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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 13, 2019 7:17:11 GMT
As promised, Part II dealing with the American side of things.
First, the situation of mid to late-1945 needs to be viewed through the prism of the intelligence both sides were working on. In this regard, the Japanese were completely dominant over the United States, having correctly figured out the timing, sequence and even invasion points the Americans were going to use as part of Operation DOWNFALL in Kyushu. The Japanese had deduced the entire planning of DOWNFALL according to D.M. Giangreco's Hell To Pay, with their only error being, if it could be even called that, their assumption the Allies were going to deploy more forces than they actually were planning for. They expected the United States and its allies to commit almost 10,000 plans when in reality it would've been 5,000 or less, while they also estimated they (Allies) would land between 15 to 40 divisions; in reality, the Allies were planning for 14. The Japanese were preparing to meet and defeat a much larger force than the Allies could actually bring to the table.
On the flip side, the U.S. was completely off. Case in point was MacArthur's G-2 estimating that, by X-Day on November 1 in 1945, the Japanese in all of Kyushu would have 300,000 men and 200 tanks. In actuality, the 57th Army based in southeast Kyushu alone had that amount of strength. When the 700,000 Marines and U.S. Army soldiers of the 6th Army landed in that November, they would've been facing in total 900,000 Japanese soldiers dug in with permanent emplacements just like at Iwo and Okinawa. Japanese planning as part of KETSU-GO also envisioned that, immediately following the American invasion, an addition 90,000 troops in four divisions were to be transported across the narrow waterway of the Shimonoseki Strait. IGHQ projections had the entire force outfitted and ready by October of 1945, with the logistical underpinning of the force being six months worth of supplies that had been stockpiled, ready for the decisive battle. Outside of the immediate invasion beaches, no firepower advantage would've existed for the Americans; Kyushu is extremely mountainous and thus the ranges involved would've produced a situation the U.S. found like that in Italy or Korea, with close in fighting at very short ranges. In essence the U.S. would've found itself launching frontal assaults against an enemy that already outnumbered it. By now I've belabored the point that by 1945 the Japanese had figured out the tactics and strategy needed to inflict 1:1 losses on their enemies, but the point needs to be re-stated here because at 990,000 to 600,000 the basic math is clear how this would go.
Finally, and most importantly, was the air campaign. IGHQ had been stockpiling aviation for months in preparation for the invasion, with total inventory being 1,156,000 barrels by July of 1942. Much the same had been done for pilots, with IJA having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. Overall, when the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO starting in July of 1945, the plan called for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet. Contemporary to this, the Japanese inventory already contained 8,500 ready planes and IGHQ expected another 2,000 by the fall. When the Allies conducted a census in August following the surrender they found 12,684 aircraft of all types in Japan, suggesting that IGHQ's estimates were spot on for 10,500 aircraft by November. As for planned uses, of the 9,000 to be used in KETSU-GO, kamikazes were to comprise 6,225 of the total.
That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. There is every reason to believe this would've worked, as the Japanese would've enjoyed several advantages they didn't have at Okinawa, such as:
1. The mountainous terrain meant that Japanese attacking aircraft would've been shielded from radar detection almost until they were right up on the fleet. At Okinawa, the U.S. had been able to deploy destroyers as pickets dozens of miles out but that wouldn't have possible here because the invasion fleet obviously had to be closely anchored off Japan.
2. The "Big Blue Blanket", which was another Anti-Kamikaze tactic devised by the U.S. during Okinawa, involved masses of fighters kept aloft and being fed data by the picket ships. However, this would've been impossible to counter the Japanese here, as the U.S. was only bringing 5,000 total aircraft from the Far Eastern Air Force in the Ryukyus and the carriers of the 3rd and 5th Fleets. The problem, as outlined by Giangreco, was that U.S. planning called for TF-58 with its 1,900 plans to be 600 miles to the North attacking targets in Honshu instead of supporting the 7th Fleet. This left just two carrier groups to provide a combat air patrol for the fleet, which means that American fighters would've been outnumbered by the Japanese by about a staggering 10 to 1. In other words, even if every American fighter pilot became an ace during those first 10 days, thousands of Japanese aircraft would've still broken through.
3. The Japanese had 60 airfields on Okinawa and the aforementioned fact of short distances to target meant that mechanical issues, a problem that plagued kamikaze operations during Okinawa given the hundreds of miles distance from Japan to the island, would not have been anywhere near as prevalent.
All of this taken together highly suggests the Japanese would've repulsed the U.S. invasion, inflicting an extremely bloody toll in accomplishing the same. Combined with the failure of the Soviet invasion, it is likely a compromise peace would've been worked out in the aftermath, with the militarists realistic enough to come to the table "only" demanding that the core empire of the Home Islands, Korea, Manchuria and Formosa be respected. They were, allegedly, even willing to accept military reductions comparable to those Germany saw as part of the Treaty of Versailles; just like the Germans, they knew in the long run they could get away with breaking them, however.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Oct 13, 2019 10:59:15 GMT
As promised, Part II dealing with the American side of things. First, the situation of mid to late-1945 needs to be viewed through the prism of the intelligence both sides were working on. In this regard, the Japanese were completely dominant over the United States, having correctly figured out the timing, sequence and even invasion points the Americans were going to use as part of Operation DOWNFALL in Kyushu. The Japanese had deduced the entire planning of DOWNFALL according to D.M. Giangreco's Hell To Pay, with their only error being, if it could be even called that, their assumption the Allies were going to deploy more forces than they actually were planning for. They expected the United States and its allies to commit almost 10,000 plans when in reality it would've been 5,000 or less, while they also estimated they (Allies) would land between 15 to 40 divisions; in reality, the Allies were planning for 14. The Japanese were preparing to meet and defeat a much larger force than the Allies could actually bring to the table. On the flip side, the U.S. was completely off. Case in point was MacArthur's G-2 estimating that, by X-Day on November 1 in 1945, the Japanese in all of Kyushu would have 300,000 men and 200 tanks. In actuality, the 57th Army based in southeast Kyushu alone had that amount of strength. When the 700,000 Marines and U.S. Army soldiers of the 6th Army landed in that November, they would've been facing in total 900,000 Japanese soldiers dug in with permanent emplacements just like at Iwo and Okinawa. Japanese planning as part of KETSU-GO also envisioned that, immediately following the American invasion, an addition 90,000 troops in four divisions were to be transported across the narrow waterway of the Shimonoseki Strait. IGHQ projections had the entire force outfitted and ready by October of 1945, with the logistical underpinning of the force being six months worth of supplies that had been stockpiled, ready for the decisive battle. Outside of the immediate invasion beaches, no firepower advantage would've existed for the Americans; Kyushu is extremely mountainous and thus the ranges involved would've produced a situation the U.S. found like that in Italy or Korea, with close in fighting at very short ranges. In essence the U.S. would've found itself launching frontal assaults against an enemy that already outnumbered it. By now I've belabored the point that by 1945 the Japanese had figured out the tactics and strategy needed to inflict 1:1 losses on their enemies, but the point needs to be re-stated here because at 990,000 to 600,000 the basic math is clear how this would go. Finally, and most importantly, was the air campaign. IGHQ had been stockpiling aviation for months in preparation for the invasion, with total inventory being 1,156,000 barrels by July of 1942. Much the same had been done for pilots, with IJA having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. Overall, when the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO starting in July of 1945, the plan called for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet. Contemporary to this, the Japanese inventory already contained 8,500 ready planes and IGHQ expected another 2,000 by the fall. When the Allies conducted a census in August following the surrender they found 12,684 aircraft of all types in Japan, suggesting that IGHQ's estimates were spot on for 10,500 aircraft by November. As for planned uses, of the 9,000 to be used in KETSU-GO, kamikazes were to comprise 6,225 of the total. That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. There is every reason to believe this would've worked, as the Japanese would've enjoyed several advantages they didn't have at Okinawa, such as: 1. The mountainous terrain meant that Japanese attacking aircraft would've been shielded from radar detection almost until they were right up on the fleet. At Okinawa, the U.S. had been able to deploy destroyers as pickets dozens of miles out but that wouldn't have possible here because the invasion fleet obviously had to be closely anchored off Japan. 2. The "Big Blue Blanket", which was another Anti-Kamikaze tactic devised by the U.S. during Okinawa, involved masses of fighters kept aloft and being fed data by the picket ships. However, this would've been impossible to counter the Japanese here, as the U.S. was only bringing 5,000 total aircraft from the Far Eastern Air Force in the Ryukyus and the carriers of the 3rd and 5th Fleets. The problem, as outlined by Giangreco, was that U.S. planning called for TF-58 with its 1,900 plans to be 600 miles to the North attacking targets in Honshu instead of supporting the 7th Fleet. This left just two carrier groups to provide a combat air patrol for the fleet, which means that American fighters would've been outnumbered by the Japanese by about a staggering 10 to 1. In other words, even if every American fighter pilot became an ace during those first 10 days, thousands of Japanese aircraft would've still broken through. 3. The Japanese had 60 airfields on Okinawa and the aforementioned fact of short distances to target meant that mechanical issues, a problem that plagued kamikaze operations during Okinawa given the hundreds of miles distance from Japan to the island, would not have been anywhere near as prevalent. All of this taken together highly suggests the Japanese would've repulsed the U.S. invasion, inflicting an extremely bloody toll in accomplishing the same. Combined with the failure of the Soviet invasion, it is likely a compromise peace would've been worked out in the aftermath, with the militarists realistic enough to come to the table "only" demanding that the core empire of the Home Islands, Korea, Manchuria and Formosa be respected. They were, allegedly, even willing to accept military reductions comparable to those Germany saw as part of the Treaty of Versailles; just like the Germans, they knew in the long run they could get away with breaking them, however.
On paper yes they seem to have a lot of advantages but how many of those forces have more than basic training and equipment? Ditto with the pilots and the condition of its a/c. Japan was already on its last legs with much of its infrastructure destroyed and organisation falling apart. Also such a concentration of air attacks means that there's going to be a very target rich situation for the defenders. Its not just taht the Japanese have to overcome the far more experienced US air cover but also an extensive AA defence with proximity fuses. Also while radar might restrict detection while over land unless the Japanese are going to operate only over the landing beaches their going to have to go some way to sea to reach other naval targets and that will enable radar to help the defence. The CV forces and the main transports aren't going to be anchored off the beach but some way off shore. Plus this assumes that a lot of those a/c and bases won't be taken out by a preliminary softening up campaign. Ditto with the coastal fortifications as their going to be hit by air and sea attacks including possibly the B-29 forces given that their got few cities left to burn.
Yes if the Japanese can get a 1-1 kill rate they would succeed but when did they ever do that? In Okinawa US dead were ~14k whereas Japanese losses are estimated as between 77-110k so between 6 and 8 to one. At Iwo Jima they did better with about 3-1 dead ratio but that was in large part because they dug in some way back from the landings and also Kuribayashi the commander of the defence refused to allow banzai charges which he correctly recognised as a waste of life. However after his death those quickly resumed, easing the US task. If the Japanese concentrate the bulk of that defensive forces on/near the beaches their going to suffer very, very badly from the intense bombadments that will be coming. Similarly if their numbers and lack of discipline means they quickly resort to banzai attacks to throw the Americans back, which is going to be likely given this is a defence of their homeland those numbers are going to dwindle very quickly.
If the US finds the fighting anything like as tough as your expecting then TF-58 can quickly be called south to aid the attack. Also those 90,000 men seeking to cross to Kyushu could see a lot of losses from air and sea attack unless they manage to do so while the US forces are totally distracted by the kamikazi attacks. - Having said that there was a railway tunnel in place from 42 so they could be safe during the crossing although if their detected assembling to cross they could get pounded. Assuming that there was still a working railway system there at that point or that the men could march across.
Its possible for the attack to fail and I suspect that US losses will be high but I suspect they will still secure a beachhead and then push inland, which might be where the best chances for inflicting casualties would be but by then the kamikazi attacks are likely to be exhausted and any further reinforcements will suffer heavily from the air and sea bombardment.
If they do fail and especially if the Soviets are also stalled in Korea I can't see a negotiated peace. Both powers will be angry at the defeat and commit more resources. Also the US can - assuming still no nukes - also fall back on letting starvation do their work as they had pretty much destroyed both the Japanese rail system and any hope of supply from oversea between naval control, sinking of the Japanese merchant shipping and very extensive mining. [The reason why I say especially if the Soviets fail is its just possible that if the Soviets succeed and the Americans fail they might feel the need to come to terms before the Soviets gain too much advantage but I still suspect its unlikely as the Soviets have very limited amphibious capacity and on the American side at least the Soviets were still seen more as allies than rivals.]
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Oct 13, 2019 23:12:06 GMT
There was a TL that I wrote regarding the Soviet Union that involves an earlier death of Stalin in October of 1945 from a stroke. What no one here realizes is that in October of 1945, Stalin had a health scare that nearly killed him. The PoD is easy to summarize, as Stalin himself was living an unhealthy lifestyle of heavy drinking, smoking and an unusual sleep pattern. Any of those things can kill him a lot sooner. With an earlier death of Stalin, there would have been a massive power struggle, as even the various would-be successors are fighting for the right to succeed him. I had this PoD in mind along with a second potential scenario in mind, which is a different Cold War where Turkey and Iran have been Finlandized
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 14, 2019 1:34:57 GMT
There was a TL that I wrote regarding the Soviet Union that involves an earlier death of Stalin in October of 1945 from a stroke. What no one here realizes is that in October of 1945, Stalin had a health scare that nearly killed him. The PoD is easy to summarize, as Stalin himself was living an unhealthy lifestyle of heavy drinking, smoking and an unusual sleep pattern. Any of those things can kill him a lot sooner. With an earlier death of Stalin, there would have been a massive power struggle, as even the various would-be successors are fighting for the right to succeed him. I had this PoD in mind along with a second potential scenario in mind, which is a different Cold War where Turkey and Iran have been Finlandized Well, since World War Two ended earlier that year, I suppose we won’t be seeing how Joe Steel dying in the middle of it shapes the conflict going forwards. Nonetheless, what happens to the USSR—and to influence the Cold War globally—ought to be interesting as the century progresses. |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 14, 2019 2:26:10 GMT
As promised, Part II dealing with the American side of things. First, the situation of mid to late-1945 needs to be viewed through the prism of the intelligence both sides were working on. In this regard, the Japanese were completely dominant over the United States, having correctly figured out the timing, sequence and even invasion points the Americans were going to use as part of Operation DOWNFALL in Kyushu. The Japanese had deduced the entire planning of DOWNFALL according to D.M. Giangreco's Hell To Pay, with their only error being, if it could be even called that, their assumption the Allies were going to deploy more forces than they actually were planning for. They expected the United States and its allies to commit almost 10,000 plans when in reality it would've been 5,000 or less, while they also estimated they (Allies) would land between 15 to 40 divisions; in reality, the Allies were planning for 14. The Japanese were preparing to meet and defeat a much larger force than the Allies could actually bring to the table. On the flip side, the U.S. was completely off. Case in point was MacArthur's G-2 estimating that, by X-Day on November 1 in 1945, the Japanese in all of Kyushu would have 300,000 men and 200 tanks. In actuality, the 57th Army based in southeast Kyushu alone had that amount of strength. When the 700,000 Marines and U.S. Army soldiers of the 6th Army landed in that November, they would've been facing in total 900,000 Japanese soldiers dug in with permanent emplacements just like at Iwo and Okinawa. Japanese planning as part of KETSU-GO also envisioned that, immediately following the American invasion, an addition 90,000 troops in four divisions were to be transported across the narrow waterway of the Shimonoseki Strait. IGHQ projections had the entire force outfitted and ready by October of 1945, with the logistical underpinning of the force being six months worth of supplies that had been stockpiled, ready for the decisive battle. Outside of the immediate invasion beaches, no firepower advantage would've existed for the Americans; Kyushu is extremely mountainous and thus the ranges involved would've produced a situation the U.S. found like that in Italy or Korea, with close in fighting at very short ranges. In essence the U.S. would've found itself launching frontal assaults against an enemy that already outnumbered it. By now I've belabored the point that by 1945 the Japanese had figured out the tactics and strategy needed to inflict 1:1 losses on their enemies, but the point needs to be re-stated here because at 990,000 to 600,000 the basic math is clear how this would go. Finally, and most importantly, was the air campaign. IGHQ had been stockpiling aviation for months in preparation for the invasion, with total inventory being 1,156,000 barrels by July of 1942. Much the same had been done for pilots, with IJA having 2,000 pilots with at least 70 hours of flying time while the IJN had 4,200 on hand who were considered sufficiently trained for night or low light missions; given the type of challenges those conditions presented, that means they were well trained. Overall, when the Japanese formulated KETSU-GO starting in July of 1945, the plan called for 9,000 aircraft to be brought to bare against the invasion fleet. Contemporary to this, the Japanese inventory already contained 8,500 ready planes and IGHQ expected another 2,000 by the fall. When the Allies conducted a census in August following the surrender they found 12,684 aircraft of all types in Japan, suggesting that IGHQ's estimates were spot on for 10,500 aircraft by November. As for planned uses, of the 9,000 to be used in KETSU-GO, kamikazes were to comprise 6,225 of the total. That last bit is perhaps the most important, as experience at Okinawa had shown that a 6:1 ratio existed in the expenditure of kamikazes to achieve a successful ship sinking. Japanese planning held, and U.S. estimates agree with them, that they believed in the initial 10 days of the invasion they could sink at least 500 transports out of the expected 1,000 the U.S. was bringing for the attack. This would've amount to the loss of about five divisions and much of the logistical network, crippling the invasion before it even stormed the beaches. There is every reason to believe this would've worked, as the Japanese would've enjoyed several advantages they didn't have at Okinawa, such as: 1. The mountainous terrain meant that Japanese attacking aircraft would've been shielded from radar detection almost until they were right up on the fleet. At Okinawa, the U.S. had been able to deploy destroyers as pickets dozens of miles out but that wouldn't have possible here because the invasion fleet obviously had to be closely anchored off Japan. 2. The "Big Blue Blanket", which was another Anti-Kamikaze tactic devised by the U.S. during Okinawa, involved masses of fighters kept aloft and being fed data by the picket ships. However, this would've been impossible to counter the Japanese here, as the U.S. was only bringing 5,000 total aircraft from the Far Eastern Air Force in the Ryukyus and the carriers of the 3rd and 5th Fleets. The problem, as outlined by Giangreco, was that U.S. planning called for TF-58 with its 1,900 plans to be 600 miles to the North attacking targets in Honshu instead of supporting the 7th Fleet. This left just two carrier groups to provide a combat air patrol for the fleet, which means that American fighters would've been outnumbered by the Japanese by about a staggering 10 to 1. In other words, even if every American fighter pilot became an ace during those first 10 days, thousands of Japanese aircraft would've still broken through. 3. The Japanese had 60 airfields on Okinawa and the aforementioned fact of short distances to target meant that mechanical issues, a problem that plagued kamikaze operations during Okinawa given the hundreds of miles distance from Japan to the island, would not have been anywhere near as prevalent. All of this taken together highly suggests the Japanese would've repulsed the U.S. invasion, inflicting an extremely bloody toll in accomplishing the same. Combined with the failure of the Soviet invasion, it is likely a compromise peace would've been worked out in the aftermath, with the militarists realistic enough to come to the table "only" demanding that the core empire of the Home Islands, Korea, Manchuria and Formosa be respected. They were, allegedly, even willing to accept military reductions comparable to those Germany saw as part of the Treaty of Versailles; just like the Germans, they knew in the long run they could get away with breaking them, however.
On paper yes they seem to have a lot of advantages but how many of those forces have more than basic training and equipment? Ditto with the pilots and the condition of its a/c. Japan was already on its last legs with much of its infrastructure destroyed and organisation falling apart. Also such a concentration of air attacks means that there's going to be a very target rich situation for the defenders. Its not just taht the Japanese have to overcome the far more experienced US air cover but also an extensive AA defence with proximity fuses. Also while radar might restrict detection while over land unless the Japanese are going to operate only over the landing beaches their going to have to go some way to sea to reach other naval targets and that will enable radar to help the defence. The CV forces and the main transports aren't going to be anchored off the beach but some way off shore. Plus this assumes that a lot of those a/c and bases won't be taken out by a preliminary softening up campaign. Ditto with the coastal fortifications as their going to be hit by air and sea attacks including possibly the B-29 forces given that their got few cities left to burn.
Yes if the Japanese can get a 1-1 kill rate they would succeed but when did they ever do that? In Okinawa US dead were ~14k whereas Japanese losses are estimated as between 77-110k so between 6 and 8 to one. At Iwo Jima they did better with about 3-1 dead ratio but that was in large part because they dug in some way back from the landings and also Kuribayashi the commander of the defence refused to allow banzai charges which he correctly recognised as a waste of life. However after his death those quickly resumed, easing the US task. If the Japanese concentrate the bulk of that defensive forces on/near the beaches their going to suffer very, very badly from the intense bombadments that will be coming. Similarly if their numbers and lack of discipline means they quickly resort to banzai attacks to throw the Americans back, which is going to be likely given this is a defence of their homeland those numbers are going to dwindle very quickly.
If the US finds the fighting anything like as tough as your expecting then TF-58 can quickly be called south to aid the attack. Also those 90,000 men seeking to cross to Kyushu could see a lot of losses from air and sea attack unless they manage to do so while the US forces are totally distracted by the kamikazi attacks. - Having said that there was a railway tunnel in place from 42 so they could be safe during the crossing although if their detected assembling to cross they could get pounded. Assuming that there was still a working railway system there at that point or that the men could march across.
Its possible for the attack to fail and I suspect that US losses will be high but I suspect they will still secure a beachhead and then push inland, which might be where the best chances for inflicting casualties would be but by then the kamikazi attacks are likely to be exhausted and any further reinforcements will suffer heavily from the air and sea bombardment.
If they do fail and especially if the Soviets are also stalled in Korea I can't see a negotiated peace. Both powers will be angry at the defeat and commit more resources. Also the US can - assuming still no nukes - also fall back on letting starvation do their work as they had pretty much destroyed both the Japanese rail system and any hope of supply from oversea between naval control, sinking of the Japanese merchant shipping and very extensive mining. [The reason why I say especially if the Soviets fail is its just possible that if the Soviets succeed and the Americans fail they might feel the need to come to terms before the Soviets gain too much advantage but I still suspect its unlikely as the Soviets have very limited amphibious capacity and on the American side at least the Soviets were still seen more as allies than rivals.]
They were well trained and superbly equipped, IGHQ had been prioritizing the Home Islands for awhile and pulling out A rated formations to prepare for the "decisive battle" they were envisioning. As for the planes, G-2 had completely missed them and continued to miss them; it was only after they were able to conduct a census following the Japanese surrender they realized they had been off by almost 2.5 times the amount the Japanese had on hand. Any losses prior to November could also be more than made up for by domestic Japanese production, which remained sufficient up until even the surrender. As for the Pilots, 4,200 as previously stated were considered well trained enough for low light or night missions, which required dozens of hours of flight time at a minimum. Even ignoring that, very little training is required for kamikaze missions. D.M. Giangreco states U.S. submarines were having trouble closing even the sea connections between Korea and Japan, and thus rates their ability to get the four divisions across the the much narrower, essentially internal, waterway that the Shimonoseki Strait constituted as high. Finally, the invasion fleet was to be anchored off the coast of Japan a pretty short distance as was standard for invasion fleets; we're talking at most a dozen to two dozen miles. 6,000 Kamikazes coming in at 300 mph is beyond the ability of the 1,000 fighters or so they'd have to react to in time and Okinawa had already shown the Japanese, even with advanced warning time for the Allies given by radar contact, could achieve a 6:1 expenditure rate. As for 1:1 casualty rates, such occurred numerous times in 1945. For example: - Iwo Jima - Okinawa - Kurils - Manchuria - Karafuto Luzon, depending on how you count it, also holds up. Extending it back to late 1944 adds Peleliu to the list. |
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 14, 2019 22:53:37 GMT
'WW2 America Invests In Heavy And Super-Heavy Tanks'. I wonder if whatever the US comes up with in that department could individually go toe-to-toe with German Tigers and Panthers, or even win.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 15, 2019 1:35:13 GMT
'WW2 America Invests In Heavy And Super-Heavy Tanks'. I wonder if whatever the US comes up with in that department could individually go toe-to-toe with German Tigers and Panthers, or even win. M4 Shermans were more than capable of meeting and defeating them, with the Panther seeing a negative kill rate against the Sherman in 1944. U.S. did come up with heavy tanks regardless, such as the T95, but discarded them due to logistical and mobility constraints. |
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 15, 2019 1:38:41 GMT
'WW2 America Invests In Heavy And Super-Heavy Tanks'. I wonder if whatever the US comes up with in that department could individually go toe-to-toe with German Tigers and Panthers, or even win. M4 Shermans were more than capable of meeting and defeating them, with the Panther seeing a negative kill rate against the Sherman in 1944. U.S. did come up with heavy tanks regardless, such as the T95, but discarded them due to logistical and mobility constraints. I’m aware that the US experimented with them, but could they have come up with a workable equivalent to the likes of, say, the German Tiger and mass-produced it for deployment (even if it may not have been obvious at the time)? |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 15, 2019 2:12:26 GMT
M4 Shermans were more than capable of meeting and defeating them, with the Panther seeing a negative kill rate against the Sherman in 1944. U.S. did come up with heavy tanks regardless, such as the T95, but discarded them due to logistical and mobility constraints. I’m aware that the US experimented with them, but could they have come up with a workable equivalent to the likes of, say, the German Tiger and mass-produced it for deployment (even if it may not have been obvious at the time)? Yes, they did with the M26 Pershing. They also developed the T-14, T-29, T-30, T-32, T-34, and M6. From a logistics and doctrine standpoint, they just didn't fit the U.S. Army's needs and thus weren't mass produced. |
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 15, 2019 23:00:23 GMT
I’m aware that the US experimented with them, but could they have come up with a workable equivalent to the likes of, say, the German Tiger and mass-produced it for deployment (even if it may not have been obvious at the time)? Yes, they did with the M26 Pershing. They also developed the T-14, T-29, T-30, T-32, T-34, and M6. From a logistics and doctrine standpoint, they just didn't fit the U.S. Army's needs and thus weren't mass produced. Very well, then. Nonetheless, I wonder if by ASB means, any of those tanks you just mentioned (with the assorted crews and munitions) could've materialized in wartime Europe and taken on Axis heavy tanks in confrontations. But I suppose that's more of a frivolous ASB scenario than anything else. Moving on from that, though, how about 'George H.W. Bush Wins In 1992'? |
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 17, 2019 3:02:59 GMT
‘Better Jimmy Carter Presidency’.
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Zyobot
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 25, 2019 15:13:35 GMT
'No Gulf War', as in Iraq never invades Kuwait and therefore provokes the UN coalition into driving Saddam's forces out.
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 25, 2019 16:02:57 GMT
'No Gulf War', as in Iraq never invades Kuwait and therefore provokes the UN coalition into driving Saddam's forces out. Iraq achieves nuclear weapons by 1993, possibly even earlier. |
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Zyobot
Fleet admiral
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
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Post by Zyobot on Oct 28, 2019 20:26:32 GMT
'No Gulf War', as in Iraq never invades Kuwait and therefore provokes the UN coalition into driving Saddam's forces out. Iraq achieves nuclear weapons by 1993, possibly even earlier. How would that come to be, exactly? |
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Post by EwellHolmes on Oct 29, 2019 2:24:55 GMT
Iraq achieves nuclear weapons by 1993, possibly even earlier. How would that come to be, exactly? Iraqi explosives experts were already working on implosion lenses in 1990, and Saddam’s ‘crash program’ would have delivered 25kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) by the end of 1991 (15kg of UEU is necessary for an implosion device). He also still had 75kg of enriched uranium supplied by the French in the initial contract from the start of the Iraqi program. |
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