What about OTL German Operations in this Time Line?OK, Germans didn't succeed in breaking through. They are stuck on the southern bank of the fjord somewhere between Rognan and Fausk.
They will launhc a series of operations as planned OTL. Let's have a look of the possible results.
The following information are taken primarily from the book:
The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945, Earl F. Ziemke, 1959, Department of Army Pamplethistory.army.mil/html/books/104/104-23/CMH_Pub_104-23.pdf (quite heavy)
or
books.google.fr/books?id=YiNwCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT127&lpg=PT127&dq=Operation+Naumburg+Lyngen&source=bl&ots=eZiCKZ6Xl9&sig=ACfU3U2h_vF-AfgyOPyQIWDUD5JPwrDDTw&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiSqcfOprrxAhVtyoUKHZaMAxMQ6AF6BAgKEAM#v=onepage&q=Operation%20Naumburg%20Lyngen&f=false1) Operation BueffelDecided last week of May
Relief column of 2,500 men of the 2nd Mountain Division
10 days expected to arrive in Narvik.
Realization
Departure on June 2 from Sorfold (probably from the bottom of Leirfjorden)
Arrival at Hellmobotn, located at the bottom of Hellmofjorden - Tysfjorden, on June 9 (about 60 km)
Junction of a platoon with Dietl in Narvik on June 13.
The commander of the detachment declared that this troop could have reached Narvik and fought.
2) Operation JunoDecided on 16 May as an operation to harass convoys at the beginning of June with the Scharnorst, Gneisenau, Hipper, destroyers
Modified on 24 May for a direct attack on Harstad
Orders given on 29 May
Note: Reader had asked for submarines to attack in the Narvik area, but the risk posed by the permament day made them give up.
Realization
Departure from Kiel on 4 June
Estimated British forces: 2 battleships, 1 carrier, 4 cruisers, 15 destroyers
Actual British forces: 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, 10 destroyers
Marschall decided on 6 June to attack during the night (in broad daylight at this latitude) from 8 to 9 June.
Having guessed the evacuation, Marschall decided on the 8th to return to the convoys...
3) Air reinforcements in NarvikDecision on June 4
1,800 men to be dropped over a period of one week
1,000 men promised shortly on June 5
6 gliders dedicated at Aalborg, Denmark
Operation not carried out
4) Operation NaumburgDecided on June 4
Planned on June 7th for execution within 14 days.
Landing north of Narvik, in the Lyngen fjord, probably at Lyngseidet (which has a pier for ferries)
6,000 men
a dozen tanks
from two liners:
Bremen - 56,000 t - 2,228 passengers - 28 knots
Europa - 55,500 t - 2,100 passengers - 28 knots
protected by:
Scharnorst,
Gneisenau,
Hipper, destroyers
Hamburg - Lyngseidet : 733 nautical miles - 26 h at 28 knots
Lyngseidet - Bardufoss : 120 to 130 km
Paratroopers were to take the Bardufoss field.
Operation not carried out.
5) Operation BieneMay 25th
Occupation of Alsten Island where a British intelligence and communication center was located.
Operation carried out by the 181. ID.
6) Operation IkarusDecided in early June ?
Landing in Iceland
BremenEuropaOperation not carried out
Analysis of the operations against the Allies1) Operation BueffelNote: it was an achievement to make the Hellmobotn - Narvik route in four days because there were still well over one hundred kilometers (perhaps 150) to cover on a much rougher and higher terrain than the first part and in terrible weather conditions.
If the Allies had not withdrawn, the detachment would have had to cover at least sixty more kilometers (as it started from the bottom of the Saltenfjord) at high altitudes and fight the forces encountered.
One can assume that Norwegian patrols would have been encountered north of the Blamannsisen Glacier, or even on the glacier itself.
If a force of 2,500 men could have swept through simple patrols, the British would have sent fighters to strafe them, which would certainly have inflicted substantial losses on the column in open terrain, they would at least have slowed it down greatly.
