The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

1. Having learned the wrong lessons at Guasimas and El Caney, did Shafter put the balloon the American taxpayers supplied him to spot his artillery fire? Did Shafter arrange an army shore to ship semaphore system with the navy to enable naval gunfire support and fall of shot correction? Did Shafter manage a plan whereby the navy bombardment would cover zones within their reach about six miles inland, so he could concentrate his own very few field guns to cover the two northern escape routes out of the city? No.

2. My comments about this letter concerning the admirable CAPT C.F Goodrich will be quite SARCASTIC as I translate his USN navalese into plain English.
--a. First, Goodrich reminds Long of just what the USS St Louis with a commercial crew and some USMC gunners did, while the rest of the fleet and the army were fouling up around and in Cuba. What the army was doing trying to perform a navy mission with the SS Apria is especially noteworthy as to incompetence. 
--b. Here I scoff at Goodrich's claims about saving the navy money by not sending the USS St Louis back home for service m,odifications. Goodrich is afraid of three things:
---time at a dockyard will see his wartime career ended before he can rack up combat time for seniority on the captain's list. 
---the people at Cramp and Sons will see what actual damage he did to the USS St Louis. 
---the actual chance that the USS St Louis will be converted into a troop transport and he will have to carry the army to and from as a mere transport captain, instead of remaining the captain of an actual warship. 
---he claims he can rejoin the fleet if his ship is armed with a few more guns, either with the squadron going to Spain or to join Sampson. The claim is malarkey for there is no way his crew can reframe the ship or reinforce the deck plating or create additional gun galleries to mount the 6 inch bore diameter guns he requests. 
---Why would Goodrich object to a navy paymaster? Guess who has been handling the ship's monies and whose cash accounts cannot stand a close look by a trained USG accountant? It is not that American Lines Bursar as Goodrich claims. 
---Commissioning merchant ship officers into the regular navy would make them eligible for veterans' benefits. Notice how Goodrich intends to shaft the ordinary sailors in the ship's crew in his recommendation? They are lower deck and therefore to be ignored as they are happy with their lot. This is Gilded Age class snobbery and presumption at its typical worst. 
--- Of the four things: "harmony, efficiency, usefulness and economy" Goodrich claims, we can ascertain that USS St Louis has been efficient and useful, but economical and harmonious Goodrich has not been. We can see signs that Goodrich does not want a cost accounting of monies spent, nor a close look at his politicking, though this letter to SecNav Long, over Sampson's and Watson's heads (Goodrich's immediate superiors in the chain of responsibility. M.) actually reeks of disharmony. 
---Writing further about disharmony and angling for a better command, we have:
----the alleged, though never proven Sampson promise about the Cristobol Colon.

Colon was not that badly damaged. But her salvage was bungled. 

Who was the idiot who ordered her pulled off before she was ready to be towed to Key West? Sampson. 

----the reference to maybe replacing Captain Evans of the USS Iowa as Iowa Actual. 

How was that it was even possible that the Captain of America's best battleship was thinking of abandoning his command and that Goodrich knew about it? 
      
What CAPT Evans wrote to RADM Sampson was a letter of protest for the record. Apparently, Sampson wanted to know why the USS Iowa was tardy and laid up at Key West, instead of with the fleet headed for its next mission. So CAPT Evans wrote his reply. I will translate it.

CAPT Evans had a bellyful of RADM Sampson's incompetence and wanted a transfer out of the chickendip outfit he, Sampson, ran and he SAID so to Goodrich. 

---The army had disgraced itself at Daiquiri and Siboney during the landings, drowning hundreds of horses and mules and more than a hundred soldiers. Goodrich, rightfully predicts that the wretched ride from Tampa to Daquiri aboard the transports will become a major newspaper scandal. He wants no part of that business. The complaint about empty army transports burning down coal and doing nothing off Daquiri is extremely valid. 
---The SS Twickenham is a clear case of Goodrich wanting to ensure that he gets his "prize money". Not to put to fine a point on it, the British collier had a fat load of Cardiff coal sent to fuel Cervera's fleet. That was a hefty sum of cash to let slip if the US admiralty courts allowed that the SS Twickenham was engaged in free trade and not a "blockade runner" as she obviously was.
---If CAPT Evan will not give up USS Iowa, how about CAPT Philip? Beach him and give Goodrich the USS Texas? One has to laugh at the gall involved.   
                      
