Post by miletus12 on Jul 6, 2022 3:22:38 GMT
Cuba: Naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba
On July 1st, Spanish Governor of Cuba, General Blanco, ordered Admiral Cervera to run the blockade and escape the harbor at Santiago de Cuba.
Admiral Cervera does so at 9:00 A.M, just hours after US Rear Admiral Sampson leaves his fleet for an on-shore conference (leaving Commodore Schley in command of both the Flying Squadron and North Atlantic Squadron). Cervera's fleet consists of the armored cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa (his flagship), Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón, and Almirante Oquendo, and the destroyers Plutón and Furor.
The Spanish column made its way around Cay Smith at around 9:31 a.m. and left the channel about five minutes later. In the lead was Cervera's flagship Infanta Maria Teresa, followed by Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón, Almirante Oquendo, travelling at around 8–10 knots (15–19 km/h) and 800 yards (730 m) apart, followed by the torpedo-boat destroyers Plutón and Furor, respectively. They then formed three echelons, the destroyers heading eastward, followed by Cristóbal Colón and Almirante Oquendo, and Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya made for Brooklyn.
The battle commenced almost immediately. At the mouth of the harbor, the American vessels, Texas, Iowa, Oregon and Indiana, engulfed the Spanish fleet in a "hail of fire." At 9:30 a.m., the first shot was fired by USS Iowa and Signal No. 250 was hoisted when the ships were seen in the channel. The Spanish responded, supported by the batteries on Morro and Upper Socapa. After leaving the channel, the Spanish vessels turned westward in column towards the American fleet.
Image: Somewhat fictious painting depicting the beginning of the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, a naval engagement between the U.S. Flying Squadron and U.S. North Atlantic Squadron against the Spanish Navy 2d Squadron on July 3, 1898
While the Spanish had taken the initiative by beginning the engagement, two factors slowed their escape. One was the continuing problem experienced in maintaining proper speed by Vizcaya; the other was the poor quality of most of the coal in the Spanish holds. An expected resupply of high-quality anthracite had been captured aboard the collier Restormel, by the American auxiliary cruiser USS Saint Paul on May 25.
Brooklyn headed nearly straight for Infanta Maria Teresa at first, but by 10:05, it was apparent they were on a collision course, and Commodore Schley ordered a sharp turn to starboard, the so-called "retrograde loop," when all of the other American ships had already turned to port. That threatened Texas with collision and Captain Philip of Texas ordered "all engines back full," which brought Texas to a near standstill until Brooklyn passed across the bow of Texas. Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya then altered course to the west, Cristóbal Colón and Almirante Oquendo falling in behind, and the two squadrons paralleled each other. Texas then swung behind Brooklyn, but Oregon then ran up on Texas and passed inboard, masking the fire of Texas. Oregon, initially to the rear of the action but the fastest ship in the US fleet, soon raced past Indiana, which had an engine problem and could go only 9 knots (17 km/h) at the time of the battle. Iowa had started from a disadvantaged position and was passed by Infanta Maria Teresa but hit her with two 12-inch (300 mm) rounds from 2,600 yards (2,400 m) and swung into the chase. As Iowa was passed in turn by Cristóbal Colón, the Spanish ship hit her with two shots from her secondary battery. One of them struck near the waterline and caused Iowa to slow and she therefore engaged Almirante Oquendo, bringing up the rear of Cervera's four cruisers. With the Spanish fleet past the American blockade, the battle became a chase.
Rather than expose the entirety of his fleet to the American battle line, Cervera had signaled his other ships to continue to the southwest while he attempted to cover their escape by directly engaging Brooklyn, his nearest enemy. Though Brooklyn was hit more than 20 times during the battle, she suffered only two casualties, and her return fire resulted in the deaths of most of Cervera's bridge crew and grave damage to the ship generally. Under that brutal punishment, Infanta Maria Teresa began to burn furiously. According to Admiral Sampson's battle report, "it was afterward learned that the Infanta Maria Teresa's fire-main had been cut by one of [the] first shots." Cervera ordered her aground at 10:35 in shallows along the Cuban coast and had been completely wrecked and aflame. Admiral Cervera survived and was rescued after he had been picked up near Punta Cabrera by the crew of Gloucester.
The rest of the Spanish fleet continued its race for the open sea. Almirante Oquendo was hit a total of 57 times and was driven out of the battle by the premature detonation of a shell stuck in a defective breech-block mechanism of an 11-inch turret, which killed the entire gun crew. A boiler explosion finished her, and she was ordered scuttled by the mortally wounded Captain Lazaga. At 10:35 Almirante Oquendo ran aground no more than a mile beyond Infanta Maria Teresa. Meanwhile, Plutón and Furor made a dash in a direction opposite the rest of the Spanish squadron. Gloucester inflicted a considerable amount of damage by direct fire at close range to the destroyers, which eventually led to their destruction from the battleships Iowa, Indiana, and eventually New York. After receiving word of the battle, Sampson turned his flagship New York around and raced to join the fight. Furor was sunk at 10:50 before making the beach. Plutón succeeded in grounding herself at 10:45 near Cabanas Bay. In total, Furor and Plutón lost two thirds of their men.
Image: Furor chased by Iowa, Indiana and New York
Vizcaya was locked in a running gun duel for nearly an hour with Brooklyn. Despite steaming side by side with Schley's flagship at a range of about 1,200 yards (1,100 m) and even with some good shooting, which knocked out a secondary gun aboard Brooklyn, almost none of the Spaniards' nearly 300 shots caused significant damage, and Brooklyn pounded Vizcaya with devastating fire. Subsequent claims by Admiral Cervera and later research by historians have suggested that nearly 85% of the Spanish ammunition at Santiago was utterly useless, defective, or simply filled with sawdust as a cost-saving measure for practice firing. The American ammunition had no such issues of lethality. Vizcaya continued the fight until she was overwhelmed and by the end of the engagement, she had been struck as many as 200 times by the fire from Brooklyn and Texas. Brooklyn had closed to within 950 yards (870 m) when she finally delivered an 8 inches (203 mm) round, which, according to witnesses, may have detonated a torpedo being prepared for launch. A huge explosion ensued, Vizcaya was mortally wounded, and fires raged out of control that burned her reserves of ammunition that were on deck. She hauled down her flag and turned toward the Aserraderos beach to ground herself at 11:15.
Schley signaled Indiana to go back to the harbor entrance, and Iowa was signaled to resume blockading station. Iowa, Ericsson, and Hist aided the crew of the burning Vizcaya. Meanwhile, Harvard and Gloucester rescued those of Infanta Maria Teresa and Almirante Oquendo. With flames and ready-to-explode ammunition on deck, the officers and sailors still ran into harm's way to rescue the Spanish crews. These proved to be some of the most valiant actions performed that day.
While Vizcaya was under fire, Cristóbal Colón had drawn ahead. Within a little more than an hour, five of the six ships of the Spanish Caribbean Squadron had been destroyed or forced aground. Only one vessel, the speedy new armored cruiser Cristóbal Colón, still survived and steamed as fast as she could for the west and freedom. Though modern in every respect and possibly the fastest ship in either fleet, Cristóbal Colón had one serious problem: she had been only recently purchased from Italy, and her main 10-inch (254 mm) armament had not yet been installed because of a contractual issue with Armstrong Whitworth. She therefore sailed with empty main turrets but retained her ten 6-inch (152 mm) secondary battery. That day, speed was her primary defense.
By the time Vizcaya had been beached, Cristóbal Colón was nearly six miles beyond Brooklyn and Oregon. At her best rate of nearly 15 knots (28 km/h), Cristóbal Colón slowly distanced herself from the pursuing US fleet. Her closest antagonist, USS Brooklyn, had begun the battle with just two of her four engines coupled because of her long stay on the blockade line, and she could manage barely 16 knots (30 km/h) while she was building steam. As Brooklyn ineffectively fired 8-inch rounds at the rapidly-disappearing Cristóbal Colón, there was only one ship in the US fleet with a chance of maintaining the pursuit, Oregon, burning Cardiff coal and New York, doing 20 knots (37 km/h).
For 65 min, Oregon pursued Cristóbal Colón. which hugged the coast and was unable to turn toward the open sea because Oregon was standing out about 1.5 mi (1.3 nmi; 2.4 km) from the course of Cristóbal Colón and would have been able to close the gap fatally of Cristóbal Colón had turned to a more southerly course.