It would then have had to confront defensive lines installed on the road: Flatkjolen glacier, bottom of Leifjorden, or harassment of small units coming from the coast.
I think that the 300 km or so in the mountains to be covered would have taken more than two weeks in the best case. The relief column, having been severely weakened by the successive battles, would have come up against the forces encircling Dietl and the 3rd Mountain Division if the latter had not yet given up. The operation succeeded OTL only because there were no opposing forces between the two German forces.
By the way, diverting 2,500 elite men from the forces attacking the Anglo-Norwegian defenses at Fauske will not help... Even less chances to break through the front at this place.
2) Operation JunoPreliminary remark: if there is no Allied evacuation, the British naval forces would probably have been different at the time of the attack, probably slightly inferior, but it is to be assumed that at least one aircraft carrier, certainly
Ark Royal, would have been in the vicinity to support the local operations.
What is amazing about this case is that the German planners were very confident of the success of the operation even though the estimated opposing forces were far superior and air supremacy was British.
The Home Fleet (
Renown,
Repulse,
Sussex,
Newcastle and 13 destroyers) was east of Iceland on the way back to Scappa Flow, at a distance of approximately 650 nautical miles or about 24 hours at sea, too far to intervene except to finish off the wounded and the stragglers...
Ark Royal operation reports show permanent watch patrols. Marschall's fleet therefore had no chance of surprising the British fleet and arriving within firing range without suffering several air attacks. Even if it was avoided by chance, it would have been detected before arriving at Harstad, allowing the carrier(s) sailing in the area to call in the Swordfish and Skua. If Marschall did not find the British fleet in his path, he would still have time to inflict considerable damage on Harstad, but his retreat might well be cut off.
So in the best case, Harstad and the surrounding cargo ships will suffer significant destruction and losses obliterating the Allied land operations but probably a little late to take the pressure off Dietl and his men. It is doubtful that all ships will escape without damage and this could spell the end of the KM surface fleet.
3) Air reinforcements in NarvikSome 1,800 men would have been a substantial reinforcement for Dietl and would have delayed its end by several weeks. The area still held on June 6 was more than 5 km by 5 km, more than enough for a parachute drop. But the weather conditions were such that no parachute drop had taken place for several days, and should the weather had cleared, the British fighters could have intervened. A few hundred men could have reached the entrenched camp, enough to slow down the progression but enough to hold on much longer? If anti-aircraft batteries had been deployed in the combat zone, the result would have been even less than that, with consequent losses.
It should be noted that many Ju 52s were lost because they did not have enough fuel to return and had landed on frozen lakes without being able to take off again before the thaw. Will the Hattfjelldal airfield be able to recover them? It is mentioned that this airfield was only used for the return of the Ju 87s to refuel, it could perhaps have been used for the Ju 52s as well, but these were much heavier.
In the best case, a thousand men would have reinforced Dietl around 15-20 June. Very late and probably insufficient to stop the nibbling of the defended ground.
4) Operation NaumburgProbably the craziest enterprise: to pass undetected between the ships and planes of the RN in order to go ashore at more than 24 hours of sailing from the point of departure in a day without any period of darkness. Certainly an encounter with one or two cruisers was not likely to endanger the operation,
Scharnorst and
Gneisenau having the means to sweep away the intruders. This was less true if a flotilla of destroyers got involved, and the liners would have had even less chance of survival against an air attack, for example.
And considering that Operation Juno took place, the German fleet must have returned almost intact. Knowing the OTL results of confrontations with only two destroyers (
Ardent and
Acasta), it is to fear that the assault of a dozen destroyers supported by one or two cruisers and the concomitant attack of a dozen bombers or torpedo boats of the Fleet Air Arm would have left some after-effects in the German ranks.
If, by some extraordinary chance, this was not the case, the RN would be on its toes and even more aggressive to any new incursion attempt.
