The Spanish–American War (1898) in real time

The Puerto-Rican Naval Campaign, 1898 Part 3 by Mark R. Barnes, Ph.D., Senior Archeologist, National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office

Testing the San Juan Blockade:

Throughout the blockade of San Juan, the U.S. Navy attempted to keep at least one cruiser in sight of San Juan harbor entrance at all times. To the people of Puerto Rico, these blockade ships came to be known as fantasmas, or phantoms, appearing at any moment at night or day to capture and, if necessary, sink any vessels attempting to enter or depart San Juan.

The impact of the blockade was soon felt. Puerto Rico's economy was then largely based on sugar production, with extensive importation of basic items, including tools, clothing, and food. Fernando Picó reported "hunger and in satisfaction" due to the blockade. However, the blockade was far from complete (usually a single vessel off San Juan), and the war too short to blame all island shortages on it (1987:46).

Around 1 PM, on 22 June, while San Juan regimental bands played inspiring martial music and a great crowd cheered, ISABEL II an old cruiser and a British built torpedo boat destroyer TERROR left San Juan Harbor to attack the sole blockading American ship, the ST. PAUL. It is possible that the attack may have been an attempt to provoke ST. PAUL into steaming within range of the San Juan shore batteries. The ST. PAUL a large and fast ocean liner made over as an armed auxiliary cruiser with eight 5-inch guns and eight 6-pounders was commanded by Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, previously commander of the MAINE (Nofi 1996:166; Rivero 1972:146, 161; Dyal 1996:287, 322).

As the ISABEL II could only make 10 knots she was soon forced to retire from the action and return to San Juan for fear of being overhauled by the ST. PAUL. On its own the TERROR attempted a torpedo attack to cover the ISABEL II's retreat. The ST. PAUL commenced firing on the TERROR at 5,400 yards. She was repeatedly hit by small caliber rounds and 5-inch shells from the ST. PAUL.

"The ST. PAUL struck the TERROR’s steering gear, jamming the rudder. As the Spanish ship turned, giving her starboard side to ST. PAUL, the latter fired a 5-inch shell that struck TERROR about 12 inches above the water line, wrecking the starboard engine and killing five men and wounding several others. The shell exited below the water line on the port side, and the TERROR began to sink. Running for port as fast as her other undamaged engine could take her, the ship was in serious danger of capsizing; so her commander beached her on Puntilla shoals [Dyal 1996:287]."




The TERROR in San Juan undergoing repairs after the fight with the ST. PAUL

In San Juan, the bands kept playing, and the crowds began spreading the rumor that the two Spanish vessels had engaged the entire United States fleet offshore (Wilcox 1898:242). The TERROR, which had come up from Martinique on the 17th of June, after being left there by Admiral Cervera on the 14th because of mechanical problems would still be under repair in San Juan when the Spanish Government surrendered in August, and would eventually be the only ship of Admiral Cervera's fleet that would return to Spain.

On 25 June, ST. PAUL was relieved by the auxiliary cruiser YOSEMITE, soon to become the hunter of the Trasatlántica blockade runner SS ANTONIO LOPEZ. Two days later, from Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti, Sigsbee reported to the Secretary of the Navy:
--Captain C. D. Sigsbee to the Secretary of the Navy, 27 June, USS ST. PAUL (U.S. Navy Department, 1898:220).

Sinking a Blockade Runner:

By 1898, the Trasatlántica Compania owned 32 liners in addition to the SS ANTONIO LOPEZ, and was the undisputed leader of Spanish shipping interests (Gómez Nuñez 1899:118). Prior to the war of 1898, the Trasatlántica had already played an enormous role in the transport of Spanish troops to-and-from the overseas colonies. Between 1868 and 1886, Trasatlántica steam liners had transported over 250,000 soldiers to the island of Cuba alone.

When the war broke out, some 213,000 soldiers were transported in 15 Trasatlántica voyages. The company's war effort also included hospital ships, contribution of personnel and vessels to the Spanish Navy, and blockade-running expeditions (Casasses and Riera 1987:8).

Blockade runners included vessels from Spain, Cuba, France, Great Britain, Honduras, Norway, Mexico, Germany, and possibly other nations. Most of these vessels were steamers. An extensive listing of blockade runners and Spanish warships captured by the U.S. North Atlantic Fleet was included in the Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (U.S. Navy Department 1898:316-325). Due to the numerous vessels in the listing, only those directly relevant to Puerto Rico's blockade are discussed.

On 8 May 1898, the Spanish cargo steamer RITA was captured with a coal shipment en route from St. Thomas to San Juan. The capture was made by U.S.S. YALE, Commander N. C. Wise, sending RITA with prize crew to Charleston, South Carolina (U.S. Navy Department, 1898:367). On 9 May, YALE was driven off by an armed transport out of San Juan. This was the auxiliary cruiser ALFONSO XII, an ocean liner armed with 4 Hontoria guns of 12 cm (Gómez Nuñez 1902:75). The maneuver allowed the approaching blockade runner PAULINA to enter San Juan Harbor from St. Thomas (Rivero 1972:72).

On 25 May, ST. PAUL captured the English steamer RESTORMEL, which had left San Juan with 2,400 tons of coal for Cervera's fleet in Santiago de Cuba. Upon questioning by Sigsbee, the British captain responded that there were two other cargo steamers (of the same British company as the RESTORMEL), both loaded with coal, still inside San Juan Harbor.

On 10 June, the British steamer TWICKENHAM, en route from Martinique to Jamaica, was captured near Puerto Rico, possibly its unofficial destination. The capture was made by the ST. LOUIS (U.S. Navy Department 1898:316).

Loss of SS ANTONIO LOPEZ:

SS ANTONIO LOPEZ was the most distinguished of the Puerto Rico blockade runners, not only by her luxurious prewar career, but more importantly, by her secret government cargo for the defense of San Juan, including six breech-loading, bronze cannon of 12 cm; four breech-loading, Mata bronze mortars of 15 cm; two breech-loading, Mata bronze howitzers of 15 cm; also 3,600 projectiles, 500,000 rations, an electric searchlight and fifty tons of gunpowder (Rivero 1972:173).

The arrival of this modern matériel was crucial for the Spanish defense of Puerto Rico. This is reflected in the secret telegram received by Captain Carreras from Don Claudio López Bru (1853- 1925), son of Antonio López and president of the Trasatlántica, "You must deliver the cargo to Puerto Rico, even if it means losing the ship" (Rivero 1972:176).

On 16 June 1898, SS ANTONIO LOPEZ departed from Cádiz with a total of 79 men, including officers, medic, priest, etc. She had no guns above deck, as Captain Carreras had removed her four Hontoria cannon of 12 cm in Cádiz (Vega 1992). She was convoyed as far as Gibraltar by a large part of the Spanish fleet. SS ANTONIO LOPEZ and ALFONSO XII separated there to dash across the Atlantic to deliver government supplies and armaments.


The Transport and blockade-runner, ANTONIO LOPEZ

After eleven days at sea, on the night of 27 June 1898, SS ANTONIO LOPEZ reached the north coast of Puerto Rico. The previous week, on 20 June, the Spanish Governor of Puerto Rico had received a coded cable message of the ship’s arrival date. While El Morro's lighthouse and the city itself were to remain in blackout as a safety measure against possible bombardments at night, the Madrid Government had ordered that the entry buoys to San Juan Harbor be lighted for the nocturnal arrival of SS ANTONIO LOPEZ.

But there were no lighted buoys awaiting the blockade runner on the night of 27 June. Instead, the entrance to San Juan Harbor was invisible. From previous experience, Carreras knew that the waters off San Juan were burdened with deadly reefs. Even in daylight, the narrow channel into the harbor had to be negotiated slowly.

According to Rivero (1972:180), whileSS ANTONIO LOPEZ was lost in the dark, Governor General Macías and General Vallarino drank brandy and played cards at La Fortaleza the official residence of the Governor General of Puerto Rico. When the socializing was over, instead of giving orders to light the buoys, General Vallarino went to sleep.

By dawn of 28 June, SS ANTONIO LOPEZ found itself a few miles off Dorado, well west of the entrance of San Juan. To the east, beyond a morning rain, was San Juan. At that moment, YOSEMITE patrolled off Isla Verde, unable to see SS ANTONIO LOPEZ behind the contoured coast and the heavy rain. YOSEMITE was an unprotected, auxiliary cruiser of 389 ft., armed with four 5-inch guns and six 6-pounders, under Commander William Emory, with a crew largely composed of Michigan Naval Reservists, and university students and graduates (Dyal 1996:358).


The USS YOSEMITE on blockade duty off San Juan

In the light of dawn, YOSEMITE's lookouts noticed the hoisting of signal flags at Fort San Cristóbal. Incredibly, a signal man was announcing the liner's arrival from the west (Rivero 1972:173). Now, with both vessels speeding at full steam towards San Juan, shells from YOSEMITE rained on the ocean liner. Aboard SS ANTONIO LOPEZ, taking hit after hit, Carreras was painfully aware that a good shot could ignite the 50 tons of gunpowder he carried.

Eager to stop the Spanish liner, Commander Emory brought Yosemite well within firing range of Morro Castle and Fort San Cristóbal. But the Spanish guns remained silent. The commanders of both strongholds had explicit orders not to fire until given permission by the high command. With Admiral Cervera's fleet expected anytime, as well as the arrival of blockade runners from neutral nations, fear of firing at their own ships had locked the Spanish forces into an embarrassing inertia.

With YOSEMITE coming closer and always firing, Carreras followed his last orders: to deliver the cargo in Puerto Rico, even if it kills the ship. At this point, that could only mean one thing: to ground the ship on the beach. At first, it seemed like a good idea, until a loud screech came out of the sea. The ship had grounded! Suddenly, Carreras had the distinct sensation of wanting to be elsewhere, anywhere but stuck on a reef with shells raining from YOSEMITE and enough gunpowder to explode SS ANTONIO LOPEZ in a million pieces (Vega 1997).

"Abandon ship!" cried Carreras. "Every man for himself!"

"Abandon ship!" the command echoed in every room [Vega 1992:69]
.
Boats were lowered into the sea, departing quickly from SS ANTONIO LOPEZ. Undaunted by the distance of over half a mile to shore, some sailors dove into the sea and swam. Carreras himself abandoned the ship, leaving behind his first officer, eight wounded sailors and the ship's priest.

While YOSEMITE fired at the immobilized liner, out of San Juan Harbor rushed ISABEL II, a 2nd class, unprotected, auxiliary cruiser of 210 ft., followed by the smaller GENERAL CONCHA, variously described as a third-class auxiliary and a gunboat, and the fast gunboat PONCE DE LEON. In San Juan, men, women, and children rushed to the city walls to see the spectacle. Soon the three Spanish vessels opened fire, with YOSEMITE firing back at all three (Vega 1997).

Under heavy fire, shooting its Nordenfelt 75 mm. rifle, PONCE DE LEON sped towards the grounded liner. Circling around SS ANTONIO LOPEZ, the fast gunboat bounced against the liner with such force that the gunboat's mizzen mast dropped like felled timber. Soon the wounded began stepping down into PONCE DE LEON.

At Morro Castle, Commander Iriarte finally received orders to open fire on YOSEMITE. For more than half an hour he had waited for the high command, watching the unprotected American vessel cruise within range of El Morro's big guns. Now, just as the coastal guns were allowed to fire, Yosemite was retreating out of range. Out went the first shell, splashing water about 300 ft. ahead of YOSEMITE. The second shot was already short. Not daring another attack on the grounded liner, YOSEMITE sped towards the horizon.

At 1:30 p.m., the tug IVO BOSCH left San Juan Harbor, followed by the steamboats CARMELITA, CATALINA, and ESPERANZA. For three days and nights the boats unloaded the precious and deadly cargo. Meanwhile, Yosemite watched from a distance, with ISABEL II, GENERAL CONCHA, and PONCE DE LEON guarding the salvage boats.

The operation was commanded by Captain Ramón Acha, a Puerto Rican military engineer later promoted to general in the Spanish army. On the night of 29 June, Acha attempted to free the grounded liner by towing with the auxiliary JUAN MANTILLA. But it was an impossible mission.

Day and night, the salvage continued. Virtually everything was rescued, including the grand piano, the coal, and personal items of the crew. Only a bronze cannon was lost to the sea, when the boat carrying it foundered at night. The following day, the salvors returned with divers and a larger boat, but they were unable to relocate the lost cannon.

By dawn of 15 July, NEW ORLEANS arrived at the scene. A protected cruiser of 354.5 ft., NEW ORLEANS was armed with 23 guns, including ten 50-caliber guns. She had already seen combat at Santiago de Cuba. Exchanging signals with YOSEMITE, NEW ORLEANS closed to three miles of SS ANTONIO LOPEZ. In the morning of 16 July, NEW ORLEANS fired twenty incendiary shells at SS ANTONIO LOPEZ. On the third hit, the liner caught fire, continuing to burn into the following night. Weeks later, the once luxurious Spanish liner disappeared beneath the sea (Vega 1997).


The burned-out hulk of the ANTONIO LOPEZ

Upon reaching Danish St. Thomas, Commander Emory wired a report on SS ANTONIO LOPEZ to the Secretary of the Navy. As told by Mortimer E. Cooley, ex-Chief Engineer of YOSEMITE, to Rivero (1972:188), this was the only U.S. vessel to engage in combat in 1898 and not receive the standard double pay. Years later, Truman H. Newberry, who had served as lieutenant aboard YOSEMITE, became Secretary of the Navy. It was only then, through an Act of Congress, that Sampson's medal was awarded to the men of YOSEMITE for their bravery in detaining SS ANTONIO LOPEZ in enemy waters, without support from other vessels.

Blunders notwithstanding, the secret mission of SS ANTONIO LOPEZZ was a Spanish victory, which may explain the belated recognition of YOSEMITE's crew, and the omission of Spanish salvage operations in diverse official reports and publications (U.S. Department of the Navy 1898 and 1966). The success of the salvage was reported in U.S. newspapers, including New York's Evening Journal of 23 August, doubting the official naval press release regarding the liner's destruction by YOSEMITE (Rivero 1972:185-186).

What is significant about SS ANTONIO LOPEZ as a blockade runner, is the fact that San Juan was empowered by the influx of artillery, projectiles, gunpowder, rations and other cargo salvaged from the stranded liner. After the battle for SS ANTONIO LOPEZ, there were no more attempts to capture or bombard San Juan. Although the U.S Atlantic Fleet had the firepower to destroy the city, now a direct attack would have been costly for both sides (Vega 1997).

Within a few days of the attack on the SS ANTONIO LOPEZ, news reached the island of Puerto Rico of the surrender of the Spanish garrison at Santiago de Cuba. What was unknown to the Spanish colonial government was the presence of an American army of invasion on transports off Santiago that would shortly be steaming for Puerto Rico. Beginning in mid-July, and lasting till the end of the war (August 13th), the army campaign against Puerto Rico was now underway.

Manuel de la Cámara and Livermoore

Biography

Cámara y Livermoore, Manuel de la. Malaga, 7.IV.1836 – 4.I.1920. Admiral who commanded the "Reserve Squadron" in the Spanish-American War.

Coming from a family of merchants, he entered the Naval College as a Navy aspirant in July 1850, sitting as a midshipman two years later in the department of Cádiz. Between 1852 and 1858 he made several navigations through the waters of the Peninsula and the Antilles and in July of this last year, promoted to ensign of ship, he was assigned to the Apostadero of Havana, where he embarked on several ships (Isabel II, Pizarro, Petronila, Valdés, Isabel la Católica, Francisco de Asís, Ulloa), and temporarily commanded the schooners Cristina and Juanita; returned to the Peninsula in 1863, steaming Piles, based in Cádiz.

In August 1864 he was assigned to the Pacific Squadron, under the command of Méndez Núñez, embarking as 2nd commander in the schooner Vencedora, and promoted to lieutenant of ship (1865) is part of the crew of the frigate Villa de Madrid taking part in several acts of war in 1866, among which it is worth highlighting the blockade of Chilean ports, the battle of the island of Abtao against the Chilean-Peruvian squadron or the bombing of Valparaíso. In April of the same year he participated in the blockade of the Chorrillos squadron in the vicinity of Callao until May 2, when the bombing of that population and attack on its fortresses took place. For the merits contracted during the War of the Pacific he is conferred the employment of commander of the Marine Corps and the Naval Merit Cross 1st class.

On July 18, 1867 he was part of the Navy commission in London and later he was assigned successively to the frigates Vitoria and Arapiles; promoted the following year to lieutenant of ship 1st class, he was sent to the Apostadero of the Philippines, where he took command of the gunboat Prueba, in support missions to the Hydrographic Commission of the Archipelago; he remained in that destination until 1870, the year in which he returned to the Peninsula.

In 1872 in the middle of the war he was assigned to the Apostadero of Havana and took part in numerous actions in command of several ships (schooner Favorita, gunboats Bazán and Cuba Española). Under the command of the latter, he went to the defense of Guantánamo attacked by Maceo's forces; for the merits contracted he is awarded the Red Cross of 2nd of Naval Merit and another Cross of Military Merit for the services rendered in the Oriental Department.

Promoted to captain of frigate (1876), and in command of the corvette Africa, by complaint of the officers of said ship he is suspended from command and is reprimanded by the captain general of Cartagena; however, when delivering said ship he is congratulated by the admiral of the Squadron, and is subsequently assigned the command of the corvette Tornado, with which he made several trips to Morocco to transfer the Minister Plenipotentiary of Spain in that country, as well as the staff of the Moroccan embassy in Spain.

By Royal Order of November 1885 he was appointed head of the Navy Commission in the United States until January 1888, when he returned to the Peninsula, and was promoted to captain that same year.