Photo: Watching the battle from the deck of USS Iowa (Battleship # 4). Note the volume of dense gun smoke around the ship in left center
Finally, three factors converged to end the chase. Cristóbal Colón had run through her supply of high-quality Cardiff coal and was forced to begin using an inferior grade obtained from Spanish reserves in Cuba. Also, peninsula jutting out from the coastline would soon force her to turn south, across Oregon's path. Finally, on the flagship Brooklyn, Commodore Schley signaled Oregon Captain Charles Edgar Clark to open fire. Despite the immense range still separating Oregon and Cristóbal Colón, the forward turret of Oregon launched a pair of 13-inch shells that bracketed the wake of Cristóbal Colón just astern of the ship.
Vizcaya exploded at 1:20 p.m., Captain Jose de Paredes, declining to see his crew needlessly killed, abruptly turned the Cristóbal Colón toward the mouth of the Turquino River and ordered the scuttle valves opened and the colors struck as she grounded. Captain Cook of Brooklyn went on board to receive the surrender. Oregon was in charge of the wreck of Cristóbal Colón wreck with orders to save her if possible. All of the prisoners were to be transferred to USS Resolute. Despite all efforts, Cristóbal Colón was taken by the sea and sank in shoal water. As the ships of the US fleet pushed through the carnage and rescued as many Spanish survivors as possible, one officer was fished out by sailors of Iowa. The man proved to be Captain Don Antonio Eulate of Vizcaya. He thanked his rescuers and presented his sword to Captain Robley Evans, who handed it back as an act of chivalry.
By the end of the battle, the Spanish fleet had been completely destroyed. The Spanish lost more than 300 killed and 150 wounded out of 2,227 men, or approximately 22% of the fleet. 1,800 officers and men were taken prisoner by the Americans, and roughly 150 returned to Santiago de Cuba. The American fleet lost only one killed and one wounded, the former being Yeoman George Henry Ellis of the Brooklyn. The Spanish ships were devastated by the overwhelming barrage of firepower by the Americans.
Admiral Cervera's analysis of the two navies:
Admiral Cervera's Analysis and Comparison of the Spanish and American Navies
General:
This is a confidential letter written by Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete to Segismundo Bermejo, the chief of staff of the Spanish Navy. Cervera gives his analysis of the navies of Spain and the U.S. His analysis proved to be very accurate though his superiors took exception to it. This analysis was completed and laid out only ten days after the loss of the battleship MAINE in Havana harbor.
The Letter:
[Confidential.]
HONORED SIR: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency:
If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as published in the December number of the Revista General de Marina and in our general statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle ships IOWA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, OREGON, and TEXAS ; the armored cruisers BROOKLYN and NEW YORK; the protected cruisers ATLANTA, MINNEAPOLIS, BALTIMORE, CHARLESTON, CHICAGO, CINCINNATI, COLUMBIA, NEWARK, SAN FRANCISCO, OLYMPIA, PHILADELPHIA, AND RALEIGH, and the rapid unprotected cruisers DETROIT, MARBLEHEAD, and MONTGOMERY. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battleships PELAYO, INFANTA MARIA TERESA, VIZCAYA, and OQUENDO, armored cruiser COLÓN, and protected cruisers CARLOS V, ALFONSO XIII, and LEPANTO; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the PELAYO, CARLOS V, and LEPANTO to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the ALFONSO XIII.
I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in service, the ram KATAHDIN, the VESUVIUS, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against our 6,840; In protected cruisers, 51,098 against 18,887; and in fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none.
The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against our 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84,7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65, and 1.45 inches represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1 which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in inches
(Caliber in inches)3
100
we find that the artillery power of the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29, 449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (COLÓN) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300.
Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the PELAYO and CARLOS V, which probably will not be ready in time; the LEPANTO, which surely will not be ready, and the ALFONSO XII, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.
Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States f It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists every where,and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great con bat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.
This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control.
If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents ,and will use it as a base of operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable.
These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: The fulfillment of duty."
Yours, etc.,
PA8CUAL CERVERA,
CARTAGENA, February 25, 1898.
His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE,
Bibliography:
Excerpted from:
Cervera y. Topete, Admiral Pasqual, Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899. 56.
General:
This is a confidential letter written by Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete to Segismundo Bermejo, the chief of staff of the Spanish Navy. Cervera gives his analysis of the navies of Spain and the U.S. His analysis proved to be very accurate though his superiors took exception to it. This analysis was completed and laid out only ten days after the loss of the battleship MAINE in Havana harbor.
The Letter:
[Confidential.]
HONORED SIR: His excellency the chief of staff of the ministry sent me, with the confidential letter of the 19th instant, two reports and two statements relative to studies made with a view to a possible war with the United States. A careful examination of these documents, followed by profound reflection, has suggested to me the following considerations, which I respectfully submit to your excellency:
If we compare the Navy of the United States with our own, counting only modern vessels capable of active service, taking the data in reference to the Americans as published in the December number of the Revista General de Marina and in our general statistics of the navy, we find that the United States have the battle ships IOWA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, OREGON, and TEXAS ; the armored cruisers BROOKLYN and NEW YORK; the protected cruisers ATLANTA, MINNEAPOLIS, BALTIMORE, CHARLESTON, CHICAGO, CINCINNATI, COLUMBIA, NEWARK, SAN FRANCISCO, OLYMPIA, PHILADELPHIA, AND RALEIGH, and the rapid unprotected cruisers DETROIT, MARBLEHEAD, and MONTGOMERY. Against this we have, following the same classification, the battleships PELAYO, INFANTA MARIA TERESA, VIZCAYA, and OQUENDO, armored cruiser COLÓN, and protected cruisers CARLOS V, ALFONSO XIII, and LEPANTO; no fast unprotected cruisers; and all this, supposing the PELAYO, CARLOS V, and LEPANTO to be ready in time, and giving the desired value to the ALFONSO XIII.
I do not mention the other vessels on account of their small military value, surely inferior to that of the nine gunboats, from 1,000 to 1,600 tons each, six monitors still in service, the ram KATAHDIN, the VESUVIUS, and the torpedo boats and destroyers, which I do not count. I believe that in the present form the comparison is accurate enough. Comparing the displacements, we find that in battle ships the United States has 41,589 tons, against our 30,917 tons; in armored cruisers they have 17,471 tons against our 6,840; In protected cruisers, 51,098 against 18,887; and in fast unprotected cruisers they have 6,287 and we have none.
The total vessels good for all kinds of operations comprise 116,445 tons, against our 56,644 tons, or something less than one-half. In speed our battleships are superior to theirs, but not to their armored cruisers. In other vessels their speed is superior to ours. Comparing the artillery, and admitting that it is possible to fire every ten minutes the number of shots stated in the respective reports, and that only one-half of the pieces of less than 7.87 inch are fired, and supposing that the efficiency of each shot of the calibers 12.6, 11.8, 11, 9.84,7.87, 6.3, 5.9, 5.5, 4.7, 3.94, 2.95, 2.24, 1.65, and 1.45 inches represented by the figures 328, 270, 220, 156, 80, 41, 33, 27, 17, 10, 4, 2, and 1 which are the hundredths of the cubes of the numbers representing their calibers expressed in inches
(Caliber in inches)3
100
we find that the artillery power of the American battle ships is represented by 43,822, and that of ours by 29, 449; that of the American armored cruisers by 13,550, and that of ours (COLÓN) by 6,573; that of the American protected cruisers by 62,725, and that of ours by 14,600; that of the American unprotected cruisers by 12,300.
Therefore, according to these figures the offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the PELAYO and CARLOS V, which probably will not be ready in time; the LEPANTO, which surely will not be ready, and the ALFONSO XII, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.
Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States f It is evident to me that we can not. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists every where,and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great con bat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.
This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control.
If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents ,and will use it as a base of operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable.
These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, through the Government of His Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: The fulfillment of duty."
Yours, etc.,
PA8CUAL CERVERA,
CARTAGENA, February 25, 1898.
His Excellency the MINISTER OF MARINE,
Bibliography:
Excerpted from:
Cervera y. Topete, Admiral Pasqual, Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899. 56.
Now the only chance Admiral Cervera's Spanish First Armored Cruiser Squadron had after Bermejo condemned him to the Santiago de Cuba trap, and that fool, General Blanco at Havana, ordered him to sortie and attempt escape too late, as a show of "Spanish honor", was to pick a time and condition when the Americans would be vulnerable. People just assume that Cervera went to the slaughter after Blanco ordered him to go, but Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete was a foxy old admiral, who had considered his problem as best he could. He had observers in the Moro which guarded the harbor's mouth and he had a couple of weeks' worth of reports to give him some idea of what kind of blockade the Americans could mount. What did his observers report back to him?
