Dark Earth: The History of the Aircraft Carrier

"Yamamoto ordered the Combined Fleet to sea on March 26th, aiming to draw out the Grand Fleet within range of Indochina by threatening the Gulf of Siam. This time, he elected to take a course to the west of the Spratly Islands and then head towards the Poulo-Condore Islands, bringing the Grand Fleet upon his land-based air and his own carriers. Cunningham took the Grand Fleet out from Singapore on March 27th in response, heading out to the east before breaking back towards the Malay coast, where he would remain, just out of sight of the shore of Kelantan, partially concealed by experimental cloaking magics. His plan was to keep his carriers within the cover of over 400 land based RAF and RNAS fighters, whilst augmenting its striking power through his amassed shore based bombers. Off to the south, halfway between Natuna and Singapore, a decoy force of surface vessels, dirigibles and skyships was to act as the Grand Fleet, utilising a variety of illusory and electronic means. This approach, should it fully succeed, would draw off the Japanese aircraft and leave their fleet open to British attacks. Ironically, the Japanese would also attempt their own use of subterfuge through the employment of a disguised diversionary force that aimed to lure the Grand Fleet to its doom. Yamamoto had kept the main body of his battlefleet between the vanguard and the Kido Butai further back off Saigon, whilst trying to draw out the British with the bait of own slower light carriers and striking them with the twin weapons of his fast carriers and remaining land-based bombers. The light carriers were disguised as their larger equivalents through ensorcelled markings and deception spells, which, whilst less sophisticated than the RN measures, were designed for a far more limited purpose. This tactical approach, whilst not fully splitting his forces per se, still presented a considerable difference to that used in previous battles. It consisted of the converted liner Shinyo, the light carriers Zuiho, Kaiyo and Taiyo and the seaplane carrier Nisshin, along with their escorts. Their defences would be swelled by 54 A6M Zeroes flying out of airfields in Central Vietnam which had been spared the attentions of the RAF bomber forces to date.

The Third Battle of the South China Sea began on March 30th, as the Japanese vanguard force was located by RN scouting aircraft off the southern tip of French Indochina whilst its own reconnaissance efforts continued to scour the seas for the Grand Fleet. The RN southern decoy force almost succeeded in drawing off Japanese attention with their electronic trickery, but the subterfuge was uncovered by a fortuitously located IJN submarine, which identified the true nature of the British ships and aircraft through direct observation; the submarine’s commander made the courageous decision to transmit his findings immediately, which resulted in the destruction of his vessel some nine hours later. His report did not include mention of the RN skyship HMSS Prometheus, which now moved northward, extending the range of its powerful new airborne RDF system. Faced with this, Cunningham ordered an air strike on the IJN vanguard, even though it would reveal his location; crucially, he chose to dispatch the air groups of only three of his carriers in addition to his land based strike bombers, keeping the other six carrier groups back in reserve. This was the northernmost group in the Grand Fleet, with the others moving away to the south, a factor that would be crucial in the development of the battle. 68 Swordfish and 76 Buccaneers escorted by 58 Eagles and 60 Fireflies and accompanied by 56 Beauforts were launched at 1042 on March 31st against the Japanese group south of the Poulo-Condore Islands. They were met by 98 Zeroes, which inflicted substantial losses on the FAA aircraft, shooting down 14 Eagles, 16 Fireflies, 13 Buccaneers, 15 Swordfish and 10 Beauforts in exchange for 25 Zeroes. The sheer weight of the RN airstrike blasted its way through the Japanese fighter defences, however, and hit Shinyo, still appearing for all intents and purposes to be Shokaku, with five torpedoes, whilst Taiyo and Nisshin were hit with six and eight bombs and three torpedoes apiece.