After occupying the commands of the cruisers Reina Mercedes and Castilla, he was assigned that of the Division of the Philippines, composed of the cruisers Castilla, Don Juan de Austria and Ulloa; he arrived in Cavite in June 1890 and remained there until December of the same year, when he ceased due to illness. Returning to the Peninsula in 1891, he was assigned the position of major general of the Apostadero de La Habana and the Squadron of the Antilles. He returned to Cadiz the following year when he was appointed commander of the cruiser Navarre.

In April 1894 he was promoted to captain of the ship 1st class and the following year he was appointed head of the Navy commission in England (naval attaché to the embassy), until April 1897, when he became rear admiral.

Declared war between Spain and the United States and destroyed the Spanish fleet in Cavite (May 1, 1898), before the requests for help of the governor general of the Philippines, Basilio Augustín, the Government of Spain decides to send a squadron to defend Manila, besieged by Americans and Filipinos; the squadron, composed, among other ships, by the battleship Pelayo and the cruiser Carlos V and under the command of Manuel de la Cámara, he sails from Cádiz flying his insignia in the Pelayo, heading to the Philippines via Port Said, where he anchors on June 26 and remains until July 5, when the Suez Canal ends. Meanwhile, the United States spreads the threat that would attack the Spanish coasts (Cádiz, Malaga and Barcelona) if the aforementioned squadron continues on its way. The threat, which has serious foundations, as well as the Egyptian refusal to carbonize Spanish ships with the excuse of having acquired all the stock by the United States, lead the Sagasta government to telegraph the admiral, who is in the Red Sea, to return to Spain; thus overshadows the only hope that Manila will not be taken and that the US strategic deployment will be broken.

Returning to Spain, he continued to command the squadron, which from January 1899 was renamed "Instruction Squadron", with which he sailed for several months through peninsular and Canary Islands waters.

From these dates he held various positions, among them, that of captain general of the Department of Ferrol (1901) and that of aide-de-camp of King Alfonso XIII (1902), being appointed to receive and accompany the king of Portugal from the border to Madrid; in May 1903 he was promoted to vice-admiral, and was appointed chairman of the Board of the Merchant Navy; in August of this last year, at his own request, he was granted the pass to the reserve status.

Sources and bibl.: Archive-Museum Don Álvaro de Bazán (Viso del Marqués, Ciudad Real), service sheet and personal data of M. de la Cámara and Livermoore.

M. Sastrón, La insurrección de Filipinas y la guerra hispanoamericana en el Archipiélago, Madrid, 1901; C. Seco, Tríptico carlista, Barcelona, Ariel, 1973; V. Palacio Atard, La España del siglo xix, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1981; F. Morales Padrón, Manual de historia universal: historia general de América, Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1982 (2nd ed. rev. and aum.); R. Carr, España, 1808-1975, Barcelona, Ariel, 1985; A. Ubieto, J. Reglá, J. M.ª Jover and C. Seco, Introducción a la Historia de España, Barcelona, Teide, 1986; M. Hernández Sánchez- Barba, Hispanoamérica en el siglo xix, Madrid, Anaya, 1998; A. R. Rodríguez González, La guerra del 98. Las campañas de Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas, Madrid, Agualarga, 1998; J. Cervera Pery, La guerra naval del 98, Madrid, San Martín, 1998; V. M. Concas y Palau, La Escuadra del almirante Cervera, Madrid, San Martín, 1998; A. Castellanos, Filipinas, de la insurrección a la intervención de EE UU, Madrid, Sílex, 1998.

Alicia Castellanos Escudier

USS Baltimore
Displacement........................................4,413 long tons (4,484 t)
Length....................................................336 ft (102 m)
Beam.......................................................48 ft 6 in (14.78 m)
Draft........................................................20 ft 6 in (6.25 m)
Installed power............................................4 × coal-fired boilers
.................................................................2 × horizontal triple expansion engines
.........................................................10,500 ihp (7,800 kW)
Propulsion...................................................2 × screws
Speed.......................................................19 knots (35 km/h; 22 mph)
Complement.............................................386 officers and men
Armament...................................................4 × 8-inch (203 mm)/35 caliber Mark 4 guns
..................................................................6 × 6-inch (152 mm)/30 caliber Mark 3 guns
..................................................................4 × 6-pounder (57 mm (2.2 in)) guns
..................................................................2 × 3-pounder (47 mm (1.9 in)) guns
..................................................................2 × 1-pounder (37 mm (1.5 in)) guns
..................................................................2 × .45 caliber (11.4 mm) Gatling guns
Armor..........................................................Gun shields: 4.5 in (110 mm)
..................................................................Main deck: 4 in (100 mm)
..................................................................Conning tower: 3 in (76 mm)

 

USS Monadnock
Type Monitor
Displacement............................................3,990 long tons (4,050 t) (designed)
Length........................................................262 ft (80 m) oa
..................................................................259 ft (79 m) lwl
Beam............................................................55 ft 6 in (16.92 m)
Draft.............................................................14 ft 6 in (4.42 m)
Installed power.................................................4 × single-ended steam boilers
................................................................1,426 ihp (1,063 kW) (produced on trials)
Propulsion........................................................2 × Triple expansion (Monadnock)
.......................................................................2 × Compound (Others)
Speed.............................................................12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph) (designed)
Monadnock:.................................................... 11.5 kn (21.3 km/h; 13.2 mph)
Others:............................................................10.5 kn (19.4 km/h; 12.1 mph)
Range.........................................................1,370 nmi (2,540 km; 1,580 mi) @ 10 knots (19 km/h; 12 mph)[2]
Complement.....................................................19 officers and 164 enlisted
Armament..........................................................4 × 10 in (250 mm)/30 caliber guns
.........................................................................4 × 6-pounder 57 mm (2.2 in) guns
.........................................................................2 × 3-pounder guns
..........................................................................Various smaller
Armor..................................................................Iron armor
..........................................................................Belt: 7–5 in (180–130 mm)
..........................................................................Deck: 1.75 in (44 mm)
..........................................................................Turrets: 11.5 in (290 mm)

... Chief Engineer Thomson had special duty and was a member of the Examining Board for Promotion of Engineer Officers 1865-69. He served on the U. S. S. Congress, North Atlantic Squadron, 1870-1. He was Chief Engineer of the Philadelphia Navy Yard 1871-2, and was then ordered to the U. S. S. Richmond, 1872-3, and U. S. S. Omaha, Pacific Squadron, 1873-4. From 1875-7 he was made a member of the Board of Inspection and Survey and was sent as Fleet Engineer of the Pacific Squadron where he served on the Flagship Alaska 1877-81. In 1881 he became again a member of the Examining Board and from this duty he was ordered as Inspector and Chief Engineer in completing the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dolphin, at Roach's Shipyard 1885-88. His last active sea duty was as Fleet Engineer of the North Atlantic Squadron 1888-9 on tne Flagship Pensacola, during the period in which that vessel was engaged in carrying out an Astronomical Expedition to view the total eclipse of the sun at St. Paul de Loando, Africa. From 1890 to 1896 he was Inspector of Machinery at the William Cramp & Sons' Shipyard, Philadelphia, during the construction of the Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis and Columbia, where his qualities as a keen critic of work and design, and as a forceful inspector were tested to the full and found to be unsurpassed. His work here was ever tempered with a broad common-sense appreciation of the contractor's viewpoint and the results of his inspection never embittered the contractors nor detracted from the excellence of the output. The Bureau of Steam Engineering selected Chief Engineer Thomson as the best man to send to the Newport News Shipbuilding Co., when (1896) they began work on their first Government contract and needed a helpful inspector more than a merely rigid enforcer of the specifications; but after a few months of this duty he found that his health was not equal to the task, and that the effects of overwork and nervous anxiety had to be realized as a demand for rest. He voluntarily retired in June, 1896, on the completion of forty years of arduous service. His resting days were, however, of short duration; on the breaking out of the Spanish War, 1898, his services were again requisitioned by the Department for the most important work of carrying on repairs to vessels sent to Key West from the fleet. He was on the staff of Admiral Remey (Flagship Lancaster) at Key West until the end of the war, when he returned home to settle at Moorestown, N. J. By special act of Congress, approved May 13, 1908, he was presented with a Civil War Service Medal, and in 1908 he received a West Indies Campaign Spanish War Medal.

He was a member of Washington Lodge A. Y. M., Phila. He was a staunch friend and a devoted husband and father. His remains were buried in Woodlands Cemetery, Philadelphia, Pa., March 20, 1914.

J. A. B. SMITH,

Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy.

2. The PURITAN’s steering gear belongs to Construction and Repair but should be placed under the Chief Engineer of the ship to be kept in repair by his force on board; in my opinion, however, its being disabled should not prevent the ship going to the blockade duty and steering by hand. The crown sheets of the three boilers of this ship reported as being down should be by this time reformed or nearly so, and in any event there are five boilers remaining which are serviceable and should be made to perform efficient duty by the Engineer’s force of the vessel.

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba - North Atlantic Fleet Squadron Bulletin No. 16

Squadron Bulletin.



U. S. Flagship New York. Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba.



TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1898.



THE Army is still engaged in landing stores; no advance has taken place since last report.



The colliers Aberenda, Scindia and Alexander have sailed for Norfolk; the Lebanon and a large four-masted schooner with coal have arrived from Key West. The Lebanon has brought the fleet and army mail and a quantity of packages which have accumulated for officers and messes at Key West.



Information has been received, by two Cuban officers from Manzanillo, that General Pando, with 8500 men, left Manzanillo on the 23rd for Santiago, and is moving at the rate of 12 miles a day, carrying with him cattle as food.



General Perez is actively engaged against the enemy in the Guantanamo district.3 As the Commanding Officer reported in an intercepted despatch that his food (half rations,) would last only until the end of June, they must be in considerable straits. The total Spanish force there is about 5000.



Several persons from Santiago have come into our lines; they report great scarcity of provisions—rice is the chief support─they gave some minor information as to block-houses and batteries. They stated that a panic existed among the inhabitants of the town.

The Spanish American War in Egypt By Patrick McSherry

General:

Following the Spanish navy’s loss at the Battle of Manila Bay / Cavite in the Philippines, major elements of the Spanish Home Fleet under Admiral Camara were ordered to the Philippines. Tactics by the U.S. and Great Britain delayed the squadron’s passage through the Suez Canal. U.S threats to the Spanish homeland and the losses suffered at the Battle of Santiago forced the squadron to return to Spanish waters.

The Spanish American War in Egyptian Waters

Following Spain’s loss of its Philippine naval squadron at the Battle of Manila Bay / Cavite, in the Philippines, Governor-General Basilio Augustin y Davila communicated with his government in Madrid requesting reinforcement, particularly warships, to defeat Rear Admiral George Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron. Spain responded by ordering a sizeable squadron to the Philippines. Included in this squadron, to be commanded by sixty-three-year-old Admiral Manuel de la Camara y Libermoore, was the battleship PELAYO and armored cruiser CARLOS V, the most powerful ships in the Spanish navy. Camara’s orders were:

These orders were rather different from those given Admiral Pascual Cervera, whose squadron was sent to Cuba. By Cervera’s his own admission in advance of its deployment that his squadron was being sent to its death.

PELAYO was the most formidable ship in the Spanish Navy. Displacing nearly 10,000 tons, almost twice that of Dewey’s OLYMPIA, she represented quite a threat to Dewey’s plucky squadron. Her two 320 mm guns (12.6 in.) and two 280 mm (11 in.) outsized OLYMPIA’s 8” guns considerably, which were the largest guns in Dewey’s Asiatic Squadron. The CARLOS V was also significant, displacing over 9,000 tons and armed with two 280 mm (11 in.) guns.

At the outbreak of the war, the PELAYO was undergoing a refit, and when she departed with Camara she was without the armor protection for her secondary battery. The CARLOS V was brand new and not yet operational when the war broke out. This was her first major assignment.

Joining these two vessels were a collection of other ships, including the Auxiliary Cruisers PATRIOTA and RAPIDO, the protected cruiser ALFONSO XIII, torpedo boat destroyers AUDAZ, OSADO, and PROSERPINA; transports PANAY and BUENOS AIRES, and four colliers with twenty thousand ton of coal. The ALFONSO XIII was quickly dropped from the squadron when it was found to be unfinished. The torpedo boat destroyers were intended to be with the squadron only as far as Port Said at the entrance to Suez Canal.

The squadron sortied from Cadiz on June 16, 1898. As many of the ships had fouled hulls – hulls with a growth of barnacles, seaweed, etc., their coal consumption would be higher than normal and their speed slower, both critical issues.

The squadron consisted of the following:

a. PELAYO – 9745 tons, main battery of two 12.6 in (320 mm) guns, two 11 in. (280 mm) guns, one 6.4 in. (162 mm) gun.
b. CARLOS V – 9235 tons, main battery of two 11 in. (280 mm) guns, eight 5.5 in. (140 mm) guns.
c. PATRIOTA – The former Hamburg-America Lines liner NORMANIA, 10,500 tons and armed with 4.7 in (120 mm) guns
d. RAPIDO - the former Hamburg-America Lines liner COLUMBIA, 9500 tons and armed with 6.3 (162 mm) and 5.5 in. (140 mm) guns
e. PANAY (transport)
f. BUENOS AIRES (transport) (with the transports carrying 4,000 troops)
g. Four colliers

As the ships left the Atlantic and passed through the Strait of Gibraltar, the movement was reported to the U.S. government. Efforts had to be made to stop or slow Camara’s squadron to allow for Rear Admiral George Dewey in the Philippines to develop alternate plans for the defense of his Asiatic Squadron.

On receiving the data, the U.S. Navy took action and dispatched the monitors MONTEREY and MONADANOCK to Manila. However, the two vessels would have to be towed across the treacherous Pacific Ocean. This was a particular concern since the monitors had very low freeboard and low reserve buoyancy, issues typical of this class of warship – in short, they could sink much more easily than a typical warship, and the vast Pacific Ocean could be unforgiving.

As for Dewey’s options, they were limited since the Spanish squadron simply would have him outgunned and outranged. The odds were somewhat altered in that target practice training was at a higher level aboard the American ships, whereas on the Spanish navy’s budgetary constraints limited target practice. If Dewey simply decided to fight it out with the Spanish squadron, an American victory would still be unlikely. Alternately, Dewey could take the squadron into hiding in a remote bay and wait reinforcements and a chance to attack the Spanish ships piecemeal. Dewey could also take his squadron east and meet the MONTEREY, the monitor expected to arrive earliest, and then move against the Spanish, but, in spite of the MONTEREY’s two 12 inch guns and two 10 inch guns, the Asiatic Squadron would still be outgunned. He could plant his squadron in front of Manila where the guns from the city could reinforce the squadron, an action also considered by the Spanish Admiral Montojo before the Battle of Manila Bay. Montojo had rejected the idea so as to avoid loss of life in the city. None of these options were good. Without more firepower, Dewey’s situation was untenable.

The U.S. and Great Britain – the latter looking out for its own interests by supporting the U.S. – independently got to work to slow Camara’s squadron’s progress towards the Philippines. The Spanish squadron headed east across the Mediterranean and would have to pass through the Suez Canal. Knowing that the lifeblood of the warship was coal and that, since only one warship would be allowed to traverse the Canal at a time – a fifteen to twenty hour journey – Camara probably planned to recoal at Port Said at the entrance to the canal. Both the U.S. and Great Britain took advantage of this situation. The deputy U.S. consul general, Ethelbert Watt, purchased all available coal supplies, including coal for which Spain had issued contracts but for which it had not yet paid. The U.S. took the initiative to buy up all available coal along the remainder of the route to the Philippines. Camara had four colliers, and could live off of the coal contained in them for some time if needed, but a threat to Spanish squadron’s coal supply could not be taken lightly. Given the fouled hulls of some of the Spanish ships, and the inability to recoal enroute to the Philippines, coal supplies could be an issue in the long term for the Spanish as they advanced on the Philippines.

Great Britain, which controlled the Egyptian government, caused Egypt to stringently enforce the twenty-four hour limit on how much time the Spanish ships could stay at Port Said according to neutrality laws. Great Britain also had Egypt inform Camara that the Spanish vessels, as a nation at war, could not recoal even from its own colliers in Egyptian waters. Again, this just created more issues for Camara, but did not stop the squadron’s move east.

Camara’s squadron slowly passed through the canal. As one ship traversed the canal in fifteen to twenty hours, the completion of the passage was wired back to Port Said and the next warship began its journey through the canal. Finally, by July 5, the entire squadron was through the canal, with the exception of the AUDAZ, PROSPERTINA and OSADO, which Camara had decided in advance to leave behind, perhaps to save on coal.

Meanwhile, the U.S. took more decisive action to the stop the eastward movement of the squadron. On June 27 the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, John Long, ordered the formation of the “Eastern Squadron” to be commanded by Commodore John Watson. Watson had commanded the Cuban blockading force up to that time. The Eastern Squadron, initially to consist of the battleships IOWA, and OREGON, as well as the auxiliary cruisers YANKEE, YOSEMITE and DIXIE, was to cross the Atlantic and threaten the Spanish homeland, the defenses of which were lowered by the departure of Camara’s squadron. At the same time that the orders were issued to form the squadron, the news was purposely leaked to Spain via William Sims, a naval intelligence officer stationed in Paris.

With the loss of Admiral Pascual Cervera’s squadron at the Battle of Santiago on July 3, the need for Camara’s squadron for the defense of the Spanish homeland became all the more critical. Though Camara’s squadron had finally cleared the Suez Canal on July 5, on July 7 it received orders to return to Spain. The threat to Dewey and the Asiatic Squadron had be[en] averted. The Eastern Squadron continued to exist on paper, though the ships assigned to it varied. Since Santiago, Cuba soon surrendered and negotiations for an armistice were soon underway, the Eastern Squadron was never physically formed as it was no longer needed.