He wanted a situation in which he could make a break for it to at least get to sea and outrun the Americans, maybe to a neutral port (Jamaica?) or to a Spanish port, (Cienfuegos?) where he could again port up, make repairs and force the Americans to wear out their ships and their sailors, while the Tercios had another go at the inept American army. He raised steam and kept boilers on hot standby that Saturday because he thought SUNDAY when the Americans were at chapel in their fleet, would be his time to make a break for it. What American admiral would expect a Spaniard to make a naval evolution on a Sunday? He got better news than he ever expected.
Battle of Santiago
SANTIAGO July 4/98
A true account of the Naval battle as seen by me on board the Iowa. I have a couple of boys writing this with me and I am writing for the benefit of my wife.
Five weeks has [have] passed since the Spanish ships ware [were]sighted in the harbor of Santiago [,Cuba] and for five weeks we had steamed back and forth before the entrance in the hope that [Rear Admiral Pascual] Cervera [Y Topete] would come out and take his chances in an open sea fight but when the first week had passed and [Rear Admiral William Thomas] Sampson’s ships reinforced [illegible] of [Commodore Winfield Scott] Schley it seemed as though the Spanish Admiral would never lead his ships to battle. The long glasses swept the entrance by day[,] and by night the glare of the searchlight guarded the entrance between Morro [Castle] and the eastern battery. What was most expected was an attack by torpedo boats for we knew that two of the finest in the world was [were] afloat in the inner bay. We settled ourselves to the not over pleasant duties of blockading. Every week or so we steamed under the forts and spent a few entertaining hours in destroying the defenses or in silencing the guns rather for no matter how torn or ragged the defences was left in the evening, the fowling [following] morning they seemed to rise from the ashes and looked more formidable than before. The weeks went by and the entrance into the channel of the Merremack and the landing of troops only seemed to stimulate our impatience for it was not plesant [pleasant] to have weeks of sutch [such] activity staring us in the face and under a sun that had not the slitest [slightest] respect for our personal comfort. The daily bulletins from the Flag ship kept us posted accurately as to the movements of the troops and of the events happening in and about Santiago. Light draught auxiliary crusers [cruisers] were cruising in close to the shore and kept up a rapid fire at whatever appeared at all suspicious to them and that was seemingly everything for day and night they fired at real or imaginary batteries on shore.
At daylight one bright morning, July 1, the fleet steamed in front of the batteries and again silenced the enemies’ guns and then for one time we started in to destroy Morro Castle altho[ugh] no guns were mounted there and it was a harmless piece of architecture as the old stone mill at Newport yet its appearance was tempting and an eyesore to the entire fleet and besides the colors of Castile floated from its flagstaff which seemed to aggravate the not over meek temperament of the gunners and Blue Jackets. The combination of Masionery was logically harmless but sentiment sways the reason in war times and acting on the impulse, the Oregon sent a 13 in[ch] shell towards the flag on that inoffensive flagstaff. When the smoke had cleared away, a great breach could be seen in the parapets of Morro and the flag and staff could be seen nowhere. Many a man in the fleet wished he could get his fingers on that striped piece of bunting; to secure it was out of the question. However, the colors were down and Morro was a smoking ruin and if not as whole at least as pictures as one so nothing remained for the fleet but to steam out to their old stations and resume the blockade on Saturday the 2nd. The Massachusetts went to Guantanamo to coal and to remain there for several days. The New Orleans and Marblehead had departed on a cruise and in the evening the Flagship New York and Indiana steamed to the eastward leaving only the Iowa, Texas, Oregon, [&] Brookline [Brooklyn] to watch the entrance.
Early on Sunday morning, July 3rd, Auxiliary Cruiser Gloucester, was seen along the shore and the torpedo boat Eric[c]son steaming lazily along. Everything was as quiet and monotonous as ever and in consequence the routine was taken up and, therefore, we were to have the usual Sunday morning inspection. At 9:15 the bugle sounded quarters and every man went to his division and fell in for inspection by the Captain. The men were not in a very amiable mood for quarters is not a very cherishing period on board a man of war and is cursed at softly and stiffly below and aloft forward and aft. The executive officer was on the last lap of his inspection when a voice from the bridge yelled out the news that sent a thrill through everyone in the ship for that yell was the long looked for one. “The ships are coming out”. No time for formalities and before the alarm died away, the magazines were open and the hydraulic pressure had gripped the turning gear of the big babies. The moment the ships were sighted the signal 250 was run aloft and a small gun fired from our forward bridge. This was an emergency signal and notified the rest of the fleet that the enemy was leaving the harbor. Now the captain was on the Bridge and full speed ahead was his first order as the ships swung toward the westward. The ships came out in the following order: The Christobal Colon [Cristobal Colon], Vizcya, Merrea Tressa [Infanta Maria Teresa] and Oqundo [Almirante Oquendo] torpedo boats Pluton and Furor. Here let us pause for a while and let us have a look at their respective fighting qualities. When the alarm was given, the Iowa was nearest to the harbor; next came the Oregon but a little to the eastward[,] the Texas and Brookline were still farther to the westward, the Brookline being about seven miles away from the mouth of the harbor. We, therefore, held the central position and were nearest to the advancing enemy so could direct any maneuvers on the part of the foe as in the events which happened the Spaniards steamed out at full speed, the Merrimac being obviously no obstacle to them and headed directly for the Iowa in the following order: Marie Tressa in the lead followed by the Vizcya; Oqunda[,] the Colon was flanked by the torpedo boats Pluton and Furor which held back however until the engagement became general. This was six ships of the enemy to six ships of us as the Gloucester and Ericson were counted as two ships on our side in the battle.
Now let us look at the ships of either side and see where the superiority exists if at all. The Spaniards had four armoured cruisers of the very best type combining the best points of the battleship and coal capacity and high speed of the cruisers. Their guns were at least equal to ours of the same caliber but their armament was somewhat inferior in point of numbers. They outranked us in numbers as each ship carried a double crew and was all prepared days before the dash was carried into execution. Moreover they had full steam and clean bottoms which should have counted with them against the slow going battle ships of our fleet. Now, as to our fleet, the Iowa and Oregon were clearly superior ships in all but speed as we only kept steam for five knots on the blockade to save coal, but the Texas was in no way superior to the enemy’s and foreign nations even class the Vizcya a type far superior to the Brookline and the slow moving Texas. The torpedo boats were superior to the Gloucester or [illegible]. To sum it up, undoubtedly we had the advantage but it was ship for ship which evened matters a little. We are down now to the respective crews. Well, the world knows the verdict there but to resume.
At 9:31 A.M., the Marie Tressa was sighted and at 9:34, she opened up with her forward 11 inch gun at the same instant the forts on either side chimed in with guns and mortors but they were a side issue now and were hardly thought of. Nearer our leading ships steamed towards each other and as the Spanish flag ship swung to the westward, the Oregon opened with a 13 inch shell from her forward tunnell. We were nearest to the enemy but held our fire for close quarters, 3000 yds. 2000 yds, and 1000 yds. was called out from the range finders in the upper top and then is when we headed for the center of the enemy’s fleet turning at the same time with a starboard helm so as to bring our ship on a broadsides to and in the same direction our main battery opened fire and our shells could be seen tearing the flag ship to pieces while her projectiles fell harmlessly around us: the smoke had surrounded all the ships by this time and the leaders were lost sight of for an instant but the Vizcya was seen next and the fire of our guns was directed on the pride of the Spanish Navy. The scene by this time became almost infernal for the ships were in close quarters and the roar of the big guns and the popping of the rapid fire and the shriek of the departing and arriving shells made conversation an impossibility. About this time, we were struck several times, one shell coming in through our forward berth deck smashing things up as it busted and riddled our starboard chain locker. Another imbedded itself in the cofferdam at the water line where it remains yet presumably unexploded. Our armor belt and quarter deck received several shells but the damage is hardly apparent. Soon the smoke was so dense that the fight went on in a dony-brook Fair fashion where as soon as you see a head, hit it for it was impossible to see what ship you were firing at. The Iowa forging ahead out of the smoke saw the Vizcya and Colon ahead but as two other ships of our fleet were with them, Cap Bob turned his attention to the other two for it seemed the Marie Tressa being disable in the first part of the battle had dropped to the rear with the Oqunda and now the cry from the top was heard repel torpedo attack on the starboard quarters. It seemed that the destroyers had lain back until the canopy of smoke enclosed the ships and they had darted forward on the Iowa to lance her while she was blind but luckily the smoke rose a little and then as the rapid fire guns turned on them, they were literally torn to pieces and to complete the work the Gloucester steamed straight for them and the destroyers were now the destroyed, riddled with shell and shrapnel with their boilers exploded and their crews shot, scalded or drowned. They ran along side of the beach but greater events were happening all this time for we now had the Oqunda and Marie Tressa on fire in several places with their torn sides and stem exposed and the smoke rising from a dozen places. The first cheer went up from the parched throats of the crew. Being assured by this voluntary stranding of the enemy’s two ships that they could be counted out of the affair, we next turned our attention to the Vizcya which was evidently trying to follow in the wake of the Colon but seeing she could not resist the storm of iron which fell around her, she imitated the Oqunda & Tressa and turned for the land. But the rain of shell never ceased for we were in a position now to rake her for and aft and as the Iowa drew in close to the shore line, the Flag of the Vizcaya could be seen coming down from her main mast. The ships company when they witnessed the first ship of the enemy strike her colors expended all their remaining energy in a wild cheer which must have grated harshly on the ears of the defeated survivors around the ill fated ship. Here ended the fight for the Oregon, Brookline and Texas were chasing the Colon and it could be seen that her capture was but a matter of time and distance.
