Alternative confederate leaders and decisions how could the south have done better based upon differ

Early in the war, it was believed that a southern gentleman could beat at least 10 Yankees; this superiority complex was part of the reason to attack Fort Sumpter as it insulted their honor. Many Southerners wrongly believed that Northerners would back down over this show of force. Save Toombs Davis administration believed this as they thought they were cowardly or would remain sympathetic as many northerners had still favored letting the CSA go despite states seizing federal property. From the start, the crowds that would not let the South were still not as enlarged post-attack on Fort Sumter, although we have covered why Fort Sumter was a grave mistake.

In the first year, the Confederates achieved several victories in 1861, along with secessionist patriotism, which swelled the ranks of the Confederacy to the point where recruits were turned down.

However, the Confederates would sometimes challenge these notions of weak Yankee soldiers Through the battlefields in 1861. surprisingly, the Confederates did not try to advance toward Washington. Still, you can blame the Confederate political and military leadership more than what the Confederate disadvantages Hard presented. Both Armies Face inadequacies in providing supplies to outfit their regiments. This is one of the reasons why casualties in the first year of 1861 remained low. In the following years, the casualties would become bloated on both sides through better weaponry and professionalism throughout the ranks.

The Sequence of Confederation losses in part from the CSA leadership
When. The Confederates started losing such as in West CSA Virginia scuttling, Kentucky, Missouri Pea Ridge, the Twin Forts, the Virginia Shiloh, Corinth, and The Union Army of the Potomac less than 10 miles away from Richmond during late May Recruitment plummeted. The Confederate morale was low, with only the Jackson Valley campaign lifting the populace's spirits as the nation seemed to be on the Threshold of defeat. The CSA Congress, in turn, expands incentives for reenlistment, but it's not enough and soon freezes the volunteer enlistment expirations.
www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/proclamation-suspension-habeas-corpus-1862

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confederate_Conscription_Acts_1862%E2%80%931864

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Partisan_Ranger_Act,_21_April_1862.png
bad generals thanks to Davis
Polk violated Kentucky neutrality, which Davis should have relieved him from his command, and is responsible for almost all of the Confederate disasters out west. Davis should have accepted his resignation. Davis offered a commission to a major General by Jefferson Davis when he should have remained at most a leutanet. This was an aggressive move, and Davis unnecessarily allowed incompetent political generals such as Floyd, who had no public support even in his home state, Virginia. Under Polk's orders, General Pillow violated neutrality and should never have been a major general. However, it is a wonder as he was good with logistics working with the Tennse munitions factory. Davis's failure to accept pillows, POlks, and eventually brag resignation is a mark of his poor description.

Better generals out west for higher command are Patrick Cleburne,Breckenridge and Simon Buckner, and with time, Felix Zollicoffer could have been promoted to major general. Nathan Bedford Forest was good for his rank; he wouldn't accede any higher due to his poor logistics abilities. Kerby Smith, although a Major general in February 1862, makes better sense for the commander of the transmission theater than van Dorn

Final thoughts accompanied by the lessons

As the South gradually matured from the hard lessons of war, its recruitment dwindled unless it was forced with the possibility of invasion of its homeland or conscription. This is a rare instance when a hazardous Bravado from the public proves to be recruitment. However, the South Patriotic fever, known as the secessionist spirit of 186,1, is a factor for civilians playing soldiers. When victories are plentiful, the public responds favorably, such as people stepping up to enlist.

Mistakes to prevent the CSA leadership.



Have Beauregard remain in Charleston, SC, or defend New Orleans by replacing retiring Twigs. By equaling Beaguard out of the Frey, a terrible field commander, these actions first improved the situation for the Confederate army with Robert E. Lee, as the Virginia legislature appointed him commander and chief of all Virginia's forces.

The historical record shows Virginia decided that one Confederate general was enough, so Lee wasn't appointed to command The Forces at Manassas. Instead, General Robert E. Lee gets along well with his friend Joseph E. Johnston and doubtless appoints him as a tactician, just as he did General Beauregard. Another possibility is that Joseph E. Johnston would have been placed as general and Lee for the Confederate forces.

Historically, Beauregard failed to concentrate all his armies against McDowell's forces despite Johnson canceling Patterson's forces in Winchester, Virginia. The CSA army was positioned far from the crucial left flank, And only Johnson's recently arrived brigades had any hope of supporting the Shanks. Such a Stonewall Jackson saved the day for the Confederacy.



One of Tyler's brigade commanders, Col. William Tecumseh Sherman, moved forward from the stone bridge around 10:00 am [47], crossed at an unguarded ford, and struck the right flank of the Confederate defenders. This surprise attack, coupled with pressure from Burnside and Maj. George Sykes collapsed the Confederate line shortly after 11:30 am, sending them in a disorderly retreat to Henry House Hill.[48] from Wikipedia

McDowell made colossal blunders throughout the fight and would be fresh prey under General Robert E. Lee's aggressive tactics, which favored Napoleonic-style war tactics.



