stevep
Fleet admiral
Member is Online
Posts: 24,832
Likes: 13,222
|
Post by stevep on Jul 30, 2018 20:14:40 GMT
sdarkshade Hell of a lot of detail there. Think its largely gone as OTL in broad trends so far but sounds like the Soviets are going to be somewhat more active in the future.
What are wu-shen please? Sound like some sort of mages or possibly supernatural spirits that the Chinese are using.
If the Iowa's are using 24" guns instead of 16" as OTL then their probably using shells something like 4 times the weight of the OTL class.
Notice that the only mention of a dragon so far is the US one that came in to help cover the retreat from the Yulu river. Presumably Chinese ones will be making an appearence at some stage.
I know from the maps that the allies ultimately win the war but suspect its going to be a bloody task. They have a huge advantage in firepower, at least unless the Soviets get a lot more open in their support but are going to face considerably numerical inferiority.
Presumably the problems the Soviets are having with their new jets are because of the fact they aren't given a free sample from Britain in TTL?
Steve
|
|
simon darkshade
Inspector-General
Member is Online
Posts: 4,976
Likes: 5,840
|
Post by simon darkshade on Jul 31, 2018 8:34:35 GMT
Lordroel,
The shells are power rammed and moved by automatons. The Mongolian situation will be similar to the Soviet MiG-15 pilots from @ - an open secret that neither side wants to see fully exposed.
Steve,
- The same basic trends are driven by geography and geopolitics. Things will start to diverge in 1951.
- The wu-shen are Chinese wizards. Their approach to magic and range of spells is quite different to Occidental wizards.
- The 24" guns generally fire ~5000lb shells; I'll have to dig out my old Springsharp folders which had a program for determining naval shell weight in them somewhere and post up the data.
- I'm fairly sure other dragons have been mentioned, albeit only one by name. Others will be coming, particularly from China. It isn't called the Dragon Throne for nothing.
- It will be a quite bloody and protracted task, made more complex by changes in US leadership at a few points.
- Correct. The lack of the Nenes does hold back the development of the MiG-15 for ~ 18 months, which has some flow-on effects on Korea as well as general Soviet aviation.
Simon
|
|
stevep
Fleet admiral
Member is Online
Posts: 24,832
Likes: 13,222
|
Post by stevep on Jul 31, 2018 11:17:12 GMT
If the Iowa's are using 24" guns instead of 16" as OTL then their probably using shells something like 4 times the weight of the OTL class.
That are big shells, how are they handle because i do not see a couple of men caring them.
I think about the largest shells that could be manhandled were about 7.5-8" circumference. Above that you need some form of mechanical handling and loading. If your seen the film 'Battleships', which has one of the Iowa class ending up destroying an alien invasion the point where about 6-8 people are lugging a 16" shell to the gun is total fantasy. The US in WWII developed a super-heavy shell which for 16" was about 2700lbs in weight and that could never be manhandled in a confined space, not unless your gun crew included say Superman or the Hulk.
Shell weight goes up dramatically with circumference. Dug up my copy of Janes Fighting Ships of WWI and for the main British capital ships shell weights are: Gun Size
| Weight in lbs
| 12" | 850 | 13.5" | 1250 | 15" | 1920
| 18" | ~3000 |
As I say the 2700lb shell developed for its new BBs in WWII by the US was markedly heavier than other 16" shells, which IIRC were about 2300lbs. Also I think the test 18" gun developed for HMS Furious was a somewhat light shell by British standards but going up by 6" from 12" to 18" sees a nearly 4 fold increase in weight. To go up again to 24" my gut feeling would be that you would have at least a tripling of the weight and quite possibly fourfold again which would give about 12000lbs per shell.
The area of a circle is pi times the squared radius so for 12" ~ 3.x144 = 432 whereas for 18" ~3x324 = 972. This is only a bit more than twice the volume of a shell but assumes that both are the same level and a similar ratio of internal components. For instance the metal of a shell is going to be denser than the explosive powder. Also that the larger shells, especially if they kept the same proportions would definitely be longer.
