didn't make big mistakes nor forget important things. I didn't mention AA ammunition, which can represent a significant tonnage, especially if, and it's most likely, Germans start a blitz over Bodø, Fauske, Narvik, Bardufoss, Harstad, Tromsø. But assuming each QF 3.7 inch AA gun fire 100 rounds a day (47 guns), 13 kg shell meaning 25 kg ammunition, it's 120 tons a day, 3,500 tons per month. For Bofor 40 mm, at 500 rounds a day for 56 guns and 0,5 kg per shell, it's 14 tons a day, 420 tons per month. Four thouthands tons per month: an additional cargo ship. We can also add gasoline for trucks. Three hundred tons to carry over an average forty kilometers using two tons trucks are 6,000 km (300 x 40 / 2), at 40 liters per 100 km, it's 2,400 l/day or 55 tons per month. But I highly overestimated the other consumptions. In Russia in 1941, armored divisions averaged some 30 tons daily when inactive and about 700 tons a day when engaged in heavy fighting; infantry divisions required 80 tons a day when inactive and some 1,100 tons during a day of heavy fighting. As most of the time, the frontline will be static and calm except artillery duels, one can say the average consumption will be closer to 150 tons a day per division instead of 300. And at least half the food for civilians will be provided by local farming. So, it's a grand total of approximativly 20,000 tons per month (food 3,000 + military supply 9,000 + AA ammunition 3,500 + bombers ordnance 1,000 + fuel 4,000); four cargo ships and one tanker per month excluding refurbishing equipment and trade with neutral. Iron ore export from Sweden to Germany was 6 million tons per year in 1939. Should British want to buy the whole production, it will require 100 bulk carriers per month (5,000 t each); far more than what was required for supplying Norway. This traffic will hide to German the strategic flow to support combat in Northern Norway. Moreover, having a small military load in each ship going to Narvik will reduce to practically nil the risk. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jul 22, 2023 13:31:46 GMT
I would like to correct and refine my previous post. The overall estimation won't change but it's to be sure I didn't make big mistakes nor forget important things. I didn't mention AA ammunition, which can represent a significant tonnage, especially if, and it's most likely, Germans start a blitz over Bodø, Fauske, Narvik, Bardufoss, Harstad, Tromsø. But assuming each QF 3.7 inch AA gun fire 100 rounds a day (47 guns), 13 kg shell meaning 25 kg ammunition, it's 120 tons a day, 3,500 tons per month. For Bofor 40 mm, at 500 rounds a day for 56 guns and 0,5 kg per shell, it's 14 tons a day, 420 tons per month. Four thouthands tons per month: an additional cargo ship. We can also add gasoline for trucks. Three hundred tons to carry over an average forty kilometers using two tons trucks are 6,000 km (300 x 40 / 2), at 40 liters per 100 km, it's 2,400 l/day or 55 tons per month. But I highly overestimated the other consumptions. In Russia in 1941, armored divisions averaged some 30 tons daily when inactive and about 700 tons a day when engaged in heavy fighting; infantry divisions required 80 tons a day when inactive and some 1,100 tons during a day of heavy fighting. As most of the time, the frontline will be static and calm except artillery duels, one can say the average consumption will be closer to 150 tons a day per division instead of 300. And at least half the food for civilians will be provided by local farming. So, it's a grand total of approximativly 20,000 tons per month (food 3,000 + military supply 9,000 + AA ammunition 3,500 + bombers ordnance 1,000 + fuel 4,000); four cargo ships and one tanker per month excluding refurbishing equipment and trade with neutral. Iron ore export from Sweden to Germany was 6 million tons per year in 1939. Should British want to buy the whole production, it will require 100 bulk carriers per month (5,000 t each); far more than what was required for supplying Norway. This traffic will hide to German the strategic flow to support combat in Northern Norway. Moreover, having a small military load in each ship going to Narvik will reduce to practically nil the risk.
On this last point how vital is Swedish iron ore with Germany in control of France and the low countries and also while the deal with Stalin lasts? I know it was concerned important before the fall of the French ore fields but is it still that significant now?
OTL importing of key technological imports from Sweden, such as ball bearings was useful and that would be much easier here.
