The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

Spies during the Spanish-American War

American intelligence agents infiltrated a Spanish spy ring operating in Montreal during the Spanish-American War.
By Peter Kross

By the end of the 19th century, the United States had grown into one of the major players on the international stage. Americans had tamed a continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the mighty industrial engine of the country was making the nation increasingly self-sufficient and self-confident as it looked across the oceans toward the rest of the world.

In 1898 the United States rushed into war with Spain, which leaders in Washington saw as continuing to interfere in Cuba and other parts of Latin America. In hindsight, the Spanish-American War might have been avoided except for the jingoistic American press, which was clamoring for hostilities to start in the wake of the mysterious sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, an event that is still being debated today. (Most experts believe the ship was the victim of a boiler-room explosion, not deliberate Spanish sabotage.)

The war with Spain was fought on two different fronts. American troops gathered in convoys off the coast of Florida and stormed the beaches of Cuba, inflicting and taking casualties from Spanish troops as well as from indigenous tropical diseases that felled many more American troops than enemy bullets. In the Pacific theater, the U.S. Navy under Admiral George Dewey decisively bested the Spanish fleet near the Philippine Islands. They were aided by agents of the Office of Naval Intelligence who supplied the Navy with important information on Spanish maneuvers.

As the opposing armies and navies battled with conventional forces, Spain began a covert espionage operation in Montreal, Canada, in an effort to undermine American war efforts. Before the war was over and the ring was eventually shut down, the United States Secret Service would penetrate the operation, conduct “black bag” jobs against the Spanish in Montreal, spy on innocent American citizens, and write forged letters—purportedly authored by Spanish agents—whose sole aim was to create a war cry within the United States.

John Wilkie Takes on the Spy Ring

The man who would take on the job of investigating the Spaniards’ Montreal spy ring was John Elbert Wilkie, chief of the American Secret Service. Wilkie, born in Elgin, Illinois, in 1860, began his professional career as a police reporter and business columnist for the Chicago Tribune. After joining the Treasury Department, Wilkie’s first job was to stop a large counterfeiting ring that was changing $1 bills into $100 bills. In the wake of the scandal, the U.S. government was forced to recall all the bills then in circulation. Wilkie worked closely with a Pittsburgh man named William Burns to run a very convincing sting operation that was right out a Hollywood script. In time, they were able to arrest the entire forgery gang.

In the wake of Wilkie’s success in breaking up the counterfeiting ring, Treasury Secretary Lyman Gage promoted him from an ordinary agent making $7 per day to the chief of the Secret Service with a salary of $3,500 per year. With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Wilkie was tasked with the job of investigating Spanish covert actions in Montreal. The Spaniard at the center of the Montreal spy ring was Ramon de Carranza, a lieutenant in the Spanish Navy. When the war broke out, Carranza was assigned to the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C., where he served as a naval attaché. Then and later, most nations assigned naval attachés as a cover for their true profession—that of spy. Carranza relished his new position as an undercover operative and took on the Montreal assignment with near-religious zeal.

Carranza’s Network of Assets

Carranza had a large number of assets he could use inside the United States, drawing on the immigrant Spanish communities in such cities as Tampa, Key West, New Orleans, and Mobile. The Secret Service received a report that pro-Spanish activists in those cities had obtained money to purchase a gunboat for Spain, as well as to carry out reconnaissance work targeting American naval facilities along the Atlantic coast. Secret Service operatives in the field also received information that Spanish spies had been seen as far west as San Francisco, scouting military facilities in the Bay Area. The intelligence service confirmed reports that the minister of the Spanish admiralty, Segismundo Bermejo, had given the order to destroy American naval facilities on both coasts.

Wilkie’s men knew the Spanish were up to no good when, only a few days before war was declared, the Spanish ambassador to Washington, Luis Polo y Bernabe, packed up and left abruptly for a presumably safer haven in Montreal, away from the prying eyes of American agents. Unbeknownst to him, U.S. Secret Service personnel were already watching closely as the ambassador and his entourage arrived in Montreal.

Montreal seemed like a perfect place to establish an elaborate espionage network. The city had a first-class rail system that allowed easy access into and out of town, and it also offered unrestricted ocean access across the Atlantic to Europe. In addition, the Spanish had a long-standing consulate-general office in Montreal from which they could conduct illegal affairs without unwanted interference from the scrupulously neutral Canadian government.

Carranza Places his Agents

After getting settled in the city, Carranza moved his headquarters to the Windsor Hotel, where he thought he would have a safe place to pursue his covert actions. He was unaware that a number of American Secret Service agents, as well as a few inquiring reporters, were also in residence at the Windsor and were literally tripping over each other in the halls.

To mislead the Americans, Carranza and a number of other high Spanish officials left Montreal, supposedly on their way to Liverpool, England. As their ship headed down the St. Lawrence River, however, a few men, including Carranza, got off the vessel and made their way back to Montreal. Carranza set up his new base of operations at a house on Tupper Street. Carranza was justifiably upset when inquiring Canadian newspaper reporters publicized his return to Montreal. Another person who saw Carranza at his Tupper Street address was an American Secret Service agent known only as “Tracer.”

Two Agents Captured

American intelligence agents infiltrated a Spanish spy ring operating in Montreal during the Spanish-American War.


John Elbert Wilkie.

The first undercover agent that Carranza sent to the United States for espionage purposes was an English immigrant named George Downing. Downing had previously served aboard the USS Brooklyn as a petty officer, but his true allegiance rested with the Spanish. When Carranza was giving Downing his orders, he did not know that an American agent was in the next room, listening to every word that was spoken. When Downing arrived in the United States, he was immediately arrested while sending a letter to his superiors concerning American naval strength. Downing was later found dead in his cell. When Carranza heard of Downing’s demise, he surmised that the agent “had hanged himself—or else they did it for him.”

In an effort to place spies within the American military, Carranza used the services of Frank Arthur Mellor, who was sent to him by a detective agency in Canada. Mellor, who came from Kingston, Ontario, convinced two men from his hometown to spy for Spain. This attempt at localized recruitment did not work out well. His first recruit, a man named Atkins, was supposed to head to San Francisco, join the U.S. Navy, and report back to Mellor on what he observed. Before Atkins could head across the border, however, he changed his mind and made his way to the U.S. consul general’s office in Kingston, where he told his improbable tale. When Mellor found out what Atkins had done, he beat him to a pulp. To avoid any other incidents, Atkins promptly boarded a ship bound for England.