I do know the super-heavy USN 16" shells were markedly longer than their previous version, to enable them to have that increase in weight, which gave markedly better penetration of armour. This meant that that shell couldn't be used by their older 16" gunned ships because it was too large for the internal shell handling.
|
|
simon darkshade
Inspector-General
Member is Online
Posts: 4,976
Likes: 5,840
|
Post by simon darkshade on Jul 31, 2018 11:35:40 GMT
Some historical shell weights from Navweaps:
USN 18" superheavy: 3850lb USN 18"/47: 2900lb
British 18": 3320lb APC/4000lb HE
German 21" experimental: 4850lb
Japanese 20.1": 4409lb APC/4097lb HE
I'm have to have a look at my old material, but the lightest 24" shells came out at 5250lb or thereabouts, with heavier ones ranging up to ~6400lb. There is a fair bit of improvement and technology put into the naval gun between 1918 and 1950 that wasn't there in @.
|
|
lordroel
Administrator
Posts: 67,964
Likes: 49,368
|
Post by lordroel on Jul 31, 2018 11:53:01 GMT
Some historical shell weights from Navweaps: USN 18" superheavy: 3850lb USN 18"/47: 2900lb British 18": 3320lb APC/4000lb HE German 21" experimental: 4850lb Japanese 20.1": 4409lb APC/4097lb HE I'm have to have a look at my old material, but the lightest 24" shells came out at 5250lb or thereabouts, with heavier ones ranging up to ~6400lb. There is a fair bit of improvement and technology put into the naval gun between 1918 and 1950 that wasn't there in @. You mentioned that the shells are power rammed and moved by automatons, what are they and in a world of magic, does anti-gravity magic not exist.
|
|
simon darkshade
Inspector-General
Member is Online
Posts: 4,976
Likes: 5,840
|
Post by simon darkshade on Aug 1, 2018 13:00:24 GMT
Over the Han and Far Away (February-March 1951)
Introduction: The Hour of Decision The successful Allied counterstrokes of Roundup and Thunderbolt had given the Eighth Army a strong morale boost and proved that not only could the Chinese surge be halted, but that it was possible to strike back with confidence. Reestablishment of a continuous line along the Han placed Ridgway’s forces within range of the occupied capital and the prospects of a second liberation of Seoul loomed high in the calculations of American and South Korean commanders alike. The reconstitution of the shattered Republic of Korea Army, which had been so bloodily defeated by the Chinese over the previous three months, was not a task that could be accomplished with any great haste and it was estimated that it would take at least a year and a half before the minimum target force of 18 divisions could be trained and fully supplied by the arsenals and factories of the United States. Strategically, the United Nations Command remained on the defensive, requiring the rebuilding of substantial logistical stocks lost in the long retreat from the Yalu before the Chinese and North Korean advantage in numbers could be adequately countered in steel and high explosive.
Winter’s bitter winds had now passed their worst point, but the frozen landscape still remained a fearsome foe to all men, wherever their allegiance lay. The ordinary peasantry of South Korea were the most wretched of all those on the current battlefield, their homes and lands now the stage upon which the great act of world conflict had come to conflagration. Every day that the war continued on their soil was one further towards the ruin of their livelihoods and that of their country, which had once again had its heart ripped out with the second fall of Seoul. The political dimension was increasingly weighing upon the strategic options and demands of the United Nations Command and General MacArthur, who also faced his own troubled relations with the Truman Administration and their conception of the war.
North of the Han, the Imperial Chinese Army was also engaged in the process of consolidation, but had not yet lost its offensive ardour nor set aside grand plans of expelling the enemy from the Korean peninsula. Their numbers had swelled to almost 1.5 million and despite the aerial interdiction campaign conducted by the Allied air forces, heavier equipment was starting to reach the front in significant amounts. A new offensive was ordered to blunt the unexpected success of the Eighth Army’s counterattacks, preparing the way for the big push planned for the onset of spring. Stalin was as yet unwilling to release the Soviet Union’s newest and most sophisticated equipment for use in the Far East, but improved postwar models of weaponry continued to be delivered to the North Koreans and Chinese in ever increasing quantities. The first blows of the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive would fall on the centre of the Allied line in a renewed attempt to rupture their forces and allow each component to be encircled and destroyed in detail by superior numbers.
Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive The Imperial Chinese Army deployed a total of four field armies and twenty two divisions in along the front in Central Korea – the 39th, 40th, 42nd and 66th, which had a total strength of 290,000 men even in their reduced state following the successes of Roundup and Thunderbolt. They had been reinforced by armoured units and further heavy artillery, but were still by and large infantry formations and each army was for all intents and purposes the equivalent of a corps after the winter fighting. Chinese and North Korean airpower had been carefully husbanded in preparation for the twin blows of the Fourth Phase Offensive, which were to fall in the hours of darkness to remove one of the chief Allied strengths, daylight air superiority. Allied intelligence considered a sustained Chinese attack to be unlikely and instead forecast a series of localised tactical manoeuvres aimed at enveloping forward units and positions prior to a pause for resupply and consolidation; the true threat would wait for the spring.
