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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 17, 2021 10:51:21 GMT
The Soviet threat of invasion referred to by Field Marshal Baker is a distant one, but the only one, given the unlikely nature of France or Germany suddenly flipping sides or the Chinese or Turks showing up in the North Sea.
It is driven by the necessity of honouring the threat of the Soviet build up in conventional military forces, specifically the increases in their numbers of Airborne and Naval Infantry divisions - intelligence reports indicate that the number of VDV divisions in the Northern Theatre is to rise from 3 to 4 and those in the Western Theatre from 1 to 2, whilst the Naval Infantry strength of the Red Banner Northern Fleet is to rise to 4 divisions. These have been accompanied by the reformation of light infantry/Rifle divisions capable of rapid deployment by air and sea that have far less of a footprint than Motor Rifle divisions and of Spetsnaz brigades assessed as being equivalent to the British Army’s Commandos; there are fragmentary reports of the formation of higher trained special forces units.
Altogether, these still don’t amount to a strong likelihood, but Britain has not abandoned home defence to the same extent as in @.
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 22, 2021 15:55:58 GMT
A preview snippet of the next chapter:
The sounds of a military band striking up Soldiers of the Queen drifted into Stanley Barton’s study from out on the other side of Horse Guards. Somewhat ironic, really. For every piece that lauded Britain’s long roll of honour in battles on every continent or hailed the empire of the clouds, there were two more that spoke of her traditional strength, of the hearts of oak and hardy tars of the Royal Navy. Despite being an Army man himself, Barton had a deep and long love for the Andrew, and viewed it as something of a regret that he had never held the office of the man who now sat opposite.
“We’ve got a dickens of a task, First Lord, but we’ll do it. On that I have no doubt.”
“Of course, Prime Minister. I do hope that my note did not give the impression that I was skeptical of our capacity, as it were; however, it will be something of an uphill struggle.
Barton ground his teeth and stared at Christopher Mayhew, First Lord of the Admiralty for a long moment.
“Yesterday, I told the Army that the purse strings had been untied. The same goes for the Navy, only the purse is deeper. We are an island nation and a seagoing empire. Our fates lie with the waves. Based on what you’ve seen and heard, what more is required to achieve our naval goals?”
Mayhew paused to gather his answer and choose the best words to answer his Prime Minister. Barton was many things, but one of the most seemingly unlikely was his wholehearted enthusiasm for all things naval, which was exceeded only by that of the Duke of London in terms of all Britain’s Prime Ministers of the last century. Labour’s naval policy heading into the election had thus been suitably ambitious and expansive, calling for the Royal Navy to outbuild and outmatch any of her foes, to ride the crest of the bold new wave of the technological revolution, to be able to fight both hot and cold wars and to project British power across the world. Ambitious, yet sufficiently broad in large parts of its rhetoric to avoid commitment to any truly impossible goals, such as truly ruling the waves in this epoch of the Pax Americana.
“We will not have any difficulty in building up to the first stages of the New Fleet Plan, Prime Minister, but that will not supplant the Red Navy from its current position within that period. They have increased their construction, just as they face the same block obsolescence problem that confronts us, the Americans, the French and others. The raw numbers fielded by the Soviets aren’t the great threat once thought, when we consider that they are divided between four widely dispersed fleets.”
“The White Sea Canal suggests otherwise, at least in part.”
“Yes, that is quite true, Prime Minister. It still doesn’t get the Black Sea Fleet out past Constantinople and through the Straits into the Med, or change the situation of their Pacific Fleet from being outnumbered and outpositioned on the other side of the world. Ship for ship, we are better than the bulk of their fleet.”
“What did Mountbatten and the Admiralty view as their most significant dangers?”
“First and foremost, their nuclear submarine fleet - it is growing and getting better by the year to boot and their ballistic missile boats are starting to reach troublesome numbers and capabilities. Secondly, their big guided missile capital ships, particularly the Stalin class battlewagons. Thirdly, their aircraft carrier force, although we assess them as being qualitatively behind our own by perhaps fifteen years. Last of all, their newest missile cruiser and destroyer types, based on current information, if it is accurate.”
“If indeed.” Barton knew it to be quite, quite accurate, although he could not let on in any way to Mayhew, naturally.
“Insofar as their older vessels go, the Skoryys and their earliest frigates are extremely good conventional gun escorts, but were caught just behind the pace of change a decade ago; today, they are very much obsolescent against modern threats and weapons. The Sverdlovs may have worried the daylights out of us in 1946, but their major threat window closed during the Korean War with the Brigands, Super Helmover and the guided Highballs.”
“They are still large and fast ships, though, with potential for upgrading with quite a few modern missiles and guided weapons beyond their current partial conversions - your note made that very point.”
“If they do go down that path, Prime Minister, there is potential there, but our reports indicate that they’d really need to give them a thorough rebuild to approach anything of the operational efficiency of the Kazans, let alone our own missile conversions or those of the USN. It would add 10-15 years to their operational lifespan.”
“Hmm. Even as second class combatants, that is still food for thought; they may not be able to go up against a Leander, but they’d give an unwary convoy a right beasting. I don’t think we can write them off just yet; the newest of them is well under a decade old, after all. Now, let’s move on from what the dashed Russians might do to what we can do.”
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stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Feb 22, 2021 16:50:45 GMT
One point. I do remember reading, IIRC in a Solzhenitsyn book, that the White Sea Canal was of very limited use. To get it completed on schedule and hence avoid ending up in the gulag themselves the people in charge cut a lot of corners, including only digging a very shallow canal that relatively few ships could use. This may be inaccurate or might not be the case in the DE universe but just to mention the point.
