Dark Earth: The History of the Aircraft Carrier

The first four Essex class carriers were laid down in 1939/1940, rather than being ordered in 1940 and laid down in 1941.

This gives the following schedule:

Essex CV-9 (Ordered January 1939, LD September 6th 1939, Launched February 11th 1941, Commissioned August 17th 1941)

The Dutch battleships serve with the Home Fleet between February 1941 and March 1942.

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So they where not spotted like OTL by a Japanese trawler.

Battle of the Coral Sea

With the exception of Malaya and Burma, Japan had achieved the main initial objectives by early 1942 and had neutralised the Grand Fleet of the Royal Navy as a decisive offensive force. However, it was unable to eliminate the last positions and forces of the British Empire in the Far East through direct assault and was also facing the increasing pressure of the recovering United States Navy across the Pacific. Intense discussions took place over the course of March amongst the members of the Imperial General Headquarters on the strategic priority for Japan in 1942, fixing upon the establishment of a firm defensive perimeter in the east and a build up of forces to push the Commonwealth forces back to India in the west. The movement of the Royal Navy's carrier forces to the Bay of Bengal served as a final trigger for this action, as it placed these vital assets beyond the immediate reach of the Combined Fleet. It was considered that the optimum means of achieving these aims in the short term would be through an oblique approach: the isolation and possible invasion of Australia. This would be carried out over the course of six months, after which time the IJN could prepare to execute its decades-old plan for the defeat of the advancing United States Navy through a process of gradual attritional battles through the Central Pacific utilising aircraft carriers, land-based bombers and submarines before a final decisive fleet battle at a time, place and circumstances of Japanese advantage.

The IJN South Seas Fleet had already taken New Britain during its initial sweeping offensive into the South Pacific in January 1942 and had landed substantial Imperial Japanese Army forces along the northern coast of New Guinea. This put Japanese forces in an optimum position to push down at take the remainder of New Guinea and occupy the key island chains that stood astride Australia and New Zealand's lifelines to the United States - the Solomon Islands, New Hebrides, Fiji and Samoa. Once this supply line was severed, Britain would be forced to redirect supplies, troops and ships away from its build-up in India and Malaya to the aid of its Commonwealth kith and kin, presenting an opportunity to eliminate its remaining naval power east of Suez. The IJN had presented an expansive plan for this concept to encompass the seizure of seizure of Northern Australia as a preventative measure. The Imperial Japanese Army was reticent to prepare full plans for an invasion of Australia, considering the troop and shipping requirements (some 20 divisions and 4.5 million tons at a minimum) being well beyond their actual capabilities, but supported a proposal by the Imperial Japanese Air Force for the neutralisation of Australian defences through a concentrated aerial campaign provided that its planned offensives in South East Asia and China received greater tactical air support.

The primary objective of the Japanese offensive would be the capital city of New Guinea, Port Moresby. With it and is surrounding airfields in Japanese control, large parts of Queensland and Northern Australia would be brought within range of IJAF bombers and the Allies would be effectively forced out of the Coral Sea. The secondary target would be Tulagi in the Solomon Islands, where a forward airbase would be built as part of the expanding defences around the South Pacific hub of Rabaul. Admiral Shiyegoshi Inoue had been taken aback by the intervention of US aircraft carriers in his early landing operations in the Lae-Salamaua area and had been reinforced by the arrival of two light carriers and four cruisers at Rabaul and the fast battleships Amagi and Atago at Truk in early April. He still regarded his force as lacking in naval airpower and urged Yamamoto to deploy heavier forces to cover the invasion force. The Combined Fleet had taken significant losses in the South China Sea campaign and the IJN lacked the infrastructure and oilers to support a full deployment to the South Pacific; additionally, a substantial battleship force was still required to be kept at Manila to cover the Grand Fleet at Singapore. Yamamoto compromised by agreeing on the deployment of two carrier divisions and supporting heavy surface elements as a covering force in mid April, enabled by the gradual repair of damaged ships and the availability of new vessels.