Allied forces in the forward zone of the central area consisted of the US 2nd Infantry Division of I Corps at Chipyong-Ni and X Corps’s ROK 8th Infantry Division at Hoengsong and US 7th Infantry Division at Wonju. To their east lay the ROK III Corps, which was still not considered capable of concerted offensive action and had been subsequently reinforced by the US 3rd Marine Division. The majority of independent tank units and heavy artillery had been mainly concentrated in the rear combat zone to facilitate tactical counteroffensives, but virtually all American and Western infantry battalions had an attached tank company for direct support, in contrast with the less well equipped South Korean forces. This deficiency would be capitalized on by the Chinese in their initial targeting.
In the second week of February, Chinese forces began a number of shaping operations, staging concentrated bombardments and infantry attacks on the flanks of the X Corps tactical area. Night-time raids in the I Corps and ROK III Corps sectors were also stepped up, along with nuisance mortar and sniper fire, feigned attacks and conjuration of fearsome illusionary wisps. Penetration of Allied lines by small commando squads accompanied these steps, with sabotage of lines of communication and small scale ambushes tying down substantial amounts of scarce troops. The final step in tactical deception came in the form of demonstration flights by Chinese dragons over the coast of the Sea of Japan north of the front line, which demanded appropriate countermeasures by the United Nations Command.
Battle of Hoengsong The opening of the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive occurred at Hoengsong, where six Chinese divisions attacked the ROK 8th Division at 2030 hours on February 11th. The 21st Regiment was swiftly enveloped by the 198th Division, which swept south along Route 29, surrounding the American 15th Field Artillery Battalion along the way. By the end of the night, all three South Korean infantry regiments were in retreat, having been subjected to relentless mortar fire and human wave attacks. At first this was conducted in good order, but this rapidly disintegrated into an individual free for all under Chinese pressure; it was later surmised by arcane intelligence units that hithertofore unknown fear and chaos spells were employed to great effect in this process. Withdrawal of forward positioned American artillery and support units was also hampered by deference to corps level command and control, a vestige of the successful systems employed in the earlier Allied advance. Guns, tanks, vehicles, supplies and ammunition were abandoned in the retreat southward and several dozen artillery pieces were captured by the Chinese in the process.
The withdrawal of the American Support Force 21 in the early hours of February 12th was to prove one of the most costly phases of the battle. Artillery units in marching order were struck by continued machine gun, grenade, rocket and mortar fire from the steep hills on either side of the narrow, twisting valley that lead southward to Hoengsong and some form of momentary safety. Four accompanying tanks were knocked out by satchel charges and rocket propelled grenades, halting the movement of the column for a crucial hour from 0332. This was followed by infantry and cavalry attacks striking in and out of the darkness, which came close to overrunning the rearguard before being repulsed by a ferocious bayonet charge. American 105mm artillery was bought into action and fired continuously over open sights as troops worked desperately to shove disabled vehicles from the road and round up scattered drivers. Elements of the 503rd Field Artillery Battalion managed to escape their separate position and rejoin the main column at the cost of abandoning their disabled 155mm howitzers before they could be destroyed. Through countless acts of outstanding courage throughout the long, bloody night, the remnants of Support Force 21 under Lt. Colonel John Keith reached the lines of the 3rd Battalion of the 38th Infantry Regiment at the road junction north of Hoengsong at 0900 hours.
This composite force received urgent orders from General Almond within the hour to pull back towards Wonju, abandoning Hoengsong, a step quickly confirmed by General Ridgway. Their withdrawal over five gruelling miles would be protected by the corps reserve of the Spartan Guards Regiment, which launched a covering attack up from Hoengsong at noon on February 12th. Chinese infantry assaults were turned back by concentrated fire by the Spartans, many of whom were hardened veterans with years of experience in mountain warfare. One American sergeant volunteered to remain behind atop Hill 300 to observe the enemy advance and his last action of calling in 40 rounds of high explosive fire on his own position earned him the Medal of Honor for his self-sacrifice. The running of the gauntlet south to Hoengsong had been an extremely bloody affair, costing over 1200 American casualties, including 326 killed or missing in action. Their frozen bodies and the smoking, abandoned vehicles would strewn across the frozen paddy fields and shattered hillsides until early March.
Beyond the immediate circumstances of the American 2nd Infantry Division, the South Korean forces had suffered grievous losses and the 8th Division had been effectively destroyed as a functioning combat unit, taking over 7000 casualties. Diversionary attacks on the ROK III Corps sector had achieved further localised success, resulting in the Mexican Regiment being hurriedly rushed up from X Corps’ lines of communication to provide immediate stiffening of the South Korean lines. Losses of equipment around Hoengsong were particularly heavy, disturbing General Almond and leading to specific steps to prevent future occurences on this scale. Meanwhile, the Chinese offensive stood poised once more before Wonju.
