A different Cold War

Stalin’s death in 1962 sent shockwaves across the Soviet bloc. It aroused widespread hopes of liberation and reawakened the fires of rebellion in many Communist satellite states and even among several Soviet nationalities. Since Stalin had failed to designate a successor, and his repeated purges in the Soviet ruling elite had mentally battered the survivors – Stalinist hardliners all – into passivity and abject subservience, it took them considerable time to settle the succession struggle and set up a functional government. This allowed anti-Soviet rebellions to explode and overthrow the Communist regimes in several Eastern European countries, including Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Their victory occurred thanks to the vast following the anti-Communist movement gained and the regular army siding in most cases with the revolutionaries against the secret police and Soviet troops.

In these countries the rebels were able to organize revolutionary governments that formally disbanded the secret police, pledged to re-establish free elections, announced their intention to withdraw from the alliance with the USSR, and asked Soviet forces to leave their territory. When this request was ignored and the Soviet troops kept fighting the revolutionary forces, these governments denounced the Soviet aggression and appealed for military protection to the Western powers. In other cases, such as the Balkan and Near East countries, the Baltic lands, Ukraine, and Central Asia, the uprisings were less successful. The Soviet forces, although seriously challenged, were able to stand their ground; this occurred also because emergent conflicts between different nationalities or between secular nationalists and Islamic conservatives among the rebels acted as a serious distraction that favored the Soviet reaction. Nonetheless, the Croat and Albanian revolutionaries were able to seize control of most of their territory.

The American President decided to answer the appeal since he deemed it a golden opportunity to weaken the Soviet threat and roll back the Iron Curtain. He assumed the widespread rebellions in the Soviet bloc and the Red Army engagement in China combined with Western conventional and nuclear superiority made the military situation very favorable. He persuaded the European governments to join the intervention. The Western Europeans were initially reluctant because of their fear of nuclear retaliation but also eager to liberate Eastern Europe and push back the Red Army from their borders. GSO forces deployed in the countries swept by anti-Communist revolutions, started a build-up on the other borders they shared with the Soviet bloc, and otherwise went into high alert. They were enthusiastically welcomed as liberators and swiftly engaged the Soviet troops to push them out of Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Albania.

The Soviet leaders were furious, but had to acknowledge that with the Red Army being overstretched from the Arctic to China and tied down fighting rebellions in multiple theaters, they would badly lose a conventional conflict with the GSO. Such a defeat would likely mean the loss of the entire Soviet bloc and quite possibly the collapse and destruction of the USSR. Nuclear escalation would inflict serious damage to the USA and more so to Europe, but utterly annihilate Russia. So when the Western powers offered to negotiate a compromise peace that would recognize the facts on the ground, they got reluctantly willing to talk. The Americans and the Western Europeans were euphoric for their successes but feared an expansion of the war from liberated Eastern Europe to the Soviet territory if the war continued would inevitably cause a nuclear conflict.

Tense negotiations resulted into an agreement that restored the truce between the GSO and the Soviet bloc. It included Soviet recognition of the independence of Finland, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Albania and their freedom to establish their political and economic system and foreign policy. The Western powers pledged to respect the territorial integrity of the USSR, not to interfere in the remaining countries of the Soviet bloc (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Iran) where the Red Army had managed to keep at least partial control, and not to deploy foreign troops in Eastern Europe. The Soviets failed to obtain a neutrality status for the Eastern European states that had escaped their sphere of influence. The two sides agreed to use the 1939 Banovina of Croatia as a template for the borders of the restored Croat state.

Just like the Suez War, the Revolutions of 1962 and the Eight-Week War brought the world to the brink of total war between the Western world and the Eastern bloc, as well as another possible WMD holocaust like the Sino-Soviet War. However ultimate doom was narrowly avoided again. As a matter of fact, it became somewhat controversial among politicians, journalists, and scholars whether the Eight-Week War had been enough of a general conflict between the GSO and the USSR to qualify as a ‘true’ WWIII, albeit of limited duration and scope, or it was just an aborted near-miss of the real thing.

Two decades of Stalinist rule had inflicted serious damage to the liberated Eastern European countries. However the revolutionary governments honored their pledge to re-establish liberal democracy and quickly forged solid economic, political, and military bonds with the Western world with strong popular support. As it concerned the Communist crimes, the Eastern European countries largely followed the precedent established by the Allies in Western Europe after WWII: the political leaders, high-ranking members of the secret police, and people directly involved in atrocities got prosecuted, while military and civilian personnel involved with the communist regimes because of their work was left alone. America and Western Europe poured generous economic and logistic support into the former Communist states, just like the former had done with the latter after WWII. Much like the precedent, if with a slightly slower pace, this aid stabilized the Eastern European countries and allowed a steady reconstruction and rehabilitation process that eventually blossomed into a solid economic boom and successful transition into the Western model.