Orders were now given for the boats to be lowered and as they commenced to drop into the water, the T.S. New York passed by to join in the pursuit of the fleeing survivor. Through the megaphone came the hail “Iowa there what casualties?” and when the answer came back “None”, the cheer that arose from the New York told us that the crew had heard and appreciated. What next was now spoken towards the Admiral but the roar and cheer from both ships completely drowned the query for the New York with constantly increasing speed driving to the westward, the last sight of her being the blue flag of the Admiral at the Marine truck before she plowed into the smoke of the pursued; when the New York came along side, Captain Bob proposed three cheers for the Admiral and it was now our company’s turn to cheer with bared head the Veteran of the War stood and listened to the cheer the men he had led into battle and the hoarseness that prevailed next day attest to the sincerity of those cheers but there was work ahead for the boats could be seen returning from the burning ship and on coming alongside, the forms of men or parts of men could be made out beneath the throats stretchers were carried aft and as the mutilated forms were deposited on them, they were brought forward to the sick bay. Boat after boat arrived filled with wounded and mangled prisoners. But let us not recall the awful horrors of that afternoon; on the Vizcya, it was still worse for the wounded were afraid to take to the water and the intense heat kept the rescuing boats away from her side. Men were clinging to the hot railings and as every movement of their body brought their wounds in contact with the hot sides, their shrieks and groans were almost unbearable. But enough of this in saying that all of the wounded that could be possibly rescued were brought aboard and both the American and Spanish doctors worked hard and fast in trying to relieve the pain of the sufferers. The uninjured Spaniards that were on the beach but went into our boats without any resistance and they even used some of their own in conveying themselves on board in this manner. Cap. Enlate of the Vizcya came aboard and was received with honors due his rank. Advancing towards Cap. Evans who was there to receive him, he unbuckled his sword and passionately kissing it, held it out towards our captain. Every eye was on the two central figures of what appeared to be a scene in a melodrama with bloody settings and every mind felt how hard it must be for a proud man to be thus humiliated. But such was not to be for no sooner did the victor see the offering than a hurried “No, No, Senor, a brave man always keeps his sword” as Enlate dazed as yet stood still for a moment, our captain raised his hand and a cheer loud and long burst from the assembled ships’ company for they had realized what this action meant for it was a privilege and honor granted by one brave man to another.
In the meantime, the boat had been recalled from the Vizcya and as the ceremony ended, all eyes were again centered on the doomed ship. A might burst of flame and smoke was seen forward and as men, masts and [illegible] were shot with terrific force into the air, a silence fell on the collected groups for they had witnessed a sight never seen before and such circumstances for it was the forward magazines and torpedo rooms which had exploded and was the beginning of the end. The defeated Capt. was on the quarter deck and when he witnessed the destruction of his ship, he uncovered and bowed his head while a groan of adios Vizcya burst from him. All the pent up emotions of his being found utterance in these few words. It was sad to witness the old man’s agony but war has no redeeming traits and at best it is but a sorry pastime. Shortly after dinner Admiral Cereva (it seemed the Harnott [Hornet] had picked him up somewhere along the coast) when Cereva stepped aboard, he was met by his former captain and when the admiral saw who it was, he embraced him in the impulsive Latin fashion. But he wasn’t the only one for while Enlate told the incident of the sword, Capt. Evans came in for his share of the hugging and we were all glad to see Cereva saved for we didn’t forget the way he saved the Merrimac’s crew and we also honored him as a brave man for the act of coming out to fight when he could have sunk his ships inside. The formalities were all over. The call of all hands bury the dead and six foreign sailors, three of whom had died aboard, were conveyed to their own cemetery, the Indiana and auxiliary gun boats had picked up the survivors of the Marie Tressa and Oqunda so we set out on the return to Santiago.
Later in the day, the news came that the Colon was seen on the beach and all her men not killed were made prisoners. The battle lasted about 55 minutes but it was 1:15 before the Colon had hauled down her colors. The Spanish loss was about 600 killed and 1750 prisoners. The loss on our side was one killed and a few wounded and we can hardly yet realize that this is so for how we escaped from the midst of it especially as all ships had orders to concentrate their fire on the Iowa. Maybe the orders given proved our salvation for if they had not aimed at us, it is more likely we would have been more damaged than we are.
This is the most decisive naval battle of all times for the opposing fleets were by far the most destructive forces that have yet met in warfare. Dewy, Sampson and Evans, three names that will rank with the greatest of past ages and the battle of Manila and Santiago will live in the memory of men long after other victories will have ceased to be.
This is the true story written by Seaman W.J. Murphy on board the U.S.S. Iowa and hope it will prove interesting to those who care to read it.
I remain as ever your obedient servant,
W.J. Murphy
Written in the Guantanamo Bay after the Battle July 7th to 15th, 1898.
S.G. Ross
W. Rapp
SANTIAGO July 4/98
A true account of the Naval battle as seen by me on board the Iowa. I have a couple of boys writing this with me and I am writing for the benefit of my wife.
Five weeks has [have] passed since the Spanish ships ware [were]sighted in the harbor of Santiago [,Cuba] and for five weeks we had steamed back and forth before the entrance in the hope that [Rear Admiral Pascual] Cervera [Y Topete] would come out and take his chances in an open sea fight but when the first week had passed and [Rear Admiral William Thomas] Sampson’s ships reinforced [illegible] of [Commodore Winfield Scott] Schley it seemed as though the Spanish Admiral would never lead his ships to battle. The long glasses swept the entrance by day[,] and by night the glare of the searchlight guarded the entrance between Morro [Castle] and the eastern battery. What was most expected was an attack by torpedo boats for we knew that two of the finest in the world was [were] afloat in the inner bay. We settled ourselves to the not over pleasant duties of blockading. Every week or so we steamed under the forts and spent a few entertaining hours in destroying the defenses or in silencing the guns rather for no matter how torn or ragged the defences was left in the evening, the fowling [following] morning they seemed to rise from the ashes and looked more formidable than before. The weeks went by and the entrance into the channel of the Merremack and the landing of troops only seemed to stimulate our impatience for it was not plesant [pleasant] to have weeks of sutch [such] activity staring us in the face and under a sun that had not the slitest [slightest] respect for our personal comfort. The daily bulletins from the Flag ship kept us posted accurately as to the movements of the troops and of the events happening in and about Santiago. Light draught auxiliary crusers [cruisers] were cruising in close to the shore and kept up a rapid fire at whatever appeared at all suspicious to them and that was seemingly everything for day and night they fired at real or imaginary batteries on shore.