The Australian and New Zealand governments had been calling for reinforcements of their increasing parlous position since the outbreak of war and, by early April, these calls could no longer be ignored, particularly in the face of signals intercepts indicating a gradual move of Japanese ships from Manila to Truk and Rabaul and Japanese intentions for the invasion of New Guinea. The Australia and New Zealand Stations had been unified as the ANZAC Squadron in January under the command of Admiral Sir John Crace and reinforced by USN cruisers and certain surviving units of the ABDAF Strike Force, but its sole capital ship was the new Australian battleship HMAS Commonwealth and the elderly carrier HMAS Albatross was not considered as a frontline unit. The Imperial War Cabinet concluded that there was a clear need for reinforcement of Commonwealth naval forces in the South Pacific. This lead to the dispatch of a squadron of the Grand Fleet from Singapore to Australia based around the aircraft carriers Ark Royal and Victorious and the battleships Australia, New Zealand, Hood, St. George and Prince of Wales under the command of Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, considered an acceptable reduction of forces given that Formidable and Indomitable would be available for service by early May and Leviathan's imminent arrival from the Mediterranean alongside the Dutch battleships De Zeven Provincien and Willem van Oranje. Additionally, two infantry divisions and a Royal Marine Division and two Spitfire wings would be redirected from India to Australia in a convoy escorted by the East Indies Squadron. Upon their arrival at Sydney on April 24th, they were designated the British Commonwealth Pacific Squadron.

However, this major force for the defence of Allied position in the South Pacific would come from the United States Navy. The three carriers of Task Force 12, Enterprise, Wasp and Essex, escorted by Connecticut, Washington and Constellation, 6 cruisers and 18 destroyers had been engaged in the Doolittle Raid and were now returning to San Diego. Task Force 11 (Saratoga, North Carolina, 4 cruisers and 12 destroyers) was en route from Fiji to the new USN base in New Caledonia, Task Force 15 (Bonhomme Richard, Alabama, 3 cruisers and 9 destroyers) was covering a crucial convoy to New Zealand 400nm northeast of Samoa and Task Force 16 (Intrepid, Kearsarge, Michigan, Indiana, 10 cruisers and 36 destroyers) was operating from the still damaged base at Pearl Harbor in defence of the American position in the Central Pacific. In the South Pacific, Task Force 17 (a total force of Yorktown, Hornet, South Dakota, Massachusetts, 6 cruisers and 25 destroyers) were on station in the Coral Sea, having recently conducted air raids against Japanese landings on the northern coast of New Guinea. The utilisation of super battleships in fast carrier task forces had already proven successful in the USN raids on the Gilberts and Marshall Islands earlier in 1942, ironically being driven by a lack of sufficient large fleet oilers to support the operation of separate battlesquadrons; the same logistical limitations and the question of the location of the main IJN battlefleet and carrier force kept the 9 older battleships of the US Pacific Fleet to San Diego for the time being as a defensive measure.

Admiral Chester Nimitz, the new commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, had reviewed intercepted Japanese signals traffic between Yamamoto and Inoue and further intelligence regarding the movement of fleet oilers to Truk and Rabaul and began to form a picture of the scope and threat of Operation MO. A further intercept by British naval intelligence regarding the movement of the Fifth and Sixth Carrier Divisions to Rabaul lead to the conclusion that a major Japanese offensive would take place in the South Pacific in May with the probable objective of taking Port Moresby. On April 25th, Nimitz ordered the concentration of all his available carriers in the Coral Sea to counter the Japanese push in coordination with Commonwealth naval units in the area, providing a local tactical superiority over the planned IJN forces. The Allies planned to catch the Japanese forces in a pincer movement in the Coral Sea, utilising all three USN task forces from the east and the RN from the west. Japanese radio intercepts had placed six US carriers in the Central Pacific and their seaplane and submarine reconnaissance of the area around the Solomon Islands had failed to indicate the presence of any additional Allied forces in the area. It was agreed that, in line with previous staff talks and commitments, the Commonwealth Pacific Squadron would come under the operational command of the US commander in the area and the overall strategic command of Admiral Nimitz.

On April 27th, USS Gato detected the departure of a large Japanese force of four carriers and three battleships from Truk, followed by aerial reconnaissance reports of the sortie of the slower invasion fleets from Rabaul on May 1st. The Port Moresby Invasion Force consisted of 29 transports carrying 18600 troops, 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers, covered by the light carriers Chitose and Chiyoda, the old battleships Echizen, Tajima, Shimose and Kazusa, 2 heavy cruisers and 5 destroyers, whilst the Tulagi Invasion Force consisted of 8 transports carrying 6800 troops, the light carriers Taiyo and Kaiyo, 2 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, 6 minesweepers and 4 gunboats. The overall heavy covering forces under Admiral Kondo consisted of the Vanguard Force commanded by Admiral Shirō Takasu (Kongo, Kirishima, Hiei and Haruna and 8 destroyers) the Carrier Striking Force commanded by Admiral Chūichi Hara of (Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo and Ryujo, the fast battleships Amagi and Atago, 3 light cruisers and 16 destroyers) and the Main Body Support Force commanded by Admiral Hiroaki Abe (4 battleships, 4 superheavy cruisers and 12 destroyers). Six Japanese submarines would form a picket line 500nm to the southwest of Guadalcanal to provide warning of the approach of Allied ships on May 4th, but the three USN task forces under Admiral Frank J. Fletcher had already entered the Coral Sea on May 3rd and the Commonwealth task group was moving up from its position off Brisbane. They would aim to draw the Japanese into a cleverly set trap.

The IJN South Seas Fleet began landing Imperial Marines and Special Naval Landing Force troops on Guadalcanal and Tulagi on the early morning of May 4th. Fletcher moved up Task Force 17 to strike at the landings early on the next day, attacking the Japanese ships and construction troops with a raid of 54 aircraft from his position some 210nm to the south, shooting down 13 Japanese planes and sinking five transports, three minesweepers and the old cruiser Kaimon for the loss of 5 US aircraft. As he had intended, this now drew the attention of the Japanese carrier force, which moved quickly towards San Cristobal to come around into the Coral Sea in pursuit. Fletcher now withdrew back to the southeast, joining up with the other two US carrier task groups. On May 6th, both the Japanese and American forces would endeavour to locate their enemy carrier groups, with fighter patrols from both sides shooting down a number of search aircraft. A USN strike from Saratoga succeeding in sinking Kaiyo and her two escorting destroyers off Malaita, whilst a large Japanese raid was launched against a suspected American carrier group which turned out to be the oilers Neosho and Rapidan, both of which were sunk by IJN dive bombers. The main Japanese carrier force was located late on the afternoon of May 6th, but Fletcher elected not to launch a strike that could not be recovered before darkness and kept his force intact under cover of sorcerously augmented overcast weather. As he did so, the next stage of the battle began with three IJNAF reconnaissance bombers out of Rabaul locating the vanguard of the Commonwealth squadron 119nm southwest of Tagula. Only a partial report could be made before they were shot down by fighters from HMS Victorious, but the garbled information came as a surprise to Kondo, who suspected that this new force could be the flanking elements of the elusive US carrier group rather than a new force. Rawlings pulled his scouting cruisers and his main fleet back southwards before resuming his advance northwards after dark, aiming to put his force in position to strike the invasion convoy once it reached the Jomard Passage through the Louisiades. Crucially for the events of the morrow, the Japanese main body linked up with the carrier striking force to add the firepower of their anti-aircraft guns to its defences, following on from the operational lessons of the South China Sea campaign.

May 7th would see the decisive phase of the battle. The Japanese had moved to the north overnight to a position 300nm southwest of Guadalcanal, whilst Fletcher's force had moved up to 260nm south of the Japanese and Rawling's Commonwealth Squadron was 150nm south of Samarai. Both the USN and IJN task groups launched search planes throughout the early morning, with the Japanese aircraft locating Task Force 17 some 239nm away at 0752, with an airstrike of 66 Zeroes, 87 Kates and 90 Vals being launched at 0832. At 0801, a USN SBD from Yorktown located the main Japanese carrier force and a strike of 54 F4F Wildcats, 85 TBM Avengers and 100 SBD Dauntlesses is launched at 0849. The Japanese strike was intercepted by the USN combat air patrol of 84 Wildcats at 0954, with 25 Vals, 19 Kates and 20 Zeroes shot down for the loss of 36 Wildcats and a further 17 torpedo planes and 21 dive bombers being shot down by the extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire of the escorting US battleships, cruisers and destroyers. Hornet was hit by three torpedoes and six bombs, lost power and set afire, Saratoga was hit by two torpedoes and four bombs and is slowed to 24 knots, Yorktown was struck by one torpedo and three bombs and has two 5” twin mounts destroyed and Bonhomme Richard was hit by two bombs. Alabama was struck by one torpedo and two bombs, North Carolina by one torpedo and three bombs, South Dakota by three bombs and Massachusetts by one torpedo, while the light cruiser Newark was hit by two torpedoes and three bombs and slowly sunk, the heavy cruiser Lansing blew up after being hit by five bombs and the destroyers Anderson and Wainwright were sunk by multiple bomb hits. The American aircraft hit the IJN carrier strike force at 1013, after fighting their way through the Japanese CAP of 72 Zeroes at a cost of 27 Dauntlesses, 22 Avengers and 31 Wildcats shot down in exchange for the loss of 20 Zeroes, with a further 16 Avengers and 19 Dauntlesses shot down by IJN anti-aircraft fire, which was particularly heavy from the escorting battleships. Shokaku was hit by one torpedo and three bombs, Zuikaku was hit by one torpedo and two bombs, Junyo evaded all but two bombs and Ryujo was smashed by five bombs and one torpedo, causing massive fires and leading to Commander Robert E. Dixon's famous radio transmission "Scratch one flattop! Dixon to carrier: Scratch one flattop.". The Japanese battleships drew considerable fire from the attacking USN strike planes, with Settsu and Mikawa being the worst hit with three bombs apiece, but none were significantly damaged, whilst the superheavy cruisers Shari and Warusawa were both struck by one torpedo and two bombs and three destroyers set afire or sunk. Both fleets proceeded to recover their aircraft and pull back away, leaving the US task groups with 233 operational aircraft compared to 248 Japanese planes and both forces having lost one fleet carrier, but with the US ships having taken greater damage and being effectively reduced to two operational flight decks.

As the major carrier battle unfolded, RN seaplanes spotted the Port Moresby invasion convoy west of the Louisiade Archipelago at a distance of 128nm from the Pacific Fleet . Admiral Rawlings ordered his 4 battleships to close at top speed whilst he launched an airstrike from Ark Royal and Victorious. 36 Swordfish, 32 Buccaneers, 30 Fireflies and 29 Eagles were launched at 1134 and RN strike arrived over the Japanese fleet at 1209, being were met by an IJN combat air patrol of 27 Zeroes. 10 Swordfish, 8 Buccaneers, 6 Fireflies and 10 Eagles are shot down for the loss of 12 Zeroes. The Japanese light carriers Chitose and Chiyoda are hit by two torpedoes and four bombs and two torpedoes and two bombs respectively and are left adrift and the heavy cruiser Furutaka capsizing after being hit by two torpedoes and five bombs. 4 destroyers are badly damaged, but the most grievous damage is done to the invasion fleet, with six transports sunk and four damaged. Admiral Kondo, upon hearing of the RN strike, ordered that his fast battleships move to the west at full speed to cover the invasion force and launched an airstrike at the Commonwealth ships, whilst the escorting Japanese cruisers formed a rearguard to defend the withdrawing convoy. At 1359 in the afternoon, Hood, Prince of Wales, Australia and New Zealand opened fire on the withdrawing Japanese invasion force at a distance of 52,376 yards. At 1410, Hood hit the Japanese armoured cruiser Izumo at a range of 42,589 yards with her eighteenth salvo. Prince of Wales scores her first hit at 1417 on Iwate. By 1445, the two old cruisers had been battered into smoking ruins and were slowly sinking, along with their two escorting destroyers, but their sacrifice had won crucial time for the withdrawal of the surviving troopships. The IJN airstrike of 56 aircraft launched by the Kido Butai attacked the Commonwealth battleships at 1502, with 7 Vals and 10 Kates shot down. Hood and Prince of Wales were hit by one torpedo and two bombs apiece, Australia by three bombs and New Zealand by one bomb, with the destroyer HMAS Voyager sunk by three bombs.

The Commonwealth battleships withdrew back towards their aircraft carriers south of New Guinea, with the Japanese forces headied north for Rabaul at 18 knots, with the two stricken light carriers being towed by cruisers. Fletcher, some 196nm to the southwest, ordered Washington and South Dakota, 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers to pursue the withdrawing Japanese and attempt to bring them to action overnight. The Japanese rearguard, consisting of the old battleships Shimosa and Tajima, 3 cruisers and 9 destroyers, was caught by the US battleship force at 0211. Washington hit Tajima with her third salvo, with the Japanese ship blowing up at 0234 with the loss of 897 lives, while South Dakota scored 13 hits on Shimosa, leaving her a fiery, battered hulk which sunk the next day. 3 Japanese and 2 American destroyers were sunk in the nighttime melee.The final acts of the battle the next morning on May 8th were brief but brutal. At 0726, the crippled light carrier Chitose was sunk by scouting USN Dauntless dive bombers from Bonhomme Richard. At 0845, five Japanese land based G4M torpedo bombers hit HMAS Albatross with three torpedoes; she sunk six hours later.

The Battle of the Coral Sea was a strategic Allied victory, with the IJN losing 1 fleet and 1 light carrier, 2 old battleships, 4 cruisers, 7 destroyers and 139 aircraft and the Allies losing 1 fleet and 1 light carrier, 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers and 185 aircraft and, most significantly, the invasion of Port Moresby being decisively defeated. The loss of the older Japanese battleships in the one-sided surface night action did somewhat obscure the true margin of victory, as they were certainly not frontline surface units by any meaning or interpretation, but they did provide an extremely valuable moral boost to the American public; as a result of the Coral Sea, the remaining IJN 15" superdreadnoughts were withdrawn from the South Pacific for duty with the China Area Fleet for the next 18 months and they would not see frontline combat again for some time. The cooperation between the Allied naval forces had been generally effective, although issues of signals, command and logistics would further hamper such efforts as 1942 proceeded. For the Japanese, the lesson of the battle was clear - the carriers of the United States Navy represented the greatest threat to the security of their newly conquered empire in the Pacific and only their elimination would pave the way for ultimate victory. Once they were removed from the equation, then the modern carriers and battleships of the Imperial Japanese Navy could crush the surface ships of their American and British foes without mercy and the Rising Sun would prevail across the world's largest ocean.

Cheers. Midway will be large, with the USN deploying Yorktown, Enterprise, Essex, Intrepid and Kearsarge and the Japanese mustering Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuikaku, Shokaku and Junyo. It will be a different battle in a number of ways.

I won’t be covering Midway in the RN account, but in the USN carrier history. Given how long 1942 is taking, that could be a while away.

The remainder of 1942 will give some hints, though.