Third Battle of Wonju Hoengsong fell to the advancing Chinese late on the afternoon of February 12th, but no major push southward to Wonju followed, allowing Almond to move up fresh forces for its defence. General Ruffner was assigned the paratroopers of the 187th Regimental Combat Team to join the South Korean 18th Regiment and the Spartans in the immediate defence of the village, supported by the 7th Infantry Division to the east and elements of the 2nd Infantry Division to the west along the boundary with I Corps. The tactical position around Wonju was therefore already superior to those that had crumbled over the previous day to the north due to improved flank security, although the availability of immediate reserves was still less than optimal. Units of the ROK 3rd and 5th Divisions had been pulled back to Malta-Ri, Chech’on and Yongwol to cover X Corps immediate lines of communication and to maintain contact with the beleagured ROK III Corps to the east.
General MacArthur arrived at Suwon airfield at noon on February 13th to meet with Ridgway, emphasising the vital importance of maintain the line along the Han River. His current strategic approach was based on his belief that decisive and safe offensive operations into North Korea were effectively impossible whilst enemy forces in Manchuria were off limits, but that a concerted push north to the prewar border was necessary to secure the Allied position in Korea. Ridgway was determined to hold along the Han, but the Chinese forces around Hoengsong threatened to enter the Han Valley and envelop the westernmost formations of the Eighth Army. The keys to holding the enemy in place were Wonju and Chipyong-Ni.
As this occurred, the Chinese 66th Army began bombarding forward American and Greek units at Wonju. A battery of American 24” superheavy guns based at Yongju responded and provided some temporary respite, but their utility was progressively lessened once infantry engagements began. Stubborn assaults continued throughout the 13th and 14th of February, but the Allied lines held thanks to concentrated direct artillery and tank support and the inability of Chinese troops to penetrate or overrun their mutually supporting positions. During daylight hours, the attackers were subjected to continued airstrikes, rocket fire and strafing by USAF and USN fighter-bombers, with napalm bombs used to particularly deadly effect. The failure of the Chinese assault on Wonju was later understood in its context as a diversionary attack from the heavier blows at Chipyong-Ni, but the achievements of the US paratroopers and grim Spartans were lauded at the time as evidence of Allied martial superiority.
Battle of Chuam-ni A gap developed along the Allied frontline between Wonju and Chipyong-Ni that was only lightly covered by forces of the US 2nd Infantry Division and Chinese forces began to move to exploit it from early on the morning of February 13th. L Company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment and the divisional reconnaissance company were assigned the mission of covering the gap, taking up hilltop strongpoints overlooking the key supply road of Route 24. A reinforced Chinese regiment struck all three hills at 1648 hours and despite mutually supporting artillery and mortar fire, the American companies were forced to conduct a fighting withdrawal to avoid complete encirclement. Their retreat down Route 24 completed the isolation of the 23rd Infantry Regiment at Chipyong-Ni and also placed them in danger of being overrun on the subsequent night.
The only reserves available to General Milburn was the Italian 3rd Bersagliere Regiment and they were dispatched forthwith to attack up Route 24 to relieve the American troops and clear the route to the 23rd Infantry Regiment. Supported by a company of Pershing tanks, the Italians broke through to the remnants of L Company at 0625 on February 15th and proceeded to advance steadily towards Chuam-ni, despite stiff Chinese resistance. A heavy bombing raid by USAF B-45 Tornadoes eliminated several Chinese positions in the late afternoon, but the pace of advance of the Bersagliere slowed once night fell. Chuam-ni was occupied at 1000 hours on February 16th, allowing consolidation of the Allied line.
Battle of Chipyong-Ni The American and French forces at Chipyong-Ni had observed the advance of Chinese troops over the course of the 12th of February, but engagements had been limited to clashes between patrols and mortar fire. Colonel Freeman had deployed his four battalions in a square formation around the village, each supported by a troop of M48 tanks and a battery of 105mm howitzers, with the Rangers in central reserve. The rate of enemy attacks mounted over the morning and afternoon of the 13th, culminating in a full scale assault by two divisions after nightfall. Intense mortar fire and the now familiar and chilling chorus of gongs, bugles and chimes heralded the first of many Chinese charges at 2200 hours. Enemy attacks continued throughout the night, not giving any of the four battalions more than momentary respite, but American firepower and cool discipline under pressure kept their foe at bay. Company A of the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Infantry kept their twelve M2 Browning heavy machine guns firing throughout the night, holding off an estimated six Chinese battalions.
Dawn bought a respite from the waves of attacks, as the Chinese command knew well the potency of American tactical airpower, allowing aerial resupply drops by USAF C-119s flying out of Japan and even the evacuation of some serious casualties by helicopter. Enemy attempts to dig in on the slopes surrounding the village were hampered by continued strafing runs by A-38 and A-48 attack fighters. The second night bought even more intense attacks around the entire perimeter, spearheaded by flamethrowers and rocket attacks. Only the commitment of tanks and the Ranger company prevented the northern flank being overrun on two occasions and the eastern line held by the 3rd Battalion turned back a particularly heavy attack just after midnight by the efforts of two U.S. wizards who perished in the frontline of the heavy fighting, hurling fireballs and lightning bolts into the ranks of the enemy with their last ragged breaths.