At daylight one bright morning, July 1, the fleet steamed in front of the batteries and again silenced the enemies’ guns and then for one time we started in to destroy Morro Castle altho[ugh] no guns were mounted there and it was a harmless piece of architecture as the old stone mill at Newport yet its appearance was tempting and an eyesore to the entire fleet and besides the colors of Castile floated from its flagstaff which seemed to aggravate the not over meek temperament of the gunners and Blue Jackets. The combination of Masionery was logically harmless but sentiment sways the reason in war times and acting on the impulse, the Oregon sent a 13 in[ch] shell towards the flag on that inoffensive flagstaff. When the smoke had cleared away, a great breach could be seen in the parapets of Morro and the flag and staff could be seen nowhere. Many a man in the fleet wished he could get his fingers on that striped piece of bunting; to secure it was out of the question. However, the colors were down and Morro was a smoking ruin and if not as whole at least as pictures as one so nothing remained for the fleet but to steam out to their old stations and resume the blockade on Saturday the 2nd. The Massachusetts went to Guantanamo to coal and to remain there for several days. The New Orleans and Marblehead had departed on a cruise and in the evening the Flagship New York and Indiana steamed to the eastward leaving only the Iowa, Texas, Oregon, [&] Brookline [Brooklyn] to watch the entrance.
Early on Sunday morning, July 3rd, Auxiliary Cruiser Gloucester, was seen along the shore and the torpedo boat Eric[c]son steaming lazily along. Everything was as quiet and monotonous as ever and in consequence the routine was taken up and, therefore, we were to have the usual Sunday morning inspection. At 9:15 the bugle sounded quarters and every man went to his division and fell in for inspection by the Captain. The men were not in a very amiable mood for quarters is not a very cherishing period on board a man of war and is cursed at softly and stiffly below and aloft forward and aft. The executive officer was on the last lap of his inspection when a voice from the bridge yelled out the news that sent a thrill through everyone in the ship for that yell was the long looked for one. “The ships are coming out”. No time for formalities and before the alarm died away, the magazines were open and the hydraulic pressure had gripped the turning gear of the big babies. The moment the ships were sighted the signal 250 was run aloft and a small gun fired from our forward bridge. This was an emergency signal and notified the rest of the fleet that the enemy was leaving the harbor. Now the captain was on the Bridge and full speed ahead was his first order as the ships swung toward the westward. The ships came out in the following order: The Christobal Colon [Cristobal Colon], Vizcya, Merrea Tressa [Infanta Maria Teresa] and Oqundo [Almirante Oquendo] torpedo boats Pluton and Furor. Here let us pause for a while and let us have a look at their respective fighting qualities. When the alarm was given, the Iowa was nearest to the harbor; next came the Oregon but a little to the eastward[,] the Texas and Brookline were still farther to the westward, the Brookline being about seven miles away from the mouth of the harbor. We, therefore, held the central position and were nearest to the advancing enemy so could direct any maneuvers on the part of the foe as in the events which happened the Spaniards steamed out at full speed, the Merrimac being obviously no obstacle to them and headed directly for the Iowa in the following order: Marie Tressa in the lead followed by the Vizcya; Oqunda[,] the Colon was flanked by the torpedo boats Pluton and Furor which held back however until the engagement became general. This was six ships of the enemy to six ships of us as the Gloucester and Ericson were counted as two ships on our side in the battle.
Now let us look at the ships of either side and see where the superiority exists if at all. The Spaniards had four armoured cruisers of the very best type combining the best points of the battleship and coal capacity and high speed of the cruisers. Their guns were at least equal to ours of the same caliber but their armament was somewhat inferior in point of numbers. They outranked us in numbers as each ship carried a double crew and was all prepared days before the dash was carried into execution. Moreover they had full steam and clean bottoms which should have counted with them against the slow going battle ships of our fleet. Now, as to our fleet, the Iowa and Oregon were clearly superior ships in all but speed as we only kept steam for five knots on the blockade to save coal, but the Texas was in no way superior to the enemy’s and foreign nations even class the Vizcya a type far superior to the Brookline and the slow moving Texas. The torpedo boats were superior to the Gloucester or [illegible]. To sum it up, undoubtedly we had the advantage but it was ship for ship which evened matters a little. We are down now to the respective crews. Well, the world knows the verdict there but to resume.
At 9:31 A.M., the Marie Tressa was sighted and at 9:34, she opened up with her forward 11 inch gun at the same instant the forts on either side chimed in with guns and mortors but they were a side issue now and were hardly thought of. Nearer our leading ships steamed towards each other and as the Spanish flag ship swung to the westward, the Oregon opened with a 13 inch shell from her forward tunnell. We were nearest to the enemy but held our fire for close quarters, 3000 yds. 2000 yds, and 1000 yds. was called out from the range finders in the upper top and then is when we headed for the center of the enemy’s fleet turning at the same time with a starboard helm so as to bring our ship on a broadsides to and in the same direction our main battery opened fire and our shells could be seen tearing the flag ship to pieces while her projectiles fell harmlessly around us: the smoke had surrounded all the ships by this time and the leaders were lost sight of for an instant but the Vizcya was seen next and the fire of our guns was directed on the pride of the Spanish Navy. The scene by this time became almost infernal for the ships were in close quarters and the roar of the big guns and the popping of the rapid fire and the shriek of the departing and arriving shells made conversation an impossibility. About this time, we were struck several times, one shell coming in through our forward berth deck smashing things up as it busted and riddled our starboard chain locker. Another imbedded itself in the cofferdam at the water line where it remains yet presumably unexploded. Our armor belt and quarter deck received several shells but the damage is hardly apparent. Soon the smoke was so dense that the fight went on in a dony-brook Fair fashion where as soon as you see a head, hit it for it was impossible to see what ship you were firing at. The Iowa forging ahead out of the smoke saw the Vizcya and Colon ahead but as two other ships of our fleet were with them, Cap Bob turned his attention to the other two for it seemed the Marie Tressa being disable in the first part of the battle had dropped to the rear with the Oqunda and now the cry from the top was heard repel torpedo attack on the starboard quarters. It seemed that the destroyers had lain back until the canopy of smoke enclosed the ships and they had darted forward on the Iowa to lance her while she was blind but luckily the smoke rose a little and then as the rapid fire guns turned on them, they were literally torn to pieces and to complete the work the Gloucester steamed straight for them and the destroyers were now the destroyed, riddled with shell and shrapnel with their boilers exploded and their crews shot, scalded or drowned. They ran along side of the beach but greater events were happening all this time for we now had the Oqunda and Marie Tressa on fire in several places with their torn sides and stem exposed and the smoke rising from a dozen places. The first cheer went up from the parched throats of the crew. Being assured by this voluntary stranding of the enemy’s two ships that they could be counted out of the affair, we next turned our attention to the Vizcya which was evidently trying to follow in the wake of the Colon but seeing she could not resist the storm of iron which fell around her, she imitated the Oqunda & Tressa and turned for the land. But the rain of shell never ceased for we were in a position now to rake her for and aft and as the Iowa drew in close to the shore line, the Flag of the Vizcaya could be seen coming down from her main mast. The ships company when they witnessed the first ship of the enemy strike her colors expended all their remaining energy in a wild cheer which must have grated harshly on the ears of the defeated survivors around the ill fated ship. Here ended the fight for the Oregon, Brookline and Texas were chasing the Colon and it could be seen that her capture was but a matter of time and distance.
Orders were now given for the boats to be lowered and as they commenced to drop into the water, the T.S. New York passed by to join in the pursuit of the fleeing survivor. Through the megaphone came the hail “Iowa there what casualties?” and when the answer came back “None”, the cheer that arose from the New York told us that the crew had heard and appreciated. What next was now spoken towards the Admiral but the roar and cheer from both ships completely drowned the query for the New York with constantly increasing speed driving to the westward, the last sight of her being the blue flag of the Admiral at the Marine truck before she plowed into the smoke of the pursued; when the New York came along side, Captain Bob proposed three cheers for the Admiral and it was now our company’s turn to cheer with bared head the Veteran of the War stood and listened to the cheer the men he had led into battle and the hoarseness that prevailed next day attest to the sincerity of those cheers but there was work ahead for the boats could be seen returning from the burning ship and on coming alongside, the forms of men or parts of men could be made out beneath the throats stretchers were carried aft and as the mutilated forms were deposited on them, they were brought forward to the sick bay. Boat after boat arrived filled with wounded and mangled prisoners. But let us not recall the awful horrors of that afternoon; on the Vizcya, it was still worse for the wounded were afraid to take to the water and the intense heat kept the rescuing boats away from her side. Men were clinging to the hot railings and as every movement of their body brought their wounds in contact with the hot sides, their shrieks and groans were almost unbearable. But enough of this in saying that all of the wounded that could be possibly rescued were brought aboard and both the American and Spanish doctors worked hard and fast in trying to relieve the pain of the sufferers. The uninjured Spaniards that were on the beach but went into our boats without any resistance and they even used some of their own in conveying themselves on board in this manner. Cap. Enlate of the Vizcya came aboard and was received with honors due his rank. Advancing towards Cap. Evans who was there to receive him, he unbuckled his sword and passionately kissing it, held it out towards our captain. Every eye was on the two central figures of what appeared to be a scene in a melodrama with bloody settings and every mind felt how hard it must be for a proud man to be thus humiliated. But such was not to be for no sooner did the victor see the offering than a hurried “No, No, Senor, a brave man always keeps his sword” as Enlate dazed as yet stood still for a moment, our captain raised his hand and a cheer loud and long burst from the assembled ships’ company for they had realized what this action meant for it was a privilege and honor granted by one brave man to another.