Steve
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 22, 2021 17:15:16 GMT
Destroyer Obsolescence, or A Study in Timing
A.) Obsolescent WW2 Destroyers 1964 USN: 64 Allen M. Sumner and 144 Gearing class destroyers RN: 80 Battle class destroyers MR: 26 WW2 Soviet Navy: 12 Gnevny class destroyers + 41 reserve
B.) 1950s DDs USN: 82 Forrest Sherman class MR: 20 Le Aventurier class Soviet Navy: 95 Skoryy class
C.) DDGs USN: 100 (16 Mitscher, 25 Farragut, 59 Charles F. Adams) RN: 84 (A-K class) Soviet Navy: 70 (+ 25 x 4900t Neustrashimy DD/DL) MR: 29
The devil is in the detail. The Skoryys are decent Forrest Sherman sized ships, but have less margin for modernisation, both in their design and by virtue of their role as fleet screens and escorts. They were built in big numbers in the late 1940s-early 1950s, before the full lessons of the war and subsequent naval revolution could be fully felt. The Royal Navy built slowly but steadily and her early DDGs have a somewhat longer window of effective service life remaining.
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 22, 2021 17:17:51 GMT
One point. I do remember reading, IIRC in a Solzhenitsyn book, that the White Sea Canal was of very limited use. To get it completed on schedule and hence avoid ending up in the gulag themselves the people in charge cut a lot of corners, including only digging a very shallow canal that relatively few ships could use. This may be inaccurate or might not be the case in the DE universe but just to mention the point.
Steve
Steve, Here, it is a deep and wide waterway that links the two fleets; there were a lot of casualties from the gulag work force in the process. It is seen as a strategic problem on a par with the Kiel Canal in the early 20th century. Simon
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 23, 2021 16:38:44 GMT
“Very good, Prime Minister. We currently deploy a smaller fleet than in 1960, when there was the last major mobilisation, or 1956, when we last went to war, but in every respect, it is a more powerful one. That is a result of some long-sighted decisions in the past decade or so to prioritise quality over numbers, as well as a natural consequence of history - by virtue of being the first to rearm in the 1930s, our ships have come to the end of their line sooner than the Americans, for example.”
“We can’t change that. Neither can we rely on it in the future. We’ve timed our build up of the fleet prior to each world war quite well, but there is no such guarantee this time around.”
“I agree, naturally - that is why the old plans of breaking out the reserve fleet don’t quite cut the mustard anymore. We might not get the time to reactivate and prepare 20 year old ships, nor can they bring the same sort of impact to a modern war that they could in Korea.”
“Your recommendations were quite plain, Christopher, and they match my own. Don’t keep what we can’t use. They must be replaced though. Not in kind, but in power.”
“We’ve inherited a fairly good process of exactly that. In our capital ships, there hasn’t been a noticeable decline due to the policy of rotation and if we continue this, which I recommend we should, then we push the useful service life of our battlefleet to the late 1970s. Within the next year, the last of the wartime light cruisers will leave service, making us the first major navy to have a purely guided missile cruiser fleet. Our destroyer numbers have declined and will continue to drop sharply as the Battles are retired, but our new construction ships are considerably more capable in both anti-submarine and anti-air warfare. That is the good side of the current fleet...”
“Meaning that there is also a bad side?”
“I’m not sure that is the best term for it; there are aspects of the fleet that aren’t what they should be, though. Aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, Prime Minister. Our atomic submarine programme is going quite smoothly, averaging two new attack boats per year, but we are starting to really fall back from the other superpowers, removing whatever advantage we have had from Dreadnought’s head start.”
“We’re going to double that rate and increase the R class from eight to twelve, to begin with. I also want you to get the D.N.C. to pick up the pace on the S class design. With the modifications we desired.”
Mayhew nodded. The S class were to be Britain’s largest fleet submarines yet, save for the bombers, and were certainly the most complex to boot. Barton’s suggestions to have them altered to carry long range missiles, coming as they did very early in his time in office, added to that complexity, but he had been quite insistent that the Royal Navy have such a capacity. The Director of Naval Construction was understandably vexed, but the logic was clear enough to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had been party to the development and fine tuning of the New Fleet Plan. Long range attack missiles would give the Andrew’s submarines both an ace in the hole against the growing Soviet and Chinese fleets and also allow them to play a role in the ‘cold war missions’ around the Empire. The bigger picture sometimes obscured the complexity of the smaller details needed to create it, though, with the wood sometimes obscuring the trees.
“As you wish, Prime Minister. Moving along to the surface fleet, it isn’t a matter of the ships themselves lacking quality, as we’re right up with the best in the world for each, but the problem is twofold for the frigates and carriers. Firstly, we already hit the block obsolescence problem with each, cutting back on the numbers and forcing us to push our smaller force harder. As well as this, the retirement of the light carriers has increased the complexity of the role of our frigate force and diverts our fleet carriers from their main role.”
“That reinforces everything we’ve been saying for years. The Admiralty has been doing the same and the Tories tried to do something about it, but the money simply wasn’t there under the caps set in the last White Paper. Those are now gone. I intend to rebuild the Royal Navy. We’ll bring forward the 1966 light antisubmarine carriers to next year and then increase orders from there. Frigates will be a bit more difficult, as we’ve pinned our hopes on the Type 21s and can’t significantly accelerate the pace of their development, but prepare a paper on our options regarding them. By my calculations, even with them, we fall short on our required escort force goals by almost 80 ships.”
“Those goals were set prior to the restoration of the Atlantic Pact, though, Prime Minister, as well as being the cost of disposing of the Battles, which is the right decision. We can factor in some degree reduced need due to Allied vessels in the Atlantic and Mediterranean without seriously endangering our status or commitments, I should think.”
“You’re quite right on one level. That’s just what the Americans were saying in Washington as well at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting. It makes sense if our main or major commitment was the Allies, or “NATO” as the cousins are now want to say.” Barton paused, inwardly bemused on the irony of that particular nomenclature, yet unable to share or explain it, for obvious reasons.
“Excerpt that they say it one moment and then seek concrete commitments to allocated escorts on the other; we can always draw down on our forces beyond the Atlantic. It makes sense and is right for them. It can’t be, though, not for us, not for Britain, not if we want to retain our full capacity for freedom of action anywhere in the world, no matter who is with us. We’ve got to restore that margin, First Lord, as that is what lets us stay up front and centre with the Commonwealth and the Newly Emerging Forces, no matter what is said or thought in Washington or Paris.”
“I leave the grand strategy and policy of the Empire to you and your fellows, Prime Minister; I merely suggest that we don’t need to bear the lion’s share of the burden on our side of the Atlantic when our allies can now do their bit. In such a case, though, our current options would be to build more Rivers, order a cheaper variant of the Tribals or increase our plans for the Type 21. The last would be pushing well beyond our planned spending and cut into other parts of the fleet programme, but if you wish, I can...”