Not to be dissuaded, Mellor tried to enlist himself at the American army base in Tampa, where troops were preparing to embark for Cuba. The Army refused to allow him to enlist, but Mellor, watching the disposition of troops and ships, sent messages by post to Carranza in Canada. Members of the British intelligence service operating in Canada alerted Wilkie to Mellor’s activities. They gave the Secret Service the phony name that Mellor was using, and more importantly, the number of the post office box where he sent his superiors his secret messages. American postal officials were able to seize one of the letters before it reached Carranza. With the incriminating evidence in hand, American authorities arrested Mellor. Like Downing, Mellor died in jail—supposedly of typhoid fever.

A Black Bag Job

To get the goods on Carranza, Wilkie’s men undertook a so-called black bag job targeting Carranza’s residence. The action was an illegal break-in, much like the Watergate affair 75 years later. On May 27, 1898, U.S. agents entered Carranza’s home at 42 Tupper Street while the Spaniard was out having breakfast. They took from his desk a letter supposedly written by Carranza to his cousin, Admiral J.B. Ymay. The letter was sent to Wilkie in Washington via a courier who took it as far as Vermont. One week after receiving the letter, Wilkie gave it to the New York Herald, while other copies were sent to the U.S. State Department and the British government.

Upon seeing the letter in print, Carranza immediately charged that its contents had been forged. Carranza was subsequently arrested and in turn sued Joseph Kellert, chief of the Metropolitan Detective Agency in Montreal, for false arrest. He accused Kellert of stealing the letter. The Carranza letter caused a large diplomatic stir involving Canada, Great Britain, the United States, and Spain. The letter was shown to the British ambassador in the United States, Sir Julian Paucefote, who in turn sent it to Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain. All this took place amid legal haggling over whether or not to deport Carranza from Canada.

Ambassador Paucefote met with Wilkie along with another man named Calderon Carlisle, who was a legal adviser to the British embassy in Washington. Carlisle, who was fluent in Spanish, verified the authenticity of the letter. But the matter was far from over. On June 11, the governor-general of Canada, Lord Aberdeen, officially asked the Spanish government to recall Carranza to Spain. The Spanish government refused to go along with the request, saying that Carranza was an innocent victim of an American-Canadian plot. In the end, Carranza, as well as Captain Juan Du Bose, who had served as the chief attaché at Spain’s Washington embassy, quietly returned home.

A Nation Embarrassment and a Blueprint for Covert Affairs

In 1899, a year after the end of the Spanish-American War, the final chapter to the Carranza letter was finally revealed. It proved to be a huge embarrassment to both Wilkie and the Secret Service. The Montreal Star wrote an article on the activities of one George Bell, a Canadian citizen who made an incredible allegation. Bell said that he had broken into Carranza’s Tupper Street residence, stolen the letter, and given it to Wilkie. Bell said that Wilkie had used a forger to falsify the letter. Bell said he was telling his story because Wilkie had failed to pay him the full amount owed, giving him only $50 of the $1,000 he had promised to deliver.

The newspaper published both versions of the letters. The American press soon picked up the Montreal Star’s version; reaction was swift. Soon there was another unexpected twist. Ralph Redfern, who was employed by the Secret Service in its Boston office, said that he, not Bell, had pilfered the letter from Carranza’s residence. Redfern claimed the original letter, proving American allegations, was on file at Secret Service headquarters, but over the years it mysteriously disappeared.

In the wake of the Carranza affair, Wilkie and the Secret Service took a hit in the press for the way the agents had conducted themselves at the time of the Tupper Street break-in. The Secret Service was damaged even more when its agents failed to protect President William McKinley from an assassin’s bullet on September 6, 1901, at the hands of anarchist Leon Czolgosz while the president was attending a trade show in Buffalo, New York. The Montreal spy case was promptly forgotten, but over the years it would become apparent that the resourceful Wilkie had set the blueprint by which American intelligence agents would function, at home and abroad, in the modern age.

July 20, 1898
Sick call at 7 am. A native kid cut off his finger; none of his colleagues passed any remarks on it. 3rd Battalion together with Utah Battery and Colorado Regiment arrived, with four guns to each battery. There are now about 7,000 troops in the camp.

Diary of John Henry Asendorf
Wednesday, July 20th, 1898

The weather is as pretty as ever. All night we listened to the cannonading and musketing of the Spanish and insurgents because they always fight at night. The natives say it is too hot to fight in the daytime. Today a British vessel came into the bay loaded with fresh meat and vegetables. We are all getting impatient to get ashore because we are tired of being kept like prisoners. Three men are sick, the rest are well. Most of us sleep on deck again.

10th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment, John Henry Asendorf, Manila, S.S. Zealandia

It is known in Manila with absolute certainty, although it is not public, that Camara’s squadron has received an order to return to Spain. (…) Since the day before yesterday, the “Boston” has been moored next to Parañaque, protecting the landing and encampment of Yankee troops on that beach. It is to be feared that they prepare a formal attack from that side.

Manila, Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore, Parañaque, Society of Jesus,

In the Philippines the Spanish East Indies squadron of unprotected cruisers and gunboats was concentrated to face the American Asiatic squadron, and was annihilated in one battle. It has been suggested they would have caused more difficulties if they had scattered throughout the islands (although the lack of supplies may have rendered this strategy equally futile). However, the Spanish in Cuba and Puerto Rico had a West Indies squadron of similar composition (three unprotected cruisers, at least one large gunboat/sloop and many medium to small gunboats) which was spread out across multiple harbors and was never combined with the armored cruisers of Cervera's ill-fated squadron. These scattered, weaker local ships were themselves involved in a number of skirmishes with American forces.

The Americans tended to confront these smaller Spanish ships not with armored ships or even protected cruisers (as was done in the Philippines) but with their third-tier ships--gunboats, armed yachts, and armed liners. It was apparently judged that these miscellaneous ships could enforce the blockade and handle any Spanish sorties. The US protected cruisers in the Atlantic would be freed to undertake longer range patrols if needed.

The battle of Nipe Bay is one case where a Spanish gunboat (sloop in British terminology, which the Americans just called a large gunboat) was neutralized by American gunboats.