With the return of Camara’s squadron to Spain, the Philippines would not be reinforced. The Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, Basilio Augustin y Davila realized his predicament, and shortly entered into negotiations with Dewey regarding the surrender of Manila.

Bibliography:
--Aguilera A., "Pelayo," Buques de la Armada Espanola. (Madrid, 1969) 338, 343.
--McSherry, Patrick, “Watson, John Crittenden,” Encyclopedia of the Spanish American and Philippine American Wars. Vol 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009) 692
--Mollan, Mark C., “Eastern Squadron” Encyclopedia of the Spanish American and Philippine American Wars. Vol 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009) 193-194
--Nofi, Albert A., The Spanish-American War, 1898 . (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1996) 273, 282, 283, 310-311, 330.
--Tucker, Spencer, “Camara y Libermoor, Manuel de la,” Encyclopedia of the Spanish American and Philippine American Wars. Vol 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC Clio, 2009) 85.

From wiki;

General characteristics
Type...................................Battleship
Displacement...........................9,745 tons
Length...................................334 ft 8 in (102.01 m)
Beam......................................66 ft 3 in (20.19 m)
Draft.....................................24 ft 9 in (7.54 m) maximum
Installed power........................9,600 ihp (8,000 ihp on trials with natural draft)
Propulsion.................................2-shaft, vertical compound, 12 return-tube boilers; in 1897–1898 her boilers were replaced by 16 Niclausse boilers.
Sail plan..............................As built 4,000 square feet (1,219 square meters), but quickly removed.
Speed.....................................16.7 knots (forced draft) as built (1888)
..........................................16.2 knots (natural draft) on trials.
Complement...............................520 officers and enlisted
Armament (1888 as built)...................2 × 32 cm (12.6 in) guns
...........................................2 × 28 cm (11.0 in) guns
...........................................1 × 16-centimetre (6.30 in) gun
..........................................12 × 12-centimetre (4.72 in) guns
...........................................5 × 6 pounder (57-mm) quick-firing guns
..........................................14 × machine guns
...........................................7 × 14-inch (356-mm) torpedo tubes
........(1898 as reconstructed)............2 × 32-centimetre (12.6 in) guns
...........................................2 × 28-centimetre (11.0 in) guns
...........................................9 × 14-centimetre (5.51 in) guns
...........................................5 × 6 pounder quick-firing guns
..........................................14 × machine guns
...........................................6 × 14-inch (356-mm) torpedo tubes (All torpedo tubes removed in 1910)
Armor (Creusot steel)......................Belt 17.75–11.75 inches (451–298 millimetres)
...........................................Barbettes 15.75–11.75 inches (400–298 millimetres)
...........................................Shields 3.125 inches (79.4 mm)
...........................................Conning tower 6.125 inches (155.6 mm)
...........................................Deck 2.75–2 inches (70–51 millimetres)
...........................................Midships battery unarmored as built; 3 inches (76 mm) Harvey armor after 1897–1898 reconstruction.
Notes: 800 tons of coal

Discover the Castle of San Pedro de la Roca, Cuba

The Castle of San Pedro de la Roca, or Castillo del Morro, is a citadel built between 1638 and 1700, on the site of an ancient fortress dating from 1610. It was supposed to defend the city of Santiago and its port from pirate attacks. This massive set of fortifications is perched on a rocky promontory overlooking the sea. Forts, shops, bastions and batteries, the Spanish-American military architecture of this castle is inspired by the Renaissance style and Italian designs.

Designed by military architects Bautista and Juan Bautista Antonelli, El Castillo del Morro is one of the largest military buildings built by the Spanish in the Caribbean. In 1662, before the completion of the work on the Castle of San Pedro, the English stormed the city of Santiago de Cuba. This forced the Spaniards to repair and strengthen the fortifications of the citadel. This work allowed the Spaniards to repel two attacks in 1678 and 1680. Damaged by earthquakes, the citadel was rebuilt and became a political prison in 1775.

The castle was used as a fortress one last time in 1898, during the war between Spain and the United States that marked the end of the Spanish colonial empire.

Santiago Harbor: Spanish coastal artillery, consisting of 11 modern guns at five different batteries, aided the protection of Santiago Harbor. The harbor was also mined. Spanish Coast Defenses of Santiago in 1898 included El Morro Castle (2) (formally called Castillo de San Pedro de la Roca del Morro), built from 1638 to 1700, converted to a prison in 1775, located at the eastern side of the harbor entrance (two 8.3-inch ML howitzers, five 6.3-inch RML), and five outer batteries: Estrella Battery (two 8.3-inch ML howitzers, two 3.2-inch BLR, two bronze 5.7-inch ML); Santa Catalina Battery (obsolete); Cayo Smith Battery (obsolete); Western Battery (aka Zokapa Battery) (three 8.3-inch ML howitzers, two 6.3-inch Hontoria BLR, one 6-pdr QF, four 3-pdr QF, one 1-pdr QF); and Punta Gorda Battery (two 6-inch BL howitzers, two 3.5-inch Krupp BLR, two 6.3-inch Hontoria BLR). The detached batteries no longer exist, the sites are now hotels and restaurants. The Estrella and Santa Catalina works were originally old Spanish forts built in support of El Morro Castle. El Morro Castle, restored in the 1960's, was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1997.

Castillo del Morro info by Nigel Hunt

Rear Admiral Joseph N. Miler, Commander, Pacific Station, To Secretary Of The Navy John D. Long



Bu. Nav., 42.] U.S. Flagship Philadelphia,



Honolulu, H.I., September 9, 1898.



SIR: 1. In compliance with article 260, United States Navy Regulations, 1896, and the Bureau’s telegram of August 3, 1898, I have the honor to make the following report, embracing the period from July 1, 1897, to August 12, 1898, the date of suspension of hostilities in the war with Spain.



2. On August 14, 1897, I relieved Rear-Admiral L.A. Beardslee,1 U. S. N., in command of the Pacific Station, hoisting my flag on the Philadelphia.



DISTRIBUTION OF SQUADRON ON JULY 1, 1897.

Philadelphia, at Honolulu, H. I.
Monadnock, at Portland, Oreg.
Monterey, at Portland, Oreg.
Bennington, at navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal.
Marion, at Honolulu, H. I.
Alert, at Frederick Sound, Alaska.
Oregon, at Tacoma, Washington.

CHANGES OF VESSELS.

Philadelphia. —Left Honolulu, H. I., October 5, 1897, for navy-yard, Mare Island, to be placed out of commission.
Monadnock.—Detached from Squadron June 4, 1898. Left San Francisco for Manila on June 23, 1898.
Monterey.--Detached from squadron on May 24, 1898, upon arrival at Mare Island Navy-Yard. Left San Francisco for Manila on June 7.
Bennington.—No change. Still attached to squadron.
Marion.—Detached from squadron by Department’s order November 4, 1897.
Alert.—May 23, 1898, Left San Francisco for Mare Island Navy-Yard to be placed out of commission. Placed out of commission June 4, 1898.
Oregon.—Detached from squadron April 18, 1898, in accordance with Department’s order No. 100516, of April 7, 1898.2
Wheeling.—Reported for duty in squadron May 20, 1898.
Baltimore.—Placed in commission at Mare Island, Cal., October 12, 1897, and joined the squadron. Detached from squadron March 25, 1898.
Philadelphia.— Placed in commission July 9, 1898, at Mare Island, Cal., and joined the squadron.
Mohican.—Reported for duty in squadron May 20, 1898
Marietta.—Joined the squadron December 29, 1897. Detached from squadron April 18, 1898, in accordance with Department’s order No. 100516, April 7, 1898.2

CHARACTER OF WORK PERFORMED BY EACH VESSEL, WITH CHANGES OF COMMANDING OFFICERS.

Philadelphia.—Protecting American interests at Honolulu, H. I., from June 30, 1897, till October 5, 1897, when she left for San Francisco to go to Mare Island Navy-Yard to be put out of commission and transfer officers and crew to the Baltimore.

Capt. N. M. Dyer,3 United States Navy, relieved Capt. C. S. Cotton,4 United States Navy, September 1, 1897.

Alert.—Convoying U. S. S. Pinta from Sitka, Alaska, to San Francisco, from June 30, 1897, till July 17, 1897.

Special duty with peace commissioners of Costa Rica and Guatemala. Protecting American interests at San Juan del Sur, and engaged in surveying Brito Harbor; also protecting American interests in Guatemalan waters until detached and ordered to Mare Island to go out of commission.5

Commander B. S. Richards relieved Commander F. HanfordAugust 20, 1897. Commander B. S. Richards detached December 18, 1897, Lieut. L. Young left in command.6

Commander E. H. C. Leutze7 assumed command January 7, 1898.

Commander E. H. C. Leutze detached and ordered to command the Monterey on May 18, 1898.

Marietta—Commander F. M. Symonds,8 commanding.—Reported for duty in squadron December 29, 1897.

Protecting American interests in the vicinity of La Libertad, Salvador, from February 7, 1898, till March 15, 1898, when she was directed to proceed to Panama and coal.

Detached from squadron April 18, 1898, upon receipt of the Department’s order No. 100516, of April 7, 1898, when she proceeded by way of the Straits of Magellan to join the North Atlantic Squadron.

Wheeling—Commander U. Sebree,9 commanding.—Reported for duty in squadron May 20, 1898.

Took Coast Survey party from Seattle to St. Michaels, Alaska. Engaged in Patrolling Bering Sea and Alaskan waters, visiting canneries, etc.

Marion—Commander G. M. Book,10 commanding.—Engaged in protecting American interests at Honolulu, H.I., till August 26, 1897, on which date he left Honolulu for San Francisco, Cal. Detached from squadron in accordance with Department’s order of November 4, 1897.

Bennington.—Arrived at Honolulu from San Diego, Cal., August 23, 1897. Engaged in survey of Pearl Harbor and protecting American interests until June 16, 1898, on which date left for San Francisco. Investigating reported presence of Spanish privateer in Alaskan waters.11

Commander H. E. Nichols12 detached (sick) July 13, 1898, on which date Lieut. Commander J. F. Moser13 assumed command.

Oregon.--Cruising in Puget Sound until March 6, 1898, on which date left for San Francisco. Left San Francisco March 19, 1898, for Callao, Peru.

Detached from squadron upon receipt of Department’s order No. 100516, of April 7, 1898, when she proceeded by way of the Straits of Magellan to join the North Atlantic Squadron.

Capt. A. H. McCormick relieved Capt. A. S. Barker14 January 17, 1898.

Capt. C. E. Clark15 relieved Capt. A. H. McCormick March 17, 1898.

Baltimore—Capt. N. M. Dyer, commanding.—The Baltimore went into commission October 12, 1897, Captain Dyer taking command October 14, 1897.

Engaged in protecting American interests at Honolulu from November 7, 1897, until March 25, 1898, on which date left for Hongkong with orders to report to commander in chief Asiatic Station. Detached from squadron upon departure from Honolulu.

Monadnock--Capt. W. H. Whiting,16 commanding.--Cruising on coast of Oregon and Puget Sound.

Drilling naval militia of Eureka, Cal., at that place. Guarding approaches to Northern ports, being stationed at Port Townsend for that purpose. Was detached from squadron June 4, 1898, to join Admiral Dewey’s17 squadron in Asiatic waters. On June 23, 1898, left San Francisco, Cal., for Manila.

Monterey.--Cruising on coast of Oregon and in Puget Sound. Stationed in San Francisco Bay at the beginning of hostilities. On May 24, 1898, left San Francisco for Mare Island Navy-Yard, and upon arrival there was detached from squadron. Left San Francisco for Manila June 7, 1898, but was compelled to call at San Diego, Cal., to replenish coal supply. Left latter port June 11, 1898.18

Capt. C. E. Clark detached from command March 15, 1898, and ordered to command the Oregon.

Lieutenant-Commander Carlin19 reported for duty as executive officer, and assumed command March 22, 1898.

Commander E. H. C. Leutze assumed command May 18, 1898.

3. The dates of arrival at and departure from each port visited and the miles sailed or steamed by each vessel have been furnished the Department by each vessel in the routine cruising reports. The coal consumed and the cost thereof have been furnished the Department in the routine reports to the Bureau of Equipment. The information in these routine reports is omitted in this report in accordance with Bureau’s letter No. 75163, of July 29, 1895.

4. The general condition and efficiency of the vessels have been good. The discipline of the squadron has been good. Owing to the frequent changes in the squadron, complete data in regard to discharges, enlistments, etc., are not at hand.

5. The sanitary condition of the command has been very good.

6. The following vessels were inspected by me during the period mentioned in this report:

Bennington, December 20 and 21, 1897.
Adams, December 28 and 29, 1897.
Baltimore, February 16, 17, and 18, 1898.

Reports of above inspections were sent to the Department.

7. Target practice has been held in accordance with the Bureau’s circular of July 22, 1897, by the vessels of the squadron and has generally been excellent, and I must congratulate the Bureau on originating a system which has produced such excellent results in the late war with Spain. Routine reports have been made of the particulars of all target practice.20

8. There have been no tactical maneuvers with the vessels of the squadron during the period embraced in the report, as there has been no opportunity for bringing the vessels of the squadron together.

9. The Philadelphia is in excellent condition; the Bennington is in good condition considering the length of time she has been in commission, and she should be generally overhauled; the Wheeling is short one 4-inch gun, which is at Mare Island, and should be installed on her as soon as possible.

10. On my arrival at San Francisco, May 9, 1898,21 the Department placed me in charge of the auxiliary naval force on the Pacific coast. This force consisted of the Albatross, Revenue-cutters Perry, Corwin, Grant, and Rush, and tugs Active, Vigilant, and Iroquois. On my departure for Honolulu, July 27, the command of this force was turned over to Lieut. Commander C. K. Curtis,22 U. S. N. A number of the Naval Militia of California were enlisted to man the tugs Active, Vigilant, and Iroquois, and the auxiliary force was stationed along the coast in accordance with a plan reported to the Department.

The condition of affairs on the Pacific coast rendered it inadvisable to call on the Naval Militia of the other States for a larger force.

11. In obedience to instructions from the Department, I left San Francisco in the Philadelphia on July 27, 1898, for Honolulu, to take part in the ceremonies incident to the change of sovereignty of the Hawaiian Islands and the hoisting of our flag. I arrived here on August 3; the arrangements were discussed and finally arranged between the United States minister,23 the Hawaiian Government, and myself, and the ceremonies took place at noon on August 12, 1898, as reported in detail in my No. 54, of August 14, 1898.24

Very respectfully,
J. N. Miller,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Station.

Source Note Print: Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898, pp. 141-44. Addressed below close: “The Secretary of the Navy,/Navy Department, Washington, D. C.,/(Bureau of Navigation).

Footnote 1: RAdm. Lester A. Beardslee.
Footnote 2: On 6 April 1898, the Oregon and Marietta were ordered to proceed to Montevideo and both ships departed on 7 April. Their crossing into the Atlantic Ocean on 21 April though the Straits of Magellan put them in the South Atlantic Station and outside of Miller’s command. See: Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 48-50 and Clark to Long, 6 April 1898.
Footnote 3: Capt. Nehemiah M. Dyer.
Footnote 4: Capt. Charles S. Cotton.
Footnote 5: There was a revolution in Guatemala in 1898.
Footnote 6: Cmdr. Benjamin S Richards, Cmdr. Franklin Hanford, and Lt. Lucien Young.
Footnote 7: Cmdr. Eugene H.C. Leutze.
Footnote 8: Cmdr. Frederick M. Symonds.
Footnote 9: Cmdr. Uriel Sebree.
Footnote 10: Cmdr. George M. Book.
Footnote 11: This turned out to be a hoax created by Spanish agents in British Columbia. See: Long to Miller, 21 July 1898.
Footnote 12: Cmdr. Henry E. Nichols.
Footnote 13: Lt. Cmdr. Jefferson F. Moser. Moser was also the author of the United States plan for the defense of the Pacific coast. For a copy of his plan, see: Long to Miller, 27 April 1898.
Footnote 14: Capt. Alexander H. McCormick and Capt. Albert S. Barker.
Footnote 15: Capt. Charles E. Clark.
Footnote 16: Capt. William H. Whiting.
Footnote 17: RAdm. George Dewey, Commander, Asiatic Squadron.
Footnote 18: For cruising reports of the Monterey and Monadnock, see: Leutze to Long, 10 June 1898; and Whiting to Long, 12 July 1898.
Footnote 19: Lt. Cmdr. James W. Carlin.
Footnote 20: While United States Navy marksmanship surpassed their Spanish opponents, their skill let much to be desired. Then Lt., and future Admiral, William Sims spent a considerable effort to bring this concern to the attention of Naval leadership. Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy: A History (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 172.
Footnote 21: RAdm. Miller was ordered to return to San Francisco on 19 April by Secretary Long to manage the defense of the Pacific coast of the United States. For a copy of the order, see, Long to Miller, 19 April 1898, Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 26.
Footnote 22: Lt. Comdr. Clinton K. Curtis.
Footnote 23: United States Minister Plenipotentiary to Hawaii Harold M. Sewall.
Footnote 24: For a copy of Miller’s report of the annexation ceremonies on August 12, see, Miller to Long, 14 August 1898, Report of the Bureau of Navigation, 1898, 145-147.

Documentary Histories » Spanish-American War » Naval Operations Manzanillo

Introductory Essay

A history of the Spanish-American War written in 1900 called the naval operations at Manzanillo the “third” most important of the war. The author contended that it had been largely ignored because it “followed so closely upon the heels of more important events.” But the fact that on 18 July 1898 “seven light-draught American gunboats” were able to enter Manzanillo harbor and destroy ten Spanish vessels in less than four hours without significant damage was, according to this author, a notable accomplishment that should be celebrated.1

Manzanillo, a port on the Southern coast of Cuba, was a haven for blockade runners and home to small Spanish gunboats (under 250 tons) before the battle. Strong defenses and a natural harbor, the result of islands protecting the bay, made Manzanillo difficult to enter, for American vessels to attack shipping in the port. One attempt by Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck, was repulsed on 30 June.2 A day, later, a foray by Scorpion and Osceola was similarly turned away.3 On both occasions the American vessels sustained hits, damage, and casualties. Hornet was so badly mauled that it was temporarily disabled.

