A different Cold War

Good and interesting question. Let's see:

The USA/NAPU, most certainly. It is an established superpower throughout the Cold War and beyond. Its conventional military and nuclear deterrent are broadly similar to OTL, quite possibly a little stronger from greater division of responsibilities and burden-sharing with its European and East Asian allies, integration and eventual annexation of the Dominions, and various favorable butterflies (no Vietnam War, a successful Great Society, no Reaganomics, etc.). Full nuclear triad, as usual. ITTL it does not bear the stigma of first use of nukes.

The EU, most certainly. It rises to established superpower status during the Cold War, and remains there for the foreseeable future. Conventional military capability is equivalent to the USA in most regards, probably a little more land- and air-oriented and a little less naval-oriented to defend itself against Russia and project power in the Middle East, the Soviet space, Central Asia, and Africa, although they still need to defend themselves from the Soviets in the Atlantic and the Med and are likely unwilling to delegate the task the the Americans entirely. Its nuclear deterrent likely ranges from a (most likely) maximum of equal to the USA or nearly so to a (less likely) minimum being eyeballed according to the following rough formula: pick the largest among the OTL arsenals of UK and France, multiply it for the sum of Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, Scandinavia after the EU-NU merger, one unit to represent the other minor member states, another two units to represent efficient use of resources from continental synergy and federalization, greater wealth from complete economic integration, an intact 1938 Germany, earlier assimilation of Iberia and Eastern Europe, no austerity, less corruption in Southern Europe, and so on. Full nuclear triad.

The USSR/Russia, most certainly, at least until the end of the Cold War. It is an established superpower during the Cold War, decays to a fallen great power afterwards. During the late Soviet period, it exhausts itself to death in the impossible task to match the US+EU combo gun for gun and nuke for nuke. Probably somewhat stronger than OTL in the naval field, to exploit its access to the Med and the Persian Gulf. Military overspending and continuation of Stalinist policies (except the mass purges) cause the fall of Communism to be earlier (say late '70s to early '80s) and much more violent than OTL (economic collapse, famine, civil war, potential WMD use). Afterwards, its fate may range from warlord Balkanization to massive and timely Western help rebuilding it into a decent, nicer shape, to (perhaps most likely) being broadly similar to Putin's Russia, only crazier, nastier, poorer, in worse shape, more of a pariah, and less able to bully its neighbors (especially the ones close to the EU). A Russia with Putin's mentality, only worse, the capabilities of Eltsin's era, and a conventional military and nuclear deterrent almost entirely being made up of aging leftovers from the Soviet period. ITTL it does bear the huge stigma of having killed dozens of millions Chinese with an unprovoked WMD attack. As a matter of fact, it is quite possible that during and after the collapse of Communism (especially if WMDs are used or threatened to), the USA and the EU intervene to neutralize the Soviet WMD arsenal and they don't ever allow the Russians to rebuild one. Full nuclear triad during the Soviet era, it depends afterwards.

The East Asian Union, almost surely. It becomes a potential superpower once it forms from the union of Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, the second becomes a developed country, and the latter industrializes. Its conventional military power and nuclear deterrent is likely significantly lower than the US or EU ones, but not radically so, for various reasons: it forms later than the EU, it is less wealthy and more divided internally being the union of a developed half (Japan and Korea) and a newly industrialized half (Southeast Asia), and the USA are a bit more wary of its extensive rearmament. Its nuclear arsenal may vary from a minimum equivalent to OTL Britain/France/China (most likely) to a maximum of half the European one (less likely). Probably a little more nuke-shy than its allies having witnessed the horrors of nuclear war close to its borders. Full nuclear triad.

India, almost surely. ITTL it fills the economic and geopolitical role of OTL post-Maoist China, including its eventual rise to potential superpower status. For this reason its conventional military power and nuclear deterrent resembles its OTL self during the Cold War, OTL China afterwards. Full nuclear triad (if the smallest one in the established/potential/fallen superpower club).

