What if: Teutoburg Disaster Didn’t Happen (9 CE)

Lordroel

Its something that has been discussed a lot. Definitely a border on the Elbe or better still the Vistula and Carpathians would be shorter and if Germania and the other affected regions could be securely Romanised then it would also add resources, including population and make the Balkans and related regions much more secure. You would also have a more European centred empire although the Asian lands might still be richer overall.

However one big problem I have see suggested is that the rivers were as important as lines of communications as of fortification. It was relatively simple to ship forces up and down the Rhine and to supply them from the Med but would have been harder for the Elbe and much harder for the Vistula as ships sailing to its mouth would have to circumvent Jutland and enter the Baltic. This may not have been insurmountable, especially given the abilities of the Romans and their subjects. However it would have been difficult and costly, at least until those northern lands are fully developed, which may have needed some technological changes as well as a lot of effort. Might have been a costly loss in the early years but a longer term profit.

As I say, if the Vistula-Carpathians border especially was secured it would increase the European territories of the empire and especially those north of the Med. As such you might see a significant regional centre developing in the North German Plains which could become a rival to some of the other regional centres, i.e Italy, Greece/Anatolia and Syria/Egypt. Especially since it would be more difficult to reach/conquer and with the eastern border on the steppes and northern one on the Baltic it would still have a substantial garrison as well as access to mercenaries from across those borders. You might see this smashed by a large nomadic invasions [i.e. Huns] or if it survived a break-away northern Roman empire.

Steve

  If you mean a Germanic empire resisting the Romans after a Roman victory at Teutoburg then that's possible, especially given how greatly threatened they would be by Rome, but they did tend to be a fractious lot, highly concerned by their liberties and tribal loyalties.  I believe Arminius is supposed to have been killed because he started acting too much like a autocratic ruler rather than just a war-leader.

  If you mean hating Rome after being conquered and assimilated then I think that's less likely.  The region would probably see itself as an integral part of the empire and in military terms probably a very important one.  If the empire broke down, and civil wars are almost certain and could be dangerously frequent given its size then the 'Northern' empire and its legions and auxiliaries would be an important fact in such conflicts, albeit possibly mitigated by their geographical isolation from the Mediterranean core.    If there was a prolonged period of separation a Germanic identity might start to re-emerge and possibly even establish links with the pre-Roman period but I suspect the elite at least would still think of themselves as 'Romans', as the Greek eastern empire did virtually until its end.

  Steve

With strong Romanized German legions, the quality of resistance to the Huns may have been much better. The legions in Attila's time were vastly inferior to earlier legions. If strong competent emperors had emerged, the empire possibly would not have split

Mostly agreed, and there are good reasons why this may easily grow into close to a best-case scenario for Rome. Use of the North Sea and the Baltic to connect with the Northern European provinces and navigate down their major rivers to penetrate in depth would be far from especially difficult for the Romans, since they experienced no significant trouble doing the same for western Hispania/Gallia and Britannia. It would be coastal navigation around the shores of Western and Northern Europe, and their naval technology was entirely up to the task. Colonization would take some time and effort, but Central Europe had demographic and natural resources that may be exploited to make its possession worthwhile to Rome. Certain areas of the Roman Empire had developed an early version of the heavy plow. It stands to reason that with colonization of Germania and so much new fallow land especially suited for this technology, its use would spread across the northern portion of Roman Europe, and it would considerably boost the development and settlement process. In a few centuries, Roman Germania would grow to look reasonably close to High Middle Ages Germany in socio-economic and demographic terms, and this in combination with widespread adoption of the heavy plow would indirectly boost the development of Britannia and Gallia in a similar way. In due time, the Roman Empire would grow to possess another major core in Western-Central Europe besides the one it already owned in the Med. If the assimilation of Germania proceeds unabated for a century or so, it is only reasonable to expect the Germans would be politically and culturally assimilated in the Roman state and civilization as successfully and thoroughly as the Western European peoples. History indicates Roman identity, once established, would not be suppressed or erased by anything short of a massive foreign invasion imposing an entirely new demographic, political, and cultural pattern.

The strategic gains this development would bring for Rome are hard to downplay. The Vistula-Carpathians-Dniester border would be much shorter and easier to defend for the legions than the Rhine-Danube one, even more so once it gets reinforced by a sturdy limes (which ITTL may easily grow to be the European equivalent of the Chinese Great Wall in meaning if not exact shape). Assimilation of whole Europe except Russia-Ukraine and Scandinavia would substantially increase the economic and demographic resources of the Roman Empire, and lessen by a proportionate amount the threat of the barbarians, by then basically reduced to the Sarmatian peoples and much easier to contain. The Romans would still have to face the recurrent onslaught and major headache of steppe nomad tribal confederations (and flightly empires) every few centuries (Huns, Avars, Magyars, Mongols, etc.) but they would be easier to withstand or recover from in these conditions. Indirectly, Rome would also gain increased power to fight off the Persians and any Arab breakout, with what it could spare from a more defensible Europe and with the extra resources of the Northern provinces.

