Dark Earth: A New Jerusalem

Whilst ANJ is finished, I'm just popping this bit here for now. It is the first part of the Committee of Imperial Defence meeting referred to in this story, setting up what happens next as a bit of a bridge between ANJ and the future. I'm not sure where it will go, as it is a bit one dimensional for a stand along piece.

“How many meetings like this have you done before, Sir Richard?”

Now there was a bit of irony, even if it was unconscious thought Hannay.

“Not many at all, Prime Minister. The Special Full Meeting has tended to be more of a extraordinary measure in times of war and crisis, so the first one came in 1950, then ‘56 and 60. The other full meetings have come during the Imperial Conferences as part of the general roundtables.”

“Well, this is far from the likes of those three years. Hopefully it gives us the means to avoid a fourth one of them.”

“Indeed Prime Minister.” He gave a quick look around the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. This would be the last time that the Committee of Imperial Defence met in this particular chamber, as it’s larger and more secure successor had been completed in the new bunker beneath their current level. The four crystal screens on the opposite wall showed the participants from North America, India, the Levant, Southern Africa, Australasia in attendance, so, with a nod to Sir Obo and without further ado, Sir Richard Hannay began the meeting.

“Good morning, Your Royal Highness, Prime Minister, My Lords and gentlemen. We shall commence this Special Full Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It has been called by Prime Minister Barton to discuss and review the coordinated defence policy and strategy of the Empire in the light of the war in Viet Nam and the other significant changes that have occurred since the Defence Review of 1961. Prime Minister?”

“My thanks to you, Sir Richard. We are on the cusp of the midpoint of this decade. What we set ourselves to here today will guide us forward for the rest of it. We shall set our the challenge, our response, how we need to go forward together on land, sea and in the air and how and where we can coordinate our production and resources. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom wishes to provide the best possible picture of our intent and design to our great Commonwealth Dominions over the seas so that, together, we can be united and victorious, as we ever have been before.

That’s the aim. To put it simply, we need to rearm and to rearm efficiently. We’ve got to modernise our armed forces, paying for the new generation of weapons and equipment whilst building up the capacity needed in crisis and, heaven forfend, wartime. In Britain, we’re going to reverse the course we’ve taken since 1961. The Chancellor of the Exchequer can expand upon the economic and fiscal basis for our policy.”

“Yes Prime Minister. The decision made by the last government in 1960 has reduced defence spending from 12.5% to 9.9% of gross domestic product over these last four years. That managed to achieve their goal of funding the key strategic weapons programmes in that period, but at the cost of part of our conventional capacity, funding of our reserves and not keeping up with the effects of inflation. We don’t face an inordinate problem with the latter, but in broad terms we have a 10% reduction in the true value of the budget over that time. This is the first facet of the issue that confronts us - we get slightly less power for our pound.

Compounding this is the rising unit cost of our basic types of equipment - tanks, guns, armoured personnel carriers and small arms are all costing noticeably more and this is writ large in flaming letters for aircraft and ships. What’s new is two additional factors - the guided missile, which we are told by the services that we need in ever larger numbers; and replacement of our wartime and Korean War fleets of support vehicles.

To accomodate these needs, we will have to boost defence spending on an annualised basis in real terms over the next five years. In combination with our programme for growth and investment, this will deliver a definite rise in what we can afford to procure and what we can afford to do. In the absence of a major war in that time, such a policy will deliver considerable growth whilst working under the hard cap of 10% that we at the Treasury have agreed upon.”

Healey delivered his analysis in a flat voice that was almost forced. The Treasury had lost this particular battle, having proposed far more measured increases in raw funding, even if there was a useful benefit of increased tax receipts from the profits made by the major defence conglomerates. In Britain, arms and the state were very closely entwined in a multiplicity of ways and the electoral and political utility of increased orders for the shipyards, steelworks and arsenals of the North and the aircraft and automotive factories of the Midlands had been too popular in the Cabinet, at least this time. Barton’s Grand Design was a logical one, albeit very ambitious, and carried in it the prospect of being able to do more with less once the engines of national growth were turning fully.

“Right. That’s what we are going to be spending. We need to increase what we are doing as the international threat has grown faster than we have over the last 4 years. Prior to the last Defence Review, the previous government did countenance that the Soviets had a larger economy than we estimated and that they would grow faster than expected. In that, they were right. The consequences of us treading water in that time are problematic, but not insoluble. Admiral Mountbatten, would you provide us with the strategic picture as it currently stands and how we are positioned?”