One of the American ships, the USS Topeka, had an interesting connection to another navy. The ship was built in 1881 as the Diogenes and had a sister ship, the Socrates. These two ships were civilian ships converted to unprotected cruisers for the navy of Peru, which was in conflict with Chile. Unfortunately for Peru, these ships were not available in time to participate in the war, and only the Socrates (renamed Lima) was ever delivered. The Lima, after serving in the Pacific coast as a cruiser, later apparently became a hulk at the port of Iquitos--which means she had to have traveled up the Amazon river, through Brazil, to this isolated interior city on the other side of the Andes from the rest of Peru (demonstrating that fairly large ships can navigate the Amazon). Her sister ship the Diogenes languished until a new crisis--the looming Spanish-American War, where both sides scrambled to purchase ships to build up their navy or deny ships to the other. The Diogenes became the USS Topeka in 1898 and was classified as a gunboat despite her relatively large size (an unprotected cruiser in other navies' terminology).

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Nipe_Bay

The General Who Turned the Spanish-American War into a 'Puerto Rican Picnic'

Military.com | By Bethanne Kelly Patrick



When the U.S. Army invaded Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898, it took 3,415 U.S. soldiers just 13 days to occupy 23 out of 70 Puerto Rican towns. By Aug. 13, the U.S. held more than half of "Porto Rico," and the American media had begun to refer to the Spanish-American War invasion as "Gen. Miles' Puerto Rican picnic."

Gen. Nelson Appleton Miles, "a brave peacock" in Teddy Roosevelt's words, entered the Army a mere private and emerged decades later as one of the service's most storied and controversial figures. Wounded four times during some of the Civil War's most crucial battles -- including Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville and the Appomattox campaign -- he won promotion to major general of volunteers.

Miles also loomed large in the Army's campaigns against the tribes of the Great Plains. He scoured the northern plains after Gen. George Custer's defeat at Little Big Horn, forcing the Lakota onto reservations. He argued for years with Gen. Oliver Howard about which of them had actually captured Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce, although it is clear that Miles had an instrumental role in the incident. Clashing with Gen. George Crook, Miles refused to use Apache scouts in trying to capture Geronimo, a decision that cost him men, money and miles.

Self-schooled in military strategy and tactics, Miles never got over his belief that West Point graduates were given unfair advantage in promotions. Ironically, he became one of the Army's most ardent practitioners of influence peddling. In 1868, he made a political and career union by marrying Mary Hoyt Sherman, niece of both Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman and Ohio Sen. John Sherman. When Gen. Sherman became Army chief of staff, Miles lost no time in looking to him for favors. (Sherman refused.)

After commanding the "Puerto Rican Picnic" and causing trouble over U.S. policy in the Philippines, Miles stepped down in 1903 at the mandatory retirement age of 64. He was the last commanding general in the Army's history and the oldest surviving Civil War general.

While attending a circus performance with his grandchildren in 1925, Miles stood for the national anthem and dropped dead of a heart attack. Perhaps the finest moment of this colorful man's history was his burial at Arlington National Cemetery, attended by President Calvin Coolidge and accorded all the military pomp that had made his career soldier's heart glad.

... they are reported to have been lately considerably reinforced, both by troops and heavy modern sea-coast guns, and therefore their reduction would require a considerable fleet and army, and would probably consume a considerable time, without apparent compensating advantage. The islands are understood to be about self-supporting, as regards food, and therefore their reduction by blockade would consume much time, and probably many ships, which we could now very illy spare.

It is therefore suggested that as long as they are in Spain’s possession, we do not attack them. The Board deprecates the further dispersal of our efforts, as we are already engaged at Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER CANOVAS.

The Murder of the Spanish Statesman Premeditated.

Golli Watched for an Opportunity to Fire the Fatal Shot. The Assassin Confesses That He Killed the Premier to Avenge the Death of the Barcelona Anarchists and the Insurgent Don Jose Rizal, Who Was Executed at Manila as the Instigator of the Philippines Revolution.

MADRID, Aug. 9.—The assassination of the Prime Minister of Spain, Senor Canovas del Castillo, who was shot and killed by an Italian anarchist, whose name is believed to be Michelo Augene Golli, at the baths of Santa Agueda yesterday afternoon, was undoubtedly cold-bloodedly premeditated. Golli watched for an opportunity to kill the Spanish statesman, and he only fired when he had no chance of missing. In fact, the assassin, who was arrested almost immediately after the Premier fell dead at the feet of his wife, has declared as much to the examining magistrate. The Prime Minister lingered for some time in coma and passed away with a cry of "Long live Spain!" Further details of the assassination show that Premier Canovas del Castillo and his wife were present yesterday morning at the celebration of mass in the chapel attached to the baths. After mass the Premier was reading and conversing with some reporters when the assassin approached and fired three shots at him with a revolver, hitting him in the forehead, chest and left ear. The wounded man fell to the ground crying: "Assassin! Long live Spain!" The Premier was carried to his room and expired at 1:30 p. m., after extreme unction had been administered him by a priest of the Dominican order. The murderer, who was immediately seized by people in the vicinity, was severely handled, and must have been killed had it not been for the protection of the civil guards. The prisoner, who declared he had killed the Premier "in the accomplishment of a just vengeance." gave tie name of Rinaldi. and claimed that the deed was the outcome of an extensive anarchist(?) conspiracy.*-. Later, however, the assassin confided/issued that his real name was Michelo Angelline Golli; that he was 20 years of age; a native of Boggi, near Naples, and that he left Italy and came to Spain in exile. After reaching Spain, Golli. according to his confession, resided at Barcelona and participated in the doings of the various anarchist societies of that pace and vicinity. After sojourning at Barcelona for some time Golli visited France and Belgium and returned to Spain in July last. After his return the anarchists seemed to have completed the plans for the assassination of the Prime Minister. He left Madrid for Santa Agueda at the same time as Senor Canovas del Castillo and awaited an opportunity to assassinate the statesman. In appearance Golli is of medium height, wears a full beard and spectacles, and his demeanor is that of a quiet, law-abiding citizen. He said he is satisfied with having done "his duty," and asserts that the has no personal grudge against the Premier and was merely obeying orders received from his superiors in the secret society of which he belonged. He frankly professes anarchist doctrine, says he was sentenced in absentia to eighteen months* imprisonment in the jail at Lucera, Italy, and claims that he escaped from there to Marseilles, from which port he made his way to Barcelona. Senora Canovas. wife of the Premier, who was but a short distance from her husband when the crime was committed, rushed to his side upon hearing the shots As the Premier lay dying on the ground she bitterly reproached the murderer for his crime. Golli. in reply to the agonizing words of the distracted wife, said: "I respect you because you are an honorable lady, but I have done my duty, and I am now easy in mind, for I have avenged my friends and the brothers of Montjuic." Montjuic is the fortress of Barcelona, outside of which the anarchists who have been sentenced to death for recent outrages have been executed by being shot in the back. The anarchists recently executed outside Montjuic were the last of the batch of fiends who were guilty of throwing a bomb on June 7. 180$, into a religious procession about to enter the church of Santa Maria de Lamar, upon the occasion of the Corpus Christi celebration. Twelve persons were instantly killed and about fifty others, several of whom died from their wounds, were injured. For this crime twenty-six anarchists were sentenced to death and many of them were executed. The condemned men shouted; "Long live anarchy." just before the orders to fire were given. The Spanish newspapers express great indignation at GoHi's crime. Even the journals that have republican leanings praise the service of the deceased statesman. The "Imparcial" "Yesterday will prove a black date for Spain. The crime will centuple the indignation of society against this would be destroyer." A number of new specials appeared this morning dressed in black. A post-mortem examination of the Premier's remains were made this morning previous to embalming them for shipment to this city. The funeral, the indignation expressed at the crime is shared by all parties in politics, and it is generally believed that the members of the colonial secret societies were concerned in this outrage.

