The Future Kaiser Wilhelm II Dies Young

Futurist

To trim things back a bit only putting your last comments and my replies here and moving back to black.


So, you think that the German bloc will still have an advantage in both industrial strength and military organization as late as the late 1930s, correct?

The bloc as a whole almost certainly. A lot will depend on how Austria develops as that could be a very weak link but with Germany, Britain, Austria and Japan the German bloc should still have more industrial muscle and probably still a qualitative edge.

Also across this period of time there are huge butterflies about how various countries developed. For instances an Amglo-German alliance could mean that Joseph Chamberlain is more influential. This could also mean that Britain abandons free trade and laissez faire earlier and more completely than OTL. This could have a big impact on Britain's economy, which might be markedly larger. Furthermore some Conservatives were arguing in ~1914 for the introduction of conscription. In TTL that isn't going to happen then but as Russian development puts our continental allies under increasing threat you're likely to see pressure for it in the run up to war and it might even be in place when the war starts. [Although unless introduced several years beforehand you don't get a large pool of trained troops]

Also without the huge losses from WWI and the social impact all nations are going to have a lot more potential but not sure how they will develop. I think that despite better leadership at the top its going to be Russia, Austria and Italy that will still be more backwards compared to the other powers. How greatly so would depend on the circumstances.

Didn't the Brits also do this in World War II in our TL?

IIRC in WWI Britain, as opposed to the empire and dominions, raised about 70 divisions and in WWII it was about 30-40. The difference was that in WWII the RAF, especially Bomber Command consumed a hell of a lot more men, both in actual military roles and in terms of the industrial infrastructure.

Also, Yes, I agree with you that there would probably be a willingness on Britain's part to do this in this TL. Indeed, such assurances might be necessary for Kaiser Heinrich to successfully push back against the pressure from German war hawks in the 1910s.

Agreed

OK. Indeed, Germany and Austria-Hungary would very likely be able to hold out for 1-3 years until significant British help arrives in this TL.

 I suspect so, although Britain should be able to put a small/medium sized force into the field almost immediately.  Quality would depend on the circumstances but its likely to be fairly well equipped.

Couldn't Britain bribe India into entering this war, though? After all, in addition to WWI, didn't India also fight in WWII in our TL?

With what? It would depend on the circumstances but an Indian dominion that didn't see a clear threat from Russia might be less than willing to support the former imperial power in what looks to be a huge and bloody war. Alternatively it might see a clear threat from a very powerful Russia but I would say its unclear if India has achieved dominion status. If it hasn't then how much unrest might there be?

Also, though, isn't there a risk of American participation in this TL's WWI resulting in an even greater defeat in this TL's WWI for the Franco-Russo-Italian alliance? If so, do you think that this risk would be outweighed by the possibility of quickly knocking Britain out of this TL's WWI using USW?

Difficult to say. The French, who are most likely to be the power that makes the decision, could view the US as unlikely to intervene for assorted reasons. With a tightening British/allied blockade they might also see it as their only choice. France OTL was very highly militarised by 1914 simply because with its smaller population it was struggling to maintain forces large enough to counter the German army. If the French problems of slow population growth continues their possibly going to be outnumbered by say 5:2 compared to Germany and with Britain also as an enemy they are likely to be very nervousness about war without an ace in the hole.  As such they might take on more of the militaristic mentality normally associated with Prussia/Germany OTL.

One point here is that France is likely a lot earlier than Germany OTL to realise they can't challenge the RN 1-1 so they might be more likely to have a large sub force before the war. [In the 19thC France fluctuated between trying to go head to head with the RN and a raiding war strategy with cruisers seeking to disrupt British trade. Also as technology advances subs will have more potential. The RN will doubtless keep an eye on this but could misjudge the situation so you could see the French starting with such a tactic and the allies struggling to adjust.


In addition to this, here's another question to consider: Would France genuinely want to anger the U.S.? After all, the U.S. and France have a long history which go back to the American Revolutionary War. Thus, angering a country which France previously (albeit 140+ years ago) helped win its independence might *not* be a very popular move in France.

