Fascist-Communist WWII/Cold War

Germany, Hungary, and Poland with the support of Italy and the acquiescence of Britain picked the pretext of the perceived pro-Soviet stance of Czechoslovakia and supposed mistreatment of its minorities to partition it. Germany got Bohemia-Moravia and Bratislava, Hungary annexed Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia, and Poland got Zaolzie. The Soviets and the French protested the partition but failed to intervene since they did not feel ready for a general conflict.

The British Empire and the USA stayed officially neutral in the growing antagonism between the Axis and the Comintern, condemning the spread of fascism and communism across Europe. In practice, however, the British showed a rather more friendly and cooperative stance towards the Axis most of the time. They regarded it as much less dangerous and a useful tool to contain Communism, even if they were afraid of either bloc getting hegemonic control of Europe. The USA had more of a true neutral stance during the 1930s, even if their attitude towards European affairs was essentially isolationist, due to the hostile stance of the Roosevelt Administration and progressive New Dealers towards fascism. American conservatives and centrists however basically shared the British attitude of regarding Communism as the most dangerous threat, and the Axis as not so bad in comparison. After FDR left the White House in 1941, the American government mostly came to adopt this mindset. Spread of totalitarianism across Europe and Soviet expansionism drove Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland to form a Nordic League, which included a customs union and a military alliance.

The Communists exploited political and ethnic instability in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to drive these nations into civil war. The conflict quickly reawakened latent tensions between the Balkan nationalities, turning it into a complex multi-sided struggle. It became a proxy war between the Axis, mostly backed by Britain, and the Comintern. It ended with the breakup of Yugoslavia, a right-wing victory in Croatia and Greece thanks to British and German-Italian support, and a Communist success in Serbia and Bulgaria due to Franco-Soviet aid and traditional pro-Russian sympathies. The victorious Communists established a Balkan Federation of Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Macedonia, and most of Bosnia. Croatia became independent, joined the Axis, and got the Croat-majority areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Carniola was partitioned between Germany and Italy. Albania with most of Kosovo became an Italian protectorate. Hungary annexed Backa and Baranja. Italy got central Dalmatia and many Adriatic islands. The Serbian Banat got partitioned between Hungary, Romania, and the Balkan Federation.

Like Free France, Greece took an hostile stance to the Communist bloc but strived to keep friendly relations with Britain and the Axis bloc at the same time. Britain and Italy agreed to cede the Dodecanese and Cyprus to Greece to reinforce it against the Communist threat in exchange for basing rights across the Greek islands. The Balkan Federation joined the Communist military alliance.

Since the late 1920s, the Soviets strongly supported the CCP in its civil war with the KMT. This allowed the Chinese Communists and pro-Soviet warlords to entrench their control of large portions of northern and western China despite the best efforts of the Nationalists to eradicate them. Soviet encroachment in China persuaded the capitalist powers to accept Japan’s seizure of Manchuria and its establishment of the client state of Manchukuo. The Chinese Nationalists adopted a policy of nation-building, trying to avoid a direct conflict with Japan or the USSR, focusing on getting control of China proper by crushing the CCP and subduing the warlords, and treating the outer frontier territories as acceptable losses. They tried to enhance their economic and military cooperation with Britain, the USA, and Germany to strengthen themselves.

Border tensions and clashing ambitions in China between the USSR and Japan peaked into an undeclared war. Its inconclusive outcome left the Soviet-Japanese land border mostly unchanged, but allowed Japan to gain control of northern Sakhalin. It drove the USSR to annex Xinjiang and seize Inner Mongolia for their Mongolian clients. The conflict and lingering antagonism with the USSR forced the Japanese to drop any plans to directly dominate China by military conquest. They had to focus their resources on containing Soviet power and their efforts to spread their influence in China largely turned into a mix of supporting pro-Japanese warlords in northern China and trying to woo the KMT to their side. The Soviet-Japanese conflict indirectly entrenched the Chinese Civil War as a three-sided proxy war between the USSR, Japan, and the KMT. Nationalist Chinese public opinion mostly turned equally hostile towards the Soviets and the Japanese.

Japan became an unofficial member of the Axis alliance to try and contain the Soviets in the Far East. This drove the Germans into a complex balancing act to keep the Japanese and the Chinese both aligned to their side. The British and more so the Americans stayed suspicious of Japanese ambitions in China and the Pacific, but they found Japan useful as a tool to contain Communism in Asia. They showed they did not mind a Japanese sphere of influence in Manchuria, Mongolia, and the Russian Far East.

By the early 1940s, the democratic, fascist, and communist powers were all rather busy with extensive rearmament plans and ambitious dual-purpose infrastructure- and industry-building programs that helped world economy dispel the lingering effects of the Great Depression and the 1930s conflicts. The world stood at a crossroads, with growing antagonism between the fascist and communist blocs having the potential of escalating into the spasm of another World War or settling down into an extended Cold War.

The French civil war and the downfall of Belgium and Portugal led to a relatively extensive realignment of the European colonial empires. As a rule, most French colonies stayed loyal to White France. The main exceptions were French Equatorial Africa, which switched its loyalties to Red France, as well as French Indochina and Syria, which were swept by radical-nationalist uprisings backed by the Comintern. The capitalist European powers perceived these events as a serious threat to their own interests, so they took steps to suppress them. A multinational European effort supported the Free French into re-conquering French Equatorial Africa, while the British occupied Syria and French Indochina. The Kingdom of Iraq, a British client state, got administration of Syria, and Indochina got autonomy under joint Anglo-Free French control with a government of conservative nationalists.

Since the fall of France to Communism, Germany had claimed restitution of the colonies it had lost after WWI, while Italy had eyed an opportunity to fulfill its own expansionist ambitions. Eventually all of these issues became part of a general settlement. Germany agreed to drop all its other claims in exchange for annexation of Gabon, Middle Congo, Belgian Congo, and Angola. Italy got Tunisia, French Somaliland, and Mozambique. Spain and Free France swapped French Morocco for Portuguese Guinea and Spanish Guinea.

Despite these interventions, however, 1930s events in Europe and Asia and the relentless destabilization activities of the Comintern helped fuel a wave of anti-colonial nationalism and instability in the European colonial empires. It was essentially centered in India, the Arab world, and Southeast Asia, while Sub-Saharan Africa mostly remained unaffected. The British faced increasing difficulties at denying the claims for independence of India, Egypt, and Syria-Iraq, while the Spanish, French Whites, and Italians brutally suppressed any Arab dissent in their own colonies. The Soviets and the French supported Communist and radical nationalist rebels in Asia as much as possible, which increased tensions between the Communist bloc and the capitalist European powers.

Pretty much the usual deal of other deposed European royal families after WWI and WWII. They fought, then fled the Communist uprising and the French invasion when they swept Belgium. Once the partition deal dethroned them for good, they retired to become part of the Western world's wealthy elite, with various members living in different capitalist countries.

Given the circumstances, Luxemburg's continued existence as a state would be rather unlikely, and depending on poltical/diplomatic and military butterflies, it might go to France or to Germany. My reasoned guess is it is rather more likely it went to Germany at the peace table. Given its ethnic-linguistic character, the Germans would in all likelihood insist on having it, and the Luxemburgeois themselves would regard fascist-lite Germany as a better alternative than Bolshevik France. I might as well add an explicit mention of it in the TL.

Very much so. Now, I expect even the German monarchist revolutionaries would not care to restore *all* the German deposed dynasties, including the ones of small and micro states, but Luxemburg would be an exception in order to ease its incorporation in the Second German Empire. The internal borders Germany inherited from unification were so dysfunctional that I assume the new leadership would take the opportunity of constitutional revision to enact an administrative reform of German states much similar to the ones of the Nazis and the Bundesrepublik. In this framework, however, they may easily restore the dynasties of the large and middle states with the strongest residual support base, regional identity, and historical fame, such as the Habsburg in Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, the Wittelsbach in Bavaria, the Wettin in Saxony and Thuringia, and the Welf in Hanover. Of course, in addition to the Imperial throne, the Hohenzollern would get back Rhineland-Westfalia, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia.