The initial reports reaching Admiral Cunningham were ecstatic, claiming the destruction of three Japanese fleet carriers, but this was swiftly cooled by the news transmitted from Prometheus - a force of hundreds of new aircraft was emerging off the coast of Southern Indochina, along with the surviving elements of the two bomber groups forming up inland. A vexsome choice was now presented to Cunningham - leave his northern task group of Implacable, Indefatigable and Unicorn to take the full force of Yamamoto’s eight fleet carriers and bombers whilst striking from the south with his remaining carriers; or pull his three task groups together and mass his defensive firepower under the cover of his land based fighters to preserve his fleet. If he chose the second course of action, he ran the risk of losing the opportunity to deal a decisive blow to the Japanese; if he chose the first, he ran the risk of losing a large part of the fleet, with all that entailed. Many naval historians from the United States in particular have subsequently criticised Cunningham for once again electing to take the more cautious approach, but even with the potential gains, his decision was plain: he would stick to the attritional approach and absorb the Japanese strike. Cunningham’s orders were enacted swiftly, pulling his carrier groups back into mutual supporting range of each other and allowing their reinforcement with his heavy surface ships, whilst swelling his defences with the RAF and RNAS fighters from Malaya. 579 IJN carrier aircraft (245 Zeroes, 164 Vals and 170 Kates) and the land-based force of 80 Zeroes and 125 G4M bombers were intercepted by a maximum effort fighter CAP of several layers - firstly the outermost group of 256 Supermarine Eagles and 70 Reapers, then the middle layer of 184 Spitfires and 78 RNAS Eagles and then the inner defence of 144 Hurricanes and 176 Fireflies. These coordinated waves of fighters split their attacks, with the Eagles and Spitfires focusing on the Zeroes and Reapers, Fireflies and Hurricanes going for the strike aircraft and bombers. The defence inflicted a high rate of attrition on the IJN attack planes, but the Japanese Zeroes maintained their impressive record of performance, despite the heavier armament of the British fighters taking a heavy toll; a total of 126 Zeroes, 61 G4Ms, 69 Vals and 73 Kates being shot down in the furious aerial melee in exchange for 91 Eagles, 54 Spitfires, 72 Fireflies, 39 Hurricanes and 23 Reapers. After breaking through what seemed to be the final layer of defence, the Japanese strike was then confronted by the Grand Fleet's ace in the hole in the form of the fighter groups of Invincible, Saint Louis and Henri IV flying in from the Andaman Sea; their 120 fighters shooting down a further 38 Japanese planes for the loss of 18 of their own number. It is a testament to the sheer numbers and skill of the Japanese pilots that the survivors were able to press home their attack on the Grand Fleet, flying through the most devastating AAA barrage they had yet faced from radar-guided guns of the hundreds of warships below, 36 bombers and 42 carrier attack planes being shot down in the process. The remaining Japanese planes concentrated their attacks on the Royal Navy carriers and battleships, resulting in extensive damage. Indefatigable was hit by four bombs and one torpedo, Illustrious by three bombs, Argus by two torpedoes and two bombs, Implacable by four bombs and two torpedoes, Monarch was struck by three bombs, Iron Duke and Triumph by two bombs and Conqueror by two torpedoes and two bombs, in addition to the sinking of 3 cruisers and 9 destroyers and various damage to 9 cruisers and 20 destroyers.

Cunningham ordered an immediate retirement of the Grand Fleet upon Singapore as dusk approached, given that half of his available carrier decks were now unusable and the prospect that launching a coordinated airstrike against the Japanese fleet would keep his remaining fleet within range of further air attacks. He had succeeded in preventing the Japanese from achieving a decisive victory and the sinking of the two light carriers could give some substance to characterisations of victory, but did not press forward to seek a night surface action against the Combined Fleet due to the threat of enemy submarines; in any event, the Japanese battlefleet had been untouched from the day's action, whilst he had several ships suffering from various degrees of damage. The final stage of the battle came as night fell and one of the RNAS Mosquito torpedo bomber wings took off from its Malay aerodromes. Guided by aerial RDF direction from Prometheus, they subjected the Combined Fleet to a surprise low-level attack, severely damaging the battleship Oshima and sinking the old light cruisers Yakumo and Nankan, which skillfully intercepted torpedoes aimed for Kaga and Mikawa respectively. The impact of the strike on the Japanese at sea was far more significant in its longer term consequences than any tactical losses, as it demonstrated that the Royal Navy too could threaten enemy surface forces at an unprecendented range and dissuaded the IJN from attempting further fleet advances into the Gulf of Siam.

Like the battles that were to come in the South and Central Pacific as 1942 wore on, those bloody frays that took place in early 1942 in the South China Sea increasingly demonstrated that threats from the air and below the waves were substantive limiting factors on the freedom of operation of the traditional battlefleet. The most significant consequence in April was Admiral Cunningham's decision to pull the remaining carrier task forces of the Grand Fleet back into the Andaman Sea from Singapore, interposing the Malay Peninsula between the Japanese and the Royal Navy. This was driven by the advance of the Japanese in Sumatra and the final collapse of Allied resistance in Java, which outflanked the stubborn defenders from the south. Singapore was now a fortress city under distant yet still very much effective siege, with the subsequent Singapore Blitz presenting significant problems for the full operational employment of the Grand Fleet from its long-time intended bases. To avoid any suggestion of panic or abandonment, considerable emphasis was placed upon the maintenance of the battlefleet, cruisers and destroyers at Singapore, in addition to the increasingly effective commerce-raiding campaign waged from its Brobdingnagian submarine pens. The deployment of the Grand Fleet's carriers would also prove decisive in breaking the Japanese line in Northern Malaya and the Kra Isthmus, even as land-based airpower was increasingly constrained by the imminent monsoon.