Again it would depend on the circumstances. How isolationist is the US and how big its military? Relations with the US could be quite well, especially if say the USN is by this time challenging the RN in terms of numbers and hence there is tension there. Hence France might decide its worth the risk either for a quick victory or later in the war getting desperate.  OTL Luddendorf was convinced that USW would be decisive in forcing the collapse of Britain and hence France before the US could raise a significant force and if their spring 1918 offensives had been successful this would have been the case.  [Although that was always a desperate bid].  Similarly in WWII Hitler was willing to declare war on Germany because he grossly underestimated the US and Donitz was confident he could sink allied shipping faster than they could replace it.  It could be quite possible that the French leadership could misjudge the situation as well.  [Similarly we're assuming that the Russia bloc deliberately start the war but also they lose it so obviously they got it wrong.

The thing is, though, that the Franco-Russo-Italian alliance would probably try *extremely* hard to avoid war before they are ready. In turn, this means that they would behave in a humble and conciliatory manner in response to any crisis which develops while they (especially Russia) are still weak in comparison to the Anglo-German bloc.

True but politicians are humans as well and have character flaws. Possibly more than most because of the corrupting influence of power on egos. Also incidents and events happen.

You might be forgetting that Russia will also have an additional 15+ years to improve its own military in this TL, though.

True but will they have continuous reforming leadership at several levels throughout this period? It not only needs the Czars to be forward looking and willing to force the issue but also the aristocracy, who traditionally dominated the military and bureaucracy to be either willing to give up a lot of their power or be replaced. It needs those on the bottom to also see substantial improvements to be willing to wait while so much energy and resources are going into a massive military and industrial build-up or there could be a lot of unrest. Without WWI, the civil war and the worse of the Bolsheviks Russia will have a markedly higher population, possibly ~300-350 million but how high a quality will that be and how well will they be able and willing to meet that population's needs and desires.

As far as I know, though, Russia's literacy rate actually increased from about 20% to about 40% between 1897 and 1914. Thus, by the start of the 1930s, Russia might very well have a literacy rate of around 60% in this TL.

That's still a fairly low level compared to the more developed nations to the west. Also a lot of the population increase might be in areas, such as Poland and Central Asia where there could be unrest and mistrust between rulers and ruled.

Meanwhile, as for a divided society, even with various reforms, it's certainly *not* like the social divisions in either Austria-Hungary or Italy are going to disappear. Indeed, I am unsure that, say, the Romanians in Transylvania or the Italians in Trentino and Trieste will be content with (greater) autonomy within Austria-Hungary (as opposed to being annexed by Romania and Italy, respectively).


Agreed on the education front, but I'm not so sure about the ethnic/nationalism front in regards to Austria-Hungary. Indeed, Austria-Hungary's problems with nationalism might be more severe than Russia's problems with nationalism in the early 20th century in this TL.


That is probably the biggest uncertainty for the German bloc. How well can Austria reform and upgrade its economy and society. At a minimum it must resolve the problem of the Magyar nobles, which could well mean a probably brief civil war and also must give something like equal status to its Slavs, who almost certainly will be the majority of the empire. Some of those, such as the Poles and Croats are traditionally loyal to the regime, if only because of the alternatives [Russia, Hungarian or Serbian domination]. Austria is likely to be the major weak point in the alliance. Plus as you say some minorities such as the Romanians and the small Italian one are likely to be disloyal but very much depends on not just the military and economic development of the empire but also its social stability and health.

Frankly, the key here is to have the Franco-Russian-Italian alliance create a land corridor between Russia, Serbia, France, and Italy. Indeed, this can be done by having the Franco-Russian-Italian alliance (along with Serbia, of course) conquer Galicia, Hungary, Slovakia, and all of the South Slav(ic) lands of Austria-Hungary up to Slovenia. In turn, this would probably mean that the militaries of the countries of the Russian bloc would need to have *extremely* good logistical systems (and transportation systems, of course).

To be honest this is demanding a hell of a lot, especially given the terrain and the expected assistance from Germany. Plus the Russians, Romanians, Italians and Serbs are likely to be less than welcomed by the people they occupy, unless the Austrian empire is in serious meltdown. Both in conquering such lands then maintaining them and then in maintaining LOC for the transfer of large quantities of oil and other items between east and west.

Probably not merely more difficult, but rather outright impossible! After all, Britain was sworn by treaty to protect Belgium from invasion, no?