China, just possibly. It is a very long shot, but if Pakistan, Maoist China, and North Korea could do it... Surely not before a good while since the KMT completes the long hard task of re-uniting the country and rebuilding it from failed state conditions, and even then the Middle Kingdom shall be a screwed-up, resentful, nutty regional power, like post-Soviet Russia but worse, barring the unlikely case of the Western powers succeeding in the Herculean effort of rebuilding it in a decent shape. Otherwise, it is likely going to be a huge case of paranoid, vicious nationalism, since foreign powers have been ripping it a new one since the Opium Wars. A bit less so as long as the KMT old guard and the islanders stay in charge, much more so once the mainlanders grab the reins of power. Its attitude towards nukes may vary from a strong taboo, having being the victim of WMD devastation, to a dogged determination to own them to prevent a repeat, no matter the cost ("we'll have them even if we have to eat grass"). Post-reunification/reconstruction conventional military power and possible nuclear arsenal most likely resemble OTL Pakistan or Maoist China. This even assuming the Western powers do allow a nasty hyper-nationalist China to have WMDs in the first place, which is way questionable.

Israel, almost surely, for pretty much the same reasons and in the same way as OTL. Conventional military power and nuclear arsenal are going to be significantly stronger than OTL, but not substantially more so, to account for its greater population and resources, more support from America AND Europe, larger and stronger Arab enemies, and so on.

Britain, almost surely, at least during the Cold War, more or less the same way as OTL. A caveat about the UK: given the recent mind-boggling irrationality of Brexit being fulfilled, I'm greatly tempted/driven to throw what I'd otherwise regard as political plausiblity to the winds and let British xenophobia blossom to its self-destructive extreme consequences ITTL, as an exception to the general pro-Western bent. So while the North American-Pacific USA, the EU, East Asia, and India carve their way into the world power club, Britain never really gets over its dysfunctional mourning for its loss of the Empire and never overcomes its prideful nationalist inability to accept integration in a subordinate role with either Europe or North America, spirals down into stubborn, resentful xenophobe isolationism, lets the rise of the North American, European, East Asian, and Indian powers marginalize its economy and international role into an insignificant, impoverished corner of the Western world, and fed up Scotland breaks ranks with nutty Little England to seek salvation in the arms of the NU/EU. Of course, at some point the English people is going to realize the error of its ways, but at this point I'm just doubtful it may succeed before the last generation that knew the Empire has gone into the grave. In these conditions, I'm doubtful England might afford to keep a nuclear deterrent.

South Africa, just possibly. IOTL they came very close to becoming a nuclear state, and ITTL they are significantly stronger thanks to their avoidance of Apartheid, more European and Chinese immigration, a gradual and largely peaceful transition into Black majority rule, and their annexation of the rest of British Southern Africa. On the other hand, with no Apartheid, they are likely to have a less antagonistic relationship with the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, and hence less reason to seek a nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, it might happen if they still feel threatened enough by other African powers gone rogue. Or they might just do it for prestige reasons.

Brazil and/or Argentina, just possibly, for prestige reasons, especially if the other does it. I'm not entirely sure about the role of Latin America ITTL, except in all likelihood it is somewhat more prosperous than OTL thanks to a greater amount of trade with a stronger, larger, wealthier Western world. A stronger America may be expect to crush all manifestations of far-left extremism in the bud, which may be painful and humiliating in the short term, but beneficial in the long term. The Latin Americans may certainly be expected to try their hand at the regional/continental integration experiments that are so successful elsewhere, but perhaps their record is less impressive here, due to the likely division between the ones that wish to involve the USA and the ones that wish to exclude the Yankees. Nevertheless, we may expect at least the Hispanic states with greatest geographic proximity and economic/strategic bonds with the USA (e.g. Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela) to seek integration with the USA in a fairly reliable way. And a more successful and prosperous USA may be just willing to have at least some of them, especially after integration with the Dominions.

Turkey/Iran/Egypt/UAK, fat chance. The moment they seriously try, Israel is going to bomb their program into rubble, and if they are Islamist, Communist, hyper-nationalist, or otherwise rogue, America and Europe are going to bomb them into pre-industrial age, then swamp the area with their troops. After Stalin's and Mao's dick-waving contest turned China into a re-enactment of Mad Max or Hokuto no Ken, nuclear proliferation of rogue powers looks as a most serious existential issue.

Pakistan and North Korea of course don't exist ITTL, and good riddance. This world is a safer, nicer place for their absence.  

For Israel, it might go both ways, but given TTL circumstances, I'd say being a open nuclear power is more plausible. After all, both America and Europe are pro-Zionist, and Israel has a good justification for a nuclear deterrent during the Cold War with Turkey and Iran being in the Soviet bloc, and after it if/when any of its big Muslim neighbors go Islamist.