A third attack on the morning of 18 July, finally succeeded where the previous two failed. The seven vessel attack force, including two gunboats of shallow draft—Wilmington and Helena; two armed tugs—Osceola and Wompatuck; and three converted yachts—Scorpion, Hist, and Hornet allowed the American commander, Capt. Chapman C. Todd, to divide his forces and attack the port from three directions. Todd gave orders to destroy enemy shipping but to avoid, if possible, an engagement with the shore batteries. His flotilla concentrated their fire on Spanish ships, though Scorpion and Osceola did fire at the batteries to silence coastal artillery directed at the American ships. Wilmington and Helena attacked the two Spanish merchant steamers and the blockade runner—PurisimaConcepción--in the harbor. Hist, Hornet, and Wompatuck concentrated their fire on the Spanish gunboats, which sallied to oppose the American flotilla but were repulsed. The Americans pursued those gunboats, four in number, to their moorings and there, when joined by the armored Helena, raked them with fire and systematically destroyed them. Wilmington, after attacking the merchant shipping, concentrated its fire upon several pontoons, armed immobile hulks that had been transformed into floating batteries and sank one, the Maria. Having successfully destroyed five gunboats, three merchant vessels, and one pontoon without suffering any losses, the Americans broke off the engagement leaving the city still under Spanish control.4

The last American attack on Manzanillo took place just as the war was ending. Lt. Lucien Young of Hist, then blockading the port, sent a report that the Spanish commander at Manzanillo, Col. Sanchez Pieron, was prepared to surrender the city unconditionally if “the American fleet will make a demonstration before the city in such force as to save him from being court-martialed for surrendering.”5 Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich, at the time leading an expedition intended for the Isle of Pines, met Young, and learned of the situation at Manzanillo. Goodrich decided to divert his forces to Manzanillo and force the ports surrender.

After making a token bombardment, Goodrich sent in the gunboat Alvarado under a flag of truce with a demand for surrender. On approaching the town, Alvarado was fired upon.6 Goodrich’s flotilla responded by bombarding the town and Goodrich’s flagship, the battleship Newark, continued firing through the night. At daylight, Goodrich saw a multiple white flags over the town’s blockhouses and batteries and when he sent a boat in he was informed that the peace protocols had been signed and an armistice was in effect.7

A disappointed Goodrich, who had hoped the Navy might garner “one more laurel and gained one more important victory before the conclusion of peace,” called off the attack and arranged for the safety of the city.8 When the war ended, and despite enduring repeated American attacks, Manzanillo remained in Spanish hands, making it a scene of both an American victory and a Spanish triumph.

Footnote 1: Everett, ed., Exciting Experiences in our Wars with Spain and the Filipinos, p. 140.
Footnote 2: See: Lt. James M. Helm to Sampson, 30 June 1898; and Lt. Carl W. Jungen to Sampson, 1 July 1898.
Footnote 3: See: Cmdr. Adolph Marix to Todd, 1 July 1898.
Footnote 4: See: Todd to Sampson 18 July 1898; Todd to Sampson, 21 July 1898; Cmdr. William T. Swinburne to Sampson, 30 October 1898; Marix to Sampson, 19 July 1898; Helm to Sampson, 18 July 1898.
Footnote 5: New York Herald and San Francisco Call, 6 August 1898; Capt. Caspar F. Goodrich to Sampson, 13 August 1898.
Footnote 6: For the surrender demand see: Goodrich to Col. Sanchez Pieron, 12 August 1898; and Goodrich to the Commander of Cuban Forces in Vicinity of Manzanillo, 13 August 1898.
Footnote 7: See: Cmdr. Joseph G. Eaton to Goodrich, 13 August 1898; Goodrich to Sampson, 13 August 1898; Lt. John L. Purcell to Sampson, 31 August 1898.
Footnote 8: See: Goodrich to Sampson, 13 August 1898; and Goodrich to the Officer Commanding Cuban Forces in Vicinity of Manzanillo, 13 August 1898.

Why There Was No Privateering in the Spanish-American War Posted on July 28, 2018 by Admin

Contents:
Introduction
The Declaration of Paris and the “Barbarous Warfare” of Privateering
The Righteous Victim: Spain’s Contradictory Diplomacy over Privateering
Professionals and Privateers: American Naval Strategy in the War with Spain
Honor for want of a Ship: Spanish Naval Strategy in 1898
Conclusion
Bibliography

Scott D. Wagner
Undergraduate Student
College of Wooster
Introduction
The front page of the New York Times for April 25, 1898, ran the headline that dominated newspapers around the world that day: The United States had declared war on Spain. The second largest headline on that page? “Spain to Use Privateers.” 1

Privateering, the practice of private individuals with government authorization seizing enemy commercial property at sea, was nominally abolished with the Declaration of Paris in 1856. 2 However, neither the United States nor Spain signed on to the Declaration. As tensions rose between the two states in early 1898, European observers grew concerned that one or both of the sides would outfit privateers in the fast-approaching war, wreaking havoc on international commercial networks and violating the rights of neutral merchant vessels. 3 Coastal communities in the United States, too, were concerned over the threat that Spanish privateers could pose to their commercial activities and their safety. 4

Neither side officially announced their intentions on privateering until war broke out in April. The same day that President McKinley announced the blockade of Cuba, Secretary of State John Sherman sent a note to foreign powers pronouncing the United States’ decision not to use privateers. 5 President McKinley announced the decision to the public three days later, on April 25. 6 In the royal decree proclaiming a state of war issued on April 23, Queen Regent of Spain Maria Cristina stated that Spain would reserve the right to commission privateers but would not issue letters of marque until circumstances deemed it necessary. 7 Circumstances apparently never deemed it necessary; Spain never sent out privateers during the war to attack American commerce or protect their own merchant vessels.

This essay seeks to examine factors that contributed to privateering’s absence in the Spanish-American War. The reasons were not technological; the Americans used private ships and private crews during the conflict, demonstrating that citizens with little to no sailing experience could adequately man modern ships of steam and steel. To fully investigate the lack of privateering, a broader approach is needed, one that takes into account the strategic and diplomatic concerns of each belligerent. Through such an extensive approach it becomes clear that the practice of privateering never fit in with the military and diplomatic strategies at play in the Spanish-American War.

The Technological Argument: Privateering and Modern Warships?
In a letter written to Spanish Minister of Marine Segismundo Bermejo in March 1898, Admiral Pascual Cervera described at length his ideas for Spanish naval strategy in the upcoming war with the United States. He was not optimistic about Spain’s chances at all, believing the main fleet under his command should stay in European waters rather than sailing to the West Indies. He was even less optimistic about the prospect of privateering:
In short, Cervera believed that private citizens could not crew modern vessels. To his credit the last time privateers had sailed during a major war was in the American Civil War, when many of the ships still had wooden hulls. Crews now had to deal with the complexities of steam engines and recoaling ships, something not seen on privateer cruises in the age of sail. 9 However events from the Spanish-American War show that Cervera’s argument that privateering was not technologically feasible does not hold water. During the war the US Navy frequently used private citizens to crew private vessels, a practice that appeared so similar to privateering that Spanish observer and artillery captain Severo Gómez Núñez stated that “There can be no doubt as to this system being privateering, and it was practiced as often as there was a chance.” 10

The Yale, Captain W.C. Wise, was one of the auxiliary ships loaned to the US Navy by the International Navigation Company for the duration of the war with Spain. (Naval History and Heritage Command photo NH 85345)

Shortly before and during the war, the American Navy Department purchased or received on loan a number of private ships from the merchant marine and independent contractors to create an auxiliary navy. Of the auxiliary navy four ships are of particular note: the St. Louis, St. Paul, Harvard, and Yale, known collectively as the American Line ships. These vessels were transatlantic steamers of the International Navigation Company that in peacetime sailed the route from New York to Southampton. The Harvard was originally the New York, and the Yale originally the Paris; their names were changed for the duration of their time in the US Navy. Each ship could do twenty-one knots, making them faster than many of the auxiliary cruisers and nearly every capital ship in the American navy. The Harvard (Captain Cotton) and the Yale (Captain Wise) had a 13,000-ton displacement, while the St. Louis (Captain Goodrich) and the St. Paul (Captain Sigsbee, former captain of the Maine) displaced 14,910 tons. The ships were captained by US Navy officers, but were not crewed by navy seamen; rather, they were manned by their regular, private crews. In a lecture given after the conflict at the Naval War College, Captain Goodrich explained the reasoning behind the decision. The ships of the US Navy were already undermanned by the start of the war, “obliging [the navy]… to call largely for volunteers to supply the deficiencies.” Rather than using the untrained civilians of the Naval Militia to man the ships, why not use the regular crew that had the best knowledge of the intricacies of each vessel and its machinery? 11 The American Line ships were privately-owned, privately-manned ships (excepting their captains) that were ideally suited to pursuing and capturing enemy merchant vessels.

Owing to their high speed and mobility the American Line ships were used in a variety of capacities during the war. When the conflict began the Harvard, Yale, and St. Louis were dispatched to the Caribbean; the St. Paul had not yet completed its armament, and remained at Hampton Roads for the time with Rear-Admiral Winfield Schley’s squadron. After the Americans blockaded Cuba, the American Line ships were tasked with locating Cervera’s fleet. The Harvard monitored the area around Martinique, the St. Louis, Guadeloupe, and the Yale, Puerto Rico in an attempt to spot Cervera as he entered the Caribbean. 12 The Harvard found the Spanish first; on May 11 Captain Cotton telegraphed to Washington the presence of five Spanish ships just off the coast of Martinique. 13 Cervera sailed to Curaçao for coal then proceeded to Santiago de Cuba. Once there, he was blockaded by a fleet of American ships including the St. Paul, the Harvard, and the Yale. Meanwhile the St. Louis busied itself with another task: cable-cutting. The auxiliary ship under Goodrich succeeded in cutting off Spanish communications to Guantanamo and Haiti, and drove off the Spanish gunboat Sandoval while doing so. 14

With Cervera trapped in Santiago, the Americans could safely deploy the Army for a landing in Cuba. The American Line ships helped in this process too, serving as troop transports for Major General William Shafter’s army. Captain Goodrich was glowing in his praise for the St. Louis during the deployment:

For four days and nights she acted as mother-ship, feeding and berthing nearly 200 extra men and officers; coaling, watering, and repairing steam cutters; furnishing voluntary relief crews of machinists and firemen for the latter for night work…and all this without even taxing her facilities. 15

Though they did not play a major role in the Naval Battle of Santiago, the American Line ships did help rescue prisoners from the destroyed Spanish vessels, particularly the Infanta Maria Teresa and the Oquendo. The Navy Department then used the American Line ships to transport the Spanish prisoners northward and back to the states. During their time in the Caribbean the auxiliary cruisers captured multiple Spanish vessels, for which the officers and private crews of the ships received compensation in the form of prize money – the Navy Department did not eradicate prize money until shortly after the war. After the ceasefire and the ensuing peace treaty, the four ships were returned to the International Navigation Company.

In his postwar lecture Goodrich summed up the exemplary service of his ship, St. Louis:
Bear in mind that the American Line ships that took part in all the operations Goodrich describes were private vessels with private crews, albeit under naval command. The crews of these ships even took prize money during the war, making their service eerily similar to the practice of privateering. While there are clear differences between the functioning of the American Line ships and the actions of privateers, it is clear that the privately-owned, privately-operated auxiliary steamers provided exemplary service in a variety of capacities during the Spanish-American War.

The American Line ships proved an effective fighting force, even with private crews. The vessels had enough force and firepower to capture enemy merchant ships and lightly-armed craft, and had enough speed to avoid confrontation with a larger ship or fleet. Private ships could still be used in war in the late 1890s; but could private citizens – the likes of which would make up the bulk of privateer crews – effectively man modern vessels? The crew of the American Line ships were exemplary, but they were also trained seamen familiar with the machinery on board the vessel, something unlikely to be found on an average privateer. To analyze the effectiveness of private citizens manning armed vessels in wartime, we can turn to the Naval Militia.

Many private citizens served in various Naval Militias during the war with Spain, often serving with auxiliary cruisers and coastal monitors. (Photo by James H. Hare; Naval History and Heritage Command photo NH 96734)

The Naval Militia was used by the Navy Department to augment undermanned crews of auxiliary ships. Made up of generally well-educated professionals from seaside states, the Naval Militia served with auxiliary cruisers and in other units established by the US Navy for coastal defense. In some cases, such as on board the Yankee and the Yosemite, the entire crew (excepting the captain and navigation officers) was comprised of men of the Naval Militia. Almost every report regarding the Naval Militia refers to the ardent motivation of the volunteers during the war. Commander Willard Brownson appreciated the “zeal and intelligence” possessed by the men under his command. 17 Commander Charles Train, captain of the Prairie, admired his men’s “patriotism, zeal and intelligence.” 18 Chief of the Bureau of Navigation Arendt Crowninshield, in a letter to Secretary Long, noted that the Naval Militia as a whole were “zealous and attentive” in their duties. 19

While no one could argue against the enthusiasm displayed by the Naval Militia, some captains were skeptical of their effectiveness. A report in the Army and Navy Journal cited officers that believed a crew of Naval Militia “would do more thinking than fighting.” 20 Crowninshield believed that they “lacked all of the training and sea experience which would have made them really efficient.” 21 Lieutenant Lazarus Reamey was especially critical of the Maine Naval Militia, stating that “not a single one of the number has the slightest appreciation of the qualifications necessary for service on board a government vessel.” 22 Commander William Emory had the most reason to discredit the Naval Militia; in his ship Yosemite he threw 28 men in the brig for supposed drunkenness, though some militiamen claimed Emory was an incompetent officer. 23 The men of the Naval Militia were not professional seamen, and some opponents of the organization were critical of its perceived improper attitude and performance during the war.

There were also a number of officers who were supportive of the Naval Militia. Commander Train believed the “industry and subordination” of the militia under his command were “beyond praise,” and described how,

The hard labor of coaling, the constant drills, and in short the complete change in their conditions of life from those to which they had been accustomed have been borne by them most willingly and cheerfully, and that, too, in spite of the fact that the ship, for the greater part of her cruise, was performing duty of a sort and in places that furnished no chance of an occasional attack of an enemy to break the monotony and furnish the excitement which alone can make such a life endurable. 24

Secretary Long’s report for the year 1898 admitted that while the Naval Militia lacked experience, they “rapidly acquired while on shipboard the knowledge necessary for their efficiency.” Long was supportive enough of the Naval Militia to claim “that the country has been amply repaid” for the cost of training the volunteers. 25 The report of the assistant secretary supported Long’s praise, stating that the Naval Militia “served with great intelligence and enthusiasm” and that they “made good men-of-warsmen.” 26

The performance of the Naval Militia was mixed. They were enthusiastic and happy to serve, but at times apparently lacked the necessary maritime knowledge to provide the most efficient service. Some of the complaints against the Naval Militia were not against their effectiveness but their professionalism. Commander Willard Brownson, captain of the Yankee, stated that “in caring for their messes, their bags and hammocks, scrubbing their clothes, and in many of the minor details of a man of war, [the Naval Militia] were almost entirely ignorant.” However, Brownson also states that “in performing the ship’s duties they were willing, and after some weeks, became fairly efficient.” 27

So how can we evaluate the performance of the Naval Militia, and could the members of the various Militias have provided adequate service on board privateers? On balance, there is reason to believe they could have. There are numerous reports demonstrating that over the course of the war the Naval Militia became competent, if not spectacular sailors. With the exception of the incident on board the Yosemite, there were few outstanding instances of poor service by the Naval Militia while at sea. The lack of professionalism so often levied as a criticism against the Naval Militia would have been a moot point on board a privateer. The men of the Naval Militia may not have been the best sailors at sea but their performance suggests that they would have offered comparable service to the crews of privateers from the late eighteenth century.

The examples of the vessels chartered by the United States Navy as auxiliaries demonstrate that privateering was not technologically outdated by the Spanish-American War. The United States effectively used private vessels during the conflict, recruiting the American line ships as scouts, transports, and cable-cutters. Private citizens also served with competency during the war. The crews of the American Line ships manned the steamers all through the war and received high praise from the naval captains for their service. The Naval Militia received mixed reviews from the officer corps after the war, but their performance suggests that private citizens with little-to-no sailing experience were able to provide adequate service on modern steam-powered vessels. While it would have been more difficult for privateers to outfit and sail during the Spanish-American War than it had been during the age of sail, evidence suggests that it was still technologically feasible. To understand why neither belligerent commissioned privateers, we must rather look to the diplomatic and strategic circumstances surrounding the practice of privateering and the Spanish-American War.

The Declaration of Paris and the “Barbarous Warfare” of Privateering

The Spanish-American War was a bilateral conflict, but one in which both belligerents were in constant talks with potential allies. Both Spain and the United States needed to court favor from the European Powers: Spain in an effort to forge an alliance, and the United States in the hopes of ensuring Europe’s continued neutrality. It was in part because of these diplomatic goals that neither side commissioned privateers. European statesmen and merchants had long seen privateering as a barbaric and outdated form of warfare and would doubtless look unfavorably on whichever power resorted to the practice. A brief investigation of the events surrounding the Declaration of Paris will demonstrate Europe’s animosity towards the practice of privateering and will explain why neither belligerent commissioned privateers during the Spanish-American War.