“Yes, Prime Minister. As of the beginning of 1965, the Soviets will have an arsenal of well over 10,000 nuclear warheads, with an estimated quarter of those being strategic or semi-strategic. They outnumber the Empire in long range ballistic missiles by over 150 and their current production is focused on the heavyweight SS-9 Scarp and SS-10 Scrag. There are indications that they have a solid fueled LRBM under development and that they are studying the possibility of mobile missiles. The Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile programme is the most advanced in the world and of their 180 Buryas and 120 Burans, perhaps 60 present a threat to Britain, whilst the bulk of their numbers are focused on North America. Our main defence against the LRBM is to be Violet Friend, but our current deployment is limited to 40 missiles at this point. Once our full defensive force is in place, we project that we can successfully intercept up to 200 inbound targets with our ground based weapons; we are planning on upgrading our newer battleships with improved versions of the Triumph that can assist in the anti-ballistic missile role plus a potential airborne component.

We estimate they field 608 MRBMs, made up of 480 SS-4s and 228 SS-5s, with a new mobile missile, the SS-14 expected to be deployed next year; between 160 and 250 of these are targeted on . There are indications that they will start phasing out the older SS-4s deployed in soft sites over the next few years, which will dramatically increase their relative protection and decrease their reaction time. Currently, we have a two hour warning that they are being fueled, which is sufficient time for a pre-emptive strike with our Black Arrows and White Knights or with the TSR-2s. With silo basing, that figure is cut to perhaps 15-20 minutes if they are in high alert condition, which they can hold for 48 hours. That in itself is a considerable escalation of the Soviet threat to the British Isles, albeit measured by our missile defences. Our information indicates that up to 50 missiles are positioned to target India from the Uzbek SSR, but these are of the older type on soft sites and countered by our proposed Black Arrow deployment and sales, in addition to the extension of the defensive missile shield. There are no indications of Soviet targeting of medium ranged missiles on any of the other Commonwealth Dominions at this time, although it is expected that as their production rate increases, some of their newer weapons would be targeted on Israel.

In terms of bombers, the Soviets have over 500 intercontinental Tu-95 Bears and 360 Bounders, which are primarily aimed at North America, and a residual force of approximately 250 Bisons for use against Western Europe, China and India. The Bears are in the class of the Vulcan and B-52, the Bounders in that of the Vengeance and B-58 and the Bisons are akin to the Valiants and B-47s. The Bisons are on their way out by the end of the decade on current indications, but the other two are our ongoing worries. All three can be effectively engaged by our RAF and Commonwealth fighter forces, but their newer supersonic developments are more concerning. The Sukhoi Su-100 is entering production this year and is a supersonic reconnaissance/strike bomber with a very long range; at this stage, only a limited deployment is planned, indicating some potential issues with it. The Tupolev Tu-100 'Barbarian' is our most vexing concern, as it straddles the line between a theatre weapon and a strategic one by virtue of its combat radius of over 2000 miles, and it combines this with a challenging top speed of 1700 mph; there is also a naval strike version under development which we and the Americans have given the reporting code name 'Backfire'. Their theatre bomber force of Blinders and Badgers is decisively outmatched by our fighters and surface-to-air guided missile defences in Europe and the British Isles; as our Continental allies modernise their fighter forces, this deficiency will only be exacerbated. The Soviets know this as well and are looking to replace them with the Barbarian, shifting the legacy force to their Naval Aviation, and with a new Sukhoi interdiction strike bomber in the class of the F-111 and Thunderbolt. This will lead to a decline in the numbers of the medium bomber threat against Britain, but an increase in its complexity.

