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Post by lordroel on May 11, 2020 15:09:30 GMT
Steve, The northern half of Sumatra remains in Allied possession. Simon Are those holding it mostly Australians and Indian troops ore are there Dutch troops still present in large numbers in Free Sumatra.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 11, 2020 23:54:45 GMT
The KNIL had 4 divisions on Java (1st,2nd,3rd,7th), 2 on Sumatra (4th and 6th) and 1 each on Borneo (5th) and Celebes (8th). After the fighting in Southern Sumatra, the 6th Division is largely destroyed as an effective combat unit, leaving the main Dutch unit as the reinforced 4th Division and 7th Divisions, whilst the 6th is rebuilt at Medan from Sumatran conscripts and volunteers from the Dutch West Indies.
Other Allied forces in early 1942, at which time a rough front line had been stabilised along the Kampar River, consist of:
XV Indian Corps 27th Indian Infantry Division 36th Indian Infantry Division 43rd Indian Infantry Division
XXXV Corps 1st Ceylon Division 4th Gurkha Division 55th (West Lancashire) Infantry Division
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Post by lordroel on May 12, 2020 3:47:10 GMT
The KNIL had 4 divisions on Java (1st,2nd,3rd,7th), 2 on Sumatra (4th and 6th) and 1 each on Borneo (5th) and Celebes (8th). After the fighting in Southern Sumatra, the 6th Division is largely destroyed as an effective combat unit, leaving the main Dutch unit as the reinforced 4th Division and 7th Divisions, whilst the 6th is rebuilt at Medan from Sumatran conscripts and volunteers from the Dutch West Indies. Other Allied forces in early 1942, at which time a rough front line had been stabilised along the Kampar River, consist of: XV Indian Corps27th Indian Infantry Division 36th Indian Infantry Division 43rd Indian Infantry Division XXXV Corps1st Ceylon Division 4th Gurkha Division 55th (West Lancashire) Infantry Division Is the RAF using free Sumatra as a bomber base for operations against Japanese held Malaysia and Singapore.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 12, 2020 6:29:28 GMT
The Japanese do not hold Malaya or Singapore. I am a little confused as to how anyone could get that impression from the material.
Recapping from what has been put up in 1942 so far:
- The Cardinal convoys arrive in early March 1942, carrying 4 divisions and hundreds of tanks and aircraft. - Force R reinforces the Grand Fleet at the same time. - The RN is increasingly limited to operating within shore based air cover from Malaya and Singapore. - Britain prioritises the defence of Malaya over Java and Sumatra. - Singapore will increasingly become a battleship, cruiser, destroyer and submarine base under the protection of its own air cover in 1942 until enough carriers can be mustered for offensive operations. - In Malaya, Twelfth Army deploys 16 divisions (including 2 armoured) and 500,000 men, plus the fortress defences and garrison of Singapore and the Royal Marines. A further reinforcement convoy, codenamed Cardinal, arrives in March 1942, allowing sufficient reserves to properly hold a line from Kota Bharu to Kedah, supported by over 1500 tactical aircraft and the Grand Fleet. The Japanese achieve quite a bit of success, but cannot crack the line against a numerically superior force with more firepower and aircraft. - Following on from the bloody draw in the South China Sea, both fleets adopted something of a circumspect approach over the next few weeks, with both having suffered enough losses to make decisive offensive action impossible to support. The Grand Fleet was further weakened by the necessity to dispatch a squadron of Invincible, Lion and Princess Royal to the Andaman Sea to support the increasingly beleaguered Twelfth Army in its retreat from Siam in the face of the strong Japanese and Siamese advance. Admiral Cunningham was limited to the rotational forward deployment of a single carrier task force in the Natuna Sea whilst he held the main body of his fleet in Singapore, where he had now been joined by the French Escadron d'Extrême-Orient. Control of this barrier sea, lying between Malaya and Borneo, was seen as vital in maintaining the crumbling Malay Barrier, which was being increasingly outflanked by the Japanese push southwards. - The Japanese have the advantage of geography here, as they can outflank Malaya and Singapore by taking Borneo (Brunei and Sarawak) from the Sulu Sea and heading down into the DEI through the Celebes Sea. This causes an issue for how and where the Grand Fleet can operate. The other strategic offensive that will attempt to draw away Allied strength is the South Pacific thrust to cut off Australia from the United States, which does force the British to send carriers and battleships to Australia and New Zealand. - Essentially, to break out, the Grand Fleet needs to field at least 12 carriers with improved aircraft, adjusted tactics and radar, greatly increased AAA on escorts and carriers (which is already substantially in advance of 1942, being more on the level of late 1944/early 1945 levels) and coordination with land based offensives to break out of the "bag" formed by Indochina, Borneo, Java and Sumatra. - It is a difficult time of the war for the Allies, to put it mildly, and the British Empire has a very difficult fight to hold Malaya and Burma for exactly the reasons that you point out. The Japanese take Java and the southern half of Sumatra, forcing the RN into the Bay of Bengal, but not breaking the utility of Singapore as a fortified base or the very strong Commonwealth positions in Malaya. The Grand Fleet will return to the South China Sea, once the Japanese airpower in Sumatra is sufficiently attrited and their attention drawn in a number of directions.
The situation in 1942 is essentially the opposite - the Japanese conduct a protracted bombing campaign against Singapore and Malaya from Borneo, Sumatra and Java, but mainly from Siam and Indochina. This isn't a success for them, as the IJAF hasn't invested in a strategic bomber force to the same extent as the RAF and USAF.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 12, 2020 11:12:25 GMT
Steve, Not quite. The 3rd Battle of the South China Sea isn’t decisive as a result or carrier battle, but rather, by preventing the IJN from winning, the RN achieves success. It is partly Pyrrhic, as there are a lot of damaged ships that end up needing repairs in quite a number of locations as previously signposted, in addition to the need for reinforcements of the Australian and New Zealand squadrons in the South Pacific. Already under repair: Hermes, Formidable, Indomitable, Centaur Repairs post 3rd SCS: Illustrious, Indefatigable, Implacable, Argus Bound for the South Pacific: Ark Royal, Victorious Operational Grand Fleet : Eagle, Invincible, Unicorn, Pegasus; Saint Louis, Henri IV Coming from Med/Home in second half of 1942: Ocean, Leviathan The northern half of Sumatra remains in Allied possession. The Grand Fleet, or at least its remaining carriers, shift to the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea for part of 1942. Simon
OK thanks for clarifying. Midway was a bad example in my case as rather than a crushing defeat for the Japanese I was thinking this sees them wear down the IJN, especially its carrier arm.
Ah holding northern Sumatra and withdrawing to west of the peninsula during much of this period makes good sense.
Steve
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Post by simon darkshade on May 12, 2020 11:18:49 GMT
Steve,
The Japanese will certainly be worn down by the next battle and by subsequent attrition. Using the Malay Peninsula and Kra Isthmus as a barrier between the carriers and the enemy does play more to the RN's strengths and position in the months to come. Holding Northern Sumatra keeps the supply lines open, nominally.
It is important to remember what happens between May and October/November in Burma and Siam...
Simon
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Post by lordroel on May 16, 2020 8:01:53 GMT
The Japanese will certainly be worn down by the next battle and by subsequent attrition. Using the Malay Peninsula and Kra Isthmus as a barrier between the carriers and the enemy does play more to the RN's strengths and position in the months to come. Holding Northern Sumatra keeps the supply lines open, nominally. Simon The air battles over Northern Sumatra must be heavy with the Japanese trying to bomb and the RAF and Dutch trying to counter.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 16, 2020 12:31:45 GMT
The Japanese air forces in the area aren’t huge. Sumatra ranks behind China, Siam, Indochina, the Burma/Malay fronts, Borneo, New Guinea and Java, with an operational force of 150-200 aircraft available for frontline offensive operations, with over 200 aircraft focused on the air defence of Palembang and other major centres in occupied Southern Sumatra.
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Post by lordroel on May 16, 2020 12:37:58 GMT
The Japanese air forces in the area aren’t huge. Sumatra ranks behind China, Siam, Indochina, the Burma/Malay fronts, Borneo, New Guinea and Java, with an operational force of 150-200 aircraft available for frontline offensive operations, with over 200 aircraft focused on the air defence of Palembang and other major centres in occupied Southern Sumatra. Is it a fix front on Sumatra ore a moving front (also sorry for derailing the thread from aircraft carriers to the Sumatra campaign of World War II).
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Post by simon darkshade on May 16, 2020 13:08:46 GMT
Generally static along the river line as described above, with further reinforcements (Imperial Service Corps consisting of Mysore, Hyderabad, Rajputana and Kashmir divisions, three African divisions and an Australian division) arriving over the coming months of 1942 to pin the Japanese forces in place and oppose them in depth. It begins to move once the Grand Fleet is fully repaired and operational, allowing its air groups to hit the Japanese in coordinated strikes from the Indian Ocean.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 17, 2020 11:48:35 GMT
Some more drip feeding "The confined nature of the South China Sea provided for complications for both fleets, with the Japanese land based air fleets being treated cautiously by the Royal Navy and the increasing number of RN submarines in the region presented an increasing threat for IJN operations. Admiral Cunningham had three key weapons that gave him an advantage in the battle to come. First and foremost, Allied codebreaking gave the Grand Fleet a useful degree of operational warning of any Japanese fleet movements and general intentions. Secondly, the Royal Air Force’s strategic heavy bomber force in the Far East, Bomber Command’s No. 25 Group, had now been reinforced with additional Wellingtons and Handley Page Halifaxes, giving a potent long range punch to Far East Command. Finally, the Royal Naval Air Service strike force in Malaya had been substantially increased in firepower with the arrival of two wings of de Havilland Mosquito torpedo bombers with the Cardinal convoys. He aimed to use these to counteract the numerical edge of the Combined Fleet and, upon receiving indications that a Japanese sortie was imminent in March 23rd, he requested a maximum effort bomber attack on IJNAF airfields. Two major raids of over 300 bombers struck five airfields in Southern Indochina, inflicting considerable damage at the cost of 27 RAF aircraft being shot down. Yamamoto ordered the Combined Fleet to sea on March 26th, aiming to draw out the Grand Fleet within range of Indochina by threatening the Gulf of Siam. This time, he elected to take a course to the west of the Spratly Islands and then head towards the Poulo-Condore Islands, bringing the Grand Fleet upon his land-based air and his own carriers. Cunningham took the Grand Fleet out from Singapore on March 27th in response, heading out to the east before breaking back towards the Malay coast, where he would remain, just out of sight of the shore of Kelantan, partially concealed by experimental cloaking magics. His plan was to keep his carriers within the cover of over 400 land based RAF and RNAS fighters, whilst augmenting its striking power through his amassed shore based bombers. Off to the south, halfway between Natuna and Singapore, a decoy force of surface vessels, dirigibles and skyships was to act as the Grand Fleet, utilising a variety of illusory and electronic means. This approach, should it fully succeed, would draw off the Japanese aircraft and leave their fleet open to British attacks."
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Post by lordroel on May 17, 2020 11:53:28 GMT
Some more drip feeding "The confined nature of the South China Sea provided for complications for both fleets, with the Japanese land based air fleets being treated cautiously by the Royal Navy and the increasing number of RN submarines in the region presented an increasing threat for IJN operations. Admiral Cunningham had three key weapons that gave him an advantage in the battle to come. First and foremost, Allied codebreaking gave the Grand Fleet a useful degree of operational warning of any Japanese fleet movements and general intentions. Secondly, the Royal Air Force’s strategic heavy bomber force in the Far East, Bomber Command’s No. 25 Group, had now been reinforced with additional Wellingtons and Handley Page Halifaxes, giving a potent long range punch to Far East Command. Finally, the Royal Naval Air Service strike force in Malaya had been substantially increased in firepower with the arrival of two wings of de Havilland Mosquito torpedo bombers with the Cardinal convoys. He aimed to use these to counteract the numerical edge of the Combined Fleet and, upon receiving indications that a Japanese sortie was imminent in March 23rd, he requested a maximum effort bomber attack on IJNAF airfields. Two major raids of over 300 bombers struck five airfields in Southern Indochina, inflicting considerable damage at the cost of 27 RAF aircraft being shot down. Yamamoto ordered the Combined Fleet to sea on March 26th, aiming to draw out the Grand Fleet within range of Indochina by threatening the Gulf of Siam. This time, he elected to take a course to the west of the Spratly Islands and then head towards the Poulo-Condore Islands, bringing the Grand Fleet upon his land-based air and his own carriers. Cunningham took the Grand Fleet out from Singapore on March 27th in response, heading out to the east before breaking back towards the Malay coast, where he would remain, just out of sight of the shore of Kelantan, partially concealed by experimental cloaking magics. His plan was to keep his carriers within the cover of over 400 land based RAF and RNAS fighters, whilst augmenting its striking power through his amassed shore based bombers. Off to the south, halfway between Natuna and Singapore, a decoy force of surface vessels, dirigibles and skyships was to act as the Grand Fleet, utilising a variety of illusory and electronic means. This approach, should it fully succeed, would draw off the Japanese aircraft and leave their fleet open to British attacks." So both Yamamoto and Cunningham think they have made the best move, but in the end, only one will be left standing i guess.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 17, 2020 12:05:03 GMT
Given that we know that Yamamoto is around in 1963 and Cunningham is 1st Sea Lord in 1947...
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Post by lordroel on May 17, 2020 12:06:24 GMT
Given that we know that Yamamoto is around in 1963 and Cunningham is 1st Sea Lord in 1947... Well in the battle i was saying, its nice to hear both are alive in the Darkearth verse.
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Post by simon darkshade on May 17, 2020 12:43:32 GMT
The battle will not end up as a decisive one for either side, given the stakes and more significantly, the general technological level of advance. There is something of an impasse as of early 1942.
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