The Declaration of Paris grew out of discussions on maritime regulations following the Crimean War. During the war, Britain broke with tradition and agreed to abide by the “free ships free goods” principle, which precluded the seizure of neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo. 28 The United States staunchly supported the principle and after the war opened negotiations to make the practice a staple of international maritime law. It was not the first time the United States fought for neutral shipping rights; in a letter to British Foreign Secretary George Canning written in 1823, then-Secretary of State John Quincy Adams argued that “this search for, and seizure of, the property of an enemy in the vessel of a friend is a relict [sic] of the barbarous warfare of barbarous ages,” and proposed a complete abolition of private war at sea. 29 Britain did not want to give up their right to seizure without receiving something worthwhile in return; they proposed to relinquish their traditional practices and accept “free ships make free goods” permanently if the United States agreed to abolish the practice of privateering. 30

Britain had a number of reasons for seeking the abolition of privateering. Privateers were a real threat to British naval strategy. A large number of small, fast commerce-raiding privateers could attack shipping lanes where the Royal Navy was absent and vanish before the Navy could respond. Britain had a large merchant marine and vast commercial networks; eliminating the threat of privateer attacks on British trade would allow the Royal Navy to focus its efforts on hunting down the enemy navy and blockading an opponent’s home ports. Queen’s Advocate J.D. Harding advised Queen Victoria that the abolition of privateering would be “a great advantage to the civilized world in general, and of peculiar value to Great Britain, especially in case of a war with the United States,” which had effectively used privateers against the British in two prior wars. 31 The eradication of a privateering threat would make a possible war with the United States much easier and would in general play to the advantage of British naval planners.

The mercantile community strongly favored privateering’s abolition. Privateering was unquestionably bad for business; lucrative merchant ships were the main targets of privateer attacks. Even if the cargoes made it to their destination safely, war always brought with it a spike in insurance rates which cut heavily into profits. On March 13, 1854, the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce issued a resolution calling for Britain to renounce privateering. 32 MP Thomas Horsfall brought the resolution to the attention of the House of Commons four days later. 33 The abolition of privateering would remove a dangerous threat to the merchant community, allowing for more freedom of trade on the oceans and, in turn, more profit.

Eradicating the practice of privateering had a moral quality to it as well. In a letter to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Earl Clarendon, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir James Robert Graham spoke of the “advance of civilization” that would come from the elimination of the practice. In the same letter, he compared privateering to the slave trade, a practice that was outlawed by Britain in 1808. “The using of letters of marque,” Graham argued, “tends to foster a mercenary, violent, and lawless spirit, uncurbed by any social or moral control, which soon degenerates into that of a pirate.” 34 Graham’s arguments apparently swayed Clarendon; in the House of Lords, Clarendon compared privateers to “pirates, the common enemies of mankind,” and later called the practice “the fruitful source of iniquity and misery in its worst form.” 35 Privateering negatively impacted British strategy, business, and morality, leading many from Britain to lead the charge for its abolition. 36

The Declaration of Paris was announced on April 16, 1856 with the first article reading “Privateering is, and remains, abolished.” In their minds, Europe had achieved a major step forward economically, strategically, and morally with the abolition of privateering. Forty-five states agreed to the Declaration, but two notable exceptions were the United States and Spain. Both countries agreed on the other three articles of the Declaration regarding the rights of neutrals at sea and the legitimacy of blockades, but neither side would relinquish the right to privateering. The United States argued that since their navy was far weaker than the largest navies of Europe, their only hope to contend with European powers in a maritime struggle was through the reliance on privateers. 37 Spain’s position was directly related to that of the United States. Should a conflict arise between the United States and Spain where the Americans sent privateers against Spanish colonial possessions in the Caribbean, Spanish authorities wanted to withhold the ability to defend their possessions in the same manner.

The performance of Confederate privateers in the American Civil War demonstrates the suffocating diplomatic effect the Declaration had on the practice. Just five days after the Battle of Fort Sumter, Confederate President Jefferson Davis began accepting applications for letters of marque. Fear spread through the Union mercantile community, with some frightened reports claiming that Confederate privateers were preparing to sail from Spain and England. 38 Union representatives sought to have the privateers condemned as pirates in Europe; Secretary of State Seward even suggested that the United States may sign on to the Declaration. 39 to Russell [British Foreign Secretary], 27 April, 1861, in Tracy, Sea Power and Trade, 43. Lyons believed the suggestion was in bad faith, writing “The time at which the offer would be made renders the thing rather amusing.”] Such an action was never carried out, and in the event the Union did not need to in order to neutralize Confederate privateers. The European powers maintained a strict neutrality in the Civil War and banned the sale of any prizes in their ports. Privateers relied heavily on the sale of prizes to produce profits; with nowhere to sell the spoils of war internationally, Confederate privateers struggled to operate anywhere outside of the American South. As William Robinson Jr. notes, the decision’s “effect upon the United States was vastly less injurious than upon the Confederate States.” 40 Owing to the diplomatic restrictions Confederate privateers operated almost exclusively in their home waters and by 1862 had largely disappeared from the war. 41 Though the Declaration of Paris failed to outlaw privateering worldwide, it had succeeded in neutralizing the impact of privateering and keeping the vessels out of European waters.

Since the Declaration of Paris in 1856 privateering had all but been eradicated in Europe, much to the approval of the Great Powers. European navies did not rely on privateering for naval defense; some, like Britain, were certainly better off strategically without the possible threat of privateers. Merchants rested a little easier knowing that their goods would not be seized in transit by roguish individuals on the high seas, while some merchants campaigned to take maritime law a step further and eradicate all seizure of private property. Politicians and pressmen alike trumpeted the advance of civilization with the eradication of a barbaric and cruel practice that was seen as an outmoded relic of warfare. Privateering was immoral, impracticable, and illegal to Europe, and since both the Spanish and the United States needed to curry favor from the European states during the 1890s, it made sense for both to avoid the practice altogether.

For the Americans, commissioning privateers may have escalated a conflict that was in many ways unwanted to begin with. During the election of 1896 William McKinley ran on a strong economic platform, representing the gold interests and a rebuild of the economy after the Panic of 1893. He had little-to-no foreign policy experience, and in none of his campaign speeches did he address the growing Cuban issue that would eventually lead to war with Spain. As late as April 1898 McKinley and his diplomatic staff were working with the Spanish to secure an armistice in the Cuban conflict, but McKinley eventually bowed to the domestic pressures of his Congress and turned the initiative to declare war over to them. 42 Once war was declared, the Americans wanted to ensure that the conflict would remain a bilateral affair. The United States was widely recognized as having the superior navy; given that, and Europe’s distaste for privateering, issuing letters of marque would have been seen as vindictive, antagonistic, and unnecessary. The diplomatic actions of the United States after the war demonstrate their desire to do away with privateering; at the Hague Conference of 1899 they introduced a motion to make private property at sea immune from attacks. 43 By announcing at the onset of the conflict that no privateers would be outfitted for the war, the United States eased the worries of Europe’s mercantile community, and in avoiding a disagreement with the Europeans over the controversial practice, ensured their continued neutrality. Spain too needed to garner favor from the European powers, but their diplomatic tactics were rather more complex.

The Righteous Victim: Spain’s Contradictory Diplomacy over Privateering

In a letter written shortly after the Maine incident, Admiral Cervera wrote to Minister of the Marine Segismundo Bermejo, “A campaign against [the United States] will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned.” 44 The balance of military power in the war tilted decisively towards the Americans, and Cervera was correct in stating that Spain’s only realistic hope of victory was to establish an alliance with one of the other European states. In an attempt to gain support from one or more of the Great Powers, Spain positioned itself as the just and righteous defender of honor, a law-abiding victim of the bellicose and imperialistic Americans. In doing so, the Spanish hoped to turn diplomatic opinion against the Americans, and increase the sympathies for their own side. Authorizing privateers, an act made illegal by customary law in the Declaration of Paris, would have comprehensively undermined Spain’s diplomatic strategy and would have likely turned the sympathies of Europe against the Spanish.

With the explosion of the Maine in Havana Harbor pushing the two sides closer to war, Spain sought to emphasize their innocence to other European powers. Whereas the Spanish believed the incident to be “purely accidental,” American yellow journalists were quick to accuse the Spanish of treachery, allegations that Spain categorically refused. 45 In a letter to Spanish ambassadors, Minister of State Pío Gullón e Iglesias requested that the ambassadors “invite attention” to the unfounded press reports which were “arousing a spirit of menace in the relation of that Republic with Spain.” 46 Both states formed commissions to investigate the cause of the explosion; the Spanish complained that their inquiry was impeded by “the refusal to establish the necessary cooperation” between the two commissions. 47 The two sides naturally came to different conclusions; the Spanish believed the explosion was internal, while the Americans found that the source of the blast came from outside the hull of the ship. The Spanish saw the discrepancy as an example of American treachery in the face of Spanish morality, a view they were quick to push upon other European powers.

In late March, Gullón attempted to garner outright European support for Spain against the Americans. In his letter he used what would become the standard Spanish diplomatic ploy during the war: positioning Spain in the moral right against US aggression, while threatening that war may have adverse effects on the Great Powers.

So convinced is Spain of her right…and of the prudence with which she is acting that…she will not hesitate to at once ask the counsel of the great powers and, in the last resort, their mediation to adjust the pending differences, which differences, in the near future, may disturb a peace that the Spanish nation desires to preserve as far as its honor and the integrity of its territory will permit, not only on its own account, but because war, once begun, affects all other powers of Europe and America. 48

Gullón’s pleas had little effect; the Great Powers expressed their sympathies but chose to remain neutral. The only action they undertook was to send a weakly-worded demarche to the United States government “appeal[ing] to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President”; this letter was criticized by the Spanish for being too considerate to the Americans. 49

In mid-April, as war became inevitable, the language used by Spanish diplomats became more extreme. In a letter to his ambassadors on April 14, Gullón spoke of the “irritating and groundless charges against Spain” levied by the US House of Representatives, and asserted that Spain “has gone to the extreme in its moderation and painful sacrifice to maintain and facilitate peace.” 50 Four days later Gullón sent another memo to his ambassadors including “a statement of the facts up to this time” regarding Spanish-American relations over the Cuban insurrection. The document detailed the methods used by the United States “for encouraging the fratricidal struggle” in Cuba and explained how the Americans “skillfully exploited” the Maine explosion “to provoke a conflict between Spain and the United States.” It continued on to describe the “fresh and painful sacrifice” of concessions made to the United States by Spain, concessions that the power-hungry Americans would not accept. The letter concludes, “His Majesty’s Government only desire to make known to the civilized world that reason and right are on their side and provocation and injustice on that of the United States.” 51

Once the war began, Spain took note of every supposed American transgression, bringing them to the attention of the European powers in the hopes of garnering sympathy for their cause. One of the major points of contention was the declaration of the Cuban blockade. Officially, the Congress of the United States declared war on Spain on April 25, 1898. However, on April 22 McKinley had declared the blockade of Cuba, and vessels of the United States Navy had begun to take Spanish ships and apply for prize money from those captures. McKinley, then, had technically authorized warlike acts before war had been declared; to remedy this, Congress backdated the declaration, stating on April 25 that the state of war had existed since April 21. In a letter detailing Spanish grievances to foreign powers, Gullón called this a “strange and unlawful particularity.” The consequences of the war’s declaration were more than semantic. Given that Spain deemed the retroactive war declaration unlawful, every seizure of a ship between April 21 and April 25 was also illegal. In the aforementioned letter Gullón specified nine Spanish vessels that had been taken in that time span and also included “any others which may have taken place prior to April 25.” 52

Spain also claimed that the ineffectiveness of the Cuban blockade made it illegal. According to the Declaration of Paris, “blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective – that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.” 53 The US blockade officially commenced on April 22, but Gullón provides a list of seven vessels that sailed past the blockade between April 22 and May 7. If the blockade was ineffective to begin with, it was all but nonexistent when Rear Admiral William Sampson, commander of the squadron blockading Cuba, took his fleet to Puerto Rico to scout for Admiral Cervera’s Spanish force. 54 Any interruption in the blockade required a new notification once the blockade was reestablished; Spain received no word as such from the United States. 55

In constantly reporting perceived American violations, Spain sought to turn support against the United States and gain enough sympathy that one of the European powers would support her in the war. The strategy succeeded, in part; Austria expressed intentions of helping to end the war but never received wide European support. France was instrumental in communicating Spain’s desire for a ceasefire with the Americans to bring about a quick end to the war. While Europe may have been sympathetic, Spain’s diplomatic strategy was not effective in bringing a strong ally into the war.

Throughout the Spanish-American conflict Spain positioned itself as the just victim of American aggression; why, then, did Spain explicitly reserve the right to commission privateers, rather than renounce the practice entirely as the United States had done? Perhaps Spain, fearing the worst in the coming war, wanted to be able to resort to privateering should the Americans launch an attack on the Iberian Peninsula; however, as the war ended before the Eastern Squadron set sail, this is impossible to prove definitively. What is clear is that throughout the course of the war, Spain used the threat of privateering in an attempt to leverage both the Great Powers of Europe and the United States.

On April 24 Gullón sent a missive to his ambassadors detailing the Spanish declaration of war. The section regarding privateering is of particular note:

Regarding privateering, your excellency should state, confidentially, that although the Government of His Majesty reserves absolutely its right it does not intend to exercise it for the present, unless the neutral powers do not observe the strict neutrality prescribed by the law of nations. The Government of His Majesty trusts that this generous concession on its part will be duly reciprocated by friendly powers, and that they will see in it a new proof of the correct procedure of Spain, who desires to demonstrate that in all its acts it is influenced by justice and right. 56

Once again Gullón emphasizes Spain’s position of “justice and right” in their decision to refrain from privateering. However, they would resort to the practice if the Great Powers did not remain neutral in the war. If Spain could not forge a European alliance, it could at least ensure that its opponent remained isolated too. The language of the letter contains more of the same Spanish diplomatic posturing, while the spirit of it implies a simple threat: remain neutral, or privateers will devastate European commerce.

Spain’s threat was not directed at all of Europe, but at one power in particular, the state that was the most likely to form an alliance with America: Britain. During the 1890s Britain found that its interests lined up with those of the Americans. An increased American presence in the Far East would help to balance the rising power of Germany in the region, and open the door for further British expansion there. 57 When American ambassador to Spain Stewart Woodford broke off official relations with the Spanish, he left the British embassy in charge of American interests in country. 58 The press were quick to seize upon rumors of an Anglo-American alliance against the Spanish in the coming war. On May 13, those rumors appeared accurate when British Minister for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain proposed that the war between Spain and the United States could help bring about an Anglo-Saxon alliance. 59 The British never broke from their commitment to neutrality, but it was clear that their sympathies lay with the Americans.

Britain too had the most reason to fear a return of privateering. Britain still had one of the largest merchant marines in the world, and had close trading ties with the United States. Of particular interest to the British were American ships carrying wheat and cotton to the British Isles; attacks on these ships by Spanish privateers would disrupt the British food supply and textile industry. 60 Spanish privateers could pose major disruptions to British trade and may well have forced Britain into the war, thus hurting Britain’s diplomatic standing with the rest of Europe. Preserving the right to commission privateers allowed Spain to use the practice as leverage against Britain and the other European powers without ever having to resort to privateering or to stray from the already-established diplomatic strategy of appearing as the just and righteous power in the war against the Americans.

Maintaining the right to use privateers allowed Spain to leverage the United States with threats of the practice as well. Up and down the American coastline there was widespread fear of Spanish naval raids, giving Spanish agents a grand opportunity to create unrest among their opponent’s populace. One notable example of Spanish agents using the threat of privateering comes from British Columbia. The province had a number of small inlets and harbors, making it almost impossible for the authorities to track down potential privateers. The lucrative Yukon gold trade also ran just off the coast of British Columbia and down into the Pacific American coast and was an enticing prize for any privateer. Spanish agents in the region spread rumors tothe local press about the presence of a Spanish privateer, and sent encoded telegrams that were intercepted by the Americans referring to Spain’s intention to purchase ships in the region. No privateer ever sailed from British Columbia during the war, and the affair had no major effect on the war’s outcome; however, the “phantom privateer” in the Yukon demonstrates that by refusing to renounce privateering, Spain enabled its agents use the practice to spread concern along the American coast. 61

Spain could not commission privateers during the war with America in 1898 because doing so would utterly undermine the diplomatic strategy Spain was pursuing. Before and during the war, Spain sent a steady stream of memoranda and letters to the Great Powers of Europe detailing the “real” nature of the conflict as a war of imperial aggression on the part of the United States against Spain, the peaceful monarchy that had done all it could to avoid an unjust war. Commissioning privateers would have been contradictory to the role Spain had created for itself; however, privateering was still an effective tool as a threat. Spain did not renounce privateering altogether because it intended to use the threat of privateering to leverage both the European powers and the United States. Though Spain’s threats of privateering did achieve some minor successes, they had little effect on the overall war effort.

Professionals and Privateers: American Naval Strategy in the War with Spain
For the United States Navy, the question of privateering was never in doubt: the Navy did not want privateers, nor did it need them. Leading up to and during the war, the Navy worked to remodel itself as a first-class, professional navy, a notion entirely contradictory to privateering. Largely because of these improvements the US Navy was far superior to the Spanish Navy by the start of the war and did not need to resort to commerce raiding to cripple its opponent. The strategy for the war, which was planned out well in advance of the actual conflict, was predicated on gaining control of the waters around Spain’s colonies and not destroying Spain’s trade networks. Even for coastal defense the US Navy used other auxiliary vessels, negating the need to use privateers to protect major American ports. The attitudes and actions of the Navy Department regarding the war with Spain effectively eliminated privateering from the conversation in American naval strategy.