The only chance is a miserable weather allowing an undetected passage at Narvik. At full speed, it takes only six to eight hours to pass the danger zone. Historically, this was almost never the case at the end of June (the weather was bad on June 24, 25 and partly 26 only -
www.wetterzentrale.de/). The bad weather would then disrupt the unloading operations and forbid any air support action.
By the time the British reacted and understood where the Germans wanted to go, it would be too late, as in many other cases until late in the war, such as the Cerberus operation in February 1942. The landing at Lyngseidet of the
Bremen and
Europa should be able to be done without too many problems if the alert is not given. But telephone communications were very efficient in Norway and it is to be feared that the information would be relayed, allowing a Norwegian and Allied reaction, probably too slow however to prevent the landing of most of the men and equipment. But the 40 km between Lyngseidet and the bottom of the fjord will give opportunity to the RN to inflict some casualties to the invading column and to destroy part of the supply on the road.
If the weather is good, the airborne assault on Bardufoss will be possible... but the German fleet has all the chances to be spotted and intercepted and the British fighters and the AA artillery from the field will be able to intercept the attackers.
If the weather was bad, no attack on the field and the forces landed at Lyngseidet had 120 to 130 kilometers to cover to reach Bardufoss. Having tanks at their disposal, they will be difficult to stop and the British fighters could be obliged to retreat to Alta/Elvesbakken or Elvenes, greatly disrupting their action.
Everything will then depend on the speed of reaction of the Allied and Norwegian command to redeploy forces (troops and anti-tanks) to counter the attackers. If they could be contained for a few days, their situation would quickly become critical because the supply of 6,000 men by plane at this distance was not within the reach of the LW, especially in the middle of the battle of France. It would be necessary to quickly take the Bardufoss field intact with its fuel reserves.
With a lot of luck, the operation could succeed but there would still be 120 km to go to save Dietl. As the operation could not be launched before June 21, it is doubtful that he would still be able to resist after that date.
So even if Germans could reach Bardufoss, their fate would be to surrender as Dietl was about to do.
5) Operation BieneThis operation will be carried out as OTL because the island of Alsten is too far away (south of the entrance to the Mo i Rana fjord) to be supported. On the other hand, the islands and the coast north of the Svartisen glacier are probably out of reach of the Germans as long as Bodø holds.
6) Operation IkarusIceland has been occupied by the United Kingdom since 10 May, naval means to invade Iceland have been used several times since the beginning of June, one wonders when and with what residual means this operation can be launched. It would have had, in any case, only a very marginal impact on the operations in Norway by diversion of British means.
I will not study further this operation which, without air support or the possibility of refuelling, seems to me to be just as scabrous.
To sum upWith a lot of luck, the conjunction of the four operations planned in the north of Norway would perhaps have allowed Germany to save Dietl and push the Anglo-Norwegians back into the Lofoten, a territory too small to be held for long. But Dietl would have had to hold for almost a month, which seems difficult but not impossible if the LW managed to reinforce and supply it. The cost for the German forces would have been very heavy, certainly much more than for the British.
More likely, these operations would have lead to the loss of valuable German assets (mountain troops, battle cruisers, paratroopers, planes...) without gaining any real advantage on the battlefield (saving Dietl force, seizing Bardufoss, inflicting unsustainable losses to the logistics...)
Note that none of these operations was planned to force the Fauske defenses. It seems that apart outflanking British-Norwegian defenses (witch was almost impossible in this case), the Germans has no other option.
It seems curious to me at this point that several authors (1) considered the withdrawal of the Allies and the final Norwegian defeat as inevitable. If not impossible, it still seems unlikely to me, and I still cannot see how the Germans could have achieved it with any certainty.
(1) General Walter Warlimont, Pr. Walther Hubatsch for example, quoted by Ziemke, or T. K. Derry, in The Campaign in Norway.
