lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 16, 2020 3:52:15 GMT
The Germans do not have carriers around to spare prewar and the Turks don’t have the need for one from their perspective, focussing on battleships. They are a regional power that goes up against a global superpower, both navally and in general. So the Germans did not have a carrier deployed in the Mediterranean then before the outbreak of the war. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 4:17:02 GMT
I refer you to the Kriegsmarine order of battle at the beginning of the war earlier in this very thread: alternate-timelines.proboards.com/post/87343Even the Mediterranean Flotilla is ultimately a wasted and wasting asset, as there are no means for the Germans to reinforce it. What was deployed there pre-war on a show of force cruise ends up trapped up with the Austro-Hungarians for the duration. For me, it doesn't make sense for the Germans to deploy half of their active carriers to the Med on that basis. Even if all four had been fully in service, then the best use of them would be as a concentrated force rather than a divided one. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 16, 2020 4:19:24 GMT
I refer you to the Kriegsmarine order of battle at the beginning of the war earlier in this very thread: alternate-timelines.proboards.com/post/87343Even the Mediterranean Flotilla is ultimately a wasted and wasting asset, as there are no means for the Germans to reinforce it. What was deployed there pre-war on a show of force cruise ends up trapped up with the Austro-Hungarians for the duration. For me, it doesn't make sense for the Germans to deploy half of their active carriers to the Med on that basis. Even if all four had been fully in service, then the best use of them would be as a concentrated force rather than a divided one. A thanks for the link, some the Germans did not have a carrier in the Med at the start of the war, and i assume if one was there it would move quickly to a AH port ore Ottoman port to be safe. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 4:47:01 GMT
They did not have one there, nor did they ever plan to send one there. Whilst the Kriegsmarine may have been many things, it was not completely incompetent nor delusional and was aware of the Mahanian principle of fleet concentration.
I can’t see why it would make a run for the Eastern Med, which is essentially a British lake; if Austrian ports weren’t available, they’d go for Italy as another member of the Pact of Steel.
The pair of German ships in the Med + the 6-7 Austrian ships + the Regia Marina was supposed to be able to counterbalance the combined forces of Britain and France.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 16, 2020 4:53:55 GMT
They did not have one there, nor did they ever plan to send one there. Whilst the Kriegsmarine may have been many things, it was not completely incompetent nor delusional and was aware of the Mahanian principle of fleet concentration. I can’t see why it would make a run for the Eastern Med, which is essentially a British lake; if Austrian ports weren’t available, they’d go for Italy as another member of the Pact of Steel. The pair of German ships in the Med + the 6-7 Austrian ships + the Regia Marina was supposed to be able to counterbalance the combined forces of Britain and France. While most likely use shore based bombers and fighters operating from Italy as their cover. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 5:01:06 GMT
Not one but three Fliegerkorps (2 German, 1 AH) are shifted to Southern Italy and Sicily in January 1941, which has the effect of limiting carrier operations beyond the shorebased cover available from Algeria and Egypt, particularly around Malta. This allows the Germans etc to deploy to Libya post Operation Compass, among other developments.
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 5:14:59 GMT
What do the Allies ultimately need to win the Battle of the Mediterranean?
In no particular order:
- Control of Libya
- Malta as an offensive base
- Sufficient time for the RN submarine fleet to smash Italian commerce and shipping
- Large airfield complexes around Tripoli and Carthage/Tunis to project air cover over Southern Sicily
- A large, capable tactical air force and strategic bomber force with a technological edge
- French, British and American carriers and surface forces capable of covering an invasion fleet
- Control of Sicily and Sardinia, which allows the Trident Plan to go into action (Spain, Italy, Greece)
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 16, 2020 9:04:01 GMT
What do the Allies ultimately need to win the Battle of the Mediterranean? In no particular order: - Control of Libya - Malta as an offensive base - Sufficient time for the RN submarine fleet to smash Italian commerce and shipping - Large airfield complexes around Tripoli and Carthage/Tunis to project air cover over Southern Sicily - A large, capable tactical air force and strategic bomber force with a technological edge - French, British and American carriers and surface forces capable of covering an invasion fleet - Control of Sicily and Sardinia, which allows the Trident Plan to go into action (Spain, Italy, Greece)
If French NA is allied then isn't that a more important base than Malta? It has a similar geographical position but much greater capacity for air power as you mention plus once forces there are built up is the easiest way of securing Libya. I would think that Malta would be relatively unimportant militarily as well as due to its size a dangerous position for any substantial forces based there.
Otherwise looking interesting and Britain is highly stretched. Assuming the Nazis have still attacked Russia so that would be pulling off a lot of German and probably some Austrian, Italian and Turkish resources. Not sure how a so isolated Constantinople/E Thrace can survive in the modern era, let alone the nightmare of any attempts to supply and reinforce it.
Steve
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 9:38:21 GMT
Steve,
It is a matter of distance. From Malta, bombers and fighters have a lot more time/range over their targets and surface ships/submarines are closer to their targets.
Tunisia lacks a great deal of modern infrastructure, just as Algeria is fairly lacking. To build it up takes time, material and money, all of which are limited for Free France. They have plans to build up there, but are working from a fairly low basis as of July/August 1940. It will take 18-24 months to build up supply dumps, roads, railways, airfields, staging fields, fuel farms, warehouses and ports to support anything close to what is needed.
The French pulled out equivalent manpower to ~12 divisions and ~800 aircraft, but now need to re-equip with vehicles, tanks and all weaponry larger than rifles and machine guns, plus a lot of AA guns. They will also need to re-equip with American and British aircraft, as supporting the French aircraft with spares and maintenance would be just too hard.
In the meantime, Malta is an established, equipped base, albeit one under siege. It is also very well placed to interdict supply convoys to Italian North Africa.
The British Empire is very highly stretched, although will continue to expand and mobilise all through 1942 and 1943.
Barbarossa occurs and takes up the majority of German and AH strength, but Italy (which is quite a bit stronger and ‘deeper’ in its strength) can focus on the Med, Spain and North Africa as well as making contributions in Russia, the North Atlantic and in a couple of other theatres. The Turks are pinned down on the Anatolian Front and in the Middle East; their intent was similar to Italy in @, to jump in quickly and get a place at the table at any peace conference.
The Greeks hold Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Ionian coast and hinterland down to Smyrna. It is just, just enough to support resistance with the aid of difficult supply convoys. As you say, it is one of several logistical nightmares.
Simon
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 16, 2020 15:29:34 GMT
Steve, It is a matter of distance. From Malta, bombers and fighters have a lot more time/range over their targets and surface ships/submarines are closer to their targets. Tunisia lacks a great deal of modern infrastructure, just as Algeria is fairly lacking. To build it up takes time, material and money, all of which are limited for Free France. They have plans to build up there, but are working from a fairly low basis as of July/August 1940. It will take 18-24 months to build up supply dumps, roads, railways, airfields, staging fields, fuel farms, warehouses and ports to support anything close to what is needed. The French pulled out equivalent manpower to ~12 divisions and ~800 aircraft, but now need to re-equip with vehicles, tanks and all weaponry larger than rifles and machine guns, plus a lot of AA guns. They will also need to re-equip with American and British aircraft, as supporting the French aircraft with spares and maintenance would be just too hard. In the meantime, Malta is an established, equipped base, albeit one under siege. It is also very well placed to interdict supply convoys to Italian North Africa. The British Empire is very highly stretched, although will continue to expand and mobilise all through 1942 and 1943. Barbarossa occurs and takes up the majority of German and AH strength, but Italy (which is quite a bit stronger and ‘deeper’ in its strength) can focus on the Med, Spain and North Africa as well as making contributions in Russia, the North Atlantic and in a couple of other theatres. The Turks are pinned down on the Anatolian Front and in the Middle East; their intent was similar to Italy in @, to jump in quickly and get a place at the table at any peace conference. The Greeks hold Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Ionian coast and hinterland down to Smyrna. It is just, just enough to support resistance with the aid of difficult supply convoys. As you say, it is one of several logistical nightmares. Simon
Simon
Thanks for the response. I was forgetting that distances and sizes are larger in the DE universe. Hence Malta is more useful than I was thinking.
Ditto with Greece I hadn't realised that they had regained the Ionian coast of Anatolia.
Steve
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 16, 2020 18:33:03 GMT
Steve,
Both of those factors create some degree of friction within the wider war
British Empire Deployments 1/1/1941
Britain: 32 British infantry + 6 British armoured + 4 British airborne divisions; 6 Canadian + 1 Newfoundland infantry divisions + 2 Canadian armoured divisions + 3 Polish infantry divisions; 2 Royal Marine divisions
India: 20 Indian infantry divisions + 4 British infantry divisions + 1 British armoured division
Canada: Canada: 10 Canadian infantry divisions + 2 Canadian armoured divisions
Australia: 6 Australian infantry divisions + 2 Australian armoured divisions
New Zealand: 2 NZ infantry divisions + 1 NZ Armoured division
South Africa: 2 South African infantry + 2 South African armoured divisions
Rhodesia: 1 Rhodesian infantry division
New Avalon: 2 New Avalon infantry divisions
West Indies: 3 WI infantry divisions
Afghanistan/Persia: 4 Indian infantry, 2 cavalry divisions
Malaya : 2 British, 2 Indian, 1 Australian infantry divisions
Ceylon: 1 Indian infantry division
Burma: 2 Indian infantry divisions
Iceland: 1 Canadian infantry division
Canary Islands: 1 British infantry division
Spain: 2 British, 1 Polish, 1 Canadian, 1 New Avalon, 1 West Indian infantry divisions, 1 British armoured division
Norway: 4 British infantry + 2 armoured divisions, 2 Canadian, 1 Polish, 1 Gurkha, 4 Norwegian infantry divisions
East Africa: 3 India, 1 South African, 1 Rhodesian and 4 African infantry divisions
West Africa: 4 African infantry divisions
Middle East/Ottoman Front: 5 Israeli, 4 Indian, 2 British infantry + 2 Indian cavalry, 2 British and 1 CW cavalry
Egypt: 3 British, 2 Australian, 1 NZ, 1 South African, 1 Canadian, 2 Indian infantry divisions, 2 British armoured divisions
Crete: 1 British + 1 Gurkha infantry division
Malta: 2 British infantry divisions
Cyprus: 1 British infantry division
Balearic Isles: 1 British infantry division
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 16, 2020 19:19:53 GMT
Steve, It is a matter of distance. From Malta, bombers and fighters have a lot more time/range over their targets and surface ships/submarines are closer to their targets. Tunisia lacks a great deal of modern infrastructure, just as Algeria is fairly lacking. To build it up takes time, material and money, all of which are limited for Free France. They have plans to build up there, but are working from a fairly low basis as of July/August 1940. It will take 18-24 months to build up supply dumps, roads, railways, airfields, staging fields, fuel farms, warehouses and ports to support anything close to what is needed. The French pulled out equivalent manpower to ~12 divisions and ~800 aircraft, but now need to re-equip with vehicles, tanks and all weaponry larger than rifles and machine guns, plus a lot of AA guns. They will also need to re-equip with American and British aircraft, as supporting the French aircraft with spares and maintenance would be just too hard. In the meantime, Malta is an established, equipped base, albeit one under siege. It is also very well placed to interdict supply convoys to Italian North Africa. The British Empire is very highly stretched, although will continue to expand and mobilise all through 1942 and 1943. Barbarossa occurs and takes up the majority of German and AH strength, but Italy (which is quite a bit stronger and ‘deeper’ in its strength) can focus on the Med, Spain and North Africa as well as making contributions in Russia, the North Atlantic and in a couple of other theatres. The Turks are pinned down on the Anatolian Front and in the Middle East; their intent was similar to Italy in @, to jump in quickly and get a place at the table at any peace conference. The Greeks hold Eastern Thrace, Constantinople and the Ionian coast and hinterland down to Smyrna. It is just, just enough to support resistance with the aid of difficult supply convoys. As you say, it is one of several logistical nightmares. Simon Could a British carrier cross the Bosporus into the Black Sea during the war. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 17, 2020 2:53:38 GMT
Whatever for?
The Aegean is a sea controlled by German airpower, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are narrow straits creating extreme vulnerability and once in the Black Sea...there is extraordinary threats provided by land based airpower from Romania and Bulgaria. There is no physical reason why they couldn’t, similar to there being no physical reason why a carrier task force couldn’t fight its way into the Baltic, but there are no practical reasons for one to do so.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Mar 17, 2020 4:10:19 GMT
Whatever for? The Aegean is a sea controlled by German airpower, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus are narrow straits creating extreme vulnerability and once in the Black Sea...there is extraordinary threats provided by land based airpower from Romania and Bulgaria. There is no physical reason why they couldn’t, similar to there being no physical reason why a carrier task force couldn’t fight its way into the Baltic, but there are no practical reasons for one to do so. Well they tried it sort of in OTL 1915, so i toughed, they might try again with a carrier so they could give air support to the Soviets. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 17, 2020 4:26:17 GMT
1915 was forcing through a whole battlefleet to Constantinople in order to knock out Ottoman Turkey somehow and then send through supply convoys to Russia in an environment pre-aircraft threat and pre-mechanised warfare.
1941: Germany already holds Greece, plus is allied with Bulgaria and Romania. No one is going to propose sending through a single carrier on what would be a one-way mission with an extremely small chance of success.
The Royal Navy has more carriers, but can't afford to effectively waste them on a mission that would not yield any tangible positive results and would deny other operations and theatres of necessary air cover.
If there was a need to supply air support to the Soviets, then it would be a matter of flying RAF aircraft through Northern Norway to Murmansk or through Persia to the Caucasus.
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