Long before the first signs of war with Spain arrived, the US Navy had worked towards the establishment of a more professionalized naval officer corps and department as a whole. During the 1880s the Navy created the ABCD fleet made up of the modern warships Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and Dolphin. The Office of Naval Intelligence was established in 1882 and would play a major role in the war providing information on Cervera’s fleet and the Spanish Navy at large through their network of naval attaches placed in the capitols of European powers. 62 Two years later, the Naval War College opened. The brainchild of Rear-Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the War College sought to educate officers in “the higher branches of the naval profession,” including strategy, history, and international law. 63 Writing just after the war, Englishman H.W. Wilson believed the main strength of the US Navy was its professionalism and conduct, calling the American naval officers “intelligent, brave, and resourceful.” 64 Since the 1880s the American Navy was trending towards a more professional and sophisticated organization, and the officers prided themselves on the quality of their service. A hearkening back to the banditry of privateering would have been a complete about-face for the Department and would have run contrary to their intention of creating a professionalized fighting force.

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan was a proponent of battleship tactics, and was skeptical of the success of commerce-raiding tactics. (Naval History and Heritage Command)

In the years before the war with Spain American naval strategy shifted towards an increased use of battleships accompanied by lightly armed cruisers. Much of the impetus for this new direction came from Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. In his seminal work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Mahan spoke at length of the merits of large fleet action as opposed to a strategy predicated on commerce raiding. He concluded his analysis by stating:

It is not the taking of individual ships or convoys…that strikes down the money power of a nation; it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores. This overbearing power can only be exercised by great navies. 65

The benefits of a large navy were more than strategic; leaders like Theodore Roosevelt saw a powerful navy as a necessity for the pursuit of America’s imperial ambitions. To truly be considered a great power, America needed a world-class navy. The two men played major roles in the Navy’s strategy during the war with Spain; Theodore Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, while Captain Mahan was a member of the Naval War Board. Their influence led to an emphasis on the role of the battleship in naval grand strategy, and steered America far away from the unprofessional and inconsistent practice of privateering. 66

The improved efficiency and competency of the US Navy meant that, out of all the military branches of either belligerent, it was the most prepared for war with Spain in 1898. 67 In 1894, a year before the Cuban Revolt even began, Captain Henry C. Taylor gave his students at the Naval War College an exercise asking them to formulate a strategic plan of war against Spain, including the “principal objectives” of both sides and bearing in mind tactical considerations such as coal and railroad operations. 68 That same year Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train drafted a potential operational plan for war with Spain. He accurately predicted that a Spanish offensive against the US coast was “most improbable,” and that “command of the sea would play an all-important part” in a war over Cuba. Train also was one of the first to propose the idea of a blockade of Cuba in his plans, suggesting a “strict blockade” of Havana, Matanzas, Saguala Grande, and Cienfuegos. 69 In 1896 Lieutenant William W. Kimball issued a similar plan, detailing that the war would grow out of a conflict over the fate of Cuba and suggesting that the Navy’s primary objective should be to target the Spanish fleet as it made its way into Cuban waters. 70 In his own plan of action the same year, Taylor concurred that the main theatre of operations would be the Caribbean but warned that “an attack on Cuba cannot be successful through a blockade alone.” 71 A Naval Board that evaluated Taylor’s plan of action in December 1896 chose to add a “European squadron” to make demonstrations against the Spanish coast; this plan was never carried out, though the idea of making direct attacks on Spain never fully disappeared during the war. 72

The foresight of the US Navy is notable in and of itself, but of particular interest to this study is the complete lack of privateer operations in each of the plans. Train’s plan called for three fleets, one of which would be comprised of “cruisers and armed merchant ships” and which would be used primarily as a blockading force. 73 Kimball too called for an “auxiliary fleet” comprised of “fifty auxiliary cruisers” and “twelve to twenty yachts and small steam craft in commission for despatch [sic] and look-out vessels.” He believed such a force was best equipped to “meet fleet of 20 Spanish naval small craft and privateers”; Kimball assumed that while the Americans would abide by the Declaration of Paris, Spain would outfit privateers. 70 Taylor’s sketches offered no suggestions on privateers and only briefly mentioned an auxiliary fleet, “which of necessity we must employ.” 71 The Board’s plan of 1897 also neglected privateers but spoke of “light vessels” which could be employed as blockading ships and “must be drawn from the merchant service.” 76 While the early plans for war did not seem to consider privateering a viable strategic option, they all appreciated the necessity of outfitting private merchant vessels as auxiliaries to the primary capital ships.

The diplomatic fallout from the Maine explosion encouraged the Americans to ramp up their preparations for war. On March 9 Congress appropriated fifty million dollars for the national defense, $29,973,274.22 of which was used by the Navy Department. 77 The funds were used to secure “such vessels as might be desirable for purchase” to add to the auxiliary fleet; a full list of purchased vessels can be found in the Secretary of the Navy’s Report from 1898. Of particular note are the Amazonas and the Almirante Abreu; the American government purchased the two ships from Brazil in March and renamed them the Albany and the New Orleans. The Spanish had been eyeing the same vessels and were putting money together to purchase them from Brazil before the Americans swooped in and beat the Spanish to the punch. Private donations also bolstered the ranks of the United States Navy; William Randolph Hearst and F. Augustus Schermerhorn both donated their yachts to the Navy for the duration of the war. 78 In their preparations for the war the US Navy was proactive in searching for additional vessels to add to their fleet, finding new ships from both foreign nations and domestic businessmen, along with a number of ships from the American merchant marine. These kinds of vessels, particularly the small and fast ships of the merchant service, would have likely been the preferred vessels of privateers had they been commissioned during the war. With the US Navy’s actions, those private ships found a home within the ranks of the Navy, not in the hands of private individuals.

When the two sides declared war in April, the United States had a clear plan of operations for their fleet. Commodore George Dewey was immediately ordered to “proceed at once to the Philippine Islands [and] commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet.” 79 President McKinley ordered the blockade of Cuba on April 21 and deployed Rear-Admiral Sampson and the North Atlantic Fleet to the Caribbean. The main objective was the destruction of the Spanish fleet under Cervera, which was expected to appear in the West Indies sometime in the spring. Held in reserve was the Flying Squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Schley. Schley’s fleet gave the United States more flexibility in their deployment; once Cervera’s fleet manifested itself, Schley and Sampson could converge and eliminate the threat from Spain’s navy in one single action. With Cervera’s fleet destroyed, it would be possible for the US Army to move safely across the Caribbean and land in Cuba or Puerto Rico. No part of the US Navy’s strategy called for commerce raiding in the privateer style. Capital ships under Sampson (and after his deployment to the Caribbean, Schley) would cripple commercial networks running in and out of Cuba through the blockade, following Mahan’s emphasis on battleship tactics discussed earlier. Privateers and their style of commerce raiding had no place in America’s naval strategy for the war with Spain.

In the 1850s the primary reason given by the United States for refusing to agree to the Declaration of Paris was the need to rely on privateers to protect the country’s coast and maritime commerce. While there was never a strong campaign to revive privateering for coastal protection, there was a genuine fear of Spanish attack on the Eastern seaboard. Local merchants and business leaders feared the war would jeopardize their seaborne trade and hamstring the coastal economy. Charles B. Church, a shipping magnate based in Washington, DC, had even requested that the navy employ a convoy system to protect Atlantic trade. 80 Most naval strategists thought it highly unlikely that Spain would send the bulk of its forces to attack the American coast. Captain Alfred Mahan called the public fear of attack “preposterous and humiliating terrors,” while Captain Caspar Goodrich stated that “our worst foe is ‘uninstructed public opinion.’” 81 Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt was of the same mind and by his own word “urged the President and the Secretary [Long] to pay absolutely no heed to the outcries for protection from Spanish raids.” 82

Though it seemed highly improbable that an attack from Spain would be forthcoming, the Navy felt obligated to do something to provide for the common defense; to that end, it created the Northern Patrol Squadron and a mosquito flotilla. Commodore John A. Howell commanded the Squadron, and the San Francisco and auxiliary cruisers Prairie, Dixie, Yankee, and Yosemite comprised its main components. 83 Commander Horace Elmer organized and led the mosquito flotilla until his death in April, at which time Rear-Admiral Henry Erben took command. 84 Coastal defense gunboats and monitors composed the principal ships of the mosquito flotilla, which was organized into nine districts along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The ships of the mosquito flotilla largely remained in their home districts, while the Northern Patrol Squadron cruised up and down the entire Eastern seaboard. The Northern Patrol Squadron and the mosquito flotilla were in many ways more theater than defense. In his patrol orders to Captain Theodore Jewell of the Minneapolis and Captain James Sands of the Columbia, Secretary Long stated:

The object of this cruise is to reassure the inhabitants of the cities and towns on the New England coast by showing a few of our vessels in their vicinity. Therefore it is important to either enter the harbors, or to send in a boat to get the mail, or communicate with the local authorities, or make such inquiries regarding the enemy’s vessels as will demonstrate to the people the fact that one of our ships is on the lookout in the neighborhood. 85

As H.W. Wilson stated after the war, the mosquito flotilla may have been sparsely armed, but successfully “reassure[d] the timid and ignorant.” 86 With the two squadrons and well-equipped coastal fortifications protecting the Eastern seaboard, the Navy could appease the public outcry for protection at relatively little cost to the main theatre of operations in the West Indies and without having to outfit privateers for the same purpose.

To crew the numerous ships in the mosquito flotilla and Northern Patrol Squadron, the Navy drew on state-based naval militias. The men of the Naval Militia were given a modicum of training and dispatched aboard ships for duty, primarily serving with the deep-sea auxiliary cruisers and the mosquito flotilla monitors. In his report of 1898 Secretary Long states that “the personnel of the [Auxiliary Navy] was almost entirely contributed by the Naval Militia organizations of the various States,” and that additionally “a small percentage was supplied by the merchant marine.” 87 Nearly 4,000 sailors served in the Naval Militia during the war, with over 1,500 coming from New York and Illinois alone. 88 Though the militia operated with mixed results – as seen earlier in this essay – naval strategists saw “the imperative necessity for the maintenance of a national Naval Reserve.” 89

The Naval Militia was just one of the many ways the United States Navy eliminated the need for privateering and took from the same sources that privateers would have tapped during the war. Privateers would have needed ships, men, and a place in the grand strategy of the Navy; they found none of that during the Spanish-American War. The increased professionalism of the American Navy and its growing reputation abroad negated any possibilities of a privateering campaign, as shown by the actions of the Navy Department before and during the war. None of the plans for war dating back to 1894 gave any thought to America using privateers, or even partaking in commerce raiding outside of a blockade of Cuba. As war drew near, the Navy Department bought and outfitted any vessel it could find that would provide some use in the war, leaving the cupboard bare for any potential privateers looking to purchase seaworthy cruisers. By commissioning officers and sailors in the Naval Militia to join the Auxiliary Fleets, the US Navy eliminated a vital source of manpower that privateers would have needed to operate. The efficiency of the Navy Department and its grand strategy utilizing auxiliary cruisers demonstrates neither a desire nor a need for privateers on the American side during the Spanish-American War.

Honor for want of a Ship: Spanish Naval Strategy in 1898

Privateers were most often commissioned by the side with the weaker navy. Privateers were cheaper, required less direct control, and could prove devastating to enemy commerce, though they were all but hopeless against enemy warships. The Spanish Navy was recognized as the weaker force in the war; on paper it was only superior to its American counterpart in speed, but as German Rear-Admiral Plüddemann wrote, “It is doubtful…whether Spanish ships ever actually possessed the speed officially claimed for them.” 90 With a weaker naval force, perhaps Spain could have benefited strategically from the use of privateers. Most of the American fleet was operating in the Caribbean and the Philippines, leaving American commercial routes in European waters exposed to possible attack. Privateering may have also demoralized the American people and brought a more satisfactory end to the war. Spanish artillery captain Severo Gómez Núñez believed that privateers could have separated the two American naval squadrons under Sampson and Schley and eased the pressure of the blockade, saying “there is no possible excuse to justify our not having taken advantage of this means of warfare.” 91 There was potential strategic upside for Spain to commission privateers, yet they never issued letters of marque. The Spanish did not have the resources necessary to stage a privateering campaign, and given their attitudes regarding honor in war it is unlikely the Spanish would have resorted to the practice even if the resources had been at their disposal.

In the Naval Annual of 1899, Sir George Clark wrote, “In Spain, some efforts of preparation [for war] were made, but want of money, of resources, and of administrative capacity proved fatal.” 92 Clark’s assessment is entirely accurate; where the US Navy was well-prepared for the war, the Spanish Navy floundered. Ship construction and outfitting lagged sorely behind schedule. In a letter to his cousin, Admiral Pascual Cervera cited the example of the Cataluña, a ship that had been under construction for eight years and still lacked a completed hull. He noted that the Carlos V, a ship entirely of Spanish construction, “is not what she should be,” if not entirely “a dead failure.” 93 In his letters to Bermejo in the early part of 1898, Cervera predicted that a number of Spanish capital ships would be unfit to sail by the time his squadron departed. He was correct; upon receiving his orders to sail to Puerto Rico, the Pelayo, Carlos V, Vitoria, and Numancia were all incomplete or ill-equipped for the voyage. 94 The armaments on board the ships were poor as well; the Cristobal Colón, which Cervera called “no doubt the best of all our ships,” did not have her heavy guns, nor did the crew have any 5.5-inch ammunition needed to fire the new, lighter guns. 95 In the months preceding war with America, Spanish ships were on the whole poorly constructed, in states of disrepair, and possessed weaker armaments, a testament to the dilapidated state of Spain’s maritime power. Materials and armaments to outfit public ships before and during the war were sparse and poorly administered; it is unlikely that any significant amount of resources could be found to outfit private ships in their place.

In many ways Spain’s problems in outfitting its fleets can be tied to its finances, or lack thereof. Spain was economically in dire straits before and during the war in 1898. Though the monarchy had stabilized the government in 1875, old political rivalries between the Liberals, Conservatives, Carlists, Republicans, Basques, and a host of other interest groups meant Spain was never internally unified and struggled to find the stability necessary for strong economic prosperity. Most of Spain’s trade was with its colonies rather than with other European powers. With insurgencies growing in power and scope in both Cuba and the Philippines in the 1890s, that trade was running perilously low. By January of 1898, Cervera was able to state that Spain was “absolutely penniless,” particularly compared with the United States. 93 The war only made the situation worse – principally for the lower classes, as the price of food increased and poor men were inducted into the military. In early May, the citizens of Gijon rioted over the price of bread, and the Civil Guard had to impose martial law. 97 Spain simply was not a wealthy state, either in the public or private sector. The lack of funds prevented the Spanish Navy from effectively preparing for the war with America, and likely would have precluded any potential privateering expeditions from outfitting successfully.

If the situation in Spain was unconducive to the practice, the situation in the colonies – the main theaters of operations during the war – was hopeless. Insurrections in both Cuba and the Philippines had driven both economies to ruin. In a speech given to the Senate in March 1898, Vermont Senator Redfield Proctor described Cuba as a land of “desolation and distress, misery and starvation.” 98 With the reconcentration policy placing all Cubans into the towns held by the army, there were few opportunities for public enterprise in Cuba in the lead-up to the war. As a result there were few Cubans who could legitimately stake their funds to privateer expeditions. In addition, the ships that were already in Cuba were of no use; Cervera wrote that “the eight principal vessels of the Havana station…have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn out.” 99 The Commandant-General of the Manterola Navy Yard in Cuba was of the same mind, stating that “of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty-two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service on the coast.” 100 Even if there had been a number of effective ships in Cuba, and enough money in country to fund privateer expeditions, the United States Navy took control of the waters off Cuba almost immediately after war was declared. Privateers operating from Cuban ports would have likely seen little success in the face of direct US opposition. What vessels that were seaworthy in Cuba were used with mixed results as blockade runners and posed no real threat to US sea superiority there. In the Philippines, US control was even more pronounced. Following Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, Spain had no major harbors in the archipelago and was losing territory rapidly to the insurgents under Emilio Aguinaldo. There, the Spanish could only hope to hole up in Manila and wait for support from the homeland.

Spain did not have a viable option for outfitting privateers. In the Iberian Peninsula, maritime facilities had few ships to offer and were incapable of successfully outfitting ships for the Spanish Navy, let alone ships for private individuals. Economic difficulties made the practice unreasonable in Spain, and impossible in its colonies. Yet even if Spain did have a strong foundation from which to send out privateers, it is unlikely that Spanish leaders would have opted to use them. Running through nearly all the Spanish documents related to the war is an emphasis on fighting with honor; if Spain was going to lose its colonies, it would maintain its pride while doing so. With military leaders, statesmen, and press all putting an emphasis on honorable wartime conduct, Spain would never rely on such a dishonorable practice as privateering.

In response to reports of US military superiority over the Spanish in March, Madrid-based newspaper El Imparcial wrote, “such news items would weigh very little in one pan of a balance scale compared with Spain’s honor in the other pan.” 101 Spain’s actions throughout the war were characterized by a strong desire to fight with honor, even at the expense of prudent tactical decisions. The General Ordinances of the Spanish Navy included an article stating:

You will fight as far as lies in your power against any superior forces, so that, even though necessary to surrender, your defense will be considered honorable by the enemy. If possible, you will run your ship aground on own or hostile coast rather than surrender, if there is no immediate risk of the crew perishing in the shipwreck; and even after running aground, it will be your duty to defend the ship and finally burn it, if there is no other way of preventing the enemy from taking possession of it. 102

When facing likely defeat in Santiago, Cervera was expected to follow these instructions. Captain-General of Cuba Ramon Blanco ordered Cervera to attempt to break the blockade, believing “it is preferable for the honor of arms to succumb in battle” than to possibly lose the fleet without a fight. 103 Tactically, little could be gained from the attempt to run the American blockade, but following Blanco’s orders Cervera led his squadron out of Santiago on July 3, where he were resoundingly defeated by the Americans. In his telegram to Blanco informing him of the disaster, Cervera made a point to emphasize that the “gallantry of all the crews has earned the most enthusiastic congratulations of enemy.” 104 If Cervera’s fleet had to be destroyed, Spain thought it best that it went down fighting rather than dishonorably surrender.