Their strategic submarine force has advanced rapidly over the last few years, but remains fundamentally behind us and the Americans. Their 25 Golf class boats are obsolete and are equipped with the SS-N-4, which has a range of 300 nautical miles. The Reds did plan on upgrading them to their new SS-N-5s, which can be launched from underwater, but their range is also limited to 700 nautical miles and was apparently seen as of limited utility. They will start to leave service in 1967. Their more substantive threat is the 16 Hotels, 10 Indias and particularly the two new Yankee class bombers. The former two carry the SS-N-5, which by virtue of its range is going to be of less utility against the US and thus could well be redeployed against us and the Japanese. It is considered decidedly unlikely that they would deploy far enough south in the Atlantic or Pacific to threat Southern Africa or Australasia, as moving to those areas would take them through some of our key chokepoints, and we are yet to allow a Soviet submarine into the Indian Ocean without a tail. As of this morning, the four Red bombers at sea in our area each have one or more of our attack boats stalking them in addition to surface ships, aircraft and airships on station within striking distance. Currently, their SSGN fleet is primarily focused on anti-surface warfare and even their vestigal efforts to threaten us with their Whiskey class conversions have come to a halt as they've conceded that they can't slip a wartime diesel boat down into the North Sea, surface and spend 20 minutes preparing to fire. The Floating Fortresses have similarly killed them off on the North Atlantic flank. If they build new dedicated land attack submarines, we will have a substantial strategic warning prior to their commissioning to allow for development of a response.

We thus largely have the measure of the Soviet strategic threat at this time, with the caveats of their evolving medium range missile force and the limited shield against their longer range weapons.

Their next major threat comes from their tactical forces. The Red Army has increased its strength to 284 divisions, a rise of 28 since 1960, and are expected to rise to 300 by 1969. They now field a dozen airborne divisions and have 12 rifle divisions, raised as light infantry with a deliberate reduction mechanised transport; intelligence on their TOE suggests that they do not lack in artillery or helicopter support and are fairly lavishly supplied with modern light support vehicles. This new unit is intended for air or sea deployment beyond the immediate region of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, suggesting their envisaged use in Asia and Africa alongside their airborne and naval infantry forces. They are also in the process of modernising four cavalry divisions, although we have conflicting reports on their equipment and use. In direct terms, the Soviets are raising a Tank Army to the Leningrad Military District and a further Combined Arms Army in the Archangelsk Military District. This, in combination with preparation for the formation of a Murmansk Military District, suggests a renewed Soviet emphasis on the Scandinavian theatre. There has been significant debate inside Stavka regarding the role of their mechanised corps. Their mechanised divisions were amalgamated with their old rifle divisions in the reforms of 1957/58, but the separate corps have been maintained, each being the approximate equivalent of two divisions. It does seem now that they were intended for use as mobile front level assets in the manner of cavalry-mechanised groups in the last war, but doctrinal shifts are putting them somewhat out of favour as the great wartime commanders begin to retire and die off. It is entirely possible that they may be reorganised as motor rifle divisions, which would present an apparent rise in numbers of Soviet divisions whilst not increasing their actual troop numbers.

Their equipment is also increasingly catching up on Western weapons systems in quality and lethality. They have replaced the T-55 with the T-62 in their frontline motor rifle divisions and the T-64 in their tank divisions in Eastern Europe, which shifts the general balance somewhat. Whereas one of the later model Centurions could match half a dozen T-55s and a Chieftain easily take on ten, their newer tanks even the odds markedly. Their new T-68 heavies further alter the equation and from what we can tell about their current pair of future tank projects, they will feature further incremental improvements. We are in front of them with tanks, but cannot afford to stand still even a day further. Their new armoured personnel carriers and mechanised infantry fighting vehicles constitute a much larger improvement to their current weapons and represent a considerable threat. In artillery and helicopters, they are also catching up, whilst they lead us in sheer numbers of tactical battlefield rockets. The Red Army is receiving more tactical nuclear weapons systems every year and countering these is an increasingly complex task.

Some notes on the meeting thus far:

- The 1960 plan to stop the growth in defence expenditure worked. Unfortunately, it worked at the same time as three other factors: gradual inflation, the entry of a new and more expensive generation of weapons and the Soviets putting their foot to the floor. As such, the assumption that a bit of economy could be afforded without too much trouble didn’t quite turn out that way. The defence pound didn’t quite stretch as far as envisaged and this was principally manifested in conventional weapons.
- As will be seen, the nuclear ‘modernisation’ worked, but at the same time as a shift in significance.
- Once again, the Treasury comes off as the ‘loser’ in the Whitehall tussle, but this is more an illustration of how political power and priority is positioned slightly differently. This Labour Party is the military Keynesianists.
- The Soviets are now clearly in front in overall nuclear terms and a bit less so in purely strategic ones, but both of these increase from here.
- Their older ICBMs go out of service faster, replaced by some darn capable ones.
- The MRBM conundrum is a genuinely worrying one; we’d call them IRBMs. The British response is threefold - defend against them, be prepared to pre-empt them and try and lessen their effectiveness with some complex tricks…
- Bears and Bisons = not so much of a worry. Bounders = quite concerning. It is the new Soviet bombers that really create a threat. The Barbarian is somewhere between a Backfire and Blackjack, so is a heck of a worry and the Soviet Tu-125 Mach 3 strategic bomber project, whilst aimed more at North America, is perhaps twice as threatening again.
- It is a little unclear here, as I wanted to convey an atmosphere of slightly muddled intelligence, but the Soviets have two planes in the Su-24/F-111 category: the Su-24 and the Su-26. The latter is an enlarged aircraft akin to the FB-111H in its ‘rough shape’.
- The Red SSBN threat to Britain is at a low ebb and they need longer ranged missiles to have a chance.
- The Red Army is developing more of a flexible capacity, at a not insignificant cost. Prior to 1957 in @, the Soviets did have a mixture of tank, mech, rifle, cavalry, air rifle/airborne and arty divisions and this is an interesting mix for my thinking; there may be some further nomenclature twists and turns to come as foreshadowed here…
- Signs of a threat to Scandinavia are real ones and this leads to a response in forces, agreements and armament, as seen in the 1965-1969 timeline.
- The Air Force section is straightforward, showing the concern at Moscow catching up.
- British estimations on the Soviet sub fleet numbers are off, but their analysis of the classes is correct. The Tango class here will be rather more capable and threatening.
- In carriers, battleships, battlecruisers and cruisers, the British picture is largely correct. The relative contempt for the destroyers and frigates is similarly accurate, with new ships needing a few more years to hit the fleet in decent numbers before the Soviet block obsolescence issue is resolved. As I’ve touched upon before, Moscow ended up mass producing/building a lot of DDs that would be exceptional for the 1940s in the 1948-1955 period and they have become painfully obsolescent much more quickly than could be anticipated. I’m not a surfer, but the Red Fleet picked the false wave to ride into shore, missing the next big one.
- Hence their problem as expounded here:

“Destroyer Obsolescence, or A Study in Timing

A.) Obsolescent WW2 Destroyers 1964
USN: 64 Allen M. Sumner and 144 Gearing class destroyers
RN: 80 Battle class destroyers
MR: 26 WW2
Soviet Navy: 12 Gnevny class destroyers + 41 reserve

B.) 1950s DDs
USN: 82 Forrest Sherman class
MR: 20 Le Aventurier class
Soviet Navy: 95 Skoryy class

C.) DD/DDGs
USN: 100 (16 Mitscher, 25 Farragut, 59 Charles F. Adams)
RN: 84 (A-K class)
Soviet Navy: 70 (+ 25 x 4900t Neustrashimy DD/DL)
MR: 29

The devil is in the detail. The Skoryys are decent Forrest Sherman sized ships, but have less margin for modernisation, both in their design and by virtue of their role as fleet screens and escorts. They were built in big numbers in the late 1940s-early 1950s, before the full lessons of the war and subsequent naval revolution could be fully felt. The Royal Navy built slowly but steadily and her early DDGs have a somewhat longer window of effective service life remaining.“

“That level of flexibility with regard to emerging or regional conflicts will permit us in Britain in turn to focus on our major priorities: a large land army and air force in Europe for Continental warfare and home defence, naval forces for control of the Atlantic, and smaller combined forces for holding the Middle East, supporting India and defending our position in the Far East. These are informed by the needs of the Dominions and Britain alike, but particularly for the frontline states - Australia and Israel. In turn, it determines our goals and collective priorities as an Empire. What follows from Sir Richard is an initial draft, as it were, subject to further refinement.”