The European Communities, and later the EU, soon extended the ENA system, which Western Europe had established for North Africa, to the former Communist countries with considerable success. Economic growth however did not stop a sizable number of Eastern Europeans from immigrating to Western Europe, where they formed the second most populous immigrant community after the Chinese. The Western powers honored their pledge not to deploy American or Commonwealth troops into Eastern Europe and they were pulled out after the initial stabilization period. However the Western bloc exploited the loophole of the supranational nature of the European integration process to keep a sizable amount of EDC/EU force in Eastern Europe to protect it from Soviet aggression. The NU did the same for Finland with a similar excuse. In the late 1960s, the Eastern European states officially joined the GSO. In the early 1970s Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and Albania joined the EU, and Finland became a NU member state, completing their dearly-wished integration in the Western world. Much the same way, Malta joined the GSO and the EU in this period soon after it gained independence.

The Soviets pulled their troops out of northern China – but kept full control of the territories they had annexed – and concentrated their military power in the repression of rebellions in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Baltic lands, Ukraine, and Central Asia. With some serious effort, they were eventually successful in re-establishing their control and brutal repression followed. The Soviet leaders reacted to the Revolutions of 1962, the Eight-Week War, and ongoing competition with America and Europe the only way they could really conceive of. They kept pursuing Stalinist policies of brutal repression of dissent, quantitative military power, and a command economy based on brute-force exploitation of subject populations and natural resources. Any capability or willingness to engage in a radical reform of the Soviet system had been rooted out of them by three decades of Stalinist purges.

The extent of their ability to innovate manifested in clumsy attempts to boost light industry and agriculture with mediocre results, establishment of a collective leadership in the Politburo, end of large-scale purges, and a slight toning-down of the Gulag system. The Soviet leaders’ fear of domestic and external threats to their rule made them keep their economy focused on dual-use heavy industry and collectivized agriculture, their empire engaged in a reckless effort to achieve military parity with the Western bloc, and their security apparatus geared for repression of potential dissent. An increasingly nationalist emphasis on the leading role of the Russian people within the Soviet empire was another Stalinist policy that got perpetuated. This got mirrored by favoritism to Serb nationalism. Once rump Yugoslavia got shrunken to Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, the Soviets allowed the Serb Communists to restructure it into an unitary Serb state and abolish the autonomy of the other republics and autonomous provinces.

After the Soviet pullout, the rump PRC partially reasserted its autonomy from the USSR, although it remained dependent on its support for survival. At the same time, it had to concede control of central China to advancing KMT forces from the southeastern provinces. The Taoist theocracy of the Yellow Banners consolidated its control of the southwest. A semi-stable tripartite division of China proper gradually emerged that included PRC northern China, KMT central-southeastern China, and Yellow Banners southwest China. Fighting continued in border areas, but there was a partial lull in the Chinese civil war as the three polities mostly turned to focus on rebuilding and stabilizing their control of their core areas and rooting out banditry, minor warlords, and ethnic separatists. Tibet entrenched its independence under Indian military protection. Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Mongolia apparently seemed lost to the USSR for the foreseeable future after the ethnic cleansing of the Han. The CCP still faced serious popular hostility in their territory to Communist rule, but the pause in the civil war enabled them to withstand it.

As the Cold War progressed, the superiority of the Western world in political, socio-economic, and technological terms got more and more evident. In the late phase of the Cold War the Soviet bloc got relatively close to a quantitative military parity with the GSO at the price of a terribly exhausting effort. However the Transatlantic partnership of the American and European superpowers made this achievement ultimately impossible. The technological superiority of the USA and the EU made their militaries keep a clear quality advantage at all times anyway. A growing lead in space exploration dramatically highlighted this technological superiority of the Western bloc. Its most notable landmarks included the US landing on the Moon in the mid-60s and the joint US-EU manned mission to Mars in the mid-80s.

The freedom, technological superiority, and prosperity of the Western world stood in stark contrast to the backwardness, poverty, and oppression of the Communist bloc. The Stalinist security apparatus did its considerable best to stem the tide of popular discontent, but ultimately could do it only so much and so long in the face of a creeping economic collapse that was significantly accelerated by an increasingly unsustainable military effort. The material for the violent downfall of the Communist bloc was slowly but inexorably gathering.

This map shows Europe in a late phase of the Cold War, after the Revolutions of 1962 and the Eight-Week War started the decay of the Communist bloc and the reunification of the continent. Same caveats as the first map.