Then, the Union army was well routed by 5 pm.

Historically, President Jefferson Davis came touring the battlefield, with Jefferson Davis requesting only 5000 men to take Washington, DC. The president didn't answer him.


As most Union soldiers retreated the same route, they suddenly arrived by the roundabout in Spring-Ford. Military historian and retired Korean War veteran Robert E. Smith notes that Confederate troops should have quickly sent a small number of soldiers to Centreville, cutting off most of the Union troops.

He further argues that the senior commanders should have been present to seal the retreat with their best regiments, but this didn't happen. Mcdowell left 5,000 Union soldiers in DC, which did not have adequate defense during this time because, with only auxiliary on the Union arsenal and Fort Washington, which was south of the Potomac guarding the river,

The Historian argues that Buarguard should have crossed Bull Run at Balls Ford or Sones Bridge and had his forces push on through the night under a full moon. Johnston should have galloped back at Mitchels for Centreville with fresh reserves who saw no action under Longstreet, Dr.Jones, and Mileage Bonham. (The Historian doesn't mention that even the reserves were tired from marching, but it was worth the energy.)This move would have sufficiently threatened the Union flanks without a need for heavy fighting.

A threat upon either flank would have been sufficient; even blank fires would have caused panic -Porter Alexandria memories.

The Confederate generals believed they could take the capital from the evidence of the orders issued. Neither general personally ordered that the orders be executed.

On July 22, President Lincoln signed a bill for enlisting another 500,000 men for up to three years of service.[77] On July 25, 11,000 Pennsylvanians who had earlier been rejected by the U.S. Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, for federal service in either Patterson's or McDowell's command arrived in Washington, DC, and were finally accepted.[78]from Wikipedia.

The thread is about leaders, and Davis and these military leaders missed this opportunity. Even if it has been unsuccessful, good leaders always try the closest way to defeat the enemy

In the aftermath of Bull Run,

Johnston would make excuses, arguing the Historian for his gross failure not to take, saying his army was disorganized( green they were also tired, then again the Union is too). However, large portions of his army weren't disorganized. His units could have departed at a quick speed. A strike on the Baltimore and Ohio railways, which would have cut off northern supplies from the CSA, was not even attempted. Davis should be blamed because he didn't believe in an offensive to take the capital and only wanted a defensive war.
The Frenchmen suggested to invade Maryland in 1861, which at least would make sense if the CSA had the capital. If the CSA has DC, they can control southern Maryland.
what I think
Lincoln and enough politicians to reorganize the Union government in Philadelphia probably would have escaped, with Union soldiers delaying action.

1862 Jefferson Davis's energy and resources were devoted to the Maryland invitation. This distracted him elsewhere in the theaters, such as in the Kentucky campaign, where he provided no additional aid and took a while to respond. As it was, Brag won the race in Kentucky and should have stayed at Munfordville, which blocked Buell from Nashville. While Buell can try to escape through other routes, Brag hasn't blocked; he stands badly and risks getting flanked. Buell arrived at a snail's pace due to his oversized supply trains and cautious nature. Brag should have gone to Louisville brags supply was running low. Another move is to ask Kirby Smith to aid him, the general, and go to Louisville for supplies. Instead, brag stalls in Frankford to install a CSA governor so he could have the legal power to draft the Kentuckians.

Historian Alexander argues that this would have blocked Union River traffic, broken all existing Union supplies, and slowed rail connections in Saint Louis out west if they went to Louisville. This would have complicated the supplies for Union-occupied cities Nashville, Corinth, and Memphis.


The records go that buel outnumbered the CSA at the battle of Perryville, yet it was a tactical CSA victory. However, without the supplies, they retreated. Had the CSA not violated Kentucky's neutrality in 1861, the Confederates would have been more likely to have had remarkably more recruits before the Bulls army arrived. However the Kentuckians were not going to rise up last bills army was no longer something to worry about in Kentucky

Davis offensive-defensive strategy
This allowed the Union commanders to become much more cautious, such as in the battle of Shiloh, which fed logic into Buells, Halleck, and little Macc's fears. Also, in the short term, it succeeded as the CSA captured supplies during the campaigns, and Antitam was tactically a stalemate. Strategically, if these commanders won the battle, then Maryland, Kentucky, and possibly the destruction of grants army at Shiloh or disgrace as almost happened in the historical record, would have accorded with Corinth safe and the csa land regained

Had did Albert S Johnson survived the battle of Shiloh he would have given complete command of his army out west Bragg, Kirby Smith, would have been under direct subordination under Albert S Johnson preventing the problem of an unified command which happened during the Kentucky invasion