As it concerns the space program, it is indeed a very big and successful thing ITTL. Thanks to the USA and the EU both being more prosperous and their relationship in the space field being one half close partnership, one half friendly competition, the space race got more lively during the Cold War, stayed strong even after the collapse of the USSR, and eventually became a self-sustaining process once a string of impressive achievements entrenched the popularity of space exploration and colonization with the politicians and the public. The USA landed on the Moon in the mid-60s, the USA and the EU sent a joint manned mission to Mars in the mid-80s, in the following decades the USA and the EU sent manned missions to the high atmosphere of Venus, the asteroid belt, Mercury, and the moons of Jove and Saturn. By the 2010s America and Europe have space stations in Earth orbit and the Lagrange points, as well as permanent bases on the Moon, Mars, and Ceres. The EAU and India are eagerly gearing up to match them, but they have just reached the space stations stage. Permanent off-Earth human presence ranges in the few thousands, and is expected to grow massively in the next few decades. Academia, think-tanks, the NASA and ESA, the Congress, the European Parliament, and major corporations discuss somewhat detailed programs to start large-scale colonization of the Inner Solar System by the mid-21st century, as well as more tentative but genuine plans to begin terraforming of Mars and Venus by the second half of the century. Nuclear pulse propulsion is growing into a mature technology, and it is the cornerstone that made interplanetary travel relatively cheap, efficient, and fast.

More and more evidence is piling up that stars with planets are the norm in the galaxy, and Earth-like worlds are relatively common. Evidence of extraterrestrial life remains elusive, and the Fermi Paradox is more puzzling than ever, but suggestions grow that conditions favorable for its existence may be not so rare. Current technology promises to allow reaching a nearby star within a human lifetime. Scientists are trying their best to crack some loophole of exotic physics or another that may yield the key to FTL travel. Wormholes and the Alcubierre drive show promise on paper, but the necessary technology is probably centuries away. Yet mankind perseveres, because it is getting the feeling the stars are getting within reach, if not for the current generation at least for the grandchildren, a new frontier with unlimited resources is opening up in space, and places potentially suitable for human colonization may be more common than expected. Young boys and girls all over the developed world dream of becoming the astronauts that shall do interstellar travel, find a new Earth, and establish first contact with an extraterrestrial civilization.

Indeed. ITTL Japan, Korea, and the Southeast Asian countries have achieved genuine reconciliation and a good relationship, thanks to the various examples and lessons of America, Europe, India, Russia, and China. Japan and united Korea are both developed, industrialized powerhouses of similar standing and they co-lead the EAU (using united Europe as an analogy, they are like Germany and France, while Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines are a less developed, rough equivalent of Italy, Spain, and Poland/Scandinavia, and Indonesia may be a larger, more popolous equivalent of the Balkans and Ukraine combo) while the Southeast Asian countries are newly industrialized. The later formation, the residual socio-economic gap and different perspective between its northern and southern halves (an issue the EU mostly overcame long ago thanks to its early assimilation of Southern and Eastern Europe, although the Balkans and Ukraine are a similar problem on a smaller scale), and the lack of the common cultural heritage Europe shares are among the reasons the EAU has not yet gotten exactly so powerful, united, and advanced as the North American-Australasian USA or the from-the-Atlantic-to-the-Donets EU. However Europe and India show democratic federal unions with vast ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity may work and thrive, and the EAU strives to imitate them. America, Europe, East Asia, and India show each other and the rest of the world that democratic, federal, liberal superstates are the way of the future, the key to peace, prosperity, and unity in freedom and diversity, and mankind's path to the stars. If only Russia, China, Africa, and the Muslim world would care to learn the lesson.

Due to the reasonably good relations between the four world powers, their common democratic character, their relatively similar size, population, GDP, and military power, the long-standing partnership of three of them in the Western bloc, and the vast global success of gradual, federalist regional/continental integration, the potential next step of their ever closer cooperation and integration in some kind of de facto world government to address global issues like world security and economy, environmental problems, and space colonization is a fairly hot political topic that gets seriously discussed as a 21st century perspective. As of the 2010s, the closest equivalent is the semi-permanent international forum of the four world powers, through a mix of regular teleconference consultations, periodic summits, and the proposed permanent secretariat. How to give proper representation in this system to the less integrated Latin American and African regions and the Russian, Chinese, and Muslim problem children without making it less balanced and effective is a recurrent but as yet unsettled diplomatic issue. Since three world powers out of four are long-standing members of the GSO, a frequent proposal is integration of India in the alliance, and its transformation into a truly global peace-keeping organization.