“Prepare a feasibility study. Do so. Now, what do you have next?”
“Aircraft, Prime Minister, then the secret weapon we’ve discussed.”
“Excellent.”
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stevep
Fleet admiral
Posts: 24,836
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Post by stevep on Feb 24, 2021 11:34:56 GMT
“Very good, Prime Minister. We currently deploy a smaller fleet than in 1960, when there was the last major mobilisation, or 1956, when we last went to war, but in every respect, it is a more powerful one. That is a result of some long-sighted decisions in the past decade or so to prioritise quality over numbers, as well as a natural consequence of history - by virtue of being the first to rearm in the 1930s, our ships have come to the end of their line sooner than the Americans, for example.” “We can’t change that. Neither can we rely on it in the future. We’ve timed our build up of the fleet prior to each world war quite well, but there is no such guarantee this time around.” “I agree, naturally - that is why the old plans of breaking out the reserve fleet don’t quite cut the mustard anymore. We might not get the time to reactivate and prepare 20 year old ships, nor can they bring the same sort of impact to a modern war that they could in Korea.” “Your recommendations were quite plain, Christopher, and they match my own. Don’t keep what we can’t use. They must be replaced though. Not in kind, but in power.” “We’ve inherited a fairly good process of exactly that. In our capital ships, there hasn’t been a noticeable decline due to the policy of rotation and if we continue this, which I recommend we should, then we push the useful service life of our battlefleet to the late 1970s. Within the next year, the last of the wartime light cruisers will leave service, making us the first major navy to have a purely guided missile cruiser fleet. Our destroyer numbers have declined and will continue to drop sharply as the Battles are retired, but our new construction ships are considerably more capable in both anti-submarine and anti-air warfare. That is the good side of the current fleet...” “Meaning that there is also a bad side?” “I’m not sure that is the best term for it; there are aspects of the fleet that aren’t what they should be, though. Aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, Prime Minister. Our atomic submarine programme is going quite smoothly, averaging two new attack boats per year, but we are starting to really fall back from the other superpowers, removing whatever advantage we have had from Dreadnought’s head start.” “We’re going to double that rate and increase the R class from eight to twelve, to begin with. I also want you to get the D.N.C. to pick up the pace on the S class design. With the modifications we desired.” Mayhew nodded. The S class were to be Britain’s largest fleet submarines yet, save for the bombers, and were certainly the most complex to boot. Barton’s suggestions to have them altered to carry long range missiles, coming as they did very early in his time in office, added to that complexity, but he had been quite insistent that the Royal Navy have such a capacity. The Director of Naval Construction was understandably vexed, but the logic was clear enough to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had been party to the development and fine tuning of the New Fleet Plan. Long range attack missiles would give the Andrew’s submarines both an ace in the hole against the growing Soviet and Chinese fleets and also allow them to play a role in the ‘cold war missions’ around the Empire. The bigger picture sometimes obscured the complexity of the smaller details needed to create it, though, with the wood sometimes obscuring the trees. “As you wish, Prime Minister. Moving along to the surface fleet, it isn’t a matter of the ships themselves lacking quality, as we’re right up with the best in the world for each, but the problem is twofold for the frigates and carriers. Firstly, we already hit the block obsolescence problem with each, cutting back on the numbers and forcing us to push our smaller force harder. As well as this, the retirement of the light carriers has increased the complexity of the role of our frigate force and diverts our fleet carriers from their main role.” “That reinforces everything we’ve been saying for years. The Admiralty has been doing the same and the Tories tried to do something about it, but the money simply wasn’t there under the caps set in the last White Paper. Those are now gone. I intend to rebuild the Royal Navy. We’ll bring forward the 1966 light antisubmarine carriers to next year and then increase orders from there. Frigates will be a bit more difficult, as we’ve pinned our hopes on the Type 21s and can’t significantly accelerate the pace of their development, but prepare a paper on our options regarding them. By my calculations, even with them, we fall short on our required escort force goals by almost 80 ships.” “Those goals were set prior to the restoration of the Atlantic Pact, though, Prime Minister, as well as being the cost of disposing of the Battles, which is the right decision. We can factor in some degree reduced need due to Allied vessels in the Atlantic and Mediterranean without seriously endangering our status or commitments, I should think.” “You’re quite right on one level. That’s just what the Americans were saying in Washington as well at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting. It makes sense if our main or major commitment was the Allies, or “NATO” as the cousins are now want to say.” Barton paused, inwardly bemused on the irony of that particular nomenclature, yet unable to share or explain it, for obvious reasons. “Excerpt that they say it one moment and then seek concrete commitments to allocated escorts on the other; we can always draw down on our forces beyond the Atlantic. It makes sense and is right for them. It can’t be, though, not for us, not for Britain, not if we want to retain our full capacity for freedom of action anywhere in the world, no matter who is with us. We’ve got to restore that margin, First Lord, as that is what lets us stay up front and centre with the Commonwealth and the Newly Emerging Forces, no matter what is said or thought in Washington or Paris.” “I leave the grand strategy and policy of the Empire to you and your fellows, Prime Minister; I merely suggest that we don’t need to bear the lion’s share of the burden on our side of the Atlantic when our allies can now do their bit. In such a case, though, our current options would be to build more Rivers, order a cheaper variant of the Tribals or increase our plans for the Type 21. The last would be pushing well beyond our planned spending and cut into other parts of the fleet programme, but if you wish, I can...” “Prepare a feasibility study. Do so. Now, what do you have next?” “Aircraft, Prime Minister, then the secret weapon we’ve discussed.” “Excellent.”
That sounds very good for the Andrew. Having 12 SSBMs would give a good degree of capacity to absorb losses in say an extended conventional conflict while maintaining a 2nd strike deterrent. Also seriously facing the problems of international commitments rather than simply withdrawing to the N Atlantic as the US [and OTL many in Britain ] wanted.
When talking about the S class, presumably SSNs? I think you meant boomers rather than bombers when you discussed their size or did I misunderstand something?