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 22, 2023 20:21:52 GMT
Iron ore export from Sweden to Germany was 6 million tons per year in 1939. Should British want to buy the whole production, it will require 100 bulk carriers per month (5,000 t each); far more than what was required for supplying Norway. This traffic will hide to German the strategic flow to support combat in Northern Norway. Moreover, having a small military load in each ship going to Narvik will reduce to practically nil the risk.
On this last point how vital is Swedish iron ore with Germany in control of France and the low countries and also while the deal with Stalin lasts? I know it was concerned important before the fall of the French ore fields but is it still that significant now?
OTL importing of key technological imports from Sweden, such as ball bearings was useful and that would be much easier here.
There was a controversy on this subject in the sixties, seventies but in 1940, Churchill and other politicians and high ranking military strongly believed this was crucial to German war effort. Indeed, ball bearing was also identified as strategic material and will be purchased as much as possible to deprive Nazis.
The most important point was the high quality Swedish ore (high-grade iron-content and low-phosphoric ores of Kiruna, Luossavaara,and Gällivare).
For the discussion on Swedish iron ore, see:
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 23, 2023 18:32:52 GMT
An interesting testimony dated probably some days after the Bjervik assault on May 13th.
Alma Braathen, alias Brodjaga, was a correspondent for the Stockholm newspaper Dagens Nyheter during the campaign in Northern Norway:
General Fleischer stated in a meeting Braathen had with him that the advance towards Elvegårdsmoen had been very hard for the Norwegian forces, but the losses had been small after all. Brodjaga thought the general looked like an "old carolinian" as he sat at a roughly hewn table with his jacket partially unbuttoned. The old warrior expressed pride in his soldiers, emphasising a group that remained in snow caves for three weeks without even having the opportunity to change their shoes and socks. "It is nothing less than a feat they have accomplished, every one of them." And the general's conclusion says a lot about his optimism: "I cannot, of course, reveal any immediate plans, but I can say this much: if we receive as much help as we have so far, there are high hopes that Northern Norway can be preserved."
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 24, 2023 17:36:34 GMT
Convoys to Norway vs. Iceland
Still trying to evaluate the logistical needs, I studied the historical convoys to similar destinations. Considering 125,000 inhabitant in Iceland in 1940, 25,000 men for British, then Canadian, then American occupation, huge infrastructure works been set-up in 1940-41 (three airfields, harbour facilities, roads, defensive installations in Iceland...) on one side and ammunition consumption (4,000 tons per month for AAA, and 4,000 tons per month for land artillery in Norway) on the other side, one can say the needs for Iceland in 1941 (2 to 5 merchant ships per month) was quite similar to what I estimated for the defense of N. Norway. It seems that no loss have been recorded in the traffic to Iceland (only one ship bombed by a FW-200 at anchorage). Please note Arnold Hague's data I relied on could be incomplete. Norway April-May 1940FP. United Kingdom to Norway, 3 convoys (8 liners and 9 cargo ships), April-May NP. Clyde to Narvik, 2 convoys, April-May NSM. Scapa Flow, Orkney islands group to Narvik, 1 convoy, April TM. United Kingdom to Åndalsnes, 1 convoy, April TP. Norway to United Kingdom (Rosyth?), 1 convoy, May Iceland 1941DS. Clyde to Reykjavik, 71 Monthly convoys, from April 1941 onward DS.1 - 10 April, 2 merchants, 2 escorts DS.3 - 10 May, 3 merchants, 2 escorts DS.4 - 21 May, 1 merchant, 2 escorts DS.4A - 28 May, 1 merchant, 0 escort DS.5 - 5 June, 2 merchants, 3 escorts DS.6 - 20 June, 2 merchants, 3 escorts DS.8 - 21 Jully, 3 merchants, 2 escorts DS.9 - 10 August, 1 merchants, 1 escorts DS.10 - 17 August, 2 merchants, 2 escorts DS.11 - 6 September, 1 merchants, 2 escorts DS.12 - 19 September, 1 merchants, 2 escorts DS.12B - 1 October, 1 merchants, 2 escorts DS.14 - 16 October, 2 merchants, 2 escorts DS.15 - 30 October, 1 merchants, 2 escorts DS.16 - 12 November, 1 merchants, 2 escorts DS.17 - 27 November, 2 merchants, 2 escorts DS.18 - 14 December, 3 merchants, 3 escorts DS.19 - 28 December, 2 merchants, 2 escorts ... SD. Reykjavik to Clyde ...