When an agreement between the world powers cannot be found, international politics are the usual squabbling, rivalries, and power plays that mankind has known for centuries. When they can agree on something, relatively effective and coherent global policies usually follow. This is one important reason the 21st century world has been able to manage serious global issues such as Islamist terrorism, Russian, Chinese, and Muslim instability and rogueness, environmental problems, occasional economic crises and pandemics, WMD proliferation (although the world powers show considerable reluctance to let go of the nuclear toys they dislike other would-be powers owning apart from a few favorites such as Israel, which the rest of of the world finds deeply unfair) and keeping aborning space colonization fairly peaceful and ordered so far.

Industrialization and achievement of developed status for North America-Australasia, Europe, and Japan-Korea, with India, Southeast Asia, vast swaths of South America, and parts of Africa trailing not so far behind (and Russia and China dealing with the terrible legacy of Communism and nuclear war) has done the Earth no favors, and at times it looked like it would send the planet into catastrophic, irreversible change. In a long-term perspective, it looks like the most important global issue ever, at least until space colonization really takes off. Thankfully large-scale adoption of widespread recycling, renewable energy sources, fairly safe and reliable fast-breeder nuclear power, and reforestation policies by the developed powers has allowed to forestall and contain damage to manageable levels, although it shall be several decades at least before all the mess early industrialization wrought can be adequately reversed and healed. Ironically enough, it seems mankind shall be done repairing the damage it inflicted on its birth planet by the time it is ready to colonize new ones, either by reshaping the Solar System in Earth's image or by finding suitable new homes among the stars. However, it also increasingly seems both goals shall likely be within reach within the current century, which gives many people motivation and hope, and valuable lessons are being learnt by addressing the effects of past carelessness that may be useful to prevent repeat mistakes in the future, address natural disasters (scientists warn that even if we dodge the bullet of man-made climate change, a natural one like the next Ice Age may be bound to happen eventually) and manage the terraforming of Mars and Venus.

It was a very lucky occurence for the world that the unreliability and security risk of the Russian and Middle Eastern oil and gas sources since the collapse of Communism, the rise of Islamism, and the 'oil shocks' they caused in the late 20th century drove America and Europe to do their best to wean themselves off dependence from them. It drove the development of fairly efficient, safe, and reliable nuclear power and renewable energy technology that was already relatively mature, widespread, and available for even greater large-scale adoption when climate change from massive use of fossil fuels threatened to become an unsustainable problem at the turn of the millennium. The political, economic, and technological situation made the switch not so painful for America and Europe, although India has shown rather more reluctance to sacrifice cutting-corners solutions to economic growth for the sake of the environment, and East Asia is split on the issue, with the Japanese and Koreans sharing the perspective of the other Western countries and the Southeast Asians the one of India. Thankfully, after decades of research and painfully slow and frustrating development, it really seems commercial fusion power shall become available in the next decade, entirely solving mankind's energy issues for the foreseeable future.

During the Cold War, US influence restrained Argentina by doing anything rash about its claims on the Falkland Islands. After it, the radical decline of Britain due to its nationalist isolationism as the rest of the Western world merged into three federal superstates and India rose as the fourth world power eventually drove many pieces of the former United Kingdom such as the Malvinas Islands, Gibraltar, Scotland, and the Caribbean and Pacific possessions to vote to secede and join Argentina, the EU, or the USA respectively. England managed to keep Northern Ireland since Ireland found its stubborness about neutrality and denial of reproductive rights to women was a stumbling bloc to its EU membership. Ironically enough, common economic misery in the two islands helped keep the Northern Ireland conflict relatively quiet in recent times, since neither Britain nor Ireland looked like appealing options. The Europhile Welsh, English, and Irish younger generations are ever more impatiently waiting for their conservative/nationalist Europhobe elders to die off in sufficient numbers to vote a radical reversal of policies, which is projected to happen by the end of the 2010s, and in the meanwhile, many emigrate to Europe or the USA. The Malvinas Islands joined the Argentine federation as a province with special autonomy. Gibraltar got a temporary statute as an associated state of the EU similar to the other European microstates, a referendum is due in a few years to decide whether to extend the status quo (which would preserve autonomy rights) or join Spain (which would grant full political representation in the EU). Scotland became another member state of the EU, part of the ex-NU Nordic group together with the Scandinavian and Baltic states.