Steve
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 24, 2021 11:53:04 GMT
Steve,
The 12 R class SSNs are separate from the R class SSBNs, symbolising a bit of a sign of the confused nomenclature that occurs with a larger fleet. It is something of a Sturgeon analogue.
Britain isn't pulling back progressively to a solely North Atlantic role, as that would lead to an accompanying collapse of any Imperial power; it is something of an ongoing chain reaction that Barton is keenly aware of. There isn't going to be any withdrawal from the Far East or Mediterranean, which makes trying to cover the Eastern Atlantic in force quite strained, particularly when combined with the escort needs of the Grand Fleet/carrier strike fleet and ongoing Commonwealth/Imperial commitments. That last part is where the 'secret weapon' comes into play...
The S class are a successor SSN to be built from the late 1960s that will be broadly analogous to the US Los Angeles class, albeit larger. Barton's modification calls for them to carry cruise missiles in VLS type cells, in addition to torpedoes and anti-ship missiles; he wants them to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Papa class and other rumoured developments.
British naval terminology refers to SSBNs as 'bombers' rather than 'boomers'.
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stevep
Fleet admiral
Posts: 24,836
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Post by stevep on Feb 24, 2021 12:34:18 GMT
Steve, The 12 R class SSNs are separate from the R class SSBNs, symbolising a bit of a sign of the confused nomenclature that occurs with a larger fleet. It is something of a Sturgeon analogue. Britain isn't pulling back progressively to a solely North Atlantic role, as that would lead to an accompanying collapse of any Imperial power; it is something of an ongoing chain reaction that Barton is keenly aware of. There isn't going to be any withdrawal from the Far East or Mediterranean, which makes trying to cover the Eastern Atlantic in force quite strained, particularly when combined with the escort needs of the Grand Fleet/carrier strike fleet and ongoing Commonwealth/Imperial commitments. That last part is where the 'secret weapon' comes into play... The S class are a successor SSN to be built from the late 1960s that will be broadly analogous to the US Los Angeles class, albeit larger. Barton's modification calls for them to carry cruise missiles in VLS type cells, in addition to torpedoes and anti-ship missiles; he wants them to counter the perceived threat of the Soviet Papa class and other rumoured developments. British naval terminology refers to SSBNs as 'bombers' rather than 'boomers'.
OK thanks for clarifying. I have the feeling you have mentioned that last point before now I've read it. Sorry but the memory isn't what it used to be.
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 24, 2021 13:14:06 GMT
That is quite fine.
The first of the S class will replace the oldest three British SSNs (Dreadnought, Warspite and Valiant) from the mid 1970s after shorter service lives of ~25 years. The R class will bring the nuclear submarine fleet to 50 boats, but then there will be a steady changeover as the older 1950s boats are replaced.
The conventional submarine fleet, consisting of the Oberons and Pearls, will stick around in a variety of supporting roles for a long time to come.
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 25, 2021 17:09:02 GMT
“The RNAS plan mainly focuses on modernisation of the maritime patrol aircraft fleet and their land based fighters. The last of the Shackletons will go next year and the Albions by 1967, with a view towards consolidating further on the Nimrod and Sydney in an all jet force. That gives us a powerful mix, with no great loss in endurance over the Mid Atlantic, given our bases. Crucially, the Nimrod can operate from the Floating Fortresses, although with a quite small margin. The flying boats give us a certain degree of basing flexibility in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There have already been some back channel approaches from the South Americans regarding acquiring the Albion fleet.”
“That will be a job for the Foreign Office when they make their formal approach, but so long as it doesn’t disturb the balance of power down there, I can see no issue with it. What of the Poseidons then?”
“Australia and New Zealand will take 120 and 30 and the rest will go to India as part of their naval modernisation. All of them were quite keen on the longer range it offers and the transfers can be streamlined through existing Commonwealth arrangements. Our own longer range arrangements will be addressed with the commissioning of the first of the new RN skyships next year.
“They will be essential parts of our strategy, First Lord, and you’ll get the full programme, despite the fuss that the Air Ministry is kicking up about it taking up too much of our supply of levian metals and cavorite. These aren’t going to take any roles from their skyship carriers or aerodreadnoughts, after all.”
“When we get them all, Prime Minister, then we can start put Skyweb into active service. With that, the anti-submarine battle in the Atlantic will shift further in our favour. Moving to the fighter question, our first order of priority will converting the land based air defence squadrons to Phantoms, which will allow for commonality with the Fleet Air Arm carrier squadrons. If we were to also consider equipping the maritime strike fighter squadrons with Phantom, then there would be a further efficiency saving, at the cost of some range and performance compared with the Tornado.”
“I can see the logic in that argument, but I’m somewhat hesitant to put all our eggs in the Phantom basket for a number of reasons. The Tornado is longer ranged and carries a heavier bomb load to begin with, and the RNAS maritime strike wings are primarily meant to fight up over the Norwegian and Baltic Seas where that matters more than the Med. We are also looking to sell the maritime strike variant of the Tornado to a number of allied states, notably Germany, so we don’t want to do the saleswork for our Atlantic chums at our own expense. It is going to be enough of a job to maintain a two Phantom forces in the face of a Treasury that doesn’t like the armament programme as it stands. Ultimately, the land based planes are more for the Empire and the Floating Forts, but give us the opportunity to maintain extra carrier capable pilots and aeroplanes to back up the fleet.”
“The first point alone should suffice against anything that comes up in Parliament, Prime Minister, and the second should keep the Treasury sharks at bay. On that point, it could be worth considering whether to cancel the RNAS Valiant replacement programme - it would save at least £250 million and could be played as a responsible savings measure.”
“An interesting proposal. There is less of a case for the Navy to have a strategic bomber than the 40s, given what the Excalibur can do off the carriers. It isn’t urgent though, so have the Admiralty put together a paper on our options. Now, Fleet Air Arm.”