Since ITTL all the other Axis powers are monarchies and would thus create a strong precedent, the Spanish nationalists may easily bring the Bourbon back on the throne soon after they seize power. The new king would most likely be Infante Juan, and the Spanish strongman may be any of the OTL leaders of the Nationalist uprising (Franco, Sanjuro, Mola, and Queipo de Llano), depending on butterflies. Pretty much the same way, Hungary may well dispense with the pretension of the regency, and put back an Habsburg on the throne - of course, he would be a figurehead, and the real power would stay in Horthy's hands. It would have to be a different Habsburg prince than the one reigning in Vienna. Quite possibly, it would be Otto in Hungary, and Robert in Austria-Bohemia, but it might be the other way around, depending on butterflies and event sequence (and brothers may swap thrones after both become available). As it concerns Croatia, almost surely it would get a surviving Amedeo of Aosta as King Tomislav II. Since ITTL the Nazis are not in power, the Ustase would in all likelihood look too extreme to be in charge of the Croats, and Vladko Macek would accept the offer of the Germans and Italians to be the leader of independent Croatia.

As it concerns 'Free' France, it would in all likelihood stay a republic. Depending on political butterflies, it might be a military junta, a police state that keeps the empty trappings of parliamentarism, or something fairly similar to Vichy France with less anti-semitism. I see no good reason why Petain should not be expected to be its leader, but depending on butterflies during the French Civil War, it might be any one of the sufficiently charismatic, popular, and talented 1930s-1940s French right-wingers. Ironically enough, De Gaulle too would be quite suited to be in White France's ruling circle, if perhaps a tad too young and obscure to become the first supreme leader - unless he somehow rises to major prominence during the civil war, as Franco did IOTL. As it concerns Red France, Thorez is the most likely candidate for leadership (with Zinoviev or Stalin pulling his strings, of course). 

ITTL the British elites would have less reason to mind a King with Germanophile/fascist-lite sympathies, so Edward VIII may well avoid abdication if a sensible solution to the Wallis affair is found. Moreover, given the PoD, the King and Ms. Simpson may easily fail to meet and fall in love ITTL.  

Even for fascists, it would look too gauche. Judging from their historical M.O., the standard for the monarchies they created/restored was to pick a member of a royal house with suitable historical or foreign-policy ties to the nation that was willing to cooperate with them (*) and put him on the throne as a figurehead, while the real power stayed in the hands of a charismatic strongman as prime minister, or an oligarchic ruling clique/military junta, as the case may be. The Nazis were the main republican exception, but ITTL they are an obscure footnote, and the DVNP nationalist-militarist guys that replaced them were strongly monarchical, so I expect the pattern would apply in full.

(*) Given TTL circumstances, I expect any historical figure that is not a far-leftist/socialist/radical liberal would be a likely collaborationist with this 'light' brand of fascism. This means in all likelihood Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland, etc. would keep pretty much all their scientists and artists except for the left-wing sympathizers and uncompromising liberals.

Oh, no doubt Horthy would be good enough for Hungary if he stays Head of State and I very much doubt Germany would care enough on this issue to make diplomatic pressure. It is basically a domestic issue: on one hand the Horthy regime would get more prestige at home and abroad by restoring a Habsburg King. On the other hand, Horthy would have to deal with the (relatively minor, but not entirely meaningless) power-sharing such a restoration would involve. Yet, if Horthy decides against an Habsburg restoration the modern precedent for making himself King would be relatively scarce, apart from the big Bonaparte exception. On the other hand, there is that fairly meaningful precedent, the Hungarian monarchy was originally elective, changes of dynasty in Middle Age Hungary were far from rare, and the Horthy family was nobility. So their seizure of the throne would not be so outlandish. Horthy might make the sensible argument that Habsburg restoration in Austria-Bohemia makes the House unfit for the throne of Hungary; the obvious counterargument would be different branches of the same family taking the thrones of different states were very common in European history. Horthy might even take the middle course of staying Head of State for life, then restoring the Habsburg on the throne at his death, like OTL Franco did. In short, it might go various ways. What is unfeasible is a personal union between Austria-Bohemia as a German state and Hungary as an independent nation, even if Berlin and Budapest are close allies.

