Eighty-NineBritain hadn’t started this war, but she was going to fight it until the very end. That was the sentiment that was portrayed by Prime Minister Cameron and his deputies in the national unity government, Nick Clegg and Harriet Harman. The British homeland had been attacked by missiles and commandos and British forces overseas had been thrust into a fight that they were not prepared for, against a foe that outnumbered them across the front; this had been fatal for the UK’s troops in Latvia under the multinational NATO brigade which had been stationed there, and many thousands more servicemen and women had died in Poland, in Norway, at sea and within the British isles as well. There were hundreds of civilian casualties from large-scale air raids which were continuing against Britain as the fighting on the continent went on, and there were Russian
Spetsnaz teams believed to still be active within the UK too. All of this created a terrible domestic situation for the government to deal with. There was pressure from both the far-left and some elements within the radical right such as the British National Party to withdraw British forces from the fighting. The media, while not being officially censored, was under pressure from MI5 to keep up national morale and was making some effort to do so, but the evening news never failed to air footage of sinking warships and burning buildings. Though the number of anti-war protests was fairly small, those that did occur would almost always collapse into violence as hooligans and thugs hijacked legitimate movements, seeking to cause chaos and profit for themselves in doing so. The police response in countering this was equally violent.
Those scenes witnessed in Russia back at the end of 2008 weren’t repeated on the streets of London or Manchester, but riot police would ruthlessly put down large disturbances, earning themselves little popularity as they did so. The ongoing fear of an impending nuclear exchange had led to many instances of absenteeism in the workplace as thousands of civilians fled from major population centres, clogging up roads that were needed for military usage.
The domestic situation was quite grave, but not utterly hopeless. The government, after talking with many chief constables from around the country, had decided that general usage of the Armed Forces to deal with the unrest would be a dramatic overreaction and would only worsen the situation. Besides, those troops were needed in Europe, not gunning down looters outside corner shops. The military chiefs of staff, split between the Ministry of Defence in London and the deep-underground facility at Northwood, north-west of the capital, agreed with this sentiment.
British Special Forces from the SAS and Special Reconnaissance Regiment were deployed in significant numbers to support counter-terrorism police units in rounding up suspected enemy infiltrators, however, with many successes being met but some failures too.
Spetsnaz commandos had been captured when they had attempted to raid RAF Kinloss up in Scotland on the first night of the war. That attack had seen some success but the mission had ultimately been a failure for those involved, with many of the commandos killed and a few taken as prisoners. As they had not been wearing military uniforms when they had struck, those enemy soldiers were not afforded the rights given to Prisoners of War by the Geneva & Hague Conventions and thus MI5, MI6 and Britain’s military intelligence forces could interrogate them as they pleased. Outright torture was seen as a poor choice of interrogation method due to its lack of reliability, but those
Spetsnaz men captured were subject to extreme amounts of discomfort and confusion in attempts to elicit information from them.
From these prisoners, the British Army’s Intelligence Corps was able to ascertain the whereabouts of another
Spetsnaz unit operating within Great Britain and what its planned target was. Originally, that team had been in place for the purpose of striking RAF Waddington or perhaps shooting down the E-3 Sentry aircraft there with shoulder-launched missiles as they took off, but intelligence had come in to the GRU that such high-value air assets had now been moved to Poland, leaving the assault team tapped for RAF Waddington without a target. Instead, they had gone to ground for use at a later date where their efforts would be more useful. The target of that Spetsnaz team was revealed to be RAF Menwith Hill. Menwith Hill was not, despite its name, a British-run facility but rather a listening post operated by the United States Air Force. The Americans had expected an air of Spetsnaz attack against their listening post earlier in the war but it had so far been left alone, much to the confusion of the US Air Force. Menwith Hill provided a vast array of listening and intelligence capabilities to NATO, and could be used to track Russian communications and decipher signals intelligence picked up elsewhere.
When the planned attack on that American-run facility was discovered, it was immediately reported up to the British government. The cabinet was undergoing daily briefings from Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of Defence Staff, and from Defence Secretary Davis & Armed Forces Minister Admiral West too. The news they received was rarely good, but the presence of yet another Spetsnaz element on British soil was the key concern of the briefing that day.
The SAS and police firearms teams had put great effort into rounding up potential Russian agents and traitors working for the GRU or SVR, but still the Russian commandos had managed to slip through the net and were preparing to strike once again. The Chief of the General Staff, General Sir David Richards, was the head of the British Army and by default he held indirect command of the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment. There were official channels that the government would through to authorise military deployments within the UK and those concerning Special Forces, however it was Richards who briefed the government and advised them on the course of action to take. The Director of Special Forces (DSF) would ideally be the one to take this role, but he was busy coordinating operations with Maj.-General Thomas over in Poland.
It fell not to the Prime Minister, but to the Home Secretary, Theresa May, to give the final authorisation here. Although the military had repeatedly been deployed within the UK for counter-insurgency roles, each of these occasions had seen ministerial approval happening and there was no blanket authority for the military to operate except in regards to air-defence roles. It would have been legal for the military to deploy itself within the UK under the Military Aid to Civil Power Act and the Civil Contingencies Act so long as blanket authorisation to do so was given by the civilian government; Cameron, urged on by Defence Secretary David Davis, refused to give this authorisation. The Armed Forces didn’t really want it and ultimately Britain was still a democracy and would remain so as long as the conflict remained conventional; the idea of the Chiefs of Staff moving large numbers of soldiers to shoot at protestors, while far-fetched, was still something the government wanted to avoid. Optics were important as well as the political and moral realities of the situation; the country was already in grave danger and the appearance of martial law would only worsen things. May authorised the SAS and whatever supporting elements could be arranged to carry out a targeted shoot-to-kill operation against the Spetsnaz that were active up in North Yorkshire.
Early in the morning, Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) of the North Yorkshire Constabulary established blocking positions on roads in and out of the township of Harrogate. Army reservists assisted them here when the police did not have enough firearms-qualified personnel to carry out this task, with some of the training staff from Catterick going there as well.
The SAS’s counter-revolutionary warfare team hit a safe-house within the city but came up empty with nobody there. Defence Intelligence had been tipped off about this building and its use by a captured
Spetsnaz man but there was nobody there when it was occupied by the security forces. However, many signs of the presence of enemy troops were discovered. The intelligence had been accurate but the timing had been wrong.
Moments after the SAS raid, a white van attempting to leave Harrogate was engaged by police firearms officers and some Army personnel…
The van skidded to a halt and four men disembarked, with two of their number being cut down providing covering fire for the other two as they ran for cover. The shooting lasted for a matter of only a few minutes, but when it was over, four police officers and two British soldiers were dead, along with a civilian who happened to be passing by. All four of those suspected enemy troops had been killed but the fight had been a bloody mess, and British intelligence new full-well that there had been more than four enemy soldiers in Yorkshire.
It wasn’t long before another suspect vehicle was located outside of Harrogate and headed towards Menwith Hill. That vehicle had apparently escaped before the town had been cordoned off but it wouldn’t be allowed to get very far; the SAS conducted an enforced stop in their armoured Rangerovers. The
Spetsnaz reacted well and started laying down fire as they SAS men emerged from their own vehicles and moved to subdue their opponents. Gunfire illuminated the early-morning haze. Over six hundred rounds were fired and seven grenades detonated in the shootout; four out of the six occupants of the vehicle were dead and the other two captured, with a pair of British SAS soldiers dead in the firefight as well.