With the extra resources from Northern Europe, we may also expect Rome would gain the upper hand in its eternal conflict with Persia most of the time, and contain the Arabs much more effectively than the Byzantines were able to. In these conditions, lasting Roman conquest and assimilation of Mesopotamia, western Persia, and quite possibly the habitable portions of (western) Arabia as well would be far from especially difficult to occur, with the Persian Empire being nerfed to a rather less threatening remnant in eastern Persia/Khorasan. Just like the Vistula-Dniester line, an eastern border at the Persian deserts would prove much easier and simpler for Rome to defend than the OTL one, and Roman Mesopotamia and western Persia would provide increased resources for the Empire that are denied to its enemies. Rise of Islam would almost surely be butterflied out by Roman influence on, and likely control of, western Arabia. In these conditions, it is far from unreasonable to expect the 3rd century and 5th century crises would become temporary, much less harmful setbacks Rome can effectively bounce back from w/o lasting damage, and the Empire would never enter a death spiral triggered by them. It is fairly likely these changes would send Rome into a Chinese evolutionary pattern, where occasional periods of crisis and division may occur, but the political and cultural unity of the Roman civilization and civic nation-state ultimately prove indestructible. Given how great an imprint Rome left on European successor states, it stands to reason with longer and greater successes, Roman Western Eurasia would develop a national identity as solid as the Chinese one.

If the history of Byzantium and the analogy with China are anything to go by, a longer-lived, more successful Rome would eventually develop a solid bureaucratic elite to balance the professional army and the landed elites to a degree and lessen the threat of military anarchy, usurpations, and civil wars to more manageable levels (even if they wouldn't go away entirely by any means). Much like Byzantium, a longer-lived Rome would probably evolve into a de facto largely hereditary monarchy by means of the incumbent emperor appointing and crowning his successor, even if anything like strict primogeniture is not so likely to get entrenched and dynastic changes would be far from a rare thing. Much the same way, a longer-lived Rome would eventually modify and adapt its military tactics to make its armies more effective against horse-mounted enemies. Given its valuable resources and position, Nubia would be conquered sooner or later, and most likely so would Caledonia to lessen the burden of defending Britannia. Given how talented the Romans were at engineering, they would maintain and expand the Suez canal version that had intermittently existed since Pharaonic Egypt. It is also far from unreasonable to assume they would eventually dig a version of the Eider/Kiel Canal to ease crossing of the Danish Straits, and create an canal network to link the major northern European rivers from France to Poland-Romania. This would greatly ease movements of goods and troops across Europe, in addition of course to the extensive, well-kept road network they would maintain and expand across the continent. With hegemonic control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Rome would be in a position to dominate the sea trade routes to India and China, and enjoy extensive trade and cultural exchanges with the sophisticated Asian civilizations on mutually-profitable terms.

Given how talented Roman civilization was with political and cultural assimilation of the peoples it conquered, rebellions of subject nationalities (as opposed to the occasional taxation uprising or civil war for the Imperial throne) would never be a significant threat for the Romans, assuming the area has been reliably controlled for a couple generations or so. Pretty much everyone that matters in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East would proudly think of themselves as Roman citizens, and speak Latin, Greek, or both. In due time, standard Latin and Greek would evolve into something fairly close to Church Latin and Byzantine Greek; some linguistic drift across the lands of the Roman Empire is inevitable, but with enduring political and cultural unity of the Roman lands, and extensive movement of merchants, soldiers, and bureaucrats across the Empire, it would never cross the threshold of fairly easy intellegibility. The Roman elites would ensure the Latin-Greek linguistic unity of the Empire is maintained and entrenched, more or less the same way it occurred as for China and the Arab world. Roman Western Eurasia-Northern Africa would thus develop and maintain a high degree of political and cultural unity, with linguistic diversity and political fragmentation only being able to survive in the periphery beyond the natural barriers of sea, steppe, or desert. E.g. Germanic and Slavic languages and polities would only survive in Russia-Ukraine and Scandinavia.

A Roman civilization that avoids its OTL collapse may be expected to keep the cultural/technological dynamism it showed during its Republican/Principate apex and its talent for eagerly assimilating useful ideas from whatever source. During the Principate, the Roman Empire had developed an extensive trade network and urban market economy that spanned the Med lands. With assimilation and development of Germania, this would spread to the entirety of Western-Central Europe, and if the OTL death spiral is averted, previous proto-capitalist patterns of socio-economic development would endure and grow. This means a successful Roman Europe-plus would avoid its OTL Early Middle Ages collapse and regression into manorialism, and evolve from the Principate to an early, non-feudal combo equivalent of the High/Late Middle Ages for Europe and Islamic Golden Age for North Africa and the Near East. Development of ocean-worthy naval technology, and quite possibly a semaphore telegraph system, would lessen the logistic burdens of governing and defending the empire, and supplement the extensive road, canal, and post riders system a successful Rome would maintain and develop.