Well, there is Long's bluff to recall Camara's expedition given concrete form. Is it a waste of time and effort? In hindsight, of course it is. At the time, Long thought he still needed this raid force to force Spain to negotiate an end to the war.   

Consults? Miles is there to read those two gentlemen the riot act. By now, even McKinley has to agree that someone who knows what he is doing has to go to Santiago de Cuba and straighten that mess out. So, against his better political judgment, McKinley lets his best general go look-see and find out what needs to happen to resolve the issue. What Miles discovers is "not too good" if your name is Shafter or Sampson.


It is that direct order from Long to Sampson. Will Sampson obey it? As a practical matter... he will not, but it will be a moot disobedience as circumstances are about to change. Unfortunately, not for the better. It remains remarkable, to this day, amazing just how generous John Long is to Russell Alger. This council of war was to ascertain just how badly things were going in Santiago de Cuba, for this was the main US effort that was stalled. People in Washington had forgotten all about poor George Dewey out there in Manila Bay, up to his armpits in dissembling Spaniards, tricky Aguinaldo and Blustering Otto von Diederichs. George was not complaining about his problems or getting reported on by the newspaper correspondents in a negative way... yet. 

As for Alfred Mahan and Russell Alger, how many times has a navy captain called a war minister a stupid worthless son of a you know what and gotten away with it and on top of that insult had made the minister of the army apologize to the navy minister for being such a ninny about navy matters?     

I think of maybe one other time this happened, about when Louis Johnson apologized to George C. Marshal for he, Johnson, being an absolutely worthless SedDef after Arleigh Burke called Johnson an incompetent imbecile during the Admirals Revolt. 

Day 87 of the Spanish–American War, July 15th 1898

Spanish forces under General Toral capitulated to US forces at Santiago de Cuba.

United States - Commodore George C. Remey, Commandant, Key West Naval Base, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST [Fla.]

U. S. Flagship Lancaster, July 15, 1898

Sir:

As the extension of the blockade on the north side of Cuba increases the need of vessels, I have the honor to request that you will send as many around from the south side as you can spare. Every available vessel here is kept out on the blockade as long as she can stay, but this number is occasionally drawn on for convoys. The NEWPORT has just been sent north by the Department’s order, convoying four prize steamers to New York, and the DOLPHIN has not yet returned from being repaired at Norfolk. Commodore Howell3 has expressed a particular desire for all the small vessels to be had.

(2) The Department has sent here the Torpedo Boats MORRIS, TALBOT and GWIN, to be used on blockade between the Isle of Pines and Batabano. I have sent the NASHVILLE down to examine into the practicability of maintaining these small craft in that vicinity, with a sub-base at Siguanea Bay or near there. I expect the NASHVILLE to return in a few days.

(3) Regarding the monitors for service in Porto Rican waters, I have just reported to the Department that all four can be ready, as far as known, on the 20th instant, the PURITAN being obliged to go with two defective boilers blanked off. I have said they can go to Guantanamo with their own steam, convoyed by one vessel, but to go direct to Porto Rico they would need towing vessels, one of them to be a steam collier. There is no steam collier here now, the nearest one being the POMPEY, stationed at Cardenas.

(4) The CINCINNATI has just arrived from the North.

Very respectfully,

Geo. C. Remey

Commodore Commanding

Bacoor - Emilio Aguinaldo Y Famy To Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron

TRANSLATION.

His Excellency, the Admiral of the Squadron

of the U.S.in the Islands.

Bacoor, July 15, 1898.

Sir:

The Revolution having taken possession of the various provinces of the Archipelago this Government has found it necessary to adopt the form and organization best suited to the popular will.