“We find ourselves in the somewhat lucky position of not having any expensive development or procurement programmes on the horizon for the next decade or so, allowing us to concentrate on building our strength of existing types and a few new key planes. In the Vanguard, we have an excellent air superiority and fleet defence fighter with a range long enough to give the Reds conniptions, so there are no substantive issues there, save for a few minor RDF teething issues that have cropped up in escort missions over South Vietnam. The Supermarine Excalibur is the best carrier bomber in the world, which it should be for its price. The Buccaneers and Merlins cover the attack and strike missions extremely well. Replacing the de Havilland Spectre with the Phantom is the biggest change that will be occurring over the next five years; it is a newer and consequently better plane and the extra legs will be useful.”
There was more to it than simply performance, Barton thought. He had bristled at the initial talk of buying the American fighter when it was first rumoured several years ago, but that all ended once Prime Minister Eden had invited him around to Number 10 for a late night drink. The Phantom deal had more wheels within wheels than the Antikythera Mechanism, but it came down to three main factors - a complicated series of Anglo-American quid pro quo agreements for licenced production of different aircraft on either side of the Atlantic; the need to lead the Commonwealth into the matter, rather than be left behind at a time when Australia, New Avalon and Israel had their minds set on the Phantom; and freeing up the substantial numbers of still highly competitive Spectres for a calculated swamping of the Middle Eastern and South American markets. That last twist in the tale was already yielding substantial dividends.
“Range. That is the important part. With long ranges carrier groups, we can project ourselves inland in Africa and Asia in such strength that we rapidly control arising situations. That is the prize on offer.”
“A heady one indeed, Prime Minister. I pursued the question of the Sea Harrier on the fleet carriers as you requested, but the general consensus is that it would not be of any operational benefit, given that very issue of range. Their best place is on the light anti-submarine and commando carriers, although there is a not insubstantial minority that advocates their permanent deployment on the battleships as well.”
“Have them run a few more tests then, but don’t commit to anything binding either way. Anything on the new aircraft?”
“Fairey estimates that the Cormorant will be flying by the end of next year, Armstrong-Whitworth are aiming for 1967 for the Argonaut and Bristol can get the Sparrowhawk ready within six months.”
“Good. Very good. Right on time.”
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 25, 2021 18:08:00 GMT
Quite a bit going on there, but as a preliminary note:
Fairey Cormorant = An ASW carrier plane A-W Argonaut = A quad turboprop STOL transport for COD and more Bristol Sparrowhawk = Light attack jet
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 28, 2021 17:17:40 GMT
A New Jerusalem Part 12
The sounds of a military band striking up Soldiers of the Queen drifted into Stanley Barton’s study from out on the other side of Horse Guards. Somewhat ironic, really. For every piece that lauded Britain’s long roll of honour in battles on every continent or hailed the empire of the clouds, there were two more that spoke of her traditional strength, of the hearts of oak and hardy tars of the Royal Navy. Despite being an Army man himself, Barton had a deep and long love for the Andrew, and viewed it as something of a regret that he had never held the office of the man who now sat opposite.
“We’ve got a dickens of a task, First Lord, but we’ll do it. On that I have no doubt.”
“Of course, Prime Minister. I do hope that my note did not give the impression that I was skeptical of our capacity, as it were; however, it will be something of an uphill struggle.
Barton ground his teeth and stared at Christopher Mayhew, the First Lord of the Admiralty, for a long moment.
“Yesterday, I told the Army that the purse strings had been untied. The same goes for the Navy, only the purse is deeper. We are an island nation and a seagoing empire. Our fates lie with the waves. Based on what you’ve seen and heard, what more is required to achieve our naval goals?”
Mayhew paused to gather his answer and choose the best words to answer his Prime Minister. Barton was many things, but one of the most seemingly unlikely was his wholehearted enthusiasm for all things naval, which was exceeded only by that of the Duke of London in terms of all Britain’s Prime Ministers of the last century. He had risen to prominence in part in speeches, articles and newspaper articles on the Navy and its paramount importance, after all. Labour’s naval policy heading into the election had thus been suitably ambitious and expansive, calling for the Royal Navy to outbuild and outmatch any of her foes, to ride the crest of the bold new wave of the technological revolution, to be able to fight both hot and cold wars and to project British power across the world. Ambitious, yet sufficiently broad in large parts of its rhetoric to avoid commitment to any truly impossible goals, such as truly ruling the waves in this epoch of the Pax Americana.
“We will not have any difficulty in building up to the first stages of the New Fleet Plan, Prime Minister, but that will not supplant the Red Navy from its current position within that period. They have increased their construction, just as they face the same block obsolescence problem that confronts us, the Americans, the French and others. The raw numbers fielded by the Soviets aren’t the great threat once thought, when we consider that they are divided between four widely dispersed fleets.”
“The White Sea Canal suggests otherwise, at least in part.”
“Yes, that is quite true, Prime Minister. It still doesn’t get the Black Sea Fleet out past Constantinople and through the Straits into the Med, or change the situation of their Pacific Fleet from being outnumbered and outpositioned on the other side of the world. Ship for ship, we are better than the bulk of their fleet.”
“What did Mountbatten and the Admiralty view as their most significant dangers?”
“First and foremost, their nuclear submarine fleet - it is growing and getting better by the year to boot and their ballistic missile boats are starting to reach troublesome numbers and capabilities. Secondly, their big guided missile capital ships, particularly the Stalin class battlewagons. Thirdly, their aircraft carrier force, although we assess them as being qualitatively behind our own by perhaps fifteen years. Last of all, their newest missile cruiser and destroyer types, based on current information, if it is accurate.”
“If indeed.” Barton knew it to be quite, quite accurate, although he could not let on in any way to Mayhew, naturally.
“Insofar as their older vessels go, the Skoryys and their earliest frigates are extremely good conventional gun escorts, but were caught just behind the pace of change a decade ago; today, they are very much obsolescent against modern threats and weapons. The Sverdlovs may have worried the daylights out of us in 1946, but their major threat window closed during the Korean War with the Brigands, Super Helmover and the guided Highballs.”
“They are still large and fast ships, though, with potential for upgrading with quite a few modern missiles and guided weapons beyond their current partial conversions - your note made that very point.”
“If they do go down that path, Prime Minister, there is potential there, but our reports indicate that they’d really need to give them a thorough rebuild to approach anything of the operational efficiency of the Kazans, let alone our own missile conversions or those of the USN. It would add 10-15 years to their operational lifespan.”
