Part VIII: The Rise and Fall of the Afriqua Corps.
“I was once told that when Martial Valin heard I was appointed KLSKMO, he said a woman would never defeat his air force. I wonder what he said when BW-35s started bombing Paris?”
Lieutenant colonel Minna-Dietlinde Wilcke.
For both the Axis and the Allies, the Middle East was strategically vital. The many oil fields in the area made up almost half of the Commonwealth's annual fuel production and would mean a permanent end to Axis fuel troubles while closing the Suez channel would block the Royal Navy from entering the Mediterranean.
To prevent such a scenario, the Dutch send in marshal Jeroen Pietersz to lead operation Telegram. A World War 1 veteran, Pietersz was a traditionalist through and through, viewing anything modern with suspicion. The most hatred he reserved for Air Force general Rudolf van Brugge, who was nearly his polar opposite.
The son of a minor noble, van Brugge had been handed a high ranked position right out of officer school and never went anywhere without his butler and maid. The hatred between him and Pietersz went beyond simple branch rivalry, with one looking at the other as a simple peasant afraid of everything electrical and the other seeing his rival as everything wrong with the country. It goes without saying that with the two never agreeing on anything, the Libya campaign was doomed before it fully got started.
The RAF regularly performed bombing missions over the Axis colonies, but adamantly refused to provide anything but the bare minimum of reconnaissance data and air support that Van Brugge judged appropriate for the Army to complete its task. He was more interested in sinking Italian capital ships, especially the carrier
Aquila, and ensuring Dutch naval superiority in the Mediterranean.
Both to get Van Brugge to focus his attention where it mattered and out of revenge, Pietersz withheld RAF supplies unless they did what he wanted them to. This created a vicious cycle where the RAF was forced to barter for supplies by performing raids they deemed too dangerous or wasteful and then would refuse to provide air support out of revenge.
Despite the two branches being more interested in fighting each other, incompetent Italian command and mostly obsolete Equipment meant would take until mid-1942 for the Dutch to be stopped in their conquest of Libya and Algeria and even then it was more because of French interference than Italian effort.
The prospect of Allied bombing raids over France caused Doriot to general Leclerc as leader of the newly formed Afrique Corps. An expert on leading operations over vast distances, Leclerc’s efficient leadership, capable tanks and mobile warfare caught the Dutch by surprise and, over the course of three large battles, drove them all the way back to Cairo. Despite the setback, the Dutch were now actually in a stronger position than they were before the the war. For one the Kaapstad-Cairo railroad was finally completed on 12 May, 1942 and with it supplies and reinforcements from the Boer States could be delivered at a much faster rate than previously. Another help was MID finally cracking the Italian Naval codes. With the discovery that the Regia Marina rarely sortied in force unless absolutely necessary due to fuel shortage, Force S went on the offensive. Armed with the knowledge of the location of every Axis ship, no Italian sailor could feel safe as entire convoys would sometimes be sunk literally overnight.
With their back against the wall and being informed by a spy that the enemy capital ships were gathered at Alexandria, the Regia Marina set out for one last decisive battle. After frogmen disabled the battleships
Eendracht and
Juweel van India with guided torpedoes, the carrier
Aquila and the battleships
Littorio, Roma and
Durnesque launched an assault on the port of Alexandria. It had been hoped that this would be the Pearl Harbour of the Mediterranean and destroy Force S once and for all.
Instead, after a half hour battle the
Littorio, Roma and
Durnesque were forced to limp back to port, all having suffered damage from the aerial counterattack, and without the
Aquila. The carrier had been sunk by a bomb penetrating her flight deck and hitting a fuel tank.
On the Dutch side the battlecruiser
Adwa had been sunk and the battleships
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden and
Juweel van India had suffered so much damage they spent the rest of the war in drydock, ensuring that Force S lost most of its heavy hitters for the foreseeable future. Unlike their Axis counterparts the survival of the battleship
Evertsen and the carrier
Triomf meant that the Royal Navy was still capable of projecting offensive force in the Mediterranean theatre. This was very different from the Italian ships, which spent the rest of the war cowering inside their harbours.
At land things were not going much better for the Afrique Corps. A reorganisation of the general staff had moved general Van Brugge to the North American theatre and Goering had taken the opportunity to sneak in one of his rising stars.
A former ace pilot With exstensive experience from the American fronts, Lieutenant colonel Minna-Dietlinde was an experienced officer who led her air forces With a steady hand and finally made sure air support arrived on time. Despite this, she got just as much hate from Marshal Pietersz for being a women and a foreigner at that. Before a new rivalry could ruin another operation, Field marshal Sir Wouter van Ghent intervened. Having decided that Pietersz obsolete tactics were the reason for the failure of Operation Telegram, Van Ghent had requested that he should be removed from command. His request was denied by the minister of war. Pietersz was considered a war hero in the Boer States and firing him would ruin his propaganda value.
With outright firing him out of the question, Van Ghent did the second best thing and promoted him to commander Allierte Strijdkrachten Midden Oosten, a position that sounded far more important than it actually was. To replace Pietersz he brought in another German officer, one who had also previously distinguished himself on the North American front.
The moment he assumed command, general Erwin Rommel reorganised his new army. Unlike his predecessor he had realised that in the desert mobility was key and that meant that everything without an engine was essentially worthless.
The strategy shift from gradual advance to a campaign of mobile warfare soon started booking successes. Capitalising on his superior logistics, Rommel managed to repel the Axis assault on Cairo and turn the tide at Tobruk.
Now it was the Afriqua Corps that was on the retreat. But despite the massive supply difference between the two sides, Leclerc intended to go down fighting. He built an entire army of false vehicles, stored at fake bases and running on a realistic schedule to act as decoys for RAF recon flights. He had his tanks drive in circles in the desert to kick up massive clouds of dust and give the impression that he had more tanks available then he actually had. And in one last act of spite he had his retreating troops put up fake signs at every oasis they passed that the water was poisoned.
The time not spent pulling new tricks out of his bag was spent in Paris, begging Doriot for more tanks and planes. There Leclerc was promised that as soon as operation Charlemagne had been completed and the Swedish empire surrendered, he would get all the new Char B4 heavy tanks he desired.
Despite Doriot’s delusions, Rommel had no intentions of waiting for that to happen and continued his merciless drive on Tripoli. On 23 February, 1943 the Afriqua Corps finally surrendered Leclerc was offered the opportunity to escape back to France on one of the last evacuation flights but declined, he preferred to stay with his men until the end.
With their victory over the Axis in the Middle East, the Dutch had done more then just secure their continued access to oil. Exactly as Doriot had initially feared, the RAF used their new air bases to launch operation Kruisboog, a massive bombing campaign aimed at breaking the people’s morale. This was not the first time that the Allies had launched a bombing raids against the Axis home soil, with operation Blitzer having begun some months earlier, but it was the first time a campaign of this scale had been launched.
By the time it ended in 1944 it had caused the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians and made millions more homeless. On the Allied side it was one of the most dangerous assignment among flight crews, with only thirty percent surviving long enough to have completed a tour of duty.