I have therefore the pleasure (desire) and honor of placing in your hand the enclosed decrees which contain the organization referred to,1 begging that you will communicate to you Government that the desires of this Government are to remain always in friendship with the Great North American Nation to which we are under many obligations.

I beg, also, that your Excellency will have the kindness to forward the enclosed package H.B.M. Consul,2 with a request from me that he will forward them their respective destinations.

For which favor the Filipino people and your humble servant will most deeply grateful to Your Excellency.

Very Respectfully etc. etc.

Emilio Aguinaldo

United States - Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

LETTER

Washington, [D.C.] July 15, 1898.

Sir:

As has been previously stated, the Department sometime since decided to send a squadron to Manila to reinforce Admiral Dewey. This decision was arrived at, in view of the then recent departure of Admiral Camara’s squadron from Spain for the Philippine Islands.

2. Though Admiral Camara has returned from the Suez Canal to Spain, the Department still intends to send a reinforcing squadron to Manila; and as Camara’s force, when united with other armored ships, now presumably disposable in Spanish waters, would be, on paper, stronger than the squadron proposed to be sent to the East Indies, it has been decided to send with the latter a covering squadron strong enough to guarantee against the possible efforts of all such armored ships of the Spanish Navy as may now be in condition for cruising in the straits of Gibraltar, and to hold any such force as Spain may collect, blockaded in its own ports until our squadron for the East is well on its way.

3. With this end in view, the Department has directed the two squadrons to be prepared at once, as below designated, the whole to be under one command until separated by order of the Commander-in-Chief:

4. Covering Squadron. Eastern Squadron.

Armored Ships. Armored Ships.

NEW YORK MASSACHUSETTS

BROOKLYN OREGON

IOWA

INDIANA

Cruisers. Cruisers.

NEWARK YOSEMITE

NEW ORLEANS DIXIE

BADGER

YANKEE

MAYFLOWER Food Ships.

With the proper number of

colliers to be designated by the Department.

5. The men-of-war composing this expedition are to be filled with provisions, coal, ammunition, etc., and will sail from the point that is thought most convenient in the vicinity of the Windward Passage, directly to a point 200 miles, W.S.W., magnetic from the town of Punta Delgada, in the Azores, where the Department will direct the colliers to rendezvous, the latter sailing from Hampton Roads under convoy of a cruiser, which will be designated by the Department.

6. As it is the desire of the Department to conceal the movements of this fleet as much as possible, it is thought best that only a single small vessel should be sent in to Punta Delgada, and this without showing an Admiral’s or Commodore’s flag. Communication should be had with the U.S.Consul, to whom will be addressed any important matter for the Commander-in-Chief.

7. It is not now thought expedient that the fleet should coal at this rendezvous, unless found necessary, but it should proceed to such a point on the coast of Morocco or the coast of Spain as can be occupied in comparative safety from Spanish attack, sufficiently near the straits of Gibraltar, and smooth enough for coaling of ships. In this connection the coast between Cadiz and Huelva, and between Melilla and other points on the African coast, should be considered.

8. As the speed of the fleet is regulated by that of the colliers, it would appear that about ten knots per hour can probably be maintained, in ordinary weather, though it is thought that the most economical speed of several of the men-of-war may perhaps be more than that. Great care must be taken to keep the machinery and boilers of the colliers in an efficient working condition. A few of them could, under favorable conditions, make twelve knots; but as a rule, ten will probably be as much as should be expected of most of them.

9. During the operation of coaling, which should be conducted as speedily as practicable, a vigilant lookout must be kept against the enemy’s torpedo craft, the fleet being got underway, if necessary, at nightfall, to stand off shore or to shift position, as may be thought best.

10. It must also be habitually so disposed as to properly meet any attack of the enemy’s men-of-war, or torpedo boats, and to cover the colliers and weaker vessels, the cruisers being expected to guarantee all against the attacks of torpedoboats and destroyers.

11. After coaling the fleet, such colliers as may be nearly empty should be discharged into the others - enough coal being left in the “empties” to enable them to reach the United States, or some port where it is certain that they can procure coal.