It is reported that Senor A. Pidal, President of the Chamber of Deputies, will be appointed President of the Council of Ministers m succession to the late Premier at the expiration of the official nine days' mourning. The Ministers of the present Cabinet will meet in council daily. Golli stated in the examination before the magistrate to-day that he succeeded in firing two shots at the people who arrested him before be was overpowered. The assassin calls himself a "revolutionary anarchist." Senor Silvelva, the leader of the dissident Conservatives, has followed the example of Senor Sagasta, the Liberal leader, Marshal Martinez de Campos and others, in tendering their condolences to the Government while placing their services at the disposal of the Ministers. The Cabinet sat until 2 o'clock this morning and decided to publish in the official gazette to-day, which will appear with a black border, the appointment of Lieutenant-General Don Marcolo de Azcarnaga, the Minister of War, as Premier ad interim. Senor Sagasta has postponed his projected visit to this city. In anticipation of possible disturbances at Barcelona the police force of that city has been reinforced. Later in the day it was announced that highest military honors will be accorded to the deceased at his funeral. The court will, however, not return here from San Sebastian, the summer residence, to attend the funeral ceremonies. The Queen Regent will be represented at the funeral by the Duke of Soto. The remains will be brought here on Tuesday. An individual who was heard to express sympathy with the assassin of the Premier and with his crime has been arrested. The newspapers of this city in commenting on the crime say that while anarchists have no country, it is dreadful to contemplate that the last two murders of eminent men, that of President Carnot of France and of Premier Canovas del Castillo, were the work of Italians. Considerable activity was displayed to-day among the Republicans, who seem to believe that their opportunity has arrived. The Government is taking extreme precautions to preserve order in Madrid and the provinces. It is reported in officially this afternoon that Senor Pidal, President of the Chamber of Deputies, will only be charged to form an intermediate ministry. It appears this evening that Golli, the assassin, represented himself. *As explained by a correspondent of "El Pentico'; "The prisoner cannot be tried by the laws providing for the trial and punishment of anarchists, as this law is so framed that a person prosecuted under its provisions must have used or attempted to use explosives in the commission or attempt to commit the crime charged against him. However, there is no doubt Golli will be summarily tried and sentenced. The public demands the adoption of stringent measures against anarchists, and also against those who are in sympathy with them. Golli has confessed that he killed Senor Canovas to avenge the Barcelona anarchists and the insurgent leader, Don Jose Rizal. who was executed at Bagumbayan, Philippine Islands, on December last as the instigator of the Philippine revolution. Dr. Rizal denied that he was a rebel leader, but he admitted that he had drawn up the statutes of the Philippine League. In Golli's room the police found today a large double-barreled pistol. It appears that when he left the house yesterday, he carried a parcel which is believed to have contained a bomb. The theory is that he hid this somewhere in the fields. A dispatch from Barcelona says that Golli arrived there in December 1895, coming from Marseilles. He was employed in the printing office of the "Review of Social Science," managed toy the anarchist engineer Tarrida Marmet. formerly imprisoned In Montjuic fortress at Barcelona. Golli was implicated in the terrible crime of the celebration of Corpus Christi. although he left Barcelona a few days before it occurred. He was denounced to the police for complicity, but he had already disappeared.

FOREWARNED OF DANGER. LONDON. Aug. 9.—A special dispatch j from Madrid received here to-day says i the Spanish Government was aware that a meeting of anarchists was held early in July, and it was ordered to murder Senor Canovas del Castillo before August fourth and to assassinate Senor Sagasta before August 30th.

THE FEELING AT ROME. ROME, Aug. R—The assassination of the Prime Minister of Spain, Senor Canovas del Castillo, has caused a feeling of horror here. Many flags are half-masted. The Premier, the Marquis Di Rudini and the Cabinet Ministers paid personal visits to-day to the Spanish Embassy. King Humbert has telegraphed his condolences to the Queen Regent, and it is expected that the Crown Prince Vittorio-Emanuel, Prince j of Naples, who is now cruising on his yacht, will proceed to Madrid. The Pope is greatly upset over the news of the assassination, and upon receipt of the news immediately sent to the Spanish Emlassy for details of the crime. His Holiness also telegraphed on the subject to Madrid.

GOLLI A PRINTER. BARCELONA. Aug. 9.—Gobi, the assassin of Senor Canovas del Castillo, was known here under the name of Achillolli. He formerly worked as a compositor and was also known under the alias of Jose Sonto. He was classed as a militant anarchist and was an intimate friend of Ascheri, the pereperator of the outrage in the Calle de Cambesos. Golli fled from Barcelona after that outrage.

A GYPSY'S PREDICTION. MALAGA. Aug. 9—Old inhabitants of this city relate that when Canovas del Castillo was a young assistant master at a school here a gypsy woman told his fortune. She predicted that he would become great and would meet with a violent death.

EFFECT ON SECURITIES. LONDON. Aug. 9.—On the stock exchange to-day Spanish securities fell one-half point on the news of the assassination of Premier Canovas del Castillo. Later in the day Spanish securities recovered three-eighths of the point.