In the meantime, the boat had been recalled from the Vizcya and as the ceremony ended, all eyes were again centered on the doomed ship. A might burst of flame and smoke was seen forward and as men, masts and [illegible] were shot with terrific force into the air, a silence fell on the collected groups for they had witnessed a sight never seen before and such circumstances for it was the forward magazines and torpedo rooms which had exploded and was the beginning of the end. The defeated Capt. was on the quarter deck and when he witnessed the destruction of his ship, he uncovered and bowed his head while a groan of adios Vizcya burst from him. All the pent up emotions of his being found utterance in these few words. It was sad to witness the old man’s agony but war has no redeeming traits and at best it is but a sorry pastime. Shortly after dinner Admiral Cereva (it seemed the Harnott [Hornet] had picked him up somewhere along the coast) when Cereva stepped aboard, he was met by his former captain and when the admiral saw who it was, he embraced him in the impulsive Latin fashion. But he wasn’t the only one for while Enlate told the incident of the sword, Capt. Evans came in for his share of the hugging and we were all glad to see Cereva saved for we didn’t forget the way he saved the Merrimac’s crew and we also honored him as a brave man for the act of coming out to fight when he could have sunk his ships inside. The formalities were all over. The call of all hands bury the dead and six foreign sailors, three of whom had died aboard, were conveyed to their own cemetery, the Indiana and auxiliary gun boats had picked up the survivors of the Marie Tressa and Oqunda so we set out on the return to Santiago.
Later in the day, the news came that the Colon was seen on the beach and all her men not killed were made prisoners. The battle lasted about 55 minutes but it was 1:15 before the Colon had hauled down her colors. The Spanish loss was about 600 killed and 1750 prisoners. The loss on our side was one killed and a few wounded and we can hardly yet realize that this is so for how we escaped from the midst of it especially as all ships had orders to concentrate their fire on the Iowa. Maybe the orders given proved our salvation for if they had not aimed at us, it is more likely we would have been more damaged than we are.
This is the most decisive naval battle of all times for the opposing fleets were by far the most destructive forces that have yet met in warfare. Dewy, Sampson and Evans, three names that will rank with the greatest of past ages and the battle of Manila and Santiago will live in the memory of men long after other victories will have ceased to be.
This is the true story written by Seaman W.J. Murphy on board the U.S.S. Iowa and hope it will prove interesting to those who care to read it.
I remain as ever your obedient servant,
W.J. Murphy
Written in the Guantanamo Bay after the Battle July 7th to 15th, 1898.
S.G. Ross
W. Rapp
There are errors in this account as can be seen in the "official history" above it. But the important things to remember:
a. Inspection for duty readiness was in progress. The crew was not at chapel, as expected, but they were also still not at their manning posts where you would expect if a possible Spanish fleet breakout was in the cards. The XOs were not where they were supposed to be either.
b. USS Massachusetts was out of the fight trying to complete repairs on that turret that caught fire a week earlier. She is at Guantanamo.
c. USS New York and her torpedo boat escort (USS Porter?) were headed to Siboney, carrying a madman to meet a nincompoop. More on those incredibly imbecilic idiots, Sampson and Shafter, in a moment.
d. USS Indiana was crawling along after USS New York at half her rated cruise speed of 10 knots (5 knots) for some unfathomable reason except that Sampson liked to keep that specific battleship close to him. I am about to make a speculation about Sampson that we have some peculiar evidence to support. It reflects rather unfavorably on his moral character.
e. The US blockaders were at warm standby, in that their boilers were fired, but not at steam pressure to put work into the steam engines. USS Brooklyn had one set of engines decoupled from screws as a fuel savings measure. It would take 20 minutes to jack those steam engines back in and perhaps 10 minutes to go from warm standby to hot boilers. You can fault Schley for the fleet at warm standby in general. The blame for USS Brooklyn's decoupled engines state is squarely on the shoulders of CAPT Francis. A. Cook;
Account of Capt. F.A. Cook, USS BROOKLYN, of the Battle of Santiago
SIR: At 9 a. m., July 3, I gave orders and arrangements were made for general muster at 9.30 a. m. At 9.30 a. m. the enemy were telegraphed by the Iowa as Coming out. At the same time they were discovered by the quartermaster on watch, N. Anderson, of this ship, and reported to the officer of the deck.
The executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Mason, who was on deck about to execute the order for general muster, immediately gave the order, “Clear ship for action and general quarters.'' Signal was made at the same time, “Enemy coming out - action." I went immediately forward, stood for the enemy, and gave orders to get steam on all boilers.
We started with steam on three boilers, at about 12 knots speed.
The head of the Spanish squadron, in column, was just outside the entrance of the harbor of Santiago heading about southwest. The Spanish squadron consisted of the Maria Teresa (flag), Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Colon, and two torpedo destroyers. We opened fire on the leading ship in five minutes from the discovery.
The port battery was first engaged as, we stood with port helm to head off the leading ship, and giving them a raking fire at about 1,500 yards range. The enemy turned to the westward to close into the land. We then wore around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into action. The enemy hugged the shore to the westward.
The Brooklyn, leading, was followed by the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and Gloucester. The Vixen, which had been to the westward of us on the blockade, ran to the southward and eastward of us, and kept for some time off our port side distant about 1,000 yards, evidently intending to guard against torpedo attack upon this ship. The shell passing over us fell very thick about her, some passing over her. At this time the firing was very fast and the whistling of shell incessant, and our escape with so little injury was miraculous, and can only be attributed to bad marksmanship on the part of the enemy. The Maria Teresa, which had dropped astern while we were wearing, under the heavy fire of our fleet ran ashore, the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Colon continuing on and gaining in distance.
The Brooklyn was engaged with the three leading ships of the enemy, which were forging ahead, the Texas, Iowa, and Indiana keeping up a heavy fire, but steadily dropping astern. The Oregon was keeping up a steady fire and was coming up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all others. It was an inspiring sight to see this battleship, with a large white wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draft. We were making 14 knots at the time, and the Oregon came up off our starboard quarter at about 600 yards and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our speed to 15 knots, and just before the Colon surrendered were making nearly 16.
The Oquendo, soon after the falling out of the Teresa, dropped astern and on fire ran ashore. The Vizcaya and Colon continued on, under fire from Brooklyn and Oregon. The other vessels of our fleet were well astern and out of range. The Texas was evidently coming up fast. At about 10.53 a. m. the Vizcaya was seen to be on fire, and the Colon passed inside of her with increased speed, took the lead, and gradually forged ahead. The Vizcaya soon after ran on the beach, ablaze with fire. We signaled the Oregon to cease firing on the Vizcaya, as her flag was down. Firing immediately ceased, and we both continued the chase of the Colon, now about 12,000 yards away. The ranges ran from 1,500 to 3,000 yards with the Vizcaya as she kept in and out from the coast. We steered straight for a distant point near Cape Cruz, while the Colon kept close to the land, running into all of the bights. She could not have come out without crossing our bows, and we were steadily gaining on her. We were getting more steam all the time, and now had four and and one-half boilers on, and the remaining one and one-half nearly ready.
After running for about 50 miles west from the entrance, the Colon ran into a bight of land, beached, fired a gun to leeward, and hauled down her flag. The Oregon and Brooklyn had just previously begun to fire upon the Colon and were landing shell close to her.
I was sent on board by Commodore Schley to receive the surrender. The captain spoke English, and received me pleasantly, though naturally much depressed. He surrendered unconditionally. He was polite, shook hands, and said that his case was hopeless, and that he saw that we were too much for him. I was on board about fifteen minutes. As we came from the Colon the flagship New York came in with the Texas. I reported on board the flagship to Rear-Admiral Sampson. I stated to him that I believed the Colon could be gottenoff the beach.
During the entire action I was in constant communication with you, so that I was enabled to promptly execute your orders and instructions. The officers and crew behaved with great and unexceptionable coolness and bravery, so that it is difficult to discriminate. They were encouraged in their best efforts by your enthusiasm, and your cheery words: "Fire steady, boys, and give it to them."