12. It might, perhaps, be more desirable to pass the straits at night, carrying the whole fleet into the Mediterranean, far enough to the eastward of the coast of Spain to make it difficult for the Spanish torpedo boats to act conveniently, and then anchoring on the north coast of Africa, or elsewhere, accomplish the coaling as rapidly as possible. However, the Commander-in-Chief will follow any plan that may seem to him most convenient, the fleet’s safety being secure by proper arrangements on his part. If off the coast of a neutral country, it will be necessary to coal beyond the marine league from shore, if practicable.

13. After the operation of coaling, the entire fleet has been completed, the division for the East Indies and the colliers detailed for it, will be directed to proceed as mentioned at close of sixteenth paragraph. The separation should, if possible, be made by night, and the covering squadron will then hold the Spanish fleet under observation and blockade it if necessary, till time has been allowed the Eastern Squadron to reach the Suez Canal. The covering squadron will then return to the United States, sending a vessel into Lisbon to inquire if there be any orders for it.

14. In conclusion, the Department attaches importance to preserving the armored fleet in full efficiency. Therefore, while any opportunity that may offer to destroy the enemy’s armed ships must be used to the utmost, the vessels must not be exposed any more than may be imperatively necessary, to the fire of the coast fortifications.

15. On approaching the coast of Europe, one of the cruisers will be sent ahead to call on the Minister at Lisbon for any orders the Department may have sent to his care; the cruiser to depart from Lisbon immediately and rejoin off Cape St. Vincent, or any other point that may be designated by the commander of the combined force.

16. The Department designated by the commander of the combined force, Eastern Squadron. Admiral Sampson will command the covering squadron and also the combined force until it separates, when Commodore Watson will proceed, without delay, with the “MASSACHUSETTS,” “OREGON,” colliers and store ship, to Manila, using every endeavor to make his way without any other delays than those that are absolutely necessary.

17. You will furnish Commodore Watson with a copy of this order, and you will hold the vessels designated, in such a state of readiness that they will be able to sail at the earliest practicable moment after the receipt by you of an order from the Department for them to proceed.

18. You will inform the Department, by telegraph, when they are ready for the service herein mentioned.

Very respectfully,

John D. Long,

Secretary.

Cuba - Preliminary Agreement For The Surrender Of Santiago De Cuba

PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT for the capitulation of the Spanish Forces which constitute the division of Santiago de Cuba occupying the territory herein set forth, said capitulation authorized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Island of Cuba,1 agreed to by General Toral and awaiting the approbation of the Government at Madrid and subject to the following conditions:

Submitted by the undersigned Commissioners, Brigadier General Don Frederick Escario, Lieutenant Colonel of Staff Don Ventura Fontan and Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, representing General Toral, Commanding Spanish Forces, to Major General Joseph Wheeler, U.S.V., Major General H.W.Lawton, U.S.V., and 1st Lieutenant J. D. Miley, 2nd Artillery, A. D. C., representing General Shafter, Commanding American Forces, for the capitulation of Spanish Forces comprised in that portion of the Island of Cuba east of a line passing through Asseradero, Dos Palmas, Palma Soriano, Cauto abajo, Recondida, Tanamo, and Aguilera, said territory being known as the Eastern District of Santiago, Commanded by General Jose Toral.

1. That pending arrangements for capitulation all hostilities between American and Spanish Forces in this District shall absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the Forces and war material in said territory.

3. That after the signing of the final capitulation the United States agrees, with little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said District to the Kingdom of Spain the troops as near as possible, to embark at the Port nearest the garrisons they now occupy.

4. That the Officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side arms and both Officers and enlisted men their personal property.

5. That after final capitulation the Spanish authorities agree without delay to remove or assist the American Navy in removing all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the Harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That after final capitulation the Commander of the Spanish Forces deliver without delay a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish Forces, and a roster of the said Forces now in above described District to the Commander of the American Forces.