“Thank you, Prime Minister. For the European and Mediterranean theatres, there is a requirement for a full army group of 24 heavy divisions in Germany and 2000 aircraft plus a Royal Marine force; a home defence force of 8 divisions and 1800 fighters; 8 divisions and 600 tactical aircraft for Scandinavia; two carrier battle groups in the North Sea to cover the Baltic Exits; two divisions each to reinforce Iceland and Denmark; 200 ASW aircraft in the Mediterranean and 400 for the North and Norwegian Seas; 60 convoy escorts in the Med; and garrison forces in Malta and Gibraltar equivalent to a division and 200 aircraft. The Austrians and Greeks have indicated that they would welcome further commitments of forces. Our forces in the Atlantic are almost all naval and air units, with garrison brigades for the Azures and Greenland and mobile defence battalions for the Floating Fortresses being the only significant land elements. We have a requirement for 240 escorts for convoy protection and general patrol in the North Atlantic and Western Approaches, 96 escorts and 8 light carriers for ASW Hunter/Killer Groups and four light carriers and 64 escorts for the GIB ASW Barrier Force, and 1200 assorted ASW patrol aircraft. For the North American theatre, there is a requirement for 6 divisions and 4 independent brigades and 1200 fighters for Continental defence across Canada and Newfoundland; 1 division and 200 planes in New Avalon; a brigade and 100 ASW planes in Bermuda; 100 local ASW patrol aircraft in Newfoundland; 20 coastal escorts in the Canada/Newfoundland littoral; and a carrier battle group or equivalent to cover Alaska and Western Canada. The Atlantic provides the link between the forces in the British Isles and North America and is the most significant sea in our defence against the Soviets and other global threats.

In the Middle East, we require 8 divisions and 1000 aircraft in Israel; 12 divisions and 1000 aircraft in Mesopotamia and Persia; two mobile divisions to be based in Cyprus; two divisions and 400 aircraft in Suez and Egypt; 100 ASW patrol aircraft; and garrison forces in the Gulf States. The Mediterranean Fleet of six carrier groups and two in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea would support these forces, deploying a total of 8 fleet carriers, 8 battleships, 20 cruisers and 100 escorts. The African theatre has a requirement for 6 divisions and 500 aircraft for the defence of Southern Africa, based on the current alignment of Portuguese Africa on its flanks; 2 divisions and 200 aircraft each for West Africa and Tanganyika; 200 patrol planes; and a reinforced corps to secure the Congo. We have always planned for and worked towards a strong degree of support and interchangeability of forces between the Middle East and Africa given their close proximity and one cannot be held without the other. Our fulcrum here is Suez, as ever, with our layers of defence projecting outward.

For the Far East, we need 4 divisions and 800 planes for Malaya and Singapore; divisions in Borneo and Burma; a mobile expeditionary force of 2 divisions and 500 tactical aircraft for Thailand and Indochina; a reinforced division and 200 aircraft for the defence of Hong Kong; and a theatre reserve division up on the Kra. The main force of the Far Eastern Fleet, some six carriers, four battleships, 12 cruisers and 48 escorts, is to be mobile in the South China Sea and at least 60 escorts and 250 ASW patrol aircraft for regional convoy protection. India’s requirements against a Soviet threat, as distinct from the Chinese one outlined previously, are for two reinforced field armies on the North West Frontier and Eastern Command supported by 2400 tactical aircraft and a central reserve field army. The exigencies of India’s geography are such to preclude an absolute need for carriers in support of either flank. The Pacific theatre requires fewer forces, with the defence of Australia and New Zealand being our primary focus in the South Pacific. The former requires 6 divisions across the North of Australia and New Guinea and two brigades in Timor, 500 aircraft and three carrier groups, whilst New Zealand can be covered by four brigades and 100 planes; anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft in this theatre come to 250 and escorts to 30.

Finally, we have our global forces in the form of the Royal Navy and RAF - the Grand Fleet and Bomber Command. Each has the capacity to project power within any of the above major areas, whether it be with conventional, nuclear or chemical means for the bombers or the sheer firepower of our main carrier force and battlefleet. Optimal strength of the latter is projected as 8 fleet carriers and 4 ASW carriers, 12 battleships, 36 cruisers and 120 escorts. The Imperial Strategic Reserve in Britain is currently projected as two reinforced corps and 800 tactical aircraft and operates in conjunction with the aforementioned elements across the world. Further to these, we have the four integrated commands in the North Pacific, South Atlantic, West Indies and East Africa would each have a brigade, 100 aircraft and a carrier battle group as previously outlined, acting as regional reserves and direct augmentation of the larger joint commands, and 50 assorted escort ships on Imperial trade protection. Total target global force requirements come to 15,000 tactical fighters, 2800 patrol aircraft, 28 fleet and 16 ASW carriers, 32 battleships, 100 cruisers, 800 escorts and 156 divisions."