underused after 1900 pods

'John Kerry Wins In 2004'.

Personally, I haven't seen them. Knowing AH.com, I suppose there's consensus that a Kerry presidency would be far better than Dubya's second term was.

It's ASB that nuclear weapons are never invented, although a delayed invention is certainly possible. In a situation where the U.S. doesn't have them ready for August of 1945, I think it's likely the Imperial Japanese pull off a compromise peace with no occupation and the "Core" Empire of the Home Islands, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria is retained.

Soviets would probably fail to do such, they were logistically weak to the extreme and the Kwantung Army was intact and successfully withdrawing into the Tunghua Defensive Area, which would've allowed them to outlast the Soviets. As for the US, Operation Downfall would fail and the high casualties from that would probably break American political willpower.

Alright, so first, let's start with the Soviet element of the war.

At the time of the surrender, the Kwantung Army was intact and retreating in good order. Outside of the First Area Army, its constituent elements had seen little, if any, heavy combat. Even for the aforementioned First Area Army, despite having taken a beating, it remained combat effective. According the Japanese records, the First Area Army's 3rd Army retained two thirds of its original effectiveness, the 5th Army (The force at Mutanchiang) was one half, the 128th Division (detached from 3rd Army) was also at one half and, finally, the 134th Division (under First Area Army HQ) was at two thirds effectiveness. The 122nd and 139th Divisions, meanwhile, had not been affected by the Soviet offensive to any real meaningful extent. To quote from the U.S. Army's JM-155 monograph, based on Post-War analysis of Japanese records:


The Soviets likewise concurred, as S.M. Shtemenko's "The Soviet General Staff at War" states, on page 354:


I should note this particular passage is about the First Area Army in particular, so even in the Soviet's judgement the forces they had engaged heavily were still a potent enemy. This is especially notable as well, given that despite the weakened posture of the Kwantung Army in 1945 compared to previous years, the forces at Mutanchiang inflicted equal losses upon the Soviets, destroyed hundreds of tanks and thereafter remained combat capable while conducting an orderly withdraw in the aftermath!

As previously stated now, the Kwantung Army's planning at the time of the surrender was to withdraw into the Tunghua Redoubt:




Aiding this plan was the withdraw of the China Expeditionary Army into the coastal areas of China, done in order to shorten their own supply lines and allow for a better defense for prepared positions. This allowed IGHQ to detach six divisions and six brigades from the CEA, including the 3rd Tank Division, as reinforcements into Manchuria. All told, this represented about 180,000 to 200,000 Japanese soldiers from well trained, veteran formations would be joining the already 750,000 man Kwnatung Army into the redoubt, which was in a mountain zone with already prepared fortifications. So, all together, you're looking at about just under a million Japanese soldiers against around 1.5 million Soviets, who the former having the advantage of prepared defenses. That the Japanese were consistently achieving a 1 for 1, or even better, ratio against both the Soviets and the Americans, this alone should be telling.

With the Japanese element laid out, we now turn to the Soviets. According to Shtemenko, at the onset of operations STAVKA directed that the Kwantung Army be destroyed within 8 weeks or else the logistical situation would become "perilous". It's easy to see why they stated this, because the capacity of the Trans-Siberian Railway was limited to 13 million tons yearly in 1945 and of this only 9.3 million tons could be used for military needs; this is exactly why the Soviets requested MILEPOST deliveries from the United States. According to John R. Deane's "The Strange Alliance", on pages 263-264, the statistics provided by the Red Army to the United States as part of MILEPOST showed that they would be at a monthly deficit of 200,000 tons. Thus, the 1.25 million tons the U.S. provided in the three months between V-E Day and the Soviet invasion in August gave the Soviets a very limited window to achieve decisive results because after that it would become impossible. With official Soviet belligerency eliminating the ability of further MILEPOST shipments (The Japanese only allowed Soviet shipping through their waters while they were neutral) and the inability to expand rail capacity in the Far East (The Soviets started a project to do so Pre-War...and it took until 1984 to complete IOTL), we know the eight weeks limit is firm. 

I should also add that eight weeks might also be way too generous. Their exploitation force was bingo on fuel and thus immobile by day three of combat operations:


They ended up not even reaching the outskirts of Mukden with just forward recon units until over a week after the Japanese surrender, and ended up having to use surrendered Japanese trains to occupy strategic areas like Port Arthur. Obviously this wouldn't have been possible with continued Japanese resistance. 

Elsewhere, we saw great Japanese success against the Soviets. At Karafuto (Japanese name for Southern Sakhalin), the Soviet attack was blunted at the border with heavy losses and it took over a week after the 15th for the Soviets to finish clearing out the bitter enders who refused to surrender. Much the same was found in the Kurils, with the one day battle for Shumshu seeing 1,018 Japanese casualties to 1,567 Soviet, an exchange rate of 1 for 1.5 in favor of the Japanese. There might also be an underestimate of Soviet losses, as some Russian sources suggest the total casualties might have been as 2,400. Given total Japanese strength on Shumshu was 8,500 men and the island had extensive fortifications, with 34 concrete/steel fire points, 24 earthen bunkers and 310 machine gun nests, the 87th Rifle Corps was going to be destroyed if fighting continued. It's important to note the Japanese armored attack at the end of the day nearly destroyed the Soviet beachhead on its own. The 101st Rifle Division, meanwhile, was slated for a landing at Paramushiro, but it likewise was heavily fortified and its garrison numbered about 20,000 which likely suggests it [the 101st Rifle] would've been destroyed too. Perhaps more importantly at the strategic level, of the 16 LCIs supplied by the U.S. as part of Operation HULA to give the Soviets amphibious capabilities, five had been destroyed in the one day engagement at Shumshu by Japanese artillery. Likewise, the only means of Soviet naval fire support, the minesweeper Okhotsk with its 130-millimeter gun, was damaged at the battle too by a Japanese plane.

Finally, we turn to Korea. According to Michael Sandusky's America's Parallel, the Soviet offensive found itself, like its counter-parts, stalled out as a result of both logistical difficulties and Japanese resistance. It had barely penetrated the border, reaching Chongjin and was thus still north of the 41st parallel. The Soviet landings, as part of the Seishin Operation, had damn near been a disaster with the timely intervention of the Imperial order to surrender being a major factor in their success. Overall, the Soviets had just two divisions in country facing down nine Japanese, with several of the Japanese being experienced units. Sandusky goes as far as to argue that these facts, and especially the logistical difficulties of the Soviets, mean the U.S. could've easily occupied most of the peninsula after the surrender IOTL had there been no machinations on the part of General MacArthur, who was too focused on Japan. 

That's all for the Soviet element, I'll discuss the American side of this ATL in a separate post.