PALMA BLAMES CANOVAS. TURNERS (N. V.). Aug. 9.— Estrada Palma. who is at the head of the Cuban Junta in this country, in an interview commented upon the assassination of Canovas as follows: "While I have no sympathy with the assassin, I cannot help but feel that the action was one of retribution. Canovas, ■lore than Weyler. has been responsible for the cruelties practiced by the Spanish troops in Cuba. It was by his orders that women and children were murdered and wronged. He deserved no better fate. "His death will be to Cuba's benefit, for it complicates political affairs in Spain. As the leader of the majority; he was sponsor for Weyler. His great rival is Silvela, the leader of the Conservative minority. Should the Queen Regent choose to continue the Conservatives in power, Silvela will be Premier, and that would mean that Weyler would be succeeded by General Polavieja, who is now in the Philippine Islands and belongs to the Weyler school of warfare. "It is true that Silvela recently suggested that Cuba be given autonomy, but he cannot maintain that position as a Conservative leader. The Liberals under Sagasta would indeed grant autonomy, but we will accept nothing less than absolute independence. For that we have sacrificed everything. In any case the war must continue, and as long as it continues under Spanish methods the sympathy of the world will be with us. In the meantime, the political confusion in Spain cannot but give us an advantage. "It should be distinctly understood that the assassination of Canovas is not the work of the Cuban party. We do not resort to such methods. The anarchists of Spain are for the most part in the northern part of the country, and they are intimately associated with the anarchists of France. They had long threatened Canovas, who caused many of them to be executed. Only a few days ago several anarchists were executed in Barcelona, and I suppose the assassination was the outcome. I do not think the killing of Canovas was due at all to any question of policy, but merely as a vague outbreak on the part of some member of a dangerous party of men. We Cubans have no sympathy with such an act. "As a man I deplore such a misfortune, but as a Cuban I cannot help but feel that I am benefited by it."

COMMENT ABROAD. LONDON. Aug. !).—The afternoon papers in the comment upon the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister express themselves on the same lines as the morning papers upon the incomprehensible idiocy of the murder of the man who was mainly responsible for giving universal suffrage to Spain. They also advocate the suppression of anarchy by force, pointing out that the history of nihilism in Russia proved that force consistently and steadily applied is the remedy for clearing out the pestilent fang. The "St. James Gazette" regards the death of Senor del Castillo as being a heavy disaster for Spain, adding: "Canovas was not great, but he was a statesman. During the Cuban crisis he governed with energy, and if he had been a very great man he might have told his countrymen that they must alter (find) other ways of dealing with the colonies or be prepared for evil times. But the Spaniards would hardly listen to such a lesson even from the tongue of an angel. Maybe, if he had had the choice, Canovas would have preferred the martyrdom which has overtaken him rather than to have seen the collapse which is only more threatening to Spain.

"In the meantime, the murder will destroy the already unstable administration, and, in the pick of a successor to the late Premier, the Queen Regent's position is most difficult. She may be driven to call upon some soldier, Campos or Foiavieja, which would be a misfortune to Spain abroad. The crime must have one consequence—to make the Kaiser and his brother sovereigns less disposed to adopt gentle methods with socialism."

MAY BE HURTFUL TO CUBANS. PARIS. Aug. this dare. The French newspapers do not anticipate any political complication in Spain as an outcome of the assassination of the Spanish Premier, and they do not think the conservative Government will be displaced. Senator Belancosa, a representative of Cuban insurgents, in an interview on the subject just printed here, expresses the opinion that the political situation in Spain will become critical, and greatly to the advantage of the Cuban Insurgents. That the agitation against Senor Canovas del Castillo was widespread is further evidenced by the fact that the police of this city recently tore down from the lavatories of Paris placards inscribed "Down with Canovas—The martyrs will be avenged—Long live anarchy." and other expressions in Spanish grossly insulting the Government and Premier Canovas. In addition, the officers of the Spanish Embassy here have recently received many threatening letters. It is stated that at a meeting of Spanish refugees at Grenoble, Capital of the Department of Isere. one of the speakers declared that the anarchists would soon be avenged, and that Senor Canovas would pay his debt to them with his blood.

The "Matin" to-day publishes interviews between its reporters and a number of Spanish anarchists, in which the latter are quoted as declaring they had no previous knowledge of the crime which has just startled the world. The persons interviewed also claimed, that the assassination of the Spanish Premier was provoked by his persecution of anarchists. One of the latter, however, said: "It had to come. We have been expecting it daily. We knew a high person was going to be attacked. but it might have been any other than Canovas." The police are watching the anarchists' resorts, and three arrests were made today. Other arrests are expected to follow. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. I. Hanotaux, has telegraphed, the condolences of the French Government to the Queen Regent and to the Government of Spain, expressing the indignation felt in France at the crime Just committed, and referring to the sympathy in this matter of the French people with Spain. All the French newspapers deplore the ■ crime, and the socialist organs, while \ reprobating the assassination of the Spanish Premier, refer to the severity exercised by Canovas toward the anarchists. intimating that such action ' upon his part pointed him out for attack.'

Medal of Honor

AWARDED FOR ACTIONS

DURING Spanish-American War

Service: Army

Division: 3d U.S. Cavalry

GENERAL ORDERS:

Date of Issue: June 21, 1899



CITATION:

The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pleasure in presenting the Medal of Honor to First Lieutenant John William Heard, United States Army, for extraordinary heroism on 23 July 1898, while serving with 3d U.S. Cavalry, in action at Bahia Honda, Cuba. After two men had been shot down by Spaniards while transmitting orders to the engine-room on the Wanderer, the ship having become disabled, First Lieutenant Heard took the position held by them and personally transmitted the orders, remaining at his post until the ship was out of danger.

WANDERER


Capacity



Transport Number

Vessel class

Displacement..................................1019
# Officers..........................................45
# Men.............................................800
# Horses.............................................?

This was chartered from the New Orleans Belize Royal Mail Steamship Company from July 5 to September 10, 1898 at a rate of $220 a day. 

Sealift in the Spanish American War

"A splendid little war!" That was how John Hay, the ambassador to Great Britain, described the Spanish-American War of 1898. During the Spanish-American War, the Army faced the entirely new challenge of transporting a force over a body of water, a challenge that was to come to define American military power projection during the following century. After spending the 19th century dealing with internal continental challenges - confirming its independence from Britain, civil war, and westward expansion - the United States made its appearance on the world stage.

During the Revolutionary War General George Washington used animal-driven transportation to move American and French forces from the Hudson Valley to Yorktown, more than 450 miles away. So important was transportation in the American Revolution that Washington advised Congress to establish the position of Wagonmaster General to provide the Army's essential mobility. With the Civil War came the extensive use of the military railway service in moving troops to battle.

The Army's only previous large-scale ocean movement had been during the Mexican War in 1847. The decisive campaign of the Mexican War was Winfield Scott's overland offensive designed to capture Mexico City and end Mexican resistance. In one of the great achievements in US military history, Winfield Scott's forces staged an amphibious landing at Vera Cruz that captured the port on 9 March 1847. The Mexican commander chose not to oppose the landing, so over 8,600 men were landed without a single loss in just over 4 hours. This was an unprecedented military achievement for the time. Following a brief siege, Vera Cruz surrendered on 29 March 1847.

The importance of water transportation for the military increased rapidly during the Spanish American War, as the US Army Transport Service appeared. The Regular Army on the eve of the war had only 28,183 soldiers. Once war was declared, there was an enthusiastic rush of men to enlist. By the end of May 1898, 163,626 enlisted men had been mustered into service. By the end of the war in August 1898, the Army had 274,717 soldiers on duty, including 58,688 in the Regular Army and 216,029 volunteers. But no one in the Army was experienced in large overseas movements.

The military's lack of experience in this type of operation proved to be a more serious obstacle than the Spanish Army. Congress was opposed to granting U.S. registry to foreign vessels, so for the Cuba expedition the Army was limited to chartering U.S. vessels involved in the Atlantic and Gulf coastal trade. By 1 July, the Quartermaster Department had chartered 43 transports, 4 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 2 ocean tugs, and 3 decked barges for Cuba; another 14 transports were chartered on the Pacific coast for the Philippines expeditions. More were chartered in July and August. When enough vessels could not be chartered, the Army purchased 14 steamships and quickly outfitted them to carry troops to Cuba and Puerto Rico.

Even the relatively short move to Cuba required the creation of a port of embarkation, coordinated movements of troops and supplies to the port, and placement of units on ships. The War Department selected Tampa as the port of embarkation, despite limited rail lines. Failure to establish priorities on shipments or to ensure that shipments were labeled properly compounded the transportation problems. Unloaded rail cars filled the sidings from Tampa to Columbia, South Carolina, and important shipments were detained while unnecessary supplies were unloaded. Between 18 May and 31 August, the depot at Tampa handled 13,239 carloads of supplies and equipment, as well as railcars transporting 66,000 soldiers (with baggage) and over 15,000 animals.

Spanish Adm. Cervera's fleet had taken refuge (29 May 1898) in Santiago Bay, and the American Navy had asked the Army to reduce the defenses guarding the entrance. The War Department, eager to get the Army into action, directed Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter to embark his loosely organized V Corps, which had been assembled around Tampa, and sail for Cuba. The expedition for Cuba was reduced to utter chaos as uncontrolled units rolled down the single-track railway to become hopelessly entangled at the ill-equipped port of embarkation at Tampa.

After many delays, and in an atmosphere of the utmost confusion, the embarkation of some 17,000 men began on 11 June 1898, lasting four days. Those who remained on the ships that rode at anchor in the harbor until 13 June suffered because of the heat and poor ventilation, uniforms not designed for extremely hot weather, a monotonous travel ration, and an inadequate water supply.^1 Although Shafter allowed the men off the ships in detachments for exercise, they were not permitted to remain on shore because no satisfactory campsite could be found near the harbor.^2 By the time the Cuban expedition sailed from Tampa on 14 June, it was loaded aboard 38 vessels and accompanied by Navy ships. However, poor estimates of carrying capacity meant that the transports could move only about 17,000 soldiers, not the 25,000 originally planned.

The vessels upon which the V Corps embarked had been obtained under the assumption that the landing would be at Mariel, less than two days away, rather than at the southeastern tip of the island, 1,000 miles and almost a week's voyage from Tampa. Matters were further complicated when authorities adopted a British formula for space per man intended for troop transports rather than the converted freighters and passenger vessels available to Shafter's force. As a result, many more soldiers were placed aboard each vessel than it could carry without endangering their health, especially if they were on it for many days. Conditions on board were cramped, uncomfortable, and unsanitary, and the lack of cooking facilities led to the unfortunate overreliance on canned beef.

On 20 June 1898 the convoy reached a point off Santiago, but it was two days before Shafter could make up his mind where to land the troops. Rear Adm. William T. Sampson wanted them to land near the entrance of the bay, where a powerful fort dominated the area, and to storm the positions guarding the sea approaches. Shafter considered this plan too dangerous and followed the advice of Gen. Calixto Garcia, a Cuban insurgent leader, who recommended Daiquiri, 18 miles east of Santiago Bay, as a landing site.

Unloading the troops at Daiquiri was a fairly smooth operation. The Navy landed some men, but most came ashore on small boats (the transports' lifeboats) that they manned themselves. By contrast, landing supplies was a slow and laborious operation, mainly because there was only one small dock at Daiquiri and because only one of the expedition's lighters had reached Cuba. To relieve unloading problems in Cuba, the Army contracted with a New York firm to send workers to Cuba to build lighters, barges, and docks, as well as repair railroads and engines. These workers arrived on 23 July, after the surrender of Santiago.

On 1 May 1898 a small American squadron under Comdr. George Dewey completely destroyed a Spanish naval force in Manila Bay. The Manila campaign was a sequel to the first naval engagement of the war. Having won the Battle of Manila Bay, Commodore Dewey immediately recognized that, while he could now compel Manila's surrender, the city could not be occupied without a strong force of soldiers. He also soon became aware of the dual risks of a Spanish relief expedition and intervention by another power. Responding quickly to his cabled request for reinforcements, the U.S. Government made arrangements to dispatch Army forces and additional warships.


City of Peking

By this time Washington was planning to take control of the Philippines. The War Department responded eagerly to the request for ground forces, and sent about 11,300 troops to Manila under the command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt by 25 July 1898. Three groups of soldiers were sent as rapidly as they could be gathered and trained. The first contingent of 2,500 men left San Francisco in the transport City of Peking and two other transports on 25 May and arrived in Manila Bay at the end of June. Another four transports with 3,500 men steamed through the Golden Gate on 15 June, arriving on 17 July. The third group, with 4,800 men embarked in six ships, departed on 27 June and reached Manila Bay at the end of July. More soldiers and Marines were sent after the war's conclusion.

Managing the men and materiel converging on San Francisco was a smoother process than at Tampa. The numbers involved were smaller, but San Francisco also was a better embarkation site: it had better rail connections and harbor facilities. The San Francisco depot was able to expand quickly to accommodate over 30,000 soldiers. The only serious problem was obtaining enough transports to carry the Army to the Philippines, and the Quartermaster Department solved that by procuring (mostly by charter, in a few cases by purchase) all available vessels on the Pacific coast.

The transports bound for the Philippines were better fitted for a long voyage than those going to Cuba. The accommodations generally were more comfortable, and, most importantly, there were galleys for cooking. However, there were unloading problems in the Philippines and problems moving supplies between the two bases, Camp Dewey and Cavite. Many men and supplies went ashore on cascos-the native lighter of the Philippines-towed by captured Spanish tugs or Navy launches; each casco could carry 200 men with tents, packs, and 10 days of rations.

After the fall of Santiago General Miles took personal charge of an expedition to Puerto Rico. His force of about 3,000 men on 9 transports landed at Guanica on 25 July 1898, and an additional force under Maj. Gen. John R. Brooke landed at Guayama. Four columns of American troops quickly overran the island. There was some light skirmishing in which a few Americans were wounded, but the population as a whole received the Americans with enthusiasm.

(Lie. The Puerto Ricans were less than enthusiastic. We will find out about how unenthusiastic they were in a few days, but here is a hint. Americans were shot, but not by the Spaniards in Puerto Rico. M.)

The acquisition of island territories following the Spanish-American War prompted the Army to develop its own fleet of sea-going ships to support Army forces overseas. This operation became known as the Army Transport Service, and operated under the direction of the Quartermaster General. The ships operated a line from the Pacific Coast to the Philippines, an inter-island service in the Philippines, and other support to overseas stations. They maintained this fleet until World War II, except during World War I when the Navy Department assumed responsibility for water transportation.

The American Army Moves on Puerto-Rico

Part 1

by Mark R. Barnes, Ph.D., Senior Archeologist, National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office

General:

This paper will discuss the U.S. Army's campaign on the island of Puerto Rico during the Spanish American War, including the battle of Fajardo, the skirmish at Guanica, and the battles of Yauco and Coamo. The article also includes a study of Miles's strategy, and the movements of each of his four prongs of attack.

The American Army Moves on Puerto Rico

About the time Admiral Sampson's fleet was bombarding San Juan (May 12th) the American army began to see the need to increase to its forces, as the most of the Regular Army forces were rapidly being committed to the Cuban campaign and the occupation of the Philippines. All throughout May and June of 1898 volunteer state militia units were mustered into the United States Army. By June President McKinley was ready to order General Miles to invade Puerto Rico mainly with these fresh troops (Long 1923:200). The increase in available and trained troops would allow for greater speed in the engagement of the Spanish on that island.


General Nelson Miles

However, Miles and his invasion force could not leave directly from the United States for Puerto Rico because of the military situation in Cuba in early July. General Shafter had telegraphed the President that he had taken heavy causalities in the attack on San Juan Hill and he was not sure he could hold his position, particularly with the recent outbreak of yellow fever in his camp. As a result, the administration detoured Miles to Santiago to booster Shafter, who upon being told Miles was coming with reinforcements, commenced to demand the surrender of General Toral's Spanish forces in Santiago.

With the end of the Santiago de Cuba campaign, on July 17th, General Miles shifted the seat of the war to Puerto Rico (Porter 1904:32). The Puerto Rican campaign was now the highest priority of the McKinley administration as the Spanish government of Prime Minister Sagasta had approached the French government to serve as a go-between to initiate peace negotiations with the United States (Millis 1931:336).

If the United States were to claim Puerto Rico in peace talks it was vital to land troops on the island immediately. However, Miles and his troops were delayed in Cuba by Admiral Sampson's refusal to detach armored cruisers and battleships to escort Miles' expedition to Puerto Rico, until July 21st. While Miles had sufficient transport vessels for moving his troops to Puerto Rico, he was concerned about not having enough armored battleships to protect the troop transports in the event of an attack by Spanish torpedo boats, which had already sallied out of San Juan to attack American warships twice before. Miles cabled his concerns about Sampson to the Secretary of War on July 20th.
Sampson was preparing for an attack on the Canary and Balearic Islands, and a possible bombardment of coastal Spanish towns if the war was to drag on and he was loath to part with his big ships (Nofi 1996:168). However, a telegram from the President released the ships and the Miles expedition departed Santiago de Cuba for Puerto Rico on July 21st with a mostly volunteer force that had been waiting and training for three months to see action.

The strategy Miles had developed for the Puerto Rico campaign would not have mattered without sufficient military force, which he did not yet have. Miles was under orders to return to the United States after the surrender of the Spanish in Cuba, and possibly he feared that he would not be permitted to lead the invasion. So with only 3500 troops, but sufficient naval support he decided to depart from Guantanamo, Cuba for Puerto Rico. Other elements of the invasion force would simply have to follow Miles' lead (Trask 347-349).

As previously discussed with President McKinley and Secretary of War Alger, General Miles was to coordinate his personal arrival off Puerto Rico, with a few thousand volunteer troops, mainly the 6th Massachusetts and the 6th Illinois regiments, who accompanied him to Cuba to reinforce Shafter. The 11th and 19th Regular Infantry Regiments jumping off from Tampa, and more volunteers leaving from Charleston, South Carolina, and Newport News, Virginia would all land simultaneously at Cape San Juan, near the Fajardo Lighthouse, with Miles, on the northeastern point of Puerto Rico. From there, over 25,000 American troops would march west for sixty miles overland to capture the fortified city of San Juan with the assistance of the US Navy. This was the plan approved by the President and Secretary, before Miles left Washington for Cuba, on 26 June (Nofi 1996:232).

The departure of the troops from the United States for the Puerto Rican campaign experienced much less trouble than Shafter's forces in the Cuban campaign that left from Tampa, as they left from several ports usually with good shipping facilities. Rather then concentrating all the troops at a port like Tampa whose facilities could only sustain relatively small numbers of troop movements. The first elements of I Corps, about 3500 men, accompanied by Miles, included General Henry Garretson's Brigade, consisting mainly of the 6th Massachusetts and 6th Illinois Volunteers, and a few Regular Artillery Batteries and Engineers left Charleston, South Carolina on July 7th, on the transport USS YALE and the cruiser USS COLUMBIA and arrived off Cuba to reinforce Shafter's V Corps on July 11th, where they were met with additional elements of Miles' I Corps (Trask 1996:346; Nofi 1996:232).

The landing of these troops on Cuba was rendered unnecessary by the surrender of Spanish forces a few days later. General Toral was overawed by the size of the reinforcements Miles had with him - not realizing they were intended for Puerto Rico. By protecting his troops from exposure to fevers, which was already infecting large numbers of Shafter's V Corps and would ultimately account for a larger number of deaths than that suffered in Cuban combat, Miles could land in Puerto Rico with a strong force, but one that had been sitting on ships in the tropical climate for over two weeks (Nofi 1996:233).

Of concern to Miles was the length of time his troops would have to remain on the crowded and make-shift transports. As noted in the official history of Battery A of St. Louis, transport by ship could be very difficult indeed,



This particular experience illustrates the lack of control that was occurring in the United States Army during the war. While the ROUMANIAN might be considered a particularly lurid example of the difficulty of transporting large numbers of troops caused in 1898, a reading of other volunteer accounts shows that Battery A, of St. Louis were not the only American troops exposed to these types of conditions.

Delay encountered in Cuba - securing proper naval escort, and treating with General Toral - caused General Miles to move his transports to Guantanamo Bay. But, it was imperative that Miles leave Santiago soon in order to rendezvous with Major General James Harrison Wilson's force of 3,571 men of General Enrst's Brigade. This brigade consisted of the 16th Pennsylvania, 2nd and 3rd Wisconsin, and the remaining elements of the 6th Illinois Volunteer Regiments, and had departed Charleston, South Carolina, on the 20th of July, bound for Cape Fajardo (Rivero 1972:223). Miles' command as he left Cuba consisted of 3,145 troops from the 6th Illinois and 6th Massachusetts, plus small units of combat and telegraph engineers, artillery, and a sanitation unit. These men were transported mainly on the USS YALE and USS DIXIE, with the battleship USS MASSACHUSETTS, cruiser USS COLUMBIA, and gunboat USS GLOUCESTER providing protection against Spanish torpedo boats in Puerto Rican waters. Overall command of the naval force was under Captain Francis J. Higginson, captain of MASSACHUSETTS, which served as the flagship for the Puerto Rican expedition. The bulk of Miles' troops were on the transports LAMPASAS, CITY OF MACON, NUECES, COMANCHE, UNIONIST, STILLWATER, RITA, and SPECIALIST (Rivero 1972:181-182).

However, sometime between the 21st and 24th of July, General Miles did something for which he was well known in military circles - he changed his mind about landing at Fajardo. Without consulting the President or the Secretary of War he ordered Captain Higginson to change course and sail for Guánica on the southwest side of the island, probably based to a large extent on the information supplied by newly promoted Captain Henry F. Whitney fresh from his espionage in Puerto Rico, who was now with Miles' expedition. Miles determined that a landing on Guánica would have the benefits of surprise and a more welcoming population (Trask 1981:353).
(This was the New York times. M.) 

Regardless of the tactical advantage that Miles reported, this action was not popular with Secretary of War Alger, Captain Alfred T. Mahan or Captain Francis Higginson, commander of the USS MASSASSACHUSETTS.^1  Considering Miles' change of landing sites indefensible, Mahan wrote to Secretary Long,
It has been suggested that Mahan's reaction to Miles Guánica plan stemmed from Mahan's over confidence in dealing with the Spanish military (Trask 1981:355), and his possible suspicion that Miles did not intend to share the glory of the campaign with the Navy (Millis 1931:337). Captain Higginson, however, had more practical reasons for his objection to the plan. The harbor at Guánica was not deep enough for the MASSACHUSETTS, COLUMBIA, and DIXIE to enter and so could not give proper naval support for debarking troops. Captain Higginson was not convinced that he could provide adequate offensive support in an operation on Guánica (Trask 1981:355). Should troops landing at Guánica come under fire they could only be supported by the shallow draft gunboat GLOUCESTER, formerly J. Pierpont Morgan's yacht the CORSAIR, now armed with four 6-pounders, four 3-pounders, and two Colt automatic machine guns and commanded by Captain Richard Wainwright, the former executive officer of the USS MAINE.

(I am convinced that Higginson and Mahan were on the same page as regards the hydrography. Mahan was correct about Miles' vainglory and ego. I am not sure that Mahan was wrong about the decrepitude and incompetence within the Spanish Armada. He was wrong about the Esercito which he badly underestimated. M.) 

^1 Remember that USS Massachusetts is still down one after turret and is scheduled for a visit to Cramp and Sons for postwar repairs. M.

Accepting General Miles overall authority for the Puerto Rican campaign, Captain Higginson ordered a change in the course of the fleet south through the Mona Channel and dispatched the DIXIE to meet the NEW ORLEANS, then on blockade duty off San Juan on the evening of July 24th. The DIXIE conveyed orders from Captain Higginson to Captain W.H. Folger of the NEW ORLEANS to proceed to Fajardo to direct American ships that would soon be arriving at the original landing point to Guánica. The DIXIE turned around and pursued the main invasion fleet, which was navigating the Mona Channel with its running lights off, arriving before Guánica at 5:20 AM on July 25th, 1898 (Rivero 1972:184).

In a serious breach of professional courtesy, Miles did not see fit to inform either of his civilian superiors -- the President of the United States or the Secretary of War Alger -- of the change in landing site. On July 26th, a dumbfounded Secretary of War Alger learned of the change in the landing site from the Associated Press "that General Miles had suddenly changed his whole plan of campaign while in mid-passage" to Puerto Rico, landing at the small port of Guánica on the southwest coast of the island (Millis 1931:336). Miles appears to have based his change of landing site on a variety of reasons 1) the Spanish had prior knowledge of the intended landing at Fajardo from American newspaper articles; 2) Whitney's spy mission and intelligence from Puerto Rican exile alerted Miles to strong anti-Spanish attitude among the people in the southern part of the island; 3) a landing far from strong Spanish forces would provide Miles' volunteer forces time to organize and prepare themselves for combat; and 4) lighters to transport troops and supplies from the transports were readily available at Guánica (Picó 1987:56).

Three days after landing (July 28th), Miles finally communicated with Secretary Alger and sent the following reassuring cable after the landings were secured and once he had establish communication links with Washington via the underwater telegraph lines in St. Thomas, Danish Virgin Islands.