Switzerland faced a similar conundrum as the British Isles, but eventually showed a more practical attitude. Once the USA and the EU started to crack down ever more effectively on tax havens and shady finance hubs in their neighborhood, most Swiss realized one of the most important pillars of their economy and main reasons for continued independence was gone, unlike the British, Irish, Russians, and Chinese they understood nationalism was becoming the way of disaster, and past political fetishes such as neutrality were unsustainable, so they reluctantly voted to join the EU. Europe annexed Scandinavia and the Baltic states (which had joined the NU after the fall of Communism) by means of the EU-NU merger, Ukraine and Balkan states (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece) after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and a complex rehabilitation period, and Moldova by means of unification with Romania (or Ukraine for Transnistria).

As it concerns the political status of South America, it seems after many false starts and wrong turns, the continent may have found an adequate solution to the puzzle of its integration in the near future by a tentative framework that may include the Hispanic countries north of the Amazons-Andes divide probably heading to a merger with the USA and the rest of Latin America likely forming its own continental union; Brazil and Argentina (or a discussed merger of the Southern Cone countries) sharing leadership of South America; and possibly a merger of various Latin American states to better balance the weight of the USA and Brazil in the Americas. As it happened in Europe and East Asia, the perspective of supranational integration is doing a lot to improve regional relations and to make border disputes and territorial claims (such as the ones between Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile) less troublesome by making national borders look less important. Southward enlargement of the USA and rise of a South American supranational union would further improve global governance by giving Latin America adequate weight in the international community, in comparison to the existing world powers. If a South American union is given a seat in the world powers' forum, it would certainly settle the thorny issue of the region's representation in what currently passes as the closest thing to world government.

Of course, but this was pretty much inevitable, since ITTL post-WWII circumstances start a chain reaction that consolidates the industrialized world into a few huge supranational unions by the turn of the millennium. The UK was simply far too small and had far too little resources to compete. The ship to stay competitive by turning the British Empire into an Imperial Federation had long sailed by the 1940s, and expectations to turn the Commonwealth into some kind of EU-like close union with the British at the top was a pipedream. After WWII, the USA offered the White Dominions a much better bargain for EU-style integration than Britain could ever hope to, India had its eyes fixed on its own rise to great power and could do it alone (especially once the Partition is prevented), the Arabs, the Southeast Asians, and South Africa were heading to the exit and if anything had their own regional projects in mind or thought they could do it alone. In the realistic postcolonial best case for the Commonwealth, to keep close bonds with a few African states and small islands across the world was never going to let Britain stay a major power. Given the circumstances, the realistic necessary choice was for the British was to accept a merger either with America (like the White Dominions) or the continent (like the Nordics). Once the British refuse to choose for too long and cling to the rotting status quo out of nationalist pride, their prestige and economy decay into insignificance - by no one's malice; it is simply the natural course of events once most of the developed world consolidates in a few huge trade blocs that evolve into federal superstates, even if they don't turn protectionist or hostile - and they end up being treated by the world powers like a nutty or senile relative at family meetings. As the OTL cases of Pakistan and NK show, a nuclear deterrent alone is not enough to make the world treat like a great power if you lack the other necessary assets, and this TL even lacks a static UNSC membership; you only belong in the great powers' club if you fit the part. ITTL the USA and the EU are too strong, too united, and too progressive (the rise of neoliberalism does not happen and the Keynesian consensus stays strong) to let the UK or anyone else reap a parasitical livelihood off them by being a tax haven or shady/exploitative finance hub at their expense, and they have each other (and eventually, the EAU as well) as optimal superpower partners to trade, police the world, and colonize space. They don't need the UK for anything and have no reason to do it special favors or humor its pretensions for undeserved special status. If the Little Englanders balk at the integration path the rest of the Western world is taking, let them rot in their little island, until the United Kingdom becomes an impoverished empty shell and breaks up as the most practical-minded components seek a way out. Of course, at some point the agony is going to end by the chauvinist older generations dying off, the internationalist younger generations taking over at the ballot box, and driving the country to beg for EU membership or US statehood on its knees.  