The executive officer, N. E. Mason, with his usual zeal, was continually at the battery directing the firing and keeping me well informed of the exact condition of the ship, and in encouraging both officers and men by his example of coolness and courage.
Lieutenant Hodgson was on the bridge coolly and deliberately taking bearings, and measuring and giving ranges. He was assisted in getting ranges and noting time by Chief Yeoman Geo. Ellis with a stadimeter until Ellis was killed by a passing shell.
The officers of the divisions, Lieuts. T. D. Griffin, W. R. Rush, E. Simpsou, J. G. Doyle, B. W. Wells, and Ensign Webster all performed their full duties deliberately and efficiently. The naval cadets in divisions were cool and efficient, Naval Cadets Halligan, Marble, Abele, and Cronan having especially been noticed for good service. Lieut. B. W. Wells, your secretary, volunteered for command of a division, and was given the fourth division, thus enabling me to station a commissioned officer in a turret.
Too much praise cannot be given the engineer's department for the hard work done by all in steadily raising the steam until the speed rose from 12 to 16 knots.
The marines did splendid service at the guns and at their stations. The orderlies carried messages quickly and effectively. Captain Murphy and Lieutenant Borden were constant in their visits to the different stations to be assured of efficiency.
Medical Inspector Paul Fitzsimons and Past Assistant Surgeon De Valin were in constant attendance at the divisions and on deck to be ready for any emergency.
Flag Lieut. Jas. H. Sears was particularly active, standing in the open directing signals, reporting fall of shot and position of the enemy. He was cool and firm in his duty.
Ensign McCauley attended personally to signals while constantly under fire, at one time mounting the forward turret and making the wigwag himself His coolness was conspicuous.
The boatswain, Mr. Hill, was continually about the forecastle, ready for any duty, and materially assisted in watching the fall of shots, and thus checked the ranges.
The gunner, F. T. Applegate, rendered very valuable and conspicuous service at the battery, making repairs wherever practicable during the action.
The carpenter, G. H. Warford, was on the alert, watching for effects of shell and in examining compartments, pipes, and valves.
The signalmen, under Chief Quartermaster O'Connell, all stood in the open and performed their duties courageously. I would call to your especial attention the valuable and conspicuous services rendered during the action by B. Gaynor (gunner's mate, first class), as noted in the reports of the executive officer, the divisional officers, and the gunner. Gaynor is a natural mechanic and a very intelligent man, and he went from gun to gun repairing breaks and was constant in his work keeping them in condition for use.
Chief Gunner's Mate D. F. Diggins was in all parts of the ship attending faithfully and coolly to the electric apparatus.
N. Anderson (quartermaster, first class) is a particularly bright seaman. He -was at the wheel and kept the ship steadily on her course. He has been particularly known in this ship as a valuable man. He would prove very efficient as a mate, and I recommend him for such appointment.
N. Morrissey (landsman) twice got out on the muzzle of a forward 6-pounder and backed out a jammed shot. Private Macneal, U.S.M.C., also went out on the muzzle of forecastle 6-pounder and cleared a jammed shot.
We had but two personal casualties, George H. Ellis (chief yeoman) killed, and J. Burns (fireman, first class) wounded. The ship was struck twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of bursting shell and from small shot of machine guns. No serious injury was done to the ship, and all repairs can be temporarily done by the ship's force, excepting to the 5-inch elevating gear. The smokestacks were hit in several places; the signal halyards, rigging, and flags were cut in many places. The flag at the main was destroyed, being much cut by shot and flying pieces of shell. The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; some trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets worked well. The 5-inch battery gave great trouble with the elevating gear. At the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two are bulged at the muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear for 5-inch as soon as practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 of 5-iuch, 1,200 of 6-pounder, and 200 of 1-pounder ammunition.
Very respectfully,
F. A. Cook,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDFR IN CHIEF SECOND SQUADRON,
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
Note: account written July 7, 1898.
The executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Mason, who was on deck about to execute the order for general muster, immediately gave the order, “Clear ship for action and general quarters.'' Signal was made at the same time, “Enemy coming out - action." I went immediately forward, stood for the enemy, and gave orders to get steam on all boilers.
We started with steam on three boilers, at about 12 knots speed.
The head of the Spanish squadron, in column, was just outside the entrance of the harbor of Santiago heading about southwest. The Spanish squadron consisted of the Maria Teresa (flag), Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Colon, and two torpedo destroyers. We opened fire on the leading ship in five minutes from the discovery.
The port battery was first engaged as, we stood with port helm to head off the leading ship, and giving them a raking fire at about 1,500 yards range. The enemy turned to the westward to close into the land. We then wore around to starboard, bringing the starboard battery into action. The enemy hugged the shore to the westward.
The Brooklyn, leading, was followed by the Texas, Iowa, Oregon, Indiana, and Gloucester. The Vixen, which had been to the westward of us on the blockade, ran to the southward and eastward of us, and kept for some time off our port side distant about 1,000 yards, evidently intending to guard against torpedo attack upon this ship. The shell passing over us fell very thick about her, some passing over her. At this time the firing was very fast and the whistling of shell incessant, and our escape with so little injury was miraculous, and can only be attributed to bad marksmanship on the part of the enemy. The Maria Teresa, which had dropped astern while we were wearing, under the heavy fire of our fleet ran ashore, the Vizcaya, Oquendo, and Colon continuing on and gaining in distance.
The Brooklyn was engaged with the three leading ships of the enemy, which were forging ahead, the Texas, Iowa, and Indiana keeping up a heavy fire, but steadily dropping astern. The Oregon was keeping up a steady fire and was coming up in the most glorious and gallant style, outstripping all others. It was an inspiring sight to see this battleship, with a large white wave before her, and her smokestacks belching forth continued puffs from her forced draft. We were making 14 knots at the time, and the Oregon came up off our starboard quarter at about 600 yards and maintained her position, though we soon after increased our speed to 15 knots, and just before the Colon surrendered were making nearly 16.
The Oquendo, soon after the falling out of the Teresa, dropped astern and on fire ran ashore. The Vizcaya and Colon continued on, under fire from Brooklyn and Oregon. The other vessels of our fleet were well astern and out of range. The Texas was evidently coming up fast. At about 10.53 a. m. the Vizcaya was seen to be on fire, and the Colon passed inside of her with increased speed, took the lead, and gradually forged ahead. The Vizcaya soon after ran on the beach, ablaze with fire. We signaled the Oregon to cease firing on the Vizcaya, as her flag was down. Firing immediately ceased, and we both continued the chase of the Colon, now about 12,000 yards away. The ranges ran from 1,500 to 3,000 yards with the Vizcaya as she kept in and out from the coast. We steered straight for a distant point near Cape Cruz, while the Colon kept close to the land, running into all of the bights. She could not have come out without crossing our bows, and we were steadily gaining on her. We were getting more steam all the time, and now had four and and one-half boilers on, and the remaining one and one-half nearly ready.
After running for about 50 miles west from the entrance, the Colon ran into a bight of land, beached, fired a gun to leeward, and hauled down her flag. The Oregon and Brooklyn had just previously begun to fire upon the Colon and were landing shell close to her.
I was sent on board by Commodore Schley to receive the surrender. The captain spoke English, and received me pleasantly, though naturally much depressed. He surrendered unconditionally. He was polite, shook hands, and said that his case was hopeless, and that he saw that we were too much for him. I was on board about fifteen minutes. As we came from the Colon the flagship New York came in with the Texas. I reported on board the flagship to Rear-Admiral Sampson. I stated to him that I believed the Colon could be gottenoff the beach.
During the entire action I was in constant communication with you, so that I was enabled to promptly execute your orders and instructions. The officers and crew behaved with great and unexceptionable coolness and bravery, so that it is difficult to discriminate. They were encouraged in their best efforts by your enthusiasm, and your cheery words: "Fire steady, boys, and give it to them."
The executive officer, N. E. Mason, with his usual zeal, was continually at the battery directing the firing and keeping me well informed of the exact condition of the ship, and in encouraging both officers and men by his example of coolness and courage.
Lieutenant Hodgson was on the bridge coolly and deliberately taking bearings, and measuring and giving ranges. He was assisted in getting ranges and noting time by Chief Yeoman Geo. Ellis with a stadimeter until Ellis was killed by a passing shell.