Things are suddenly evolving end of 1941:
UR. Loch Ewe to Reykjavik, 169 Weekly convoys, from Decembre 1941 onward UR.1 - 13 December, 5 merchants, 0 escorts UR.2 - 19 December, 10 merchants, 0 escorts UR.3 - 24 December, 6 merchants, 0 escorts UR.4 - 28 December, 7 merchants, 0 escorts ... RU. Reykjavik to Loch Ewe
EDIT: Half of PQ. convoys to USSR departed from Iceland from September 1941, so a growing share of the deliveries to Iceland (DS. then UR. convoys) was actually aimed at the USSR.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Allied_convoy_codes_during_World_War_IIwww.convoyweb.org.uk/hague/index.htmluboat.net/ops/convoys/
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 31, 2023 18:11:16 GMT
Condor vs. Porcupine
July - It became clear to both sides that it would be a while before a decision could be taken on land. Efforts had to be made at sea and in the air to break the enemy's capacity and will to resist.
After abandoning their plan to land in the north following the disaster of Operation Juno, the Germans were left with only their submarine fleet to interrupt the flow of Allied supplies. The Luftwaffe had not been very effective in the open sea against organised forces, but it proved its worth in the tighter waters. The bombing of Harstad, Bardufoss, Bodø, Fauske, Narvik and Tromsø intensified and long-range patrols were systematically launched to discover and possibly attack British convoys. To avoid the short periods of darkness during the Norwegian summer, the U-boats will operate only in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea, where they will be most effectively supported by the He 111s and Fw 200s based in Bergen and Trondheim.
The Admiralty, meanwhile, will be organising the convoys as cheaply as possible, as its resources are needed in the Mediterranean for the time being. A few cargo ships and an oil tanker, escorted by two or three destroyers and a few trawlers or anti-submarine corvettes, would make the trip once a month via the Faroes, protected by Bristol Beauforts, Blenheims and Short Sunderlands from Coastal Command based in Scotland, Shetland and the Faroes (No. 18 Group). Patrols close to the Norwegian coast will be provided by the RNoNAS's five Heinkel 115s and final air cover by the fighter squadron based at Bardufoss.
The first DH.1 convoy left Clyde on Monday 15 July, bound for Harstad. It was made up of three cargo ships, mainly loaded with ammunition, and an oil tanker, escorted by destroyers HMS Eskimo and HMS Ikarus. Coastal Command and the Royal Navy began to clean up to the north and west of Scotland, while the Sunderlands (nicknamed "flying porcupines" by the Germans because of their defensive firepower) of No. 201 Squadron patrolled to the east of Shetland and Scotland to guard against any enemy vessels, but the German surface fleet was no longer a threat, only the submarines remained to be feared.
On the fourth day, a Focke-Wulf 200 Condor spotted the convoy 150 miles north of the Faroes without being detected. It was too late for the submarines sailing the North Sea to intercept it, so an air raid on Harstad was planned two days later. Nearly forty aircraft took off from Værne near Trondheim around midday on 21 July and were over the Handfjorden at 2.15pm. But the British had decoded the Enigma messages preparing for the mission and the surprise was missed: seven Hurricanes and five Gladiators welcomed the intruders, while the convoy had been diverted north to Tromsø to await the end of the assault. Five aircraft were unaccounted for on the return to Trondheim where, to worsen matters, bad weather reduced visibility, three other aircraft were damaged on landing beyond repair and one aircraft crashed into the mountain. A Gladiator and a Hurricane were destroyed in return.
The success of this first supply operation boosted the confidence of the Norwegians and Poles and brought a discreet bonus in the form of two GL radar stations which, installed on the island of Værøya at the tip of the Lofoten Islands and on the heights of Narvik, reinforced the early warning system. As the Narvik station did not give good results (it was later understood that the iron-rich terrain interfered with propagation and increased the number of false echoes), it was moved in August to the north of Fauske, from where it would enfilade the Saltelna valley leading to Rognan, greatly reducing the chances of surprise low-level raids.
The HD.1 return convoy returned safely to Clyde on 2 August without having been attacked.
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575
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Post by 575 on Jul 31, 2023 18:57:24 GMT
Condor vs. PorcupineJuly - It became clear to both sides that it would be a while before a decision could be taken on land. Efforts had to be made at sea and in the air to break the enemy's capacity and will to resist. After abandoning their plan to land in the north following the disaster of Operation Juno, the Germans were left with only their submarine fleet to interrupt the flow of Allied supplies. The Luftwaffe had not been very effective in the open sea against organised forces, but it proved its worth in the tighter waters. The bombing of Harstad, Bardufoss, Bodø, Fauske, Narvik and Tromsø intensified and long-range patrols were systematically launched to discover and possibly attack British convoys. To avoid the short periods of darkness during the Norwegian summer, the U-boats will operate only in the southern part of the Norwegian Sea, where they will be most effectively supported by the He 111s and Fw 200s based in Bergen and Trondheim. The Admiralty, meanwhile, will be organising the convoys as cheaply as possible, as its resources are needed in the Mediterranean for the time being. A few cargo ships and an oil tanker, escorted by two or three destroyers and a few trawlers or anti-submarine corvettes, would make the trip once a month via the Faroes, protected by Bristol Beauforts, Blenheims and Short Sunderlands from Coastal Command based in Scotland, Shetland and the Faroes (No. 18 Group). Patrols close to the Norwegian coast will be provided by the RNoNAS's five Heinkel 115s and final air cover by the fighter squadron based at Bardufoss. The first DH.1 convoy left Clyde on Monday 15 July, bound for Harstad. It was made up of three cargo ships, mainly loaded with ammunition, and an oil tanker, escorted by destroyers HMS Eskimo and HMS Ikarus. Coastal Command and the Royal Navy began to clean up to the north and west of Scotland, while the Sunderlands (nicknamed "flying porcupines" by the Germans because of their defensive firepower) of No. 201 Squadron patrolled to the east of Shetland and Scotland to guard against any enemy vessels, but the German surface fleet was no longer a threat, only the submarines remained to be feared. On the fourth day, a Focke-Wulf 200 Condor spotted the convoy 150 miles north of the Faroes without being detected. It was too late for the submarines sailing the North Sea to intercept it, so an air raid on Harstad was planned two days later. Nearly forty aircraft took off from Værne near Trondheim around midday on 21 July and were over the Handfjorden at 2.15pm. But the British had decoded the Enigma messages preparing for the mission and the surprise was missed: seven Hurricanes and five Gladiators welcomed the intruders, while the convoy had been diverted north to Tromsø to await the end of the assault. Five aircraft were unaccounted for on the return to Trondheim where, to worsen matters, bad weather reduced visibility, three other aircraft were damaged on landing beyond repair and one aircraft crashed into the mountain. A Gladiator and a Hurricane were destroyed in return. The success of this first supply operation boosted the confidence of the Norwegians and Poles and brought a discreet bonus in the form of two GL radar stations which, installed on the island of Værøya at the tip of the Lofoten Islands and on the heights of Narvik, reinforced the early warning system. As the Narvik station did not give good results (it was later understood that the iron-rich terrain interfered with propagation and increased the number of false echoes), it was moved in August to the north of Fauske, from where it would enfilade the Saltelna valley leading to Rognan, greatly reducing the chances of surprise low-level raids. The HD.1 return convoy returned safely to Clyde on 2 August without having been attacked. Did study Norwegian Campaign some years ago; Luftwaffe Bombers would fly without escort. One reason was lack of forward Airfields but also no drop-tanks for Bf-109. A few Allied fighter Squadrons ought to do the trick when supplied with Radar.
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Jul 31, 2023 20:30:14 GMT
Did study Norwegian Campaign some years ago; Luftwaffe Bombers would fly without escort. One reason was lack of forward Airfields but also no drop-tanks for Bf-109. A few Allied fighter Squadrons ought to do the trick when supplied with Radar. Indeed, Væernes to Harstad is 645 km, even the Bf 110s couldn't escort bombers. This is the reason why Hattfjelldal was so important at 375 km from Harstad, but the runway was of poor quality and, despite a wooden pavement installed by the Germans, only the Ju 87s returning from missions could refuel there before returning to Værnes.
IOTL, anti-aircraft defense did perform very well and, as soon as British fighters entered in action, German bombers saw high casualties and poor efficiency.
The next step in the battle will be for the Germans to improve the airfield to be able to base Bf 110s there and for the Allies to target it to restrict its use. A better option being to build an airfield from scratch in the vicinity of Lønsdal but still at 235 km from Harstad. But using radar is not so obvious as the mountaneous relief leaves too many shadows and the hard weather conditions prevent high Chain Home antenna to be installed, restricting the range to some 80 km in the best conditions with GL stations, only ten to twelve minutes advance notice... The early warning will continue to rely on visual watch and fighters will have to make long and exhausting patrols to be able to intevene in all situations. |
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575
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Post by 575 on Aug 1, 2023 8:16:07 GMT
Did study Norwegian Campaign some years ago; Luftwaffe Bombers would fly without escort. One reason was lack of forward Airfields but also no drop-tanks for Bf-109. A few Allied fighter Squadrons ought to do the trick when supplied with Radar. Indeed, Væernes to Harstad is 645 km, even the Bf 110s couldn't escort bombers. This is the reason why Hattfjelldal was so important at 375 km from Harstad, but the runway was of poor quality and, despite a wooden pavement installed by the Germans, only the Ju 87s returning from missions could refuel there before returning to Værnes.
IOTL, anti-aircraft defense did perform very well and, as soon as British fighters entered in action, German bombers saw high casualties and poor efficiency.
The next step in the battle will be for the Germans to improve the airfield to be able to base Bf 110s there and for the Allies to target it to restrict its use. A better option being to build an airfield from scratch in the vicinity of Lønsdal but still at 235 km from Harstad. But using radar is not so obvious as the mountaneous relief leaves too many shadows and the hard weather conditions prevent high Chain Home antenna to be installed, restricting the range to some 80 km in the best conditions with GL stations, only ten to twelve minutes advance notice... The early warning will continue to rely on visual watch and fighters will have to make long and exhausting patrols to be able to intevene in all situations. How about Airborne Warning - the British did use Airborne Interception Radar since July 1940? Using this as an early warning radar may accelerate this work for the British also to benefit at home. The Bf-110 was not a dog fighter but as usual Fighters had short range the Bristol Blenheim IF may get into its role?
Or a damn lot of telephone wire have to be strung to man lookouts as far south as possible.
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DMZ
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Post by DMZ on Aug 2, 2023 4:54:30 GMT
575 , Airbone Radar on Blenheim Mk.IF was not suitable for warning, its range was too short and the beam is too narrow. Anyway, in my opinion, Norway won't be a place to test new technologies, too far away with no or little British presence and even for France they were reluctant to deploy Chain Home. Throughout the war, they delayed or restricted new technologies frontline deployment for fear of seeing Germans using it for their own (centimetric airborne radar, jet fighters...) At best, some Blenheims Mk.IF will be deployed as night fighters in fall 1940 with the return of the darkness but they will continue to rely on ground control to bring them close enought to use its own radar. Nevertheless, they will be usefull to protect dedicated strategic target in relatively unobstructed site like Bardufoss, Bodø, or Tromsø. Or a damn lot of telephone wire have to be strung to man lookouts as far south as possible. The telephone was widely deployed in Norway and the frontline from Bodø to Laskå was only 70 km (55 km as the crow flies), not a big deal. In Great Britain, each observer post was 10 to 20 km from its neighbours, meaning ten posts will be more than enought to cover the southern line.
(1870 - Network - The telegraph reaches Vardø in northern Norway and thus the whole country is covered in longitude. 1893 - Coverage - Norway is already one of the countries with the highest density of telephones per habitant in the world. Wikipedia)
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