Yamamoto's failure to achieve a decisive victory in South East Asia was the first setback in the successful tide of conquest, but now, his attention was drawn away to a different front.

For, on April 4th 1942, USAF bombers attacked Tokyo."

Very quick reading.

It is a different raid; full details will come in the US Carrier history. There is enough hint in the wording for some things to become clear...

A little bit of analysis:

- This last battle wasn’t decisive in the number of ships sunk, but the number of RN carriers damaged is now problematic, as discussed a few pages back.
- There are 8 ships under repair, leaving 6 fleet carriers, 2 French fleet carriers and 4 light carriers; two carriers will go with the reinforcement squadron to Sydney
- The last two times Cunningham was engaged in battle, he didn’t launch a strike of his own. That is because his orders were clear: Wait. He will be getting more pilots, planes, carriers and weapons by the month, whereas the Japanese will have their forces increasingly dragged away to cover the Pacific.
- Things got too close for comfort.
- If he had sacrificed his northern task force, he could have hit the Japanese with ~ 300 strike aircraft and ~200 fighters. They would need to fight through just over 200 Zeroes to get to the Japanese fleet, gutting the offensive power of the Grand Fleet. Now, the air groups of the carriers under repair operate from land bases in Malaya, where they face somewhat of a different threat environment.
- Up in the Andaman Sea, he can focus his air groups on specific areas of Japanese resistance on land, just as they will be pressed from Burma and Malaya.

By “wait”, his orders are to not take any undue risks with the fleet and only engage the enemy in favourable circumstances; he does have some degree of flexibility for seeking a fleet battle, but under a limited range of circumstances. The path to victory comes firstly from removing the possibility of defeat.

Steve,

It was not a traditionally decisive battle, but the last engagement in a protracted 4 month campaign that ultimately proves decisive. The Japanese prove unable to crack the last Imperial defensive layer, although they do smash the Malay Barrier and force the offensive forces of the Grand Fleet back. You are right on the money about the issue of pilots; the British Empire is better positioned for a killing match in that area.

Whilst the Japanese do have a radically different perspective compared to @ on account of their WW1 experiences, they don’t quite have the same brutal experience of attrition from 1916 and 1917 that the British do; the latter are more accustomed to attrition. They are, however, shocked that they have sustained sufficient damage to sideline 2/3rds of the Grand Fleet’s carrier force so quickly.

The Doolittle Raid brings forward Yamamoto’s expansion plan. The USN is increasing in numbers and threat on his other flank, which he aims to counter through A.) Extension of the Pacific defensive perimeter B.) Cutting off Australia and New Zealand and strategically outflanking the British resistance in SE Asia. This entails an offensive in the South Pacific, which, in order to work, needs the US threat beaten back in the Central Pacific. Their carrier production and scale of armament is already extremely concerning. Furthermore, by threatening Australia and New Zealand, he thinks to pull RN carriers and battleships our of their defensive bastion to where he can sink them.
A complex plan built on every different aspect working to schedule across multiple fronts. Whatever could go wrong?

The fighting to clear out the Kra is hard, but the advantage of carriers operating in a more open ocean is that they can strike from unexpected directions at unexpected times in conjunction with land-based air. It is the first stage of 5 key steps before the Grand Fleet can break loose, but many things wait for the monsoon.

You assess the difficulties of launching a long range night strike at sea while trying to successfully cover the withdrawal of the damaged elements of the fleet. It was an option, but the costs outweighed the benefits.

At this point, the lesson is that a strong enough strike can smash through any defence. However, if it is utterly decimated in the process, the consequences can be extensive. As such, there are several strong personalities/individuals working to curb Churchill’s more aggressive instincts, such as King George VI, Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Anthony Eden, Liberal leader and Minister of War Richard Harcourt, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir William Fisher, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, Ernest Bevin, Clement Attlee, Jan Smuts and Canadian PM Sir William Richardson.

Simon

The best answer to your question is: It depends.

It really depends when we are talking about. In 1965, New Zealand

As of 1965, the following nations have carriers:
United States
Soviet Union
Britain
France
China
Japan
Canada
Italy
Spain
Australia
Netherlands
India
Turkey
Greece
Sweden
Germany
Brazil
Argentina
Chile
Austria-Hungary
Mexico
Korea
Indonesia
Portugal
Peru
New Avalon
New Zealand