7. That the Commander of the Spanish Forces, in leaving said District, is authorized to carry with him all the military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish Army now in said District.

8. That all of that portion of the Spanish Forces known as Volunteers, Movilizadoes and Guerillas, who wish to remain in the Island of Cuba are permitted to do so under parole not to take up arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States, delivering up their arms.

9. That the Spanish Forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba, with honors of War, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States Government it being understood that the United States Commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

ENTERED INTO this fifteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, by the undersigned Commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective Commanding Generals.

(Signed):

Joseph Wheeler, Frederick Escario,

Major General Vols.

H. W. Lawton,

Major General Vols. Ventura Pentan,

J. D. Miley, Robt.Mason.

1st Lieut., 2d Artillery,

A.D.C.

Day 89 of the Spanish–American War, July 17th 1898

Cuba: Siege of Santiago

Spanish general Toral offers the surrender of the 12,000 men at Santiago de Cuba, the 12,000 men at Guantánamo, and six other small Spanish Army garrisons throughout Cuba. Leonard Wood, promoted to brigadier general, accepts the surrender and is named military governor of Santiago de Cuba. Land combat effectively ends in Cuba for the duration of the war.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba - Commodore John A. Howell, Commander, Second Blockading Squadron, To Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet

U.S.Flagship San Francisco.

Off Nuevitas,Cuba.

July 17, 1898.

Sir:--

I have to report the following report in regard to the blockade of the north coast of the Island of Cuba:-

1. In obedience to your telegraphic order of the 9th instant forwarded to me through the Commander-in-Chief of the Key West Naval Base,I have extended the Cuban blockade through the entire northern coast of the island,as far as the number of vessel under my control will admit.

2. The vessels in question are at this date stationed as follows:-

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Gorda----Topeka and Maple.

Gibara and vicinity----Prairie.

Nuevitas and vicinity----Badger.

Cardenas2 and Matanzas----Pompey, Uncas and Hudson.

Havana,Mariel, and Bahia Honda----I left Havana on July 11,leaving Captain Ludlow of the Terror in charge there, so that I cannot give the exact distribution of the vessels in that vicinity.

3. In my opinion this distribution is not sufficient to give a thorough blockade of the coast, and if possible ships should be assigned as follows:

In vicinity of Baracoa----------------------------------1.

Between Porto Tanamo and Punta Godra--------------------1.

Gibara and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Porto Padre,Porto Malagasta and Port Manati-------------1.

Nuevitas and vicinity-----------------------------------1.

Boca de Caravela and Boca de Guajaba--------------------1.

From Santa Maria Cay to Frageso Cay---------------------1.

From Frageso Cay to Dromedary Cay-----------------------1.

From Bahia de Cadiz Cay to Piedras Cay------------------1.

Matanzas and vicinity-----------------------------------2.

Havana-------------------------------------------------10.

Mariel and vicinity-------------------------------------1.

Bahia Honda and vicinity--------------------------------1.

Pass of Jutlas to Pass of Buena Vista-------------------1.

Pass of Buena Vista to Cape San Antonio-----------------1.

Total--------------------------------------------------27.

4. Of the vessels off Havana four should have a draft of not more than ten feet,if possible,two or more should be heavy ships,and the remainder should be vessels of good speed. All present efforts seem to be towards funning the blockade at this port by creeping along the shore, especially from westward, and small,light draft vessels are necessary to detect and stop this,while some ships of higher speed should be on hand to take up the chase. The heavy ships should be kept there because of the moral effect,to serve as a rallying point for the lighter ships,to run under the batteries, to destroy blockade runners if necessary, and to respond to the fire of the batteries if desired.

5. At least six small vessels of not more than six feet draft and of considerable size,similar to those used on the rivers during our civil war,should be kept inside the keys between Cardenas and Nuevitas,and two or three more inside the keys to the westward of Bahia Honda.