Potentially speaking, of course they do. ITTL they could have become an important and respected component of either the larger USA or the EU by joining them during their original formation processes, or at least join them soon afterwards. If I had written this TL before Brexit, that's probably what it would happen. But with Brexit, I got inspired not to put limits on the irrationality of British nationalism and be somewhat harsher with it, as an author. Of course, there is probably an hard ceiling to xenophobe paranoia somewhere, and the British/English are going to change their minds sooner or later once things go bad enough. So at some point they going to throw nationalism and its trappings to the garbage and beg to join the EU or the USA. Being a laggard adopter just means they are going to do it with a greatly diminished economic and prestige standing. Instead of becoming another Canada + Australia for the USA, or another Germany, France, or Italy for the EU, they are going to be another Balkans + Ukraine for the EU or another Caribbean + Central America for the USA. Of course, sheer demography means they still are going to be an important section, and once they join one of the world powers, they are going to rebuild their economy to pre-decline levels or nearly so, further increasing their influence in the union, but this is going to take time. As a matter of fact, theoretically speaking, I'm not exactly sure when the fulfillment of this process best fits in the TL; depending on how you eyeball it, it might be anytime from the 1990s-2000s to the 2020s (the dying off of the generations that knew the Empire is probably the hard limit). Brexit just inspires me to be a little more punitive than usual with British nationalism, and admittedly I'm biased against it to begin with, as an Europhile cosmopolitan I loathe nationalism and the smug British exceptionalism so frequent in the AH environment just pisses me off.

Well, it depends. The large Asian or African colonies are of course gone (in the former case to form the EAU). Admittedly as an author I'm uncertain whether the post-colonial close bond between Europe and the Maghreb is going to last into the 21st century (which would likely turn the region into an happy exception to the disaster of the Arab world) or it is going to wither due to the rise of Islamism. It might go both ways, so I'd prefer to pick the option that seems most favorable to the established features of the TL. As it concerns the small extra-European possessions of its member states, the EU is certainly more than strong enough to maintain them for the foreseeable future. I prefer not to give too much thought to it, since it is the kind of tedious, nitpicking map-making detail I find extremely boring and irrelevant when I write a TL or make maps for it. Personally I favor the butterfly of the USA absorbing most of the Caribbean and Pacific island territories one way or another out of a sense of geopolitical neatness, but it might go both ways, and both solutions are acceptable to me. It is not like the USA and the EU are going to care either way, given their excellent relations.

What gets abundantly clear, by the 21st century ITTL, is there is no future (except perhaps by becoming the odd reservation for Luddites and other nutjobs) with being one of the little nations that clutter the ranks of OTL UN. It belongs with joining one of the world powers, if they would have you, or setting up a worthwhile equivalent with your neighbors, or having the good luck to have grown to similar dimensions on your own during your imperial past. If nothing else, the fact mankind is gearing up for space colonization under the leadership of the world powers and the new frontier with huge resources is opening up in the Solar System eloquently shows how much the nation-state has grown obsolete.

The next global hot political topics of the 21st century include if and how to transition from the supranational world powers system to world government, the political, economic, and strategic issues of space colonization, the relationship between Earth and the Solar System colonies once they get sufficiently developed, the emergent issues of aborning transhuman technologies, how to fix the environment and proper management of global resources (although this becomes much less relevant over time thanks to the availability of space resources and technological progress; e.g. fusion power is just around the corner, and so do the first significant achievements with bio- and nano-technologies). Basically speaking, this world is on the verge of transitioning to post-cyberpunk/near future sci-fi conditions. But according to the optimistic bent of the TL (ok, China, Russia, and the Muslim world got screwed hard, but eggs and omelettes), cosmopolitan liberal-democratic superstates and not ruthless megacorporations are poised to lead mankind in the future.

To many people ITTL, Star Trek (or its ATL equivalent) with transhumanism is starting to look less like an heartwarming utopia and more like an optimistic but feasible plan for humanity's future. Sure there is a lot of 20th century bad stuff to deal with, such as Islamist terrorism, how to deal with and fix Russia, China, the Muslim world, and Africa, the environment to repair, but it is, and looks, doable. Overall world conditions are good enough, no matter how much damage the Islamist terrorists try to do (but their reach in TTL Europe is much lower), that OTL 21st century paranoia and disillusionement never become the prevailing mood. In OTL terms, the prevailing atmosphere remains the optimism of the 1960s and the 1990s, only at times (e.g. when Islamism and Communism, and the chaos they leave behind, are at their worst, or the oil shocks happen) it gets mixed with the wariness of the 1950s. Of course, this is the prevalent perspective in the developed and newly-industrialized world. If you ask a Russian, Chinese, Arab, or African, he would have a different view; but the Western perspective is the one that matters, in global terms.