It would depend on the situation but definitely if Germany struck 1st through Belgium it would alienate a lot of liberals in Britain. Also OTL the attack on a small neutral helped win a lot of support for the war effort from many Irish nationalists.

The Schlieffen Plan would have already almost certainly outlived its value by the start of the 1920s, though. Indeed, as far as I know, in our TL, Russian railroad construction was projected to ensure that the Schlieffen Plan would outlive its value and become obsolete by 1917.


That is largely true as I'm aware so Germany would have to change strategy by that point. Suspect that Heinrich would also support this.


I think that the European royal hemophilia gene originated in Queen Victoria, who appears to have acquired this gene as a result of some kind of genetic mutation at the time of her conception. After several generations, this gene appears to have simply disappeared and died out in the European royal family due to natural selection.

(At least, that's what I have always thought about this issue.)

OK thanks for the information.

Completely agreed. However, in spite of this, I still think that any German heir with hemophilia will be removed from the line of succession to the German throne (or at least will "voluntarily" renounce all of his rights to the German throne) in order to ensure that Germany will not have a Kaiser in the future who is more concerned about his own survival than about actually governing Germany.

Quite possibly although not sure if a Kaiser with haemophilia would necessarily be more concerned about their own survival than their responsibilities. Also there could be considerable sympathy for such a prince, struggling against such an handicap, especially if he was also the much loved son of a popular Kaiser.

The question would be influenced by and might influence in turn the views of people on eugenics, which had a lot of popularity at the time. There could be quite a debate, not just in Germany.

I could see that such a Kaiser might decide to abdicate, or possibly not marry and have children to avoid perpetuating the problem with future generations of the royal family.


Wouldn't killing Black people in African en masse be considered to be too extreme even for pre-World War I Europeans, though? After all, didn't the lynchings of African-Americans in the Southern U.S. provoke large anger in other parts of the U.S. in our TL?

  I'm afraid I'm doubtful here on this.   There was growing unrest about racial inequality, but also widespread acceptance of it and the idea of some races ruling others. I think it was fairly standard when there was rebellions or violent unrest to  crush the rebellion and possibly burning a village or two to make the point.  What seemed to cause so much unrest in the case of SW Africa and the Herero & Namaqua that just about the entire population of the tribes were forced into the desert to die. Possibly also this came closely on the scandal of the massacres in the Congo Free State.

Completely agreed. However, in this TL, this might not occur until the mid-20th century (1940s or 1950s) or so. Of course, it might occur earlier than this if World War I already breaks out by that point in time; after all, a victorious German Kaiser (likely Kaiser Heinrich's son, since Heinrich himself will probably die from cancer in 1929 in this TL just like he did in our TL) can follow up on a German victory in World War I by being magnanimous, agreeing to transform himself into a British-style constitutional monarch, and becoming an elder German statesman afterwards. Indeed, such a German Kaiser might conclude that with Germany's security assured, there is now *no longer* any justification for him to continue to have real, meaningful governing powers.

Agree

Completely agreed. Of course, I also think that France and Italy will be wise enough to restrain Russia until after both of them feel that Russia is actually ready to fight. After all, as you yourself have previously pointed out, since the militaries of both France and Italy would probably *strongly* rely on oil by the 1930s in this TL, Russia would have to *quickly and successfully* defeat and occupy most or all of Austria-Hungary so that a meaningful land link can be created between Russia's forces and the forces of both France and Italy. Indeed, in the event of a long World War I in this TL, Russia (and Romania as well) would have to occupy and control areas such as (our TL's) Slovenia in order to be able to ship oil to both France and Italy through these areas.

Indeed, as you can see here, defeating and occupying most or all of Austria-Hungary will ensure that there will finally be a land route for Russia (and Romania as well) to send its oil to both France and Italy (plus, by the 1930s, there would certainly be more railroads in Europe than there were in 1914 in our TL):

Agree but I think this is likely to be beyond them. Even with a blitzkrieg type doctrine and equipment there is a lot of rugged terrain to overrun. Also it would mean close co-operation by numerous powers which is not only awkward in itself but increases the chances of details being leaked to the German bloc. Which would enable them to make preparations against such an attack.

  Steve