“Hmm. Even as second class combatants, that is still food for thought; they may not be able to go up against a Leander, but they’d give an unwary convoy a right beasting. I don’t think we can write them off just yet; the newest of them is well under a decade old, after all. What about their Whiskeys?”
“Their sheer numbers are a worry, but nothing like how they were perceived a dozen years ago or so. Even when combined with their Romeos, the older Red boats present a challenge of time, rather than a bona fide threat. All the measures we’ve taken since 1950 have considerably reduced what conventional subs with wartime technology can accomplish, to put it mildly. Our indications are that they are working on a new hull form for the successor to the Foxtrot class, but until then, their non-nuclear subs hold no inordinate terrors for us.”
“Good. We’re not going to lack any preparation this time around, not if I have anything to do with it. Now, let’s move on from what the dashed Russians might do to what we can do.”
“Very good, Prime Minister. We currently deploy a smaller fleet than in 1960, when there was the last major mobilisation, or 1956, when we last went to war, but in every respect, it is a more powerful one. That is a result of some long-sighted decisions in the past decade or so to prioritise quality over numbers, as well as a natural consequence of history - by virtue of being the first to rearm in the 1930s, our ships have come to the end of their line sooner than the Americans, for example.”
“We can’t change that. Neither can we rely on it in the future. We’ve timed our build up of the fleet prior to each world war quite well, but there is no such guarantee this time around.”
“I agree, naturally - that is why the old plans of breaking out the reserve fleet don’t quite cut the mustard anymore. We might not get the time to reactivate and prepare 20 year old ships, nor can they bring the same sort of impact to a modern war that they could in Korea.”
“Your recommendations were quite plain, Christopher, and they match my own. Don’t keep what we can’t use. They must be replaced though. Not in kind, but in power.”
“We’ve inherited a fairly good process of exactly that. In our capital ships, there hasn’t been a noticeable decline due to the policy of rotation and if we continue this, which I recommend we should, then we push the useful service life of our battlefleet to the late 1970s. Within the next year, the last of the wartime light cruisers will leave service, making us the first major navy to have a purely guided missile cruiser fleet. Our destroyer numbers have declined and will continue to drop sharply as the Battles are retired, but our new construction ships are considerably more capable in both anti-submarine and anti-air warfare. That is the good side of the current fleet...”
“Meaning that there is also a bad side?”
“I’m not sure that is the best term for it; there are aspects of the fleet that aren’t what they should be, though. Aircraft carriers, submarines and frigates, Prime Minister. Our atomic submarine programme is going quite smoothly, averaging two new attack boats per year, but we are starting to really fall back from the other superpowers, removing whatever advantage we have had from Dreadnought’s head start.”
“We’re going to double that rate and increase the R class from eight to twelve, to begin with. I also want you to get the D.N.C. to pick up the pace on the S class design. With the modifications we desired.”
Mayhew nodded. The S class were to be Britain’s largest fleet submarines yet, save for the bombers, and were certainly the most complex to boot. Barton’s suggestions to have them altered to carry long range missiles, coming as they did very early in his time in office, added to that complexity, but he had been quite insistent that the Royal Navy have such a capacity. The Director of Naval Construction was understandably vexed, but the logic was clear enough to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who had been party to the development and fine tuning of the New Fleet Plan. Long range attack missiles would give the Andrew’s submarines both an ace in the hole against the growing Soviet and Chinese fleets and also allow them to play a role in the ‘cold war missions’ around the Empire. The bigger picture sometimes obscured the complexity of the smaller details needed to create it, though, with the wood sometimes obscuring the trees.
“As you wish, Prime Minister. Moving along to the surface fleet, it isn’t a matter of the ships themselves lacking quality, as we’re right up with the best in the world for each, but the problem is twofold for the frigates and carriers. Firstly, we already hit the block obsolescence problem with each, cutting back on the numbers and forcing us to push our smaller force harder. As well as this, the retirement of the light carriers has increased the complexity of the role of our frigate force and diverts our fleet carriers from their main role.”
“That reinforces everything we’ve been saying for years. The Admiralty has been doing the same and the Tories tried to do something about it, but the money simply wasn’t there under the caps set in the last White Paper. Those are now gone. I intend to rebuild the Royal Navy. We’ll bring forward the 1966 light antisubmarine carriers to next year and then increase orders from there. Frigates will be a bit more difficult, as we’ve pinned our hopes on the Type 21s and can’t significantly accelerate the pace of their development, but prepare a paper on our options regarding them. By my calculations, even with them, we fall short on our required escort force goals by almost 80 ships.”
“Those goals were set prior to the restoration of the Atlantic Pact, though, Prime Minister, as well as being the cost of disposing of the Battles, which is the right decision. We can factor in some degree reduced need due to Allied vessels in the Atlantic and Mediterranean without seriously endangering our status or commitments, I should think.”
“You’re quite right on one level. That’s just what the Americans were saying in Washington as well at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting. It makes sense if our main or major commitment was the Allies, or “NATO” as the cousins are now want to say.” Barton paused, inwardly bemused on the irony of that particular nomenclature, yet unable to share or explain it, for obvious reasons.
“Excerpt that they say it one moment and then seek concrete commitments to allocated escorts on the other; we can always draw down on our forces beyond the Atlantic. It makes sense and is right for them. It can’t be, though, not for us, not for Britain, not if we want to retain our full capacity for freedom of action anywhere in the world, no matter who is with us. We’ve got to restore that margin, First Lord, as that is what lets us stay up front and centre with the Commonwealth and the Newly Emerging Forces, no matter what is said or thought in Washington or Paris.”
“I leave the grand strategy and policy of the Empire to you and your fellows, Prime Minister; I merely suggest that we don’t need to bear the lion’s share of the burden on our side of the Atlantic when our allies can now do their bit. In such a case, though, our current options would be to build more Rivers, order a cheaper variant of the Tribals or increase our plans for the Type 21. The last would be pushing well beyond our planned spending and cut into other parts of the fleet programme, but if you wish, I can...”
“Prepare a feasibility study. Do so. Now, what do you have next?”
“Aircraft, Prime Minister, then the ‘secret weapon’ we’ve discussed.”
“Excellent.”