6. I find that ships can be on their stations for a really greater length of time if they are able to go into Key West or some other port where they can get water for their boilers about once in three weeks,than they can if coaled inside the keys, and I am in favor of that method of coaling and watering wherever it is possible. The better condition of the machinery resulting from the use of fresh water in the boilers makes the hips more serviceable where this method can be followed. To do this would of course call for about a third more ships than those actually on station,so that they could be relieved in turn.

7. Thus a force of forty ships and twelve of the craft for work inside the keys would make a complete and perfect blockade possible,keeping twenty-seven ships on station all the time.

8. Realizing that probably this number of vessels cannot be sent to the duty and that some parts of the coast will therefore probably have to be neglected,I have to recommend as specially worthy of care the following:-

Havana and vicinity, including Mariel and Bahia Honda.

Cardenas to Nuevitas,

Nuevitas to Porto Tanano. The importance of this last section will be very largely diminished after the conquest of the Province of Santiago,and the blockade could probably be discontinued there before very long.

9. Assuming that the main object of the blockade is to facilitate the fall of Havana by preventing the ingress of stores into that city,there are two sections of the north coast to be considered. Blockade running at Bahia Honda and Mariel can be easily prevented,especially as lack of railroad connections with Havana makes the transportation of stores from these points difficult. Havana itself is easily closed if only ten vessels of proper description can be kept there. Two ships at Matanzas will fully close that port. Thus the ships in hand can easily guard this first section.

10. The section section,from Piedras City Cay to Nuevitas is much more difficult to handle,and at present is the principal source of supplies to Havana. According to our best information there is rail connection to the eastward from Havana as far as San Juan de los Raemedios. Cargo landed anywhere inside these keys can be readily transshipped by boat and rail to Havana,and my reports show that much of this traffic has been going on. I have as yet been able to do nothing to stop it,from lack of ships,but I will give my attention to the matter as soon as possible. It is here that the very light draft vessels are needed,and this matter is of prime importance if the supply of provisions to Havana is to be stopped. Nuevitas should be blockaded for the same reason.

11. I do not fear that supplies introduced to the eastward of Nuevitas or to the westward of Bahia Honda,on the north coast,can be gotten into Havana.

12. While off Port Nipe I communicated with some Cuban insurgents at Port Banes. There were about twenty-five of them there,and no Spaniards,but they reported about one thousand Spanish troops at Port Nipe. There is a small gunboat at Nipe,but I could not find out whether there were any batteries of not. Apparently there was one,but it would not open fire,although the Topeka stood in close enough to exchange shots with the gunboat but without effect.

13. I have endeavored to find some ports of refuge to be used in case of hurricanes,especially for the smaller craft. Pot Banes is available for the small vessels,but that is the only one I have been able to find. There seems to be absolutely nothing of the sort in the vicinity of Havana.

14. The Cubans at Banes offer to furnish pilots to take vessels into that port,and I have directed the Commanding Officer of the Topeka ascertain whether that port is available for larger vessels,and whether it is possible to coal there from a collier.

Very respectfully,

(Signed) J. A. Howell,

Commodore,U.S.Navy,

Commanding North Cuba Blockade.

Damm you trolls, seems a mistake on my part, thanks for the notice, will fix it.

It was a combination of factors which caused Toral to pack it in:
a. Unlike Linnares; Toral was cognizant that "honor" was less important than the hail of shells and Gatling gun bullets that made movement and operations inside Santiago de Cuba impossible, once the US V Corps had the high ground and could rain shells down on the trapped Spanish defenders with impunity.
b. The best Spanish troops had been Linnares squandered and the limited ammunition and food the defenders had, was almost gone.    
c. Once the Spanish fleet was gone, what was the point of holding the place? Blanco had ordered it to sortie and be slaughtered. Toral was not made of the same fatalist nonsense as Admiral Cervera. 

See Map.



1. The area of coverage CMMDR Remey seeks ships to fill is the Gulfo de Batabano.
2. This is the USS Lancaster


Does one get the feeling the USN still did not get it in 1898? Those ARE muzzle loaders.

3. USS Puritan is hors de combat.  The USS Terror and the others have to be towed because their engines are subject to breakdown.   