After Cervera was defeated, the Spanish Army’s position in Santiago was unsustainable. The US Army under Major General William Shafter approached General Jose Toral regarding a surrender; however, Toral was skeptical. He stated, “A solution [must] be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact; otherwise you will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to now make defense as far as my strength will permit.” 105 By July 15, the Spanish had decided that “the honor of our arms has been completely vindicated,” and were ready to give in to the Americans. 106 The agreement between the two sides never used the term “surrender,” opting instead for the less extreme “capitulation,” and Article IX of that document stated “That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors of war…” 107 The timing of the Spanish surrender and the articles therein were primarily based on satisfying Spanish honor, a testament to the emphasis placed on the ideal by the Spanish military.

A similar occurrence happened in the Philippines, when the Spanish troops there surrendered in August. Trapped in Manila by Dewey’s fleet since early May and surrounded on all sides on land by a combination of American troops and Filipino insurgents, Governor-General Fermin Jaudenes sought to turn the city over to the Americans rather than let it fall into the hands of Aguinaldo’s fighters. However, the Spanish military code necessitated some form of resistance before surrender, at the risk of a court-martial upon their return to Spain. 108 Jaudenes came to an agreement with Dewey whereby the Americans would bombard an unoccupied fort for an hour then advance their foot soldiers towards the city, at which point the Spanish would surrender. Both sides played their respective roles, and on August 14 the Spanish again capitulated “with all honors of war.” 109

Spain’s blind obedience to its principles of honor had its fair share of critics both at home and abroad. 110 One of its staunchest opponents was Captain Victor Concas, commander of the Infanta Maria Teresa under Admiral Cervera. In the preface of his work he criticizes “political men” for their reliance on “romanticism and legends,” stating “that these are not the reality; that they do not now and never did constitute war, and that the nations which have had recourse to them have ended by disappearing from the map of the world.” 111 Concas gives the example of Admiral Sampson’s decision to avoid the coastal batteries set up by the Spanish, saying that “We should have considered that cowardice,” and that Spain would seemingly have “preferred a squadron crippled and rendered useless by a glorious battle without any objective, to a squadron that has remained intact….” 112 Concas bluntly states later in his work that “The object of military operations is final success and not proofs of valor. But it is useless to discuss this point, for it will never be understood in Spain.” 113 Concas apportions blame for Spain’s failure to a number of parties, but lays the brunt of the blame on Spanish press and politicians for their haughty and foolish adherence to irrelevant ideals of honor and valor, principles that Concas believes were woefully out of place in the conflict with the United States.

Regardless whether or not Spain’s romantic interpretation of wartime conduct was detrimental to its cause, it is clear that Spain sought to fight the war according to its cherished principles of honor and righteous conduct. In some cases valorous conduct was deemed more important than tactical considerations. Privateering was not seen as a chivalrous practice in its heyday, and was unquestionably judged negatively in 1898. Even if Spain had the resources and administration necessary to stage a large-scale privateering campaign during the war, it is highly unlikely Spain’s ministers would have accepted the adoption of the practice as it contradicted the lofty ideals of war they aspired to follow.

Conclusion

No privateers ever sailed during the Spanish-American War, a conflict that lasted only a few months and resulted in a decisive victory for the United States. Despite arguments to the contrary it was still technologically feasible for a state to outfit privateers and send them against an enemy’s maritime commerce. The United States employed a system somewhat similar to privateering during the war, using private vessels crewed by volunteers and barely-trained seamen; however, they were careful to keep the vessels under the direct control of the Navy Department, a clear contrast to the practice of privateering. The reason for privateering’s absence from the war, then, cannot be the technological improvements of fighting vessels over the course of the nineteenth century. Privateering was outdated by the Spanish-American War because of diplomatic and strategic factors. With the nominal abolition of the practice with the Declaration of Paris in 1856, Europe took a strong stance against privateering and made the tactic untenable by closing its ports to privateer prize sales. As both sides needed the support – or, at the least, the tacit neutrality – of Europe’s Great Powers, outfitting privateers would have been a risky endeavor that may have necessitated armed intervention from Europe. Spain, in an inferior military position to the Americans, desperately needed support from the Great Powers and tried to use American transgressions of agreed-upon maritime practice as a tool to gain sympathy from other states on the continent. All the while, they maintained their right to outfit privateers should another power – namely, Britain – join with the Americans, and attempted to use the threat of privateers to leverage their diplomatic position. The US Navy neither desired nor required privateers to wage war against Spain. The improved professionalism and training of the officers of the United States Navy resulted in a wartime strategy that focused on battleship action and not on commerce-raiding tactics of privateers. To augment the main battle fleet, the Americans relied on auxiliary cruisers which were under direct control of the US Navy. While Spain, as the weaker maritime power, could perhaps have benefited from outfitting privateers, the country never had the naval infrastructure nor the material and financial resources needed to wage an effective privateering campaign, and their mindset that placed honor above tactical and strategic considerations suggests that they would not have resorted to the practice even if it had been feasible. Scholars cannot explain the disappearance of privateering throughout the nineteenth century by only looking at the advancements of technology. The example of the Spanish-American War shows that while privateering was still technologically possible, strategic and diplomatic considerations surrounding the conflict made the practice unthinkable for either side.

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Footnotes

I would like to acknowledge the support and advice of my supervisor Dr. Michael Crawford of Naval History and Heritage Command for introducing me to this topic and for guiding me every step of the way. I am also indebted to Dan Roberts and Dr. Dennis Conrad of Naval History and Heritage Command for their assistance searching for sources for this article. The New York Times, 25 April 1898. Accessed June 28, 2016. www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0424.html#headlines. ↩

For more on the growth of privateering and the role it played in military and business affairs, see David J. Starkey, s.v. “Privateering,” in The Encyclopedia of Maritime History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). ↩

For one example of this from Dutch newspapers see Nico A. Bootsma, “Reactions to the Spanish-American War in the Netherlands and in the Dutch East Indies,” in Sylvia L. Hilton and Steve J.S. Ickringill, eds. European Perceptions of the Spanish-American War (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999), 38. ↩

This will be discussed later in this essay. ↩

The Secretary of State (Sherman) to Diplomatic Representatives, 22 April 1898, in Carlton Savage, ed. Policy of the United States towards Maritime Commerce in War (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1934), 486. Sherman would resign his post only three days later, on April 25. ↩

“War with Spain – Maritime Law,” 25 April 1898, in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 63, 772-73. ↩

Royal Decree, enclosed in Minister of State to the Representatives of His Majesty Abroad, 24 April 1898, in Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents 1896-1900 (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1905), 157. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Segismundo Bermejo, 7 March 1898, in Pascual Cervera, The Spanish-American War: A Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron Operations in the West Indies, vol. VII, War Notes (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1899), 33-36. ↩

John D. Coogan, End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899-1915 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), 22. ↩

Severo Gómez Núñez, The Spanish-American War: Blockades and Coast Defense, vol. VI, War Notes (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1899), 50. ↩

Caspar F. Goodrich, “Scouts: Lecture Delivered, Summer Course, 1902”: NWC Lectures, Record Group 15, Box 1, p. 6. Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. A detachment of marines was also placed on board each vessel to man the guns during combat. ↩

For the locations of these ships throughout the war see Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1898 (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1898), 329-59. ↩

Captain Charles S. Cotton to the Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, 13 May 1898, in “Documentary Histories: Spanish-American War,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed July 15, 2016. goo.gl/QqZcSe; hereafter “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. Cotton feared that the Spanish fleet under Cervera would lay in wait to capture the Harvard as it left port. Cotton was particularly concerned about “the peculiar status of the officers and crew, who are serving on board of an armed ship while they do not belong to either branch of the Naval or Military service of the U.S.”; he feared that the Spanish might consider the ship a privateer, and treat the sailors as pirates. ↩

For more on cable-cutting throughout the war see H. W. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain: Naval History of the Spanish-American War (London: Sampson, Low, Marston and Company, 1900), 382-95. ↩

Captain Caspar F. Goodrich to Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Fleet, July 2 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/3MTmyz. ↩

Goodrich, “Scouts,” 8. ↩

Commander Willard H. Brownson to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, 28 August 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/jb4kc7. ↩

Commander Charles J. Train to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, 15 September 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/c2jxH6. ↩

Commodore Arendt S. Crowninshield, Chief, Bureau of Navigation, to Secretary of the Navy John D. Long, 1 October 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/kGciwb. ↩

On the Future of the Naval Militia, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/KCVBgq. ↩

Crowninshield to Long, 1 October 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/kGciwb. ↩

Lieutenant Lazarus L. Reamey to Commodore Arent S. Crowninshield, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 13 May 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/GivLHA. ↩

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long to Commander William H. Emory, 11 May 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/BjJyl6. ↩

Train to Long, 15 September 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/c2jxH6. ↩

Annual Reports 1898, 19. ↩

Ibid. 109. ↩

Brownson to Long, 28 August 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/jb4kc7. ↩

There is still considerable debate regarding Britain’s reasons for adopting the principle. Along with the combination of domestic pressure from the mercantile community and the demands of international diplomacy, Jan Martin Lemnitzer argues that one factor in the decision may have been the threat of American privateers. By agreeing to the “free ships free goods” principle, Britain ensured America’s cooperation in the war, and guaranteed that Russia would not be able to outfit privateers in American territory. For further discussion see Jan Martin Lemnitzer, Power, Law and the End of Privateering (Houndsmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 17-25. ↩

The Secretary of State (J. Q. Adams) to the British Minister (Canning), 24 June 1823, in Savage, Policy of the United States, 302-303. ↩

Cabinet Minutes Respecting the Declaration of Paris, 6 April 1856, in Nicholas Tracy, ed. Sea Power and the Control of Trade: Belligerent Rights from the Russian War to the Beira Patrol: 1854-1970, vol. 149, Navy Records Society Publications (Burlington, VT: Ashgate for the Navy Records Society, 2005), 32-33. ↩

Observations of J.D. Harding, the Queen’s Advocate, on the Answer of the United States’ Government respective Maritime Law, 27 September 1856, in Tracy, Sea Power and Trade, 36-40. ↩

Liverpool Mail, 18 March 1854, p.5. ↩

HC Deb 17 March 1854, vol. 131, cc 968-70. Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell tabled the motion to allow naval strategists time to consider the proposal. ↩

Sir James Robert Graham, First Lord of the Admiralty, to the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 1854, in Tracy, Sea Power and Trade, 10-24. ↩

HL Deb 22 May 1856, vol. 142, cc 501. ↩

For a further investigation of British responses to privateering, “free ships free goods,” and the policies of liberalism and ideology that contributed to the adoption of the Declaration of Paris, see Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 51-67. ↩

President Franklin Pierce summarized the US position in his State of the Union in 1854, stating: “The bare statement of the condition in which the United States would be placed, after having surrendered the right to resort to privateers, in the event of war with a belligerent of naval supremacy will show that this Government could never listen to such a proposition. The navy of the first maritime power in Europe is at least ten times as large as that of the United States. The foreign commerce of the two countries is nearly equal, and about equally exposed to hostile depredations. In war between that power and the United States, without resort on our part to our mercantile marine the means of our enemy to inflict injury upon our commerce would be tenfold greater than ours to retaliate.” See Message of President Pierce to Congress, 4 December 1854, in Savage, Policy of the United States, 378-81. ↩

William M. Robinson, The Confederate Privateers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928), 25. Throughout the war, the British press consistently referred to any Confederate vessel as a “privateer,” which may have led to some confusion for the American reporters. ↩

Lyons [British ambassador in Washington ↩

Robinson, Confederate Privateers, 28. ↩

For more on the exploits of Confederate privateers see Robinson, Confederate Privateers. For an analysis of how maritime law played a role in the naval strategies of the Confederacy, see Lemnitzer, End of Privateering, 118-34. ↩

For more on McKinley’s efforts to avoid war and the diplomatic events leading up to the Spanish-American War see John L. Offner, An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992). ↩

Coogan, End of Neutrality, 28. See also Michael Howard, ed. Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 47. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Segismundo Bermejo, 16 February 1898, in Cervera, Squadron Operations, 25. ↩

The Chargé d’Affaires of Spain to the Minister of State, 16 February 1898, in Spanish Correspondence, 86. ↩

The Minister of State to the ambassadors of His Majesty in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, London, St. Petersburg, Rome, and the Holy See, 16 March 1898, in Ibid. 92. ↩

The Minister of State to the Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty in Washington, 27 March 1898, in Ibid. 102. ↩

The Minister of State to the representatives of His Majesty abroad, 25 March 1898, in Ibid. 98-99. ↩

U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 740-1, in Brad K. Berner, The Spanish-American War: A Documentary History with Commentaries (Lanham, MD: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2014), 57-58. ↩

The Minister of State to the ambassadors of His Majesty in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, St. Petersburg, and the Holy See, 14 April 1898, in Spanish Correspondence, 124. ↩

Enclosed memorandum in Minister of State to the representatives of His Majesty abroad, 18 April 1898, in Ibid. 126-32. ↩

The Minister of State to the representatives of His Majesty abroad, 11 May 1898, in Ibid. 164. ↩

For a discussion of the legal ramifications of the Declaration’s language on blockades see John Fraser MacQueen, Chief Points in the Laws of War and Neutrality (London: William and Robert Chambers, 1862), 53-54. ↩

For more on Sampson’s movements in the early years of the war see James C. Bradford, ed. Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and its Aftermath (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), 50-51. ↩

The Minister of State to the representatives of His Majesty abroad, 11 May 1898, in Spanish Correspondence, 164. In his work Blockades and Coastal Defense written after the war, Spanish artillery captain Severo Gómez Núñez was especially critical of the American blockade, calling it a “farce” and stating that from their positions in Havana the Spanish could see “private tugs of the United States Press and pleasure yachts, on board of some of which we could distinguish lady excursionists and almost feel the excitement of champagne.” See Núñez, Blockades and Coast Defense, 18. ↩

The Minister of State to the representatives of His Majesty abroad, 24 April 1898, in Spanish Correspondence, 155-56. ↩

At Manila Bay, after Dewey’s victory but before the city capitulated, Germany actually had more ships in the area than the United States. The entire time, Britain kept a ship in the region to monitor the situation. For more on Anglo-American relations in the Far East see Bertha Ann Reuter, Anglo-American Relations during the Spanish-American War (New York: Macmillan Company, 1899), 110-49. ↩

The Minister of the United States to the Minister of State, 21 April 1898, in Spanish Correspondence, 135-36. ↩

Offner, An Unwanted War, 199-200; see also Reuter, Anglo-American Relations, 150-59. ↩

Reuter, Anglo-American Relations, 86. ↩

For more on Spanish agents in British Columbia and the “phantom privateer,” see P.M. Sherrin, “Spanish Spies in Victoria, 1898,” BC Studies no. 36 (Winter 1977-78), 23-33. ↩

For more on the ONI and its overseas attachés, see Bradford, ed. Crucible of Empire, 1-22. For intelligence as a whole during the war, see ibid. 23-46. ↩

John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson, III, and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Soldiers: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), 17. In addition to improving the professionalism of the naval officer corps, the formation of the Naval War College was part of a growth in professional practices during the late-nineteenth century; for more on this and the early years of the Naval War College see Ronald Spector, Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977). ↩

Wilson, Downfall of Spain, 68. ↩

Alfred T. Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1890), 138. ↩

For more on Theodore Roosevelt, see Edward J. Marolda, ed. Theodore Roosevelt, the US Navy, and the Spanish-American War (New York: Palgrave, 2001). For Mahan’s role on the Naval War Board, see Alfred Thayer Mahan, Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, edited by Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, vol. III (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975), 627-43. For an analysis of Mahan’s strategic thought see Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997). ↩

For a comparison of the readiness of the Navy to the US Army see Bradford, ed. Crucible of Empire, 106-107. ↩

Captain Henry C. Taylor to Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/CBxzxy. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train (1894), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/Mrnnr2. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Lieutenant William W. Kimball (1896), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/FRHm8j. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Captain Henry C. Taylor (1896), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/2fWbLI. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain (1896), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/DmNhLJ. The idea for a European squadron remained in the war plans in 1897; see Plan of Operations against Spain (1897), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/eZDdq9. It was also discussed during the war in 1898, and Commodore Watson was put in command of an Eastern Squadron which was supposed to sail across the Atlantic. Spain called for a ceasefire before the squadron could set sail. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train (1894), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/Mrnnr2. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Lieutenant William W. Kimball (1896), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/FRHm8j. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain prepared by Captain Henry C. Taylor (1896), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/2fWbLI. ↩

Plan of Operations against Spain (1897), in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/eZDdq9. ↩

Annual Reports 1898, 44. ↩

Ibid. 21. Hearst’s yacht was the Buccaneer, renamed the Gloucester while in naval service, and Schermerhorn’s was the Free Lance. ↩

Ibid. 6 ↩

This request was wisely denied by Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard; see Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, President, Naval War Board, to Charles B. Church, 4 May 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/jkGYxV. ↩

For Mahan, see Alfred T. Mahan, Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1899), 69. For Goodrich see Captain Caspar F. Goodrich, Points on Coast-Defense Brought Out by the War with Spain, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/ewlQ3I. ↩

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, 14 March 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/LCECA0. ↩

Annual Reports 1898, 5. Also attached at various points during the war were the Columbia, Minneapolis, Badger, and Southery. ↩

For the order from Secretary Long authorizing the creation of the flotilla, see Secretary of the Navy John D. Long to Commander Horace Elmer, 23 March 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/s7DuWh. Rear-Admiral Joseph N. Miller commanded the Pacific coast. ↩