I Company’s perimeter was breached at 0310 and stubborn Chinese resistance and overwhelming numbers defied American attempts at restoring their lines. Ammunition supplies were running short and USAF airdrops of ammunition were disrupted by massed small arms and machine gunfire, resulting in several C-47s being shot down. At 0425, the French Foreign Legion reserve company launched a diversionary attack against Chinese troops from the corner the western perimeter, drawing off mortar and artillery fire from the north. Heavy hand-to-hand combat and bayonet fighting saw the Chinese flank first overrun and then pushed back in the hour before dawn. A devastating dragonstrike by a pair of USAF wyrms wrecked havoc on enemy forces to the south of Chipyong-Ni and a steadily advancing creeping barrage marked the advance of Task Force Crombez, an armored relief column of the 5th Cavalry.
By 1400 hours on the 15th of February, the last Chinese forces remaining between Task Force Crombez and the defenders of Chipyong-Ni were burnt out of their positions by napalm strikes delivered by USN A-1 Skyraiders. The remaining Chinese forces surrounding the village withdrew within two hours, pursued by concentrated artillery fire from the heavy guns of I and X Corps. Advanced units of the 5th Cavalry linked linked up with the lines of the 23rd Infantry shortly afterwards, the moment being memorably captured by US Army combat film crews. The battle had cost the American and French defenders 65 dead, 52 missing and 298 wounded in exchange for dealing a decisive defeat to the Imperial Chinese Army, inflicting 6000 casualties, an estimated 2000 of which were killed in action.
Victory by an isolated Allied combat team despite the extreme conditions and unfavourable odds provided a much needed boost to the morale of the entire Eighth Army, demonstrating that the Chinese juggernaut could be stopped, held and repulsed without inordinately heavy losses. General Ridgway later characterised the battle as a turning point, hailing both the obdurate defensive spirit and the aggressive offensive action of Task Force Crombez as embodying the transformation that the Eighth Army had undergone since the inglorious defeats and retreats of December and January. In many ways, it represented one of the two high-water marks of the Chinese advance into South Korea.
UNC Counterstrike General Ridgway decided to follow up the successful containment and repulse of the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive with an immediate counterstrike by the United Nations Command, catching the enemy on the back foot before they would have the opportunity to shift forces and supplies to defend against an aggressive push towards the border. This would be achieved through two mutually supporting operations, all aimed at clearing out Chinese and North Korean troops from below the Han River and inflicting maximum casualties through Allied superiority in firepower, codenamed Killer and Ripper. A number of phase lines were set as objectives, each named after American states. Ridgway was forced to bring forward his carefully organised plans for the grinding destruction of the enemy inside South Korea, but the carefully husbanded stores of materiel and armaments were to prove decisive in the weeks to come.
Operation Killer The first stage of the general counteroffensive was Operation Killer, which was to eliminate the enemy salient between Wonju and Yongwol through a general advance by I Corps, X Corps and the ROK III Corps. The objective was Line Arizona, which lay to the north of Hoengsong and Chipyong-Ni and was approximately 15 miles north of the current frontlines. Killer began early on the morning of February 22nd with the bombardment of over 1000 guns and a series of well-coordinated mass airstrikes by Allied tactical fighters, while almost 250 B-29 Superfortresses struck Chinese lines of supply and supporting positions to the immediate north of the battlefront. Heavy magical firepower was bought to bear on the primary and secondary lines of enemy defences and long range fire from superheavy guns and bombards interdicted the few attempts made to reinforce the progressively isolated strongpoints as they were cut off and subjected to a storm of artillery fire. Each American and Allied battalion was copiously augmented with tanks, self propelled guns and infantry carriers and this combination of lethality and mobility proved exceptionally effective.
In X Corps’s central zone, the 1st Marine Division struck forward up Route 29 in the lead of the attack with the 7th Infantry Division in flanking support, whilst to the west, the 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd Infantry Division drove up towards Chipyong-Ni and the South Koreans pushed forth more circumspectly to the east. Progress was deliberately methodical as no efforts were spared in eliminating all pockets of enemy resistance and inflicting maximum destruction of enemy manpower and materiel. As the Marines advanced towards Hoengsong, they were horrified to find the unburied bodies of American casualties from the earlier battle and moved to cold fury to discover the apparent signs of the massacre of helpless wounded men; very few Chinese prisoners were taken in their sector as a consequence.