That could be a Whitehead Mark I short. The USS Morris (TB-14) was ordered in 1896 and commissioned April 1898. She is a larger version of the Talbot class torpedo boats (USS Gwin and USS Talbot) built at Herreschoff Manufacturing Company. None of them was intended for blue water operations. 

---------------------------------------------------------------
 The expression is "Lead Balloon"




Commentary will of necessity be sarcastic, as this is "Long" (Actually the War Board. M.), telling Sampson what (they) he expects Sampson to do. So: it will be translated into English to explain the reality beyond the "politeness" of the age. M.

1. We now intend to rescue Dewey, stuck out there in the Philippine Islands, all this time while you dithered in the Caribbean Sea and did not do in the First Spanish Cruiser Squadron. We noticed your inactivity which is why we send you this letter of advice...
2. Even though our bluff worked, and Camara scurried back to Spain, we still intend to reinforce Dewey (Pesky Germans). Our reinforcements need a cover force to make it to the Suez Canal, which is where, despite our misgivings, you come in.
3. We now know you cannot competently plan the movement intended in 2. So: to help you out, we will do it for you.
4. Organize as follows:
--a. battle line of armored cruisers and battleships.
--b. scouting force of cruisers.
--c. fleet trains.
5. See Map. This is what we expect. Note that you will meet the fleet trains at Ponta Delgado in the Portuguese Azores. 

6. Do not do anything else, until you reach Ponta Delgada, rendezvous with the colliers we sent there, and receive cabled instructions from us. In no circumstances do like you did when you made that showy demonstration at San Juan, Puerto Rico and alerted the Spanish navy as to where you were and how to evade you like Cervera did when he ran into Santiago under your nose. And do not upset the Portuguese
7. 

Spain might not be a good option for a forward anchorage? How about Spanish North Africa? 



Ceuta looks like a good USMC target.
8. This paragraph, directed at Sampson specifically, detailing to him what to expect of his ships, is quite telling. Most of his battleline should be capable of fourteen knots or better, yet he is advised not to exceed a fleet speed of twelve knots and a cruise transit of ten knots is recommended. In specific terms, we do not see such a direct written instruction to Watson, Dewey, Schley or Howell that a recommended speed of transit is advised. To Sampson it is. Why? Because this IDIOT never listens to his engineers. Specifically: we can now credit him with damaging the four monitors laid up at Key West still under repair, the USS Indiana (Not able to exceed nine knots, though the department does not know it still since Sampson hides it, M.), the USS Massachusetts and now the USS New York, fixing her engines after the belated and futile speed run to catch up to Schley when he chased Cervera.           

That is a poke about the USS Merrimac fiasco.