Secretary of the Navy John D. Long to Captain James H. Sands, 23 April 1898, in “Documentary Histories,” NHHC. goo.gl/lpRPdw. ↩

Wilson, Downfall of Spain, 57. ↩

Annual Reports 1898, 19. ↩

Ibid. 132. ↩

Quote from W.H.H. Southerland, found in Ibid. 144. ↩

M. Plüddemann, Comments of Rear Admiral Plüddemann: German Navy on the Main Features of the War with Spain, vol. II, War Notes (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1899), 9. ↩

Núñez, Blockades and Coast Defense, 20. ↩

Sir George Clarke, “Naval Aspects of the Spanish-American War,” in The Naval Annual 1899, ed. T.A. Brassey (Portsmouth: J. Griffin and Co., 1899): 129. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Juan Spottorno, 30 January 1898, in Cervera, Squadron Operations, 12-13. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Segismundo Bermejo, 24 April 1898, in Ibid. 65. In an earlier letter Cervera also included the ship Lepanto in his list of those unfit for service; see Pascual Cervera to Segismundo Bermejo, 25 February 1898, in Ibid. 27-29. ↩

Pascual Cervera to General Captaincy of the Squadron Staff, 6 February 1898, in Ibid. 16. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Juan Spottorno, 30 January 1898, in Cervera, Squadron Operations, 12-13. ↩

Diario de Barcelona, 5 May 1898, in Berner, Documentary History, 71-72. ↩

Congressional Record, 55th congress, 2nd session, vol. 31, part 3: 2916-19, in Berner, Documentary History, 52-53. ↩

Pascual Cervera to Segismundo Bermejo, 16 February 1898, in Cervera, Squadron Operations, 24-25. ↩

Commandant-General of Navy Yard (Manterola) to the Admiral (Cervera), 21 May 1898, in Ibid. 84-85. ↩

“España no se asusta,” El Imparcial, March 15, 1898, in Berner, Documentary History, 31. ↩

General Ordinances of the Navy, part 3, Chap. I, art. 153, cited by Cervera in Cervera, Squadron Operations, 101, footnote 2. ↩

The Captain-General (Blanco) to the Admiral (Cervera), 26 June 1898, in Ibid. 113. ↩

The Admiral (Cervera) to the Captain-General (Blanco), 4 July 1898, in Ibid. 121. ↩

Major-General William Shafter to Adjutant-General H.C. Corbin, 13 July 1898, in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief Expedition, April 15, 1898, to July 30, 1902, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1993), 133. ↩

José Müller Y Tejeiro, Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, vol. I, War Notes (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1898), 143. ↩

Terms of convention for the capitulation of Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba, 16 July 1898, in Correspondence Relating to War with Spain, 151-52. See also David F. Trask, The War with Spain in 1898 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 315. ↩

Thomas M. Anderson, “Our Rule in the Philippines,” North American Review 170 (February 1900): 278, in Berner, Documentary History, 174-75. ↩

French Ensor Chadwick, The Relations of the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War, vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 421-22. ↩

For further examples of Spanish criticism, see José Martínez Ruiz, “Gaceta de Madrid,” Madrid Comico, 10 April 1898, in Berner, Documentary History, 32-33. For examples from foreign commentators see Jacobsen, Sketches from the War, 7. ↩

Victor Concas, The Squadron of Admiral Cervera, vol. VIII, War Notes (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1900), 7. ↩

Concas, Squadron of Admiral Cervera, 14. ↩

Ibid. 26; emphasis in original.

U.S. Supreme Court

The Adula, 176 U.S. 361 (1900)

The Adula
No. 167
Argued November 7, 1899
Decided February 26, 1900

Syllabus

A legal blockade may be established by a naval officer acting upon his own discretion, or under direction of superiors, without governmental notification.

In view of the operations being carried on for the purpose of destroying or capturing the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and the reduction of that place, it was competent for the admiral commanding the squadron to establish a blockade there, and at Guantanamo, as an adjunct to such operations, and such blockade was valid as against all vessels having notice thereof. It appearing that Guantanamo was eighteen miles from the mouth of Guantanam Bay and was still occupied by the enemy, held that although the American troops occupied the mouth of the bay, the blockade was still operative as to vessels bound to the City of Guantanamo.

The legal effect of a lawful and sufficient blockade is a closing of the port and an interdiction of the entrance of all vessels of whatever nationality or business.

The sailing of a vessel with a premeditated intent to violate a blockade is ipso facto a violation of the blockade, and renders her subject to capture from the moment she leaves the port of departure.

If a master has actual notice of a blockade, he is not at liberty even to approach the blockaded port for the purpose of making inquiries.

If a neutral vessel be chartered to an enemy, she becomes to a certain extent and pro hac vice an enemy's vessel, and a notice to her charterer of the existence of a blockade is a notice to the vessel.

It appearing in this case that both the charterer and the vessel had been previously engaged in bringing away refugees from Cuba, and were chargeable with notice of the military and naval operations against that island, that such facts were of common knowledge at the port from which she sailed, and that intercourse with Cuban ports was dangerous, and it appearing from a preponderance of evidence that both the charterer and master of the vessel had knowledge of the blockade, held that the vessel was properly condemned.

If an examination of the ship's papers and the testimony of the crew, taken in preparatorio, make a case for condemnation, an order for further proof is only made where the interests of justice clearly require it. Held in this case that there was no error in denying the motion of the claimant for further proofs.

This was a libel in prize against the British steamship Adula, then under charter to a Spanish subject, which was seized June 29, 1898, by the United States cruiser Marblehead for attempting to run the blockade established at Guantanamo Bay in the Island of Cuba, and was subsequently sent into the port of Savannah for adjudication.

The Adula, a vessel of 372 tons, was built at Belfast in 1889 for her owner, the Atlas Steamship Company, Limited, a British corporation, and was registered in the name of its managing director, Sir William Bowers Forwood. Prior to the American-Spanish war, she was engaged in general trade between Kingston and other ports on the coast of Jamaica, and from time to time had made voyages to Cuban ports. After the breaking out of the war, the steamer was chartered by various persons, in the intervals of its regular work, for voyages to Cuba.

In the meantime, however, under the command of Rear Admiral Sampson, a blockade was established at Santiago, where the Spanish fleet lay under the command of Admiral Cervera. Upon June 8, a blockade of Guantanamo Bay was also established by order of Admiral Sampson, the blockading squadron being under the command of Commander McCalla. Both of these blockades were maintained during the war. On April 22, a blockade of the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of Cienfuegos on the south coast, was declared by the President. On June 27, the President by proclamation, gave notice that the Cuban blockade had been extended to included all the ports on the southern coast between Cape Frances and Cape Cruz. This included the port of Manzanillo. On the 28th, this proclamation was made known to the vessels off Guantanamo.

On June 27, the Adula, then at Kingston, was engaged in taking on a cargo for shipment. On the 28th, she discharged this cargo, and the agent of the Atlas company entered into a charter party with one Solis, a Spanish subject formerly resident in Manzanillo, of the material parts of which the following is a copy:

The Adula was put at the disposal of the charterer
Accompanying this charter were certain instructions printed in the margin, * from the agent of the company to Captain Yeates, the commander of the Adula. These were taken from the ship when she was captured. The Adula left Kingston late in the afternoon of June 28. Before sailing, Solis asked from the United States consul at Kingston a permit to enter the ports of Guantanamo, Santiago, and Manzanillo. This the consul refused to give without special instructions from Washington. Just before sailing to Santiago, Solis cabled for a licensed pilot to meet the Adula. On leaving Kingston, she took her course around Morant Point at the easterly end of the island, first toward Santiago, and then to Guantanamo, and about 4 P.M. of the following day was met before reaching the harbor and brought to by the steamship Vixen, was directed to proceed, entered the harbor of Guantanamo, and was seized by the Marblehead, which, with other vessels of the fleet, was lying inside the bay, and was sent to Savannah, where a libel in prize was filed against her on July 21, 1898. The depositions in preparatorio were taken July 21, and her owner, the Atlas Steamship Company, appeared as claimant and filed its answer. The case was heard upon the proofs in preparatorio, and a decree of condemnation entered July 28th. 89 F. 351. Before the decree, claimant moved for leave to take further proofs. The court set the motion down for August 9, giving claimant leave to serve such affidavits and other papers as it might desire to read upon the motion, and directed the entry of the decree to be without prejudice to such motion. The motion was finally denied, and the vessel released upon a stipulation for her value.

From the decree of condemnation, her owner and claimant appealed to this Court.

The Santiago Campaign


The Spanish-Cuban-American War was a brief, but pivotal event in American history. It marked a major change in American foreign policy and military development. The Santiago campaign was the major land engagement between the U.S. and Spain and forms the core of American popular perceptions of the War. American understanding of the War usually overlooks the fact that the fighting of 1898 was but a part of a larger conflict between colonial Spain and Cubans seeking independence. Active conflict between the Spanish army and well organized Cuban forces had been ongoing since 1895. Given the history of underappreciation, clarifying the activities of Cuban forces constitutes one of the major areas in which archeology can offer substantive new insights into understanding of the War.

A Spanish fleet had taken refuge in the harbor at Santiago in mid May 1898. American war planners felt that this fleet had to be neutralized to protect American operations in the Caribbean. When an attempt to seal the harbor failed, a land assault on Santiago was adopted as a means of forcing the fleet out to sea where American ships were waiting.

The U. S. Fifth Army Corps, under General William Shafter and numbering some 25,000 troops (Some 8,000 Cubans under Garcia are included in this total. M.) landed in Cuba — initially at Daiquiri and later at Siboney — beginning on June 22, 1898. These landing sites are some 30 miles east of Santiago. They were selected as accessible sandy beaches on an otherwise rocky coast. The landings were unopposed, largely because Cuban forces controlled the region. The U. S. force consisted overwhelmingly of infantry and dismounted cavalry. It included relatively little artillery and limited transport capacity.

Essentially all members of the regular infantry and cavalry units were armed with smokeless .30 caliber, bolt action, Krag-Jorgensen rifles or carbines. Many of the volunteer units, however, were armed with obsolete single shot, Springfield rifles that fired a black powder charged .45-70 round. Essentially all of the Spanish troops were armed with model 1893 Mauser rifles. These were five shot, bolt action guns that fired a smokeless powder, 7 mm cartridge. It is important to note that Spanish forces were well invested in Cuba. Their force in the area of Santiago numbered more than 10,000 regulars plus colonial Cuban troops. Having been engaged in a five-year war against Cuban freedom fighters, the Spanish forces were battle hardened. Cuban liberation forces unquestionably played a major role in the campaign of 1898. They covered the American landings, served as scouting and picket formations, and took part in some major assaults. The role and exploits of Cuban troops have been variously described by Americans and are not widely appreciated in accounts of the War. Based on arms exhibited in museum displays we visited, Cuban liberation forces were armed with a variety of firearms, including large bore single shot breech loaders and even muzzle loading guns. These arms mean that Cuban forces left a distinctive archeological signature that will be easy to distinguish from firing done by either Spanish or American troops.

(As remarked earlier, Garcia's forces were supposed to take the Reservoir and block off the north exit routes as the Americans closed on the Grand Mesa Plateau. The Banditos failed spectacularly to execute this assigned mission, compelling the Americans to carry out the effort themselves at El Caney and then operate towards the northwest. M.)

Once ashore, Shafter decided to make his major assault against Santiago on an inland course. He sent his main force up a wagon track that led to the eastern side of the city. On June 24, U.S. forces, led by the dismounted cavalry division, met Spanish troops dug in and behind barbed wire barricades at the village of Las Guásimas. After a brief but sharp skirmish, the Spanish fell back and the American advance toward Santiago continued.

Spanish defenders fortified a number of locations on the low hills that blocked the eastern approach to Santiago. In most cases, these fortifications consisted of excavated trenches and small wooden "blockhouses." Some had barbed wire barricades, but not all of them were continuously manned and at least some seem to have been poorly designed. Shafter planned to take the city with a direct attack on the San Juan Heights, but decided that the defended area around El Caney could not be ignored even though it was not on the direct route to the city and its harbor. El Caney is northeast of Santiago. It had defenses like those of the San Juan Heights arrayed around a substantial "stone fort" atop of a conical stone hill.

On the morning of July 1, shortly before main assault on the San Juan Heights was set to begin, a force of American infantry under Brig. Gen. Henry Lawton attacked the Spanish installations around the suburban village of El Caney. This was expected to be a very brief engagement, but it dragged on all day, involved fighting from fixed positions, and caused serious casualties among both the Americans and Spanish. Lawton's force was supported by Cuban insurgents, but their contribution to the fight is subject to varying interpretations and needs clarification.

(*It has been clarified since this article. Some Cubans did well. Some turned yellow and hoofed it to the rear. It depended on who led which "bandito regiment". M.) 

The assault on the San Juan Heights began about midday on July 1, 1898. The major attack, led by General Jacob Kent's infantry, was aimed at the fortified southern end of a portion of the heights that has come to be known as San Juan Hill. The cavalry division, led by General Samuel Sumner after Joseph Wheeler fell ill, included the famed "Rough Riders" of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. They approached the central part of the Heights from the east, where a smaller hill stood. They took that hill, giving it the name "Kettle Hill," and then crossed the separating lowlands to occupy the northern portion of San Juan Heights.

The American assault on San Juan was confused and the Spanish defense was not well organized. Still, American forces took some 10 percent casualties before reaching the top of the Hill. When they did, Spanish troops fell back and set up a defensive front some 500-800 yards (457-732m) west of the Heights. At the time, this area was outside the city, but is now an entirely urbanized area of residences and businesses.

(Once; again the Spanish defenders mistook actual crest for a military crest and gave Parker's Gatling guns a clean target to mow down. M.)

Once on the high ground, American forces did not pursue their victory. Instead, they immediately began to fortify the area with their own earthworks and spread their perimeter around the city. They engaged in long distance exchanges with Spanish until surrender was arranged on July 17. The surrender was arranged by a group of Spanish and U.S. officers who met in the shade of a tree that stood in the area between the opposing lines. This came to be known as the "Surrender Tree."

Spanish-American War

Commander Adolph Marix To Commander Charles C. Todd

(C O P Y)

U. S. S. Scorpion, (25)
Off Manzanillo, Cuba,

July 1, 1898.

SIR:-

I have the honor to report that at 4 P.M. today, and immediately after our arrival off this port, the Scorpion and Osceola entered the harbor to attack the four Spanish gunboats that were seen inside.

2. After entering the harbor between the 2nd and 3rd southernmost of the Manzanillo Cays, we went ahead full speed; and when about 2000 yards from their vessels and about 1400 yards from the shore abreast of us, 5 vessels, 6 shore batteries, and musketry all along the shore opened fire upon us simultaneously and kept up and incessant fire throughout the whole engagement. They seemed to have plenty of ammunition.

The firing of the enemy was good throughout: too high at first, but rapidly improving. After we had been under fire about twenty minutes they had evidently got our range, and shot and shell struck all around and between both vessels. At this time I decided to turn around and steam out. We were then less than 1000 yards from the shore, and the Gatling gun of the Osceola was doing good work to keep down the musketry fire.

3. Our firing was deliberate, and must have done considerable damage; but we could not get at the gunboats, because they kept in shoal water and carefully kept bow on presenting very small targets. One of our 6” shells was seen to strike the receiving ship square in the bows. I regret that we could not steam right past the city and endeavor to sink the gunboats as we went along; but we knew nothing about the channel and had to return by the one we had found by the use of the lead and the appearance of the water.

4. We were opposed by five vessels: viz:- one receiving ship housed over with guns forward; one gunboat of about 1000 tons; two of from 500 to 400 tons; and one very small gunboat. On shore by five batteries, the principal one being above the city about half way up the hill. This was the only we made out before we entered the harbor. Three other batteries were along the water front between us and the city, and the fifth one abreast of our entrance. I do not believe that they had any modern guns of large calibre, but they certainly had some large guns, and quite a number of smaller modern guns.

5. It is remarkable that no one was struck and neither ship hurt. This ship was struck on the outside slightly, in twelve places, the nose of the shell entered the galley; and the deck was torn in several places by pieces of shell.

6. After leaving the harbor we remained outside, close to the entrance, until dark, but they did not come out.

Very respectfully,

A. MARIX,
Lieut-Com’dr. U.S.N.,
Commanding.

Source Note: TCyS, DNA, AFNRC, M625, roll 233. Addressed below close: “The Senior Officer,/Blockading Station Off Cape Cruz.” Docketing on separate page. At top of that page, rectangular “BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,” stamp dated “Jul 12 898” with the reference number: “144536.” Then: “U.S.S. Scorpion, (25)/Off Manzanillo, Cuba,/July 1, 1898/Marix, A./Lieut Comdr U.S.N.,/Comndg./Report of an engagement at/Manzanillo Cuba, July 1, 1898.”

Type

Armed yacht.........................................................1898–1899
Gunboat...............................................................1899–1927
Displacement..........................................................775 long tons (787 t)
Length...................................................................212 ft 10 in (64.87 m)
Beam......................................................................28 ft 1 in (8.56 m)
Draft.......................................................................11 ft (3.4 m)
Installed power...........................................................2 × triple expansion; 2500 IHP
Propulsion..................................................................Twin screw
Speed .....................................................................14 kn (16 mph; 26 km/h)
Complement.............................................................90
Armament..................................................................4 × 57 mm (2.24 in) 6-pounder guns

Type..........................................Armed tug
Displacement..............................571 long tons (580 t)
Length.......................................138 ft (42 m)
Beam..........................................26 ft (7.9 m)
Draft...........................................14 ft 6 in (4.42 m)
Speed.........................................14 kn (16 mph; 26 km/h)
Armament.....................................2 × 3-pounders, 1 × machine gun

Manzanillo Battery

(1898), Manzanillo

The Spanish had a shore battery just south of town that was fired upon by the American Navy on July 18, 1898.