By March 2nd, all units had reached Line Arizona and had taken minimal losses in the process; American casualties in the ten day operation amounted to 69 killed, 108 missing and 975 wounded in exchange for an estimated 10,000 of the enemy, with only 234 of the latter being taken prisoner. This followed General Ridgway’s operational concept to the letter, inflicting maximum damage on the enemy with minimal risk to Allied manpower through the concentrated application of firepower. Chinese and North Korean troops in the centre of the front had already expended a great deal of their available supplies and ammunition in the abortive Fourth Phase Offensive and had little response to American domination of the skies and the well organised tank-artillery-infantry team on the ground.
Operation Ripper Immediately following the success of Killer, the Eighth Army launched Operation Ripper, a more expansive and ambitious offensive aimed at driving from the Han River to the prewar border, recapturing Seoul and destroying the largest numbers of Chinese and North Korean troops possible in the process. It would be a full-scale theatre offensive from one side of the peninsula to the other, based on three coordinated thrusts – a coastal assault by the Commonwealth Corps and IX Corps towards the Imjin aiming at encircling Seoul, a central drive by I Corps and X Corps on Hongch’on and a concerted attack by the ROK Army up the east coast to Line Idaho. It would incorporated some of the most complex air-tasking orders yet developed in the campaign, combining the air striking capacity of both carrier task groups off the coasts of Korea and the full force of Allied land-based tactical and strategic airpower. It was emphasised that the acquisition of territory was but a means to the ends of achieving the main objective, which was to kill and destroy as many of the enemy as possible at minimal cost.
The days leading up the beginning of Operation Ripper on March 6th saw round the clock carpet bombing of enemy lines by USAF and RAF heavy bombers and rolling fire missions by American and British battleships deep into the centre of Korea. At 0428 on March 6th, the heaviest bombardment of the entire war began as thousands of Allied guns, mortars, bombards and rocket launchers pounded Chinese lines with high explosive and incendiary rounds; substantial smoke and disorientation ammunition was also employed to add to the sheer chaos of the tumultuous maelstrom of fire. Just over three hours later, over 2000 Allied tanks began to move forward alongside the infantry of twelve divisions as hundreds of tactical fighters swarmed overhead, wings laden with rockets, cluster bombs and napalm. The Han River was swiftly bridged by combat engineer units using new mechanised pontoons and arcane spanning devices and the small pockets of Chinese resistance in the immediate frontline area were quickly overrun by sheer force of UNC numbers.
As the attention of the foe was drawn away to the north, Ridgway’s master plan was put into action with the landing of the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the 2nd Royal Marine Division on either side of Inchon commencing at 0920 hours. Their mission was to seize the high ground surrounding Seoul’s primary seaport and position themselves as if they were poised to descend once again into the city in the manner of Operation Chromite the previous year. The remaining two brigades would be held in floating reserve directly outside the approaches to Inchon for 24 hours, acting as a threat to hold enemy attention, in combination with extremely heavy RN and RAN airstrikes and bombardment by three super battleships. This deception turned out to be mainly effective as elements of the Chinese garrison division were dispatched to reinforce the defences of Inchon and the road to Seoul, but was not truly decisive. The remainder of the division was landed by March 9th and the Royal Marines succeeded in linking up with advanced tank units of the Royal Scots Greys by late on the next day.
In any case, the rapid advance of the Commonwealth Corps towards the Han and Kimpo Airfield made to the Second Battle of Inchon and foregone conclusion. Chinese strongpoints were ruthlessly eliminated by self-propelled artillery and naval gunfire firing over open sights and the awe-inspiring spectacle of dragonfire and flashing heat rays hurtling down from the pairs of RFC great wyrms and RAF skyships cruising above the battlefield. Chinese attempts at nocturnal attacks on the first two nights were repulsed by cheering charges of kukri-wielding Gurkhas only too pleased to come to grips with the enemy in hand to hand fighting and the initial combat debut of the Zulu Regiment filled their opponents with similar dread. The extremely rapid rate of fire of the automatic 25pdrs assigned to the divisional artillery of the Commonwealth Division and British 1st Infantry Division proved to be a most substantial counter to Chinese mortar fire. Skirting the western suburbs of Seoul, the first major objective was reached by March 13th, as Sinwon-ni fell to the Sarac Brigade.
The task of liberating Seoul would fall to the men of the 24th Infantry Division, but, in something of an anticlimax, did not face particularly stubborn resistance as Chinese commanders had already begun withdrawing their shattered forces some days earlier. North Korean guerrilla forces ensured that the capital would not be given up without a fight, but the Victory Division, heavily reinforced with South Korean troops with a full sense of the gravity of their mission, succeeded in destroying or driving out enemy troops by sunrise on March 15th, 1951. This time, the liberation was not greeted with ecstatic celebration but by a more measured sense of thanksgiving and understanding that the task was by no means complete. In the final week of March, IX Corps would continue to push northward to the Imjin River alongside the Commonwealth Corps to the west, providing welcome defensive depth for the security of Seoul. Chinese opposition was apparently crumbling in the face of Allied guns, but this time the mood on the march northward was more circumspect.