9. Use the cruisers as intended by doctrine to protect the fleet. Screen against torpedo boats and light raiders.  Sampson did not post scouting lines until after Cervera sneaked past him in May. One remembers the letter of instruction from the War Board at that time to establish such lines addressed to Sampson around 20 May 1898? He failed to do so prior and only did so post facto after Cervera reached sanctuary. 
10. Repeated and reiterated from 9., bearing in mind what the French did at Fouzhou  and the Japanese did at Wei Hei Wei, and what Vilaamil tried to do at Bahia de Santiago and which Sampson had NOT expected, otherwise he would have disposed his own light forces to anticipate Cervera's charge and Vilaamil's bungled torpedo attack on the USS Indiana.     
11. Did Howell, Schley or Dewey need specific instructions on how to handle coaling? Here, Sampson is told to redistribute coal among his ships, so as to allow empties to head out and load up again while still keeping an operational supply on hand. It was noticed in Washington (Schley's telegrams and messenger boats? M.) that Sampson did not handle coaling operations or fleet administration (Hotel load services.) with much competency off Santiago de Cuba.
12. Going back to 7., Ceuta sure does look like a good operating forward anchorage for blanking off Cadiz and getting Watson on his way to the Suez Canal. Passing Gibraltar Straits at night is something I might expect that Dewey or Schley could handle, even in those busy shipping lanes, but to expect Sampson to pass through without waking up the whole Spanish navy at Cadiz or the British at Gibraltar; is like asking a drunken elephant on roller skates in an ice rink filled with stacks of teacups not to announce his presence by doing something stupid. It is a rather futile exercise to suggest such an evolution.
13. Again, asking Sampson to operate with nighttime subtlety to separate Watson off and cover his passage to the Suez Canal would require a competency that just is not indicated that Sampson is capable of doing by his past actions. Inasmuch as the Spanish might try (Definitely will offer.) battle to interfere with the operation, it may be fairly suggested that Sampson is the LAST American admiral one wants to fight at Ceuta. The Lisbon coda is rather funny. It is a French cable line that runs from there. Apparently, Washington does not trust London.   
14. 
This is in direct reference to Sampson's San Juan, Puerto Rico fiasco in which one third of the gunpower of the USN battleline was damaged by mechanicals and several ships were shot up to no purpose. This is the second time Sampson is directly ordered not to risk ships against forts. 
15. Updated orders will be sent ahead, so Sampson will not do anything stupid. Again, Lisbon is the trusted cable station? 
16. USS Massachusetts and USS Oregon make sense as reinforcements for Dewey. Bringing the fleet home also makes sense, in case things with Spain drag out, as Cuba is still full of Tercios and 'provincia de Cuba occidental', specifically Havana, has about 80,000 tercios still in the Cubana. The fleet has to reinforce the 'paper blockade' CMMDR Reyes complains he has too few ships to cover...     
17. Sampson and Schley never talked to each other before or after Bahia de Santiago de Cuba about battle plans. This is why Bahia de Santiago was such a confused mess. These instructions are Sampson-specific to prevent such a recurrence of USN battle confusion which HE created.
18. Keep us posted. Another feature of Sampson's incompetence was that he tended to not advise Washington as to how he intended to comply or carry out orders.         
        
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Personal comments about the above suggested plans. I would not have risked such a lunatic operation. It was high risk and quite injudicious. The USS Monterey and the USS Monadnock were already fumble-dorking their way across the Pacific Ocean and would reach Dewey before Sampson was ready to execute this insane movement. If Otto von Diederichs was still a problem for Dewey, they were more than enough to handle him and that long before USS Oregon ever cleared the Suez Canal. It should be mentioned that these two monitors did not break down in their long dangerous 7,000 nautical mile passage. Note that they had to coal five times? What was the deal here? Why could the Pacific Squadron do routinely what the North Atlantic Squadron could not? Could it be that RADM Joseph N. Miller ran a better fleet command than RADM Sampson? You better believe it. Take the USS Oregon as an example of a Pacific Squadron ship that outperformed her Atlantic counterparts. Leadership and training matters. 

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See map.



The area between Manzanillo and Antilla is the realistic area under discussion.


   

That should be "eastern Cuba". There were not many American ground troops north of the Sierra Nuestra mountains to be fought by Spaniards. Ground combat between Banditos and Tercios still of course continued.


To be blunt... CMMDR Howell may have been great when it came to designing flywheel powered torpedoes, but he knew Jack-Diddly about how to blockade his assigned areas. See MAP. 

The area in red is Banes Cuba and its hinterland. The area in yellow is what has passed into Bandito control after the US victory at Santiago de Cuba.  Now look...

  
The only viable Spanish controlled supply route to Havana, where most of the Spaniards are, is from Cienfuegos, passing supplies along the patrolled railroad. That port access can be blocked off as soon as Sampson posts a few cruisers in the Gulf of Batabano between Juventud Island and the Zapato Peninsula and a few cruisers off Cienfuegos proper. Jamaica sourced blockade runners have nowhere else they can land that is not US controlled now. The coastwise traffic along the Archipelago de Camagüey in the north, which is supplied from the Bahamas, can be intercepted from the Bahamas by a cruiser patrol line in the Old Bahama Channel. What leaks through Cuba to Cuba along the coast is a Bandito problem, that they can handle and should.