ITTL the Suez War and the Eight-Week War are two of the most severe and dangerous Cold War confrontations between the Western world and the Soviet bloc. The Suez War is fairly similar to the OTL analogue, with a few important differences: the war is expanded to the United Arab Republic/Kingdom; the British, Americans, and the Pan-European army all intervene to support Israel, seize control of the Suez Canal and the Arab oilfields, and overthrow the pro-Soviet Nasserite/Baathist regimes. The USSR initially takes a confrontational stance, which threatens an escalation to WWIII and possibly a nuclear conflict. It is defused because Stalin gets ill and this paralyzes the Soviet government for several weeks, allowing the West to settle things on the battlefield its own way. Since the Western powers make an united front and their attack is much more powerful than OTL thanks to American and European participation, the Western-Israeli coalition reaps a decisive victory. The Arab nationalist regimes are overthrown and pro-Western clients are put back in charge of Egypt and the UAK; the Suez Canal and the oilfields are returned to the control of Western companies; Israel annexes a few border territories (Sinai, the Golan Heights, southern Lebanon, northwestern Jordan, east bank of the Jordan Valley) with the blessing of its Western allies; the Suez Canal Zone is put under international administration. I suppose the war may be compared to its OTL analogue combined with various elements of the Arab-Israeli Wars and the Gulf/Iraq conflicts.  

The Eight-Week War is a relatively limited (in geographical and temporal terms) but overt conventional conflict between the GSO and the USSR that occurs when the Western powers militarily intervene to protect the Eastern European revolutionaries from the Soviet counterattack and repression. It has no real OTL equivalent, although the closest analogue in severity if not strategic character is the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets get decisively defeated for several reasons: the GSO is much more powerful than OTL NATO thanks to the existence of the Pan-European army as a full equivalent of the US military; the Red Army is already badly overstretched fighting the Chinese quagmire and several rebellions in many client states and various SSRs, and would be utterly crushed in a large-scale conventional WWIII, almost surely losing everything the Soviets gained since WWII, quite possibly vast chunks of the Russian empire as well, and putting the very existence of the Soviet regime at risk; much like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviets are the underdog in the WMD field too, and would suffer much worse damage from a nuclear escalation. At best they would suffer the same fate as China, at worst Russian would only get spoken in the afterlife or nearly so. At the same time, the West is not willing to forsake Eastern Europe to Communism a second time, but doesn't want to suffer the (survivable but very painful) damage a Soviet nuclear backlash may inflict, especially after the sobering lesson of the Sino-Soviet War. The compromise that painfully emerges is the West keeps the countries where the anti-Communist revolutions were successful and the Western intervention just defeated a Soviet comeback, and the USSR may keep its territorial integrity and the client states where the rebels weren't successful on their own. In other words, the Soviet bloc keeps its post-WWII borders, most of the Balkans, and the Near East, and the West gains most of Eastern Europe.

Yep. Much like OTL, WWII tainted monarchical tradition for Eastern Europe, and two decades of Communist rule withered the rest. Moreover, the prevailing Western influence is republican, due to the USA and most of the EU swinging that way (if I reckon correctly, only Benelux states are monarchies, and no other is going to be added before Scandinavia joins much later), and the anti-Communist revolutionaries are eager to imitate their liberators and protectors.

Yes. ITTL Nationalist Spain and Vichy France joined the Axis, so they shared the postwar course of Germany and Italy, they were defeated enemy powers, their fascist regimes were overthrown by the Axis surrender and their countries returned to democracy after a period of Allied occupation and re-education (although the Allies were very, very careful to ensure the Communists were left marginalized by all typical Cold War means necessary). This wholly disrupted Franco's plans for a monarchical restoration after his death that IOTL were first made official after WWII. So democratic Spain becomes a republic by default. Italy chose to become a republic more or less the same way as OTL, due to the Savoia dynasty getting tainted by its long collaboration with Mussolini. France, Germany, Czechia, and Portugal had been republics before the fascists took over or the Axis invaded, so they were returned to that (and democracy was restored in Portugal). Slovenia became a republic by default due to utter lack of precedent for an independent Slovene monarchy. This left the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg that had been democratic constitutional monarchies before the war and were restored to that status after it. So did Denmark, Norway, and Sweden as well, but they didn't join the EU, at least not until the turn of the millennium or so, and they pursued their own parallel neo-Kalmar Union integration project.  

Israel is allowed to keep these new territories. After the Suez War, the Western powers do regard the Zionist state as an useful, reliable proxy that deserves a reward, while the Arabs are in the doghouse, being seen as an unruly, treacherous mob that tried to hand Stalin the keys of Suez and the oilfields the moment the West's back was turned after it spilled its blood to liberate the region from the Axis and the Soviets and it provided these shiny new Pan-Arab states, the ingrates. As it concerns the likely Arab negative reaction, Israel, America, and Europe are largely oblivious and care even less. ITTL Israel has seized even bigger triumphs in its first two wars with the Arabs than OTL, and TTL Suez War has been as big a confirmation of Western supremacy and as deep an humiliation of Arab nationalism as the reverse was true IOTL. The Arabs have gotten even more of a reputation as military jokes that talk big but get routed once a real army shows up. Besides, after the war Israel only really needs fearing an Arab attack on its northern and eastern borders, because the Suez Canal Zone is under Western control. In order to attack Israel in the Sinai, Egypt would have to invade the Zone and shoot on British, American, and European personnel, with everything that entails.

The fate of Nasser and the Baathists is a sobering lesson. ITTL there is no equivalent of Korea, Indochina/Vietnam, Suez, Cