Operation Sea Lion Orbats and Discussion Thread

You’re right the Germans did not get air superiority during the Battle of Britain. What would’ve had to have happened would be for the German Luftwaffe to be allowed to completely destroy the RAF by not switching it into bombing targets.

I don’t think operation sea lion is possible because I think the British Navy would win. Also the Soviet Union alliance is only beneficial to a point in my opinion. I have already said World War II just is not my expertise and not the subject I’m super interested in but I do have some interest

The German Luftwaffe outnumbered the British RAF, and from one point of view, the Germans were already losing given the multiple german fighter losses. However, if the German fighters shot down a german, he would become a pow. On the other hand, if the British were shot down, he would be picked up and sent back to the air to fight. The germans pilots would shoot the parachuted pilot for the very purpose as mentioned

The British military could repair much of their aircraft that was shot down, and the British airforce had the advantage of fighting on their home turf. The hurricane was undoubtedly a sturdy aircraft, and the spitfire was suitable. The British RAF pilots were exhausted from having to keep fighting in the air against the waves of german pilots. The British RAF also were fighting tooth and nail at the skin of their teeth, so I've heard anyway.

The entire reason why the germans switched from attacking the RAF to bombing civilians was that the Germans thought they had basically destroyed the British fighters.

Now even if the Germans won the Battle of Britain (the air war over Britain), It would still be a german Pyrrhic victory. It arguably would be a strategic failure given the wasted resources spent on an unrealistic invasion plan.

As for the royal navy didn't Churchill complain that the royal navy wasn't prepared for aircraft defenses? The battle of Britain isn't they most deceive campaign during ww2 because even if the germans defeated the RAF the British navy still leaves Hitlers invasion plans to be unlikely

OK most of us agree Sea Lion was not doable. Could we explore the consequences of it being a complete failure as is the opinion of most here? Not sure if this would be better in another thread or it would be acceptable to keep it here as a tag along.

My thoughts (FWIW) are even in a defeat Sea Lion is gong to do a lot of damage to both sides.
So the questions are:
1. Are the consequences of this "German defeat" enough to materially change the course of the war?
2. Who gets hurt the most?
3. Who can absorb the losses and continue the original path of the war?
4. If substantial losses to the RN in stopping the invasion how badly would that hurt the ASW forces, Med fleet, Pac Fleet?
5. How much higher would Luftwaffe losses be in the invasion attempt than during the OTL battle of Britain?
6. In order to provide cover to the RN forces the RAF would have had to concentarte it's fighter strength in the channel. How naked does this leave the rest of the Brit. Isles and does it give the Luftwaffe free rain to hit the rest of the RAF air bases?
7. Does a catastrophic defeat of the Germans put heart back into the French so that Vichy France turn on the conquerors?

You get the general idea.

1. The wastage of German assets and the damage to German morale could result in a rethink of German options in the next year cycle of operations. This assumes that the Germans either: 

a. Continue air operations without transfer of  Fliegerkorps X to the Mediterranean Sea.
b. Make the landing attempt, trusting to the mine barrage, and LW tactical to cover those barge trains into the landing beaches (See Map)



Aside from the fact that the Germans could not land more than a corps, and two airborne brigades equivalents, and that it would not amount to much more than a Himmelfahrtskommando (Kamikaze), Pickett's Charge type operation, we could estimate 100%.loss of the landing force, about 70% of the German surface navy and up to 50% of the Luftwaffe committed.  The British would suffer a lot of land force casualties, possibly as many as 100,000 dead, wounded and missing to absorb the attack. There would be infrastructure damage to the landing areas, a huge re-settlement of displaced persons whose dwellings had been destroyed, intensive economic disruption of southeast England and a near disaster for the sitting British government. 

c However... the victory and it would be a British victory comparable to the Armada, will result in a better British Mediterranean situation as the Germans will have tried their one shot. They will never get another as they will have burned up their sea lift. This includes all those Rhine barges which are so important for ore and coal transport to the Ruhr. Both air forces will have been badly depleted, but Britain can replenish from Empire Air Training Schools (EATS) pilot cadre reserves. The LW pilot cadre should have been annihilated. The quickest way to degrade an air force's efficiency is to kill its trained veteran pilot cadres and eat into its future teaching cadres.  In other words, Sea Lion bungled, inadvertently does what otherwise it will take the western allies until 1944 to figure out. Kill the German fighter aces early and often so that the Allied bombers have an easier time to reach their targets.    

d. The survivors in the British territorial army, now shipped to the Desert Army, will bring the new syllabus of how to do it earlier, than when Montgomery would have brought in 1942. No more Gatehouse follies or Ritchie bungling or fall of Tobruk. 

e. Maybe Churchill will take the hint from the "success" and let his generals clean up the Italians as they wanted. No Greek adventure. No Crete disaster because the Fallschirmjager are rotting in British EPW camps, those who had not been killed during Sea Lion. Goering will be dead. Hitler would insist on it after the Sea Lion disaster. Jaschonnek or Milch as successors are worse than Goering, so Barbarossa, which will still be laid on, should be "interesting" in the air.      
              
2. The ones hurt the most is a flip the coin question.

a. Short term it is the British in the Home Islands, who have a medical and economic mass casualty catastrophe both civilian and military. Long term it will be the Germans as the butterfly effects to the Wehrmacht of the loss of a good % of their scarce field grade commissioned and non-commissioned officers from their BEST army units will transit into the loss of the combat experience and teaching for the new mass formations they trained in the run up to Barbarossa. The Russians will have a slightly easier time of it against "green" new formations.  

b. The Luftwaffe will be more garbage than it was. Maybe the Red Air Force will have a chance? 

3. Britain over time; though for the short term the British might have to pick their spots and fights with more care than historically. Italian X Army has to be bagged fast and an all-out effort into Libya must be laid on, even at the temporary expense of East Africa. Churchill never could understand geographic military logic.   

4. Estimated home fleet losses are 25%. It hurts. But the Germans have not ramped their U-boat effort into 1941 tempo yet. Go to the Americans and cut a deal for transfers and replacements. A "victory" will make them listen sooner. No Joe Kennedy effect. U-boat war changes are in the margins. Tolerable.

5. Instead of 25%; figure 50%. Trained pilot cadre and airplane losses will not be replaced in time for Barbarossa.      
 
6. The RAF will take a full year to rebuild (Americans will be re-equipping the RAF with planes. It will be Canadians, Free Franch, Poles, Netherlanders, and ANZACS filling in many empty pilot slots. Might even get an American Volunteer Group added as well. Chennault could teach the RAF decent fighter tactics.)

7. Not in Metro France. Darlan and Petain and Laval are traitors and they have too many supporters. French North Africa, there might be a chance.    

1. The assault on Malta would have to be over the beach as there are no glider flat zones or parachute drop in points. The Italians have one marine regiment, the San Marco, who are very good, but they do not have assault shipping for more than a battalion to sea lift in that era. Malta is not changing hands. Period.
2. Rail is non-existent past El Alamein. The only road net of the period in Egypt is "track" or camel routes and the laughably paved road between Alexandria and Cairo. The fight in Libya was 100% lorry supported along the Balbo highway between Tripoli and Bizerte for the Axis. Not even the tiny coastal ports they held or took, could handle the 60,000 tonnes a month per port for a 10 division force needed just to sustain in place, much less the 120,000 tonnes pushed forward a WEEK from to fight.



Hitler cannot hand over what he does not have boots on the ground to give. Franco told him as much. Gibraltar (see map) cannot be taken by the Spaniards and the Germans do not have the means for it either. The minimum requirement is a three-division abreast infantry close assault from the north, across a 600 meter wide approach avenue, and a Mount Suribachi type operation to dig the British out of their heavily tunneled and caved "rock". See map for the lunatic German plan to take Gibraltar. (Operation Felix)



There were two approach roads to Gibraltar out of Seville. Neither road was much better than an un-improved American rural road. On that route the Germans expected to move a corps sized force with all of its requirements, (40,000 tonnes a WEEK.). Not happening at all, especially when the Spaniards in the region who hated the Germans, got to work.    

My respect for the Wehrmacht is not Wehraboo at all. Those soldiers do not have what it actually would take to dig tough British infantry out of that kind of setup. Unit losses of up to 75%?



American marines would blanche at that kind of a bloodbath.