At some point, conquest or at least vassallization of Hibernia is probably in the cards for a successful, Pan-European Rome, for prestige reasons and geographic proximity if nothing else. Fate of Norse Scandinavia is more questionable, since it is remote and apparently of low value enough that the Romans may never bother to conquer it, just focusing on containing the threat of Norse raiders when it arises, and at most turn it into a client kingdom when they can. They may do the same with rump, eastern Persia, esp. if they hegemonize the sea routes to South and East Asia and do not really have much need for the land Silk Road anymore. A serious Roman effort to conquer and directly control the Jutland Peninsula and the Danish Straits is somewhat more likely for strategic and economic reasons. The Bosporan Kingdom was valuable enough that a successful, larger Rome would eventually turn it into a province for good sooner or later.

Eurofed

Your making a number of assumptions that may or may not be accurate. For instance:
a) That Germannia will make a quick and profitable conquest. It may not be if climatic problems or simply the difficulties of logistics and communications means it is a net loss economically for the empire.

b) Alternatively, even if it does provide a fairly quick profit for the empire in terms of resources this might mean it diverts resources away from the east into the north. Or given how often the empire saw internal division it might mean the north provides a rival power base for further conflict.

c) Even if the empire is stable at the key point and Germany provides extra strength that doesn't necessarily mean it can be applied. There are the questions of logistics for instance and they have clear limits in pro-industrial times. Plus an additional source of power in Germany might object to having its assets 'wasted' in a distant war when there are demands a lot closer to home.

d) You still have the problem of long term stability. As China shows a deeply established bureaucracy and say an emperor cult, while its likely to be hostile to change as a result often didn't keep China united, especially in more than name. The proposed greater Roman empire, even without the proposed Persian gains is a lot more difficult than China to keep united once it has extensive lands away from the Med.

e) There is also the danger of the example provided by Judaism and Zoroastrianism OTL while in the end resulted in Christianity and Islam. Once a belief system such as that gains prominence then you can kiss a unified empire goodbye as it would be far, far to diversify.

I'm not saying that a greater Rome would be totally impossible but I think it would be far less likely to establish and then much harder to hold together. Also there is the danger, if you do get the sort of unified culture that resulted in China you have a far more static society, which could prevent or seriously delay the sort of technological development that occurred in a fractured Europe OTL.

Steve

a) If the political will was there (and in all evidence, the early Principate had it, up to the Teutoburg disaster), the Roman Empire was willing and able to maintain recent conquests that were not going to be a net economic gain for a while. If that disaster is averted, there is nothing to indicate Roman conquest of Germania Magna would not follow the same pattern as the ones of Hispania, Gallia, Britannia, or the Balkans. Logistic and communication difficulties should not be emphasized since the Romans would be able to use coastal and river navigation to reach Germania Magna and Dacia pretty much the same way they did for Hispania, Gallia, and Britannia. Sea trade between the Med and the latter three lands had flourished since preroman times, and the Romans experienced no significant difficulties at sustaining it. Extension of the routes to the Baltic and the Black Sea would face no real climactic or technical difficulty, and the extra length of travel does not matter that much. Up to the rise of the Norse raiders, which is not scheduled to happen for the better part of the first millennium, Roman shipping would not face any serious hostility in the North Sea or the Baltic. If they could reach and navigate the Thames and the Rhine with ease, they would not be challenged to do the same for the Elbe, the Oder, the Vistula, the Danube, and the Dniester. And of course, in due time, they would spare no effort to expand their road network (and quite possibly, build a canal one as well) up to the outskirts of the steppes. Climate was not a problem for the Carolingians and the HRE, it would not be for an expanded Rome (see also Britannia, and sock-wearing legionaries garrisoning it). For this expanded Rome, the eastern Atlantic, the North Sea, the Baltic, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf would basically grow into logistic extensions of the Med, 'lakes' entirely controlled and dominated by the Empire or nearly so. Pretty much from the beginning in military terms, in socio-economic terms as well once the new provinces develop into the full equivalent of the Med ones. We may expect the equivalent of the trade and travel patterns Europe experienced during the High and Late Middle Ages, only w/o the effects of feudalism and Islam.

b) the new northeastern border on the Vistula-Dniester would be considerably shorter and easier to defend than the Rhine-Danube one, and it would turn the bulk of the Germanic and Slavic peoples (barring the ones that may escape Roman conquest by fleeing into the steppes) from enemies to an economic and military resource. The remaining independent barbarians in Sarmatia would be considerably lessened in numbers, and although border contact with the Romans would eventually allow them to grow and organize like it did for the Germans, it is still a process that is going to take several centuries. In the meanwhile, Rome would assimilate and develop its new resources, and gain more time to deal with its inner flaws. So it does not show how and why this would cause resources to be sucked in from the Persian front in a consistent, major way. Also because if conquest of Germania Magna is engaged in Augustus' time, the history of the Principate shows there would be plenty of room in periods when the Parthians were not that troublesome, to focus on northern conquest and pacification. And the pattern of Roman conquest shows the legions only needed to make a concerned major effort to pacify the new lands for a few decades. Afterwards assimilation would take off, and the legions would only be needed to defend the new border. After a province was pacified, barring odd cases such as the Jews, the Romans only had to fear foreign invasions or military rebellions. Since the new border would be shorter and easier to defend, and hence require less potentially rebellious legions to garrison it, we should not expect it would create a greater security burden, if anything the contrary.

c) See point above for logistics. Really, history shows it was not such a big deal for the Romans within their OTL borders, and it hardly shows how and why TTL ones would be that much of a difference. Their main troubles came from different sources, as to be expected from a civilization that was top-class in engineering, administration, and military skills. Sure, theoretically speaking, the extra strength gained from Germania could be wasted in pointless, distant wars. Except geography makes it not so easy to do, at least for a while. The first and foremost place the Romans would use it is Persia, and for a good while (up to the Zagros, or even better the Persian deserts), the same positive dynamic would click in as for Germania. Conquest provides a more defensible border and new resources for the Empire that are not especially burdensome to assimilate and maintain, and denies them to the enemies. They just have to accomplish, maintain, and expand on the equivalent of Trajan's successes with their extra resources.

Where else the Romans could bleed and exhaust themselves in pointless wars past these expanded borders ? The Sahara makes an impassable barrier for most of Africa. Nubia falls within the same favorable dynamic as Germania and Mesopotamia-western Persia. Caledonia may be much less valuable to own, but it is not that big and it lessens burdens in other ways (compare the expenses of defending the Britannic limes for centuries vs. the one-time generation-long effort to conquer and pacify Caledonia for good). The habitable portions of coastal/western Arabia are a borderline case. Otherwise, the Empire might indeed waste a lot of valuable resources trying to conquer the Sarmatian steppes or eastern Persia/Central Asia/India. This however would only be a serious problem if it is a recurrent, sustained effort as opposed to the onetime pet project of an overambitious Emperor. Hibernia may or may not might become the low-value prestige project of some expansionist general or emperor at some point, but it wouldn't be that costly. I doubt they would bother with Scandinavia, unless the Norse really make themselves a serious nuisance.

d) Development of a professional civil service and a relatively stable succession system, which a longer-lived, more successful Rome is likely to accomplish if Byzantium is anything to go by, changed China's trajectory enough to make it a success story for the greater part of the last two millennia. This version of Rome may easily cross the threshold into the same pattern. No matter what, this kind of Roman Europe-plus should be expected to stay more trade-oriented than Ming/Qing China for various geographical, structural, and economic reasons. Actually, China's example is far from being that bad as it concerns the chances of a united Roman Europe-plus matching or surpassing its OTL achievements. For the vast majority of its history, Imperial China was as culturally and technologically dynamic as Western Eurasia, if not more so at times, and the post-Ming stagnation was much more the late, odd aberration than confirmation of a pattern. Up to its terminal decline, Byzantium, the best evidence available for evolution of a late Rome, stayed as culturally dynamic and trade-oriented as Western Europe (if not more so) despite its development of an effective professional bureaucracy. If anything, TTL Roman Europe is more likely to match its OTL achievements a few centuries earlier (due to the lack of the Dark Ages collapse) than to go the way of Ming/Qing China. As it concerns the Chinese, steady trade and cultural exchanges with another major imperial civilization at the other end of Eurasia throughout the Common Era is likely to send TTL late China on a less isolationist and static, more trade-oriented trajectory. Of course, the same would true for Roman Europe as well.

e) True, if such a disruptive religion takes prominence. With such an early PoD, the rise and success of Christianity and more so Islam may easily be prevented, and their role in Western Eurasia filled by other religions that seemed less antagonistic to Rome and less prone to intolerance and vicious divisions. Suitable candidates were far from lacking. As for Judaism and Zoroastrianism, past a point they would be crippled in their effective opposition to Roman rule by their major difficulty to proselytize. Bluntly speaking, since they can't easily recruit to replenish and expand their numbers, if they really make themselves enough of a security problem, the Romans could and would do a desert of them until the zealots change their ways or are wiped out within Rome's borders. IOTL it is what happened to the Jews during the Principate.