“The RNAS plan mainly focuses on modernisation of the maritime patrol aircraft fleet and their land based fighters. The last of the Shackletons will go next year and the Albions by 1967, with a view towards consolidating further on the Nimrod and Sydney in an all jet force. That gives us a powerful mix, with no great loss in endurance over the Mid Atlantic, given our bases. Crucially, the Nimrod can operate from the Floating Fortresses, although with a quite small margin. The flying boats give us a certain degree of basing flexibility in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. There have already been some back channel approaches from the South Americans regarding acquiring the Albion fleet.”
“That will be a job for the Foreign Office when they make their formal approach, but so long as it doesn’t disturb the balance of power down there, I can see no issue with it. What of the Poseidons then?”
“Australia and New Zealand will take 120 and 30 and the rest will go to India as part of their naval modernisation. All of them were quite keen on the longer range it offers and the transfers can be streamlined through existing Commonwealth arrangements. Our own longer range arrangements will be addressed with the commissioning of the first of the new RN skyships next year.
“They will be essential parts of our strategy, First Lord, and you’ll get the full programme, despite the fuss that the Air Ministry is kicking up about it taking up too much of our supply of levian metals and cavorite. These aren’t going to take any roles from their skyship carriers or aerodreadnoughts, after all.”
“When we get them all, Prime Minister, then we can start put Skyweb into active service. With that, the anti-submarine battle in the Atlantic will shift further in our favour. Moving to the fighter question, our first order of priority will converting the land based air defence squadrons to Phantoms, which will allow for commonality with the Fleet Air Arm carrier squadrons. If we were to also consider equipping the maritime strike fighter squadrons with Phantom, then there would be a further efficiency saving, at the cost of some range and performance compared with the Tornado.”
“I can see the logic in that argument, but I’m somewhat hesitant to put all our eggs in the Phantom basket for a number of reasons. The Tornado is longer ranged and carries a heavier bomb load to begin with, and the RNAS maritime strike wings are primarily meant to fight up over the Norwegian and Baltic Seas where that matters more than the Med. We are also looking to sell the maritime strike variant of the Tornado to a number of allied states, notably Germany, so we don’t want to do the saleswork for our Atlantic chums at our own expense. It is going to be enough of a job to maintain a two Phantom forces in the face of a Treasury that doesn’t like the armament programme as it stands. Ultimately, the land based planes are more for the Empire and the Floating Forts, but give us the opportunity to maintain extra carrier capable pilots and aeroplanes to back up the fleet.”
“The first point alone should suffice against anything that comes up in Parliament, Prime Minister, and the second should keep the Treasury sharks at bay. On that point, it could be worth considering whether to cancel the RNAS Valiant replacement programme - it would save at least £250 million and could be played as a responsible savings measure.”
“An interesting proposal. There is less of a case for the Navy to have a strategic bomber than the 40s, given what the Excalibur can do off the carriers. It isn’t urgent though, so have the Admiralty put together a paper on our options. Now, Fleet Air Arm.”
“We find ourselves in the somewhat lucky position of not having any expensive development or procurement programmes on the horizon for the next decade or so, allowing us to concentrate on building our strength of existing types and a few new key planes. In the Vanguard, we have an excellent air superiority and fleet defence fighter with a range long enough to give the Reds conniptions, so there are no substantive issues there, save for a few minor RDF teething issues that have cropped up in escort missions over South Vietnam. The Supermarine Excalibur is the best carrier bomber in the world, which it should be for its price. The Buccaneers and Merlins cover the attack and strike missions extremely well. Replacing the de Havilland Spectre with the Phantom is the biggest change that will be occurring over the next five years; it is a newer and consequently better plane and the extra legs will be useful.”
There was more to it than simply performance, Barton thought. He had bristled at the initial talk of buying the American fighter when it was first rumoured several years ago, but that all ended once Prime Minister Eden had invited him around to Number 10 for a late night drink. The Phantom deal had more wheels within wheels than the Antikythera Mechanism, but it came down to three main factors - a complicated series of Anglo-American quid pro quo agreements for licenced production of different aircraft on either side of the Atlantic; the need to lead the Commonwealth into the matter, rather than be left behind at a time when Australia, New Avalon and Israel had their minds set on the Phantom; and freeing up the substantial numbers of still highly competitive Spectres for a calculated swamping of the Middle Eastern and South American markets. That last twist in the tale was already yielding substantial dividends.
“Range. That is the important part. With long ranges carrier groups, we can project ourselves inland in Africa and Asia in such strength that we rapidly control arising situations. That is the prize on offer.”
“A heady one indeed, Prime Minister. I pursued the question of the Sea Harrier on the fleet carriers as you requested, but the general consensus is that it would not be of any operational benefit, given that very issue of range. Their best place is on the light anti-submarine and commando carriers, although there is a not insubstantial minority that advocates their permanent deployment on the battleships as well.”
“Have them run a few more tests then, but don’t commit to anything binding either way. Anything on the new aircraft?”
“Fairey estimates that the Cormorant will be flying by the end of next year, Armstrong-Whitworth are aiming for 1967 for the Argonaut and Bristol can get the Sparrowhawk ready within six months.”
“Good. Very good. Right on time. As for the secret weapon, it is rather bemusing to regard it as such, but they really will be, if not already are, the greatest keystones of the security and survival of the British Empire at sea. I’m going to be taking the proposal to the Imperial Conference for full discussion, but getting the groundwork done with the Commonwealth navies will make the process a swifter one.”
Stanley Barton referred to one of great hobbyhorses, the regional Imperial commands around the globe made up of British and Commonwealth naval units. Their origin lay in the ambitious rearrangements put in place by the Jellicoe Report after the Great War, although the relative strength of the Dominion navies had greatly increased compared to the Royal Navy squadrons deployed beyond the three major fleets. Their distribution was both their strength and their weakness, but this was something that would change under the plan currently being discussed. New integrated fleets would be formed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans as new counterparts to the great Imperial armadas at Singapore and Alexandria, whilst command arrangements in the Atlantic would receive a timely modernisation. Barton had kept his idea of a general strategic reserve fleet in South Africa to himself for the time being, as before it could be contemplated, it would require the quite difficult political measure of a general agreement on operational integration of the R.N. and the Commonwealth navies under a more unified command structure. This would not take the form of the single structure theoretically planned in the event of general mobilisation and, heaven forfend, another world war, but more along the lines of the arrangements that were proving quite successful in Europe.