I and X Corps ground forward with all the methodical precision that they had demonstrated during Operation Killer and the rough, hilly terrain proved to be only a temporary inconvenience to their reinvigorated forces. Here the Chinese were subjected to new and terrifying weapons systems including the mobile fougasse, automatic anti-aircraft guns employed in an anti-personnel role and the large scale deployment of armoured combat dinosaurs; the psychological impact of a line of two dozen ravenous Tyrannosaurs mounted with multiple machine guns roaring out of the night was considered to be extremely effective. Soldiers and Marines alike proved more than willing to engage Chinese infantry in open, pitched battle, but the parameters of the operation meant that this task was more frequently left to the king of the battlefield, artillery shells being infinitely cheaper than men. By the 31st of March, their advance had pushed beyond Hongch’on to Ch’unch’on and Line Idaho, where work immediately began on strong defensive positions.
The South Koreans, stiffened by the presence of the US 3rd Marine Division, encountered comparatively less resistance on the eastern half of the peninsula, but the disparate units of the North Korean Army put up fanatic resistance at various points, holding villages until blasted and burnt out. There were fewer and older tanks and artillery available, but the weight of materiel was still decisively tilted in favour of the Allies. Line Idaho was reached by March 13th and, by the end of the month, the frontline stood along the objective of Line Cairo, within heavy artillery range of the prewar border. Much of the ROK Army was still recovering from the heavy blows dealt over winter, but the return of victory was a most welcome improvement for their morale and fighting spirit.
Operation Ripper came to a formal end on April 2nd 1951, having succeeded in every parameter, particularly in the infliction of extremely heavy casualties upon the North Korean and Imperial Chinese Armies. Over 20,000 of the enemy had been killed among their estimated 50,000 casualties and this was achieved at the comparatively light cost of 625 killed, 248 missing and 3570 wounded Allied personnel. The enemy had been driven from the majority of South Korean territory and devastating losses had been inflicted for a small cost, vindicating the strategy adopted by the Eighth Army’s new, victorious commander.
Politics The rapid shift from enthusiastic predictions of victory to the spectre of being driven off the Korean peninsula by the huge armies of China was accompanied by a rapid shift in the political dimension of the war. Western unanimity was shaken by the Chinese intervention and the accompanying increased prospect of the war widening to include the Soviet Union. Back channel communications between China and the Allies had continued over the winter, but neither side was as yet prepared to discuss a potential negotiated armistice.
More significant at this stage was the growing dispute on the conduct of the war between President Truman and General MacArthur. The former was displeased with MacArthur’s increasing number of public statements on the necessity to extend the war into Manchuria, which he believed bordered on the insubordinate. The Supreme Commander regarded Truman’s perspective on the war as one that waxed and waned in line with political fortunes and disliked political interference in what should have been in his view as a purely military matter.
The final component in the increasingly complex political fallout from Chinese intervention came in the form of disagreements between the United States and the European powers, particularly Britain and France, regarding the best course of global strategy. There were significant ongoing concerns that too great a concentration on Korea would great an opportunity for Soviet action in other theatres and these were now joined by profound disagreements on the viability of any evacuation of the Korean peninsula. Churchill was quite forthright in his belief that an Allied presence should be maintained at all costs in order to provide reassurance to the European states that they would not be abandoned in a future conflict.
War at Sea Allied control of the seas on both coasts of Korea came to the fore in the battles of February and March, permitting a range of raids, demonstrations, air strikes and naval bombardments in support of the successful offensives of the United Nations Command. Amphibious descents took many different forms apart from the second landings at Inchon and several dozen tactical landing operations ranging from platoon to battalion level took place behind North Korean and Chinese lines, leading to the diversion of substantial troops and resources to the task of coastal defence. The fear of a potential strategic outflanking strike was so pronounced that Soviet 240mm and 305mm coastal artillery was installed at Nampo and Kimchaek, despite their position well behind the front line.
Carrier airstrikes from the American vessels of Task Force 77 and the Commonwealth ships of Task Force 85 provided a substantial percentage of tactical air support during Operations Killer and Ripper and undertook deep strike missions well into North Korea to interdict the transport of men and munitions to the frontline. US carrier raids played a major role in the disruption of the eastern railway network and devastated important junctions with attacks of up to 250 aircraft at a time. The Royal Navy and supporting Australian and Canadian aircraft began to specialise in very low level strikes into the north, employing the Blackburn Brigand with particular success. Jet fighters from both major task forces provided an optimal means of air cover above the Central Korean battlefield, allowing USAF and RAF fighters to sortie well into the north and engage Chinese and Red fighters before they could reach Allied positions.
The sheer power of Allied battleships and cruisers inflicted devastating damage on enemy forces that had the misfortune of operating within range of the sea, which comprised a considerable portion of the Korean Peninsula. US battleships rotated off the blockaded ports of Hungnam and Wonsan on a regular basis and the constant threat of bombardment prevented effective repairs over the winter. Tactical naval gunfire was provided by destroyers and frigates, whose lighter guns and higher rates of fire were more suited to close support missions. The United States Navy began an extensive study into the optimum use of naval gunfire support in early February and the long term effects of this scientific approach were to be extremely consequential in years to come.
Air War The skies above Korea remained under Allied domination at the dawn of 1951, but perhaps the most significant event of the air war in February and March came in the combat debut of the Soviet MiG-15 jet fighter. It had been in service with PVO Strany for some months, but Stalin had been reticent to supply it to the Chinese and North Koreans given its importance to the air defence of the Soviet Union itself. The first MiG-15s were encountered in combat on February 11th over what would later become known as ‘Mig Alley’ in the northwest corner of the Korean peninsula; a fighter sweep by 24 USAF F-86s tangled with 16 MiGs, resulting in two of the latter being shot down. Their operational range soon extended over much of northern North Korea and the introduction of the frontline swept-wing Soviet fighter continued the gradual shift of USAF B-29s to night operations. Both of the premier Allied fighters, the Sabre and the Hunter, seemed to have an edge over the MiG-15 in its early battles, but this margin of superiority was to be reduced with the introduction of veteran Soviet pilots into the conflict.
Superfortresses and Lancasters would remain the mainstays of the Allied strategic bombing campaign over Korea for much of 1951, but plans were already afoot to eventually replace them with faster, higher flying bombers from Britain and the United States when sufficient production of new jet bombers would allow them in turn were shifted to second line operations. Carpet bombing missions above the central battlefield became more and more frequent as strategic targets along the Yalu became more hazardous and this in turn spurred the development of new tactical bombing radar systems to facilitate this role. The changing of the guard would continue over 1951 as the major Allied air forces shifted from structures predominantly based around the aircraft of the last war to more modern planes.
Return to the Border The conclusion of March saw the forces of the United Nations Command once again reach the 38th Parallel and the Idaho Line after a month and a half of grinding fighting. The Chinese enemy had been dealt a series of profound body blows and the morale of the Eighth Army restored after the bitter wintertide. From the Commonwealth Corps on the Imjin River in the west to the ROK Army on the shores of the Sea of Japan in the east, there was a new sense that victory was, if not directly within their grasps, then certainly back on the table. This confidence was tempered in the higher echelons of command, where knowledge of an inevitable Chinese spring offensive was commonplace and the only significant question or area of debate being on where it would strike.
Around the world, the process of mobilisation accelerated and the United States, Soviet Union, China, Britain and France all continued to build up their production of armaments and war material in anticipation of a long conflict that still looked likely to erupt into a wider conflict. The requirements of logistical support of the Allied armies and air forces in Korea was stimulating the growth of the Japanese economy, allowing it to arise from the ashes of defeat far quicker than otherwise projected. On the other side of Asia, the increasingly independence of India was being pushed forward by the impact of the war, accelerating the timetable for full self-government in light of the threat of open war with China.
In Korea, both sides stood and waited, exhausted for the moment by the advances and retreats of the last days of winter and the rapidly shifting front. As the weather grew milder and the days grew longer, the hour approached when the war would enter a new act with the return of the spring.
|
|
stevep
Fleet admiral
Member is Online
Posts: 24,832
Likes: 13,222
|
Post by stevep on Aug 1, 2018 15:15:52 GMT
Bloody and detailed but the allied forces seem to be getting on top of the Chinese hordes. Hopefully from this point weight of numbers will be rendered increasingly impotent by increased firepower and skill in its coordination. Also it may be increasingly Chinese hordes as I wonder how many N Korean forces are left, at least other than hurriedly conscripted and probably poorly trained/equipped reluctant recruits. Love the chapter title.
|
|
simon darkshade
Inspector-General
Member is Online
Posts: 4,976
Likes: 5,840
|
Post by simon darkshade on Aug 1, 2018 21:51:17 GMT
Churchill is PM, having been returned to power in 1948.
Firepower is the answer to the largely Chinese foe (rebuilding a residual North Korean force will take until 1952 or so), but as the war settles down, they can bring up a lot of their own firepower. There are some nasty surprises to come.
I was watching a lot of Sharpe while writing this chapter.
|
|