On second thoughts, IOTL Horthy did pick his own eldest son Istvan as Deputy Regent, and thus likely designated successor, before the latter's WWII death. Just like Amedeo of Aosta for Croatia, Istvan's death would be butterflied out, and this precedent seems to indicate Horthy did mean to keep his own family in power, at least through a dynastic continuation of the Regency quasi-monarchy.

To be honest, I do not have enough info available about Horthy jr. to make an educated guess whether he would be a competent successor or not. As a rule, the historical record for political dynasties in the modern age has been rather mixed and hit-or-miss with a few examples of good or adequate successors (e.g. the Adams, the Roosevelts, the Ghandis, the Kennedys) and several poor to terrible cases (e.g. the Cromwells, the Bonaparte, the Bushs, the Kims, pretty much all the cases of Third-World dictators that attempted to keep power in the family). But I guess it probably doesn't matter that much. Horthy's Hungary is not an autocratic dictatorship, so either Istvan is able to be a competent enough successor with the help of the Hungarian ruling elite and Hungary's allies, or the latter two would get him replaced with another member of the elite if he screws up too much. Theoretically speaking, the latter case might even become an opportunity for a liberalizing evolution of the regime, but since Horthy sr. is scheduled to die in the late '50s, it seems a tad early for TTL moderate brand of fascism to start seriously withering.  

ITTL a *WWII with a decisive victory of Communism that would enable it to overrun and dominate (Eastern) Europe is of course theoretically possible but seems unlikely. TTL Germany is unlikely to unleash a Barbarossa-style unprovoked general attack on the Communist bloc since it has no Nazi-like ideological imperative to do so, it is mindful of the lessons of WWI, and finds its early 1940s situation fairly comfortable, even if it forces the Germans and their allies to stay always prepared for a two-front war. Italy more or less shares the same content perspective. The Poles and the Romanians have of course more reason to be revanchist but even so they are not going to start anything without the explicit assent of their allies. If and when a *WWII starts, it would in all likelihood happen because: a) the Communist leaders feel confident enough in their nations' military and industrial build-up to unleash a Red Alert-style general attack on the Axis to fulfill their own ideological imperative to paint Eurasia Red; b) the Soviets and the Japanese stumble into a rematch and the Axis decides to honor its own unofficial alliance with Japan (and exploit the opportunity of the USSR being trapped into a two-front war of its own); or c) some local flashpoint escalates beyond the willingness or ability of the two sides to contain it.

It bears noting that in TTL 1940s, some of the most likely flashpoints involve the Balkans and/or the Middle East (e.g. the Soviets making moves on Turkey and/or Persia), and as such they have a fairly high chance of drawing the British in the conflict as a cobelligerant. The same is of course also true if the Commies make an unprovoked general attack. Even if that doesn't occur, unless the Axis appears really aggressive (unlikely for the reasons above), Britain is likely to take the stance of a pro-Axis neutral, that would surely make no move to interfere with the trade of Germany and its allies and may provide them with economic support in terms of access to loans and supplies on favorable terms, or even a British Lend-Lease. America would probably be more in the position of a true neutral (unless Britain joins the conflict), but its economic support to the Communists in these circumstances would be politically unthinkable.

Without a general war, FDR would have to leave the White House in 1940, and pretty much any realistic candidate for the Democratic or Republican nomination in the 1940s would be less biased for anti-fascism and pro-Soviet sympathies than him. Especially in TTL circumstances where the Axis nations have done little of their OTL atrocities and acts of aggression (no persecution of Jews or large-scale Japanese atrocities in China, the White Terror in Spain is pretty much the peak in terms of Axis brutality, almost all their territorial expansion has been excusable or opportunist exploitation of crises they did not directly cause), while the Commies are more or less just as tainted with their usual bloody stuff or worse (the intensity of the Soviet purges ITTL may vary somewhat although they are unlikely to be avoided entirely, but in any case there is the Second/Red Terror in France, they did all the M-R stuff on their own initiative plus various other acts of fairly blatant and aggressive destabilization).