“The two most straightforward items, for the formal establishment of standing joint task forces around the current fleet units and operational integration of supply and support, been met with unanimous endorsement from the Dominions in our initial discussions, but the command arrangements are proving as vexsome as ever and the final measure is going to take a fair bit of pressure and argument to get through.”
“Who are the big holdouts? India?”
“It isn’t quite like that, Prime Minister, but they are the most vocal in expressing their issues with both the grand concept and the execution of it. In any case, neither the R.I.N. nor the East Indies Station in general are what could truly be termed as frontline fleets. Surprisingly, it has been the Aussies who’ve been most vehement about representation in the command structure, on account of the circumstances they face with their neighbours. The Canadians are quite supportive, with the unspoken caveat that, if they provide forces beyond their immediate area, they would expect a rise in their representation.”
“That all sounds very reasonable. If they put in the price, then they must get their due. The principle of proportionality will be at the forefront of how we do it; I’m more focused on why and what happens after that. The Americans have a new term for the concept of increasing the value of a group beyond its base capability - ‘force multiplication’. When we add the new modern ships and planes we’ll be building to what the Commonwealth fleets already deploy, we’ll see that alright. That is what we need, First Lord - flexibility, modernity and audacity.”
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 2, 2021 15:12:33 GMT
Notes on Chapter 12:
- The length of this instalment inadvertently mirrors Barton’s naval interest and enthusiasm. In an earlier draft, there was a more overt reference to this in the form of a rumination on Churchill’s The Gathering Storm, but it didn’t quite fit in. - His policy is very ambitious in public, but keeps the majority of the details behind the curtain. The substance of the New Fleet Plan is to increase yearly submarine construction, boost the numbers and rate of CVSL construction, build up escort numbers by 25% above previous planning, order a further four CGNs and develop a successor class to the Leander CGs and increase the capital ship programme to 2/year. This is before they really get to examine the cost of such goals - The Soviet Navy has grown considerably since 1964 alone, with their SSNs being the biggest challenge. The BCGs aren’t quite the threat they are perceived as, but remain well above the level of the Sverdlovs in @ from the early 1950s. Their battlefleet is a clear and present challenge. - Soviet carriers...their numbers reflect Stalin Snr’s naval whims. The 12 Krasnoyarsk class CVLs are about the size of a Centaur class from @ and have exactly the same issue: they are too small to carry a decent 1960s fixed wing air group and will go by 1970-75. The Soviet CVAs and CVANs are much better, but run into the problem of being split up into four fleets. - The Soviet cruiser and destroyer programme is very different from @, flowing on from a conventional balanced fleet rather than the missile focus of Khrushchev. - Their massive conventional sub build up is less of a threat against the combination of large ASW escort numbers + aircraft + Floating Fortresses + SOSUS + other oceanic surveillance technology. - The massed reserve fleets hitting obsolescence is a development from @ and the British response is similar to historical - Their new ships are much better than the modernised wartime types such as the Battles, but they will miss the sheer numbers of the latter. However, unlike the USN, even a better-off Britain can’t afford the FRAM solution taken by the USN with their Gearings and Sumners. - In frigates, the wartime numbers and conversions of destroyers to fast ASW frigates in the 1950s meant that fewer Type 12s were built than ideal. They make up the current reserve, not quite being up to taking on the most modern Red subs. They will stick around until the mid 1970s at most. Third line ships. - Following on from them were the River class (broadly analogous to the Leanders in @) which are solid vessels, but certainly second line ships even by the mid 1960s. - The first class frigates are the Tribal class, which are broadly similar to the USN Brooke class DEGs in general armament. These have more of a AAW/ASuW mission. - This makes the new ASW Type 21s an urgent requirement, but may well lead to bloat in their requirements and an accompanying increase in cost, beginning a vicious cycle. - Barton’s view on numbers is being driven by politics - Earlier plans for a mixed RNAS fleet of Nimrods and Poseidons has been cast aside, which will carry a higher cost. - The RN skyships are quite ambitious vessels and the RAF feels that they are duplicating their capability; they are to be equipped with ASW planes and missiles rather than a fighter/attack mix. - Skyweb is an interesting idea, but more on that later, unless there is a correct guess... - The dual-track Phantom programme is another attempt to “hide” capabilities for a major armament push. - On top of that, the Phantom deal is an attempt to secure sales in the USA whilst still trying to secure exports of British planes into traditional markets by offering cheaper aircraft just behind the cutting edge at a very competitive price. - Integration with the Commonwealth fleets mirrors other attempts to maximise the power of the bloc + also maintaining its relevance.
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 3, 2021 16:27:20 GMT
The last of the ‘meeting chapters’ will be for the RAF.
- They’ve had the best of all three services in the period since 1960 and projections are for this to increase considerably over the second half of the 1960s. The RAF defends their (self-perceived) status as the most important and modern service quite zealously. - Their major areas of concern are securing their Big 5 aircraft projects, fielding ABMs, continuing to boost the strength of RAF Germany, field it’s new generation of weapons and prove its new theories of conventional tactical and strategic airpower in Vietnam. - It is quite a different RAF: in addition to size, there is the record of fighting a major war in Korea, a smaller yet intense one in 1956 and multiple counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya, Burma and Kenya. The result is that there is a fair bit of enthusiasm for a limited war in the Far East, particularly from young pilots. - Fighter Command and Bomber Command maintain quite a rivalry, leaving the other home units not a member of either, namely Strike Command as the third in the pecking order and thus seeking to expand their role and remit. - The Army’s Royal Flying Corps is still trying to put a case that it should operate Harriers... - Perhaps the biggest ace in the RAF’s possession is that it does have the forces sufficient to provide a British presence in different theatres. The Army is quite stretched to cover Germany and Scandinavia, the Middle East and Far East and the RN’s issues have been explored in the last chapter. The RAF has the capacity to deploy fighters and bombers to the Balkans, Japan or South America without breaking their figurative bank.
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