The officers of the divisions, Lieuts. T. D. Griffin, W. R. Rush, E. Simpsou, J. G. Doyle, B. W. Wells, and Ensign Webster all performed their full duties deliberately and efficiently. The naval cadets in divisions were cool and efficient, Naval Cadets Halligan, Marble, Abele, and Cronan having especially been noticed for good service. Lieut. B. W. Wells, your secretary, volunteered for command of a division, and was given the fourth division, thus enabling me to station a commissioned officer in a turret.
Too much praise cannot be given the engineer's department for the hard work done by all in steadily raising the steam until the speed rose from 12 to 16 knots.
The marines did splendid service at the guns and at their stations. The orderlies carried messages quickly and effectively. Captain Murphy and Lieutenant Borden were constant in their visits to the different stations to be assured of efficiency.
Medical Inspector Paul Fitzsimons and Past Assistant Surgeon De Valin were in constant attendance at the divisions and on deck to be ready for any emergency.
Flag Lieut. Jas. H. Sears was particularly active, standing in the open directing signals, reporting fall of shot and position of the enemy. He was cool and firm in his duty.
Ensign McCauley attended personally to signals while constantly under fire, at one time mounting the forward turret and making the wigwag himself His coolness was conspicuous.
The boatswain, Mr. Hill, was continually about the forecastle, ready for any duty, and materially assisted in watching the fall of shots, and thus checked the ranges.
The gunner, F. T. Applegate, rendered very valuable and conspicuous service at the battery, making repairs wherever practicable during the action.
The carpenter, G. H. Warford, was on the alert, watching for effects of shell and in examining compartments, pipes, and valves.
The signalmen, under Chief Quartermaster O'Connell, all stood in the open and performed their duties courageously. I would call to your especial attention the valuable and conspicuous services rendered during the action by B. Gaynor (gunner's mate, first class), as noted in the reports of the executive officer, the divisional officers, and the gunner. Gaynor is a natural mechanic and a very intelligent man, and he went from gun to gun repairing breaks and was constant in his work keeping them in condition for use.
Chief Gunner's Mate D. F. Diggins was in all parts of the ship attending faithfully and coolly to the electric apparatus.
N. Anderson (quartermaster, first class) is a particularly bright seaman. He -was at the wheel and kept the ship steadily on her course. He has been particularly known in this ship as a valuable man. He would prove very efficient as a mate, and I recommend him for such appointment.
N. Morrissey (landsman) twice got out on the muzzle of a forward 6-pounder and backed out a jammed shot. Private Macneal, U.S.M.C., also went out on the muzzle of forecastle 6-pounder and cleared a jammed shot.
We had but two personal casualties, George H. Ellis (chief yeoman) killed, and J. Burns (fireman, first class) wounded. The ship was struck twenty times by whole shot and many times by pieces of bursting shell and from small shot of machine guns. No serious injury was done to the ship, and all repairs can be temporarily done by the ship's force, excepting to the 5-inch elevating gear. The smokestacks were hit in several places; the signal halyards, rigging, and flags were cut in many places. The flag at the main was destroyed, being much cut by shot and flying pieces of shell. The 8-inch guns worked satisfactorily; some trouble and delay was caused by jamming of locks. The turrets worked well. The 5-inch battery gave great trouble with the elevating gear. At the end several were rendered useless for battle. Two are bulged at the muzzle. This ship should have new elevating gear for 5-inch as soon as practicable. We fired 100 rounds of 8-inch, 473 of 5-iuch, 1,200 of 6-pounder, and 200 of 1-pounder ammunition.
Very respectfully,
F. A. Cook,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The COMMANDFR IN CHIEF SECOND SQUADRON,
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.
Note: account written July 7, 1898.
f. Which brings on further the question; "Why was the battle such a shambles?" It comes down to a confusion as to start positions and plots and courses and even how far off the fjord mouth the blockade fleet was as we try to reconstruct the tracks.
g. We have one clear agreement among all the chartists and reconstructors of the battle chart and defenders and detractors of Schley. Instead of ordering USS Brooklyn to turn to port and raising signal 217 "Follow my lead and form line of battle", Schley ordered Cook to turn to starboard and straighten out in a course west by southwest in general pursuit of the Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya. Whether or not signal 217 was hoisted became irrelevant and moot because by this time, the gun-smoke was so thick among the American warships that they might as well have been fighting in a fog. Nobody was in a good position to read flag signals. USS Texas and USS Oregon laid out independent pursuit courses and chased after shapes in their self-generated smog. USS Indiana and USS Gloucester joined up as the moving rear guard to cover Schley's sterns end and keep Captain Vilaamil's two torpedo boats off the three pursuing American's backsides. Only in the wild fancies of naval battle artists do the three pursuing Americans settle down into a battle line and blaze away at their Spanish opposites, ship versus ship. It was more like the USS Texas, USS Oregon and USS Brooklyn gang-gunned each Spanish armored cruiser in turn, starting with Infanta Maria Teresa. USS Iowa was not part of the troika that drove off the ram attempts by Infanta Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, but she settled down into her own pursuit of the Oquendo, contributing to the USS Brooklyn's duel whenever she was in effective range and had a clear shot. This ragged, every captain for himself chase, saw Infanta Maria Teresa driven to shore first, then Vizcaya, then Oquendo. Each of these ships, bad coal or not, should have had at least three to five knots on their American opposites. Yet, it can be ascertained that only the Cristobol Colon broke 12 knots. The other "speedy" Spanish cruisers were lucky if they could make 8 knots, so fouled were their hulls. When USS Oregon and USS Texas can pace your ships, then something is wrong with your Spanish armored cruiser maintenance. There was a lot of wild shooting among the rapid fire guns of the Spanish and American ships' secondary and tertiary batteries. Some remarkable shooting by 8 inch and 13 inch guns' crews was recorded. From USS Indiana blowing a Spanish torpedo boat into 2 halves with a 13 inch diameter shell, to USS Oregon dropping a pair over and short ahead and behind the Cristobol Colon at a staggering 6,000 + meters, forcing her to head for the beach, run aground and strike, we do have one clear fact. The Americans with no battle plan, or concept of operations did try to stick together and shoot together formatting in the vicinity of the USS Brooklyn and Schley. Follow on forces (USS Gloucester, USS Vixen and the USS Indiana, scooped up prisoners and polished off cripples.) cleaned up. The dog in the manger, late to the party, ninny who managed to set up the conditions for a catastrophic defeat, and was only saved from a court martial by a pair of subordinates *(Watson, in the USS Iowa, insofar as he was able, conformed to USS Brooklyn's and Schley's movements.) was the incompetent William Sampson. h. This "man" had managed to ruin four monitors, (Five if you now include the USS Puritan.), disabled TWO battleships (USS Indiana and USS Massachusetts), Pulled a badly needed armored cruiser off station (USS New York) for a ride to talk to that other fallible fool; "Pecos Bill" Shafter, who sent Sampson the letter that was a request that the navy storm into the fjord a la Farragut, expletive deleted the mines and the Morro and threaten the city of Santiago de Cuba with bombardment if they did not surrender. The stupidly written letter was the reason for Sampson to lose his temper and go off on a mad, taking three ships with him to go and see that three hundred pound latrine detail failure to explain to Pecos Bill that battleships just do not parade past forts anymore.
i. Referring to "h", where was Sampson's fear of running past forts, when he broke all those ships on his joy jaunt to San Juan Puerto Rico?
j. Speaking of "i", has one noticed that Sampson never wanted to get the USS New York or his own precious hide within modern coastal gun range? If one notices the "blockade plan" Sampson generates, it is alright for Clark, Cook, Watson and Schley to be shoved IN FRONT of Sampson and the USS New York and take that kind of fire? Reminds me of another yellow-belly, who was always safe to the rear, when the hard fighting had to be done and other people had to take up his slack and suffer in silence his criticisms when the mess he created was not cleaned up by them to HIS satisfaction. Richmond Kelly Turner is that man's name.
Anyhow, Schley rallied the fleet, counterturned USS Brooklyn to foil Cervera's ram attempt with the Infanta Maria Teresa which I maintain was the correct decision given that he needed to bring guns to bear as well as dodge and yes "The USS Texas had better watch out for herself." in that evolution, because if one notes the chart tracks, it appears that in criss crossing as USS Brooklyn and USS Texas did, the attempt by Vizcaya to ram USS Texas was foiled by USS Texas going full reverse while USS Brooklyn's port battery gave the Vizcaya a drubbing and forced her to sheer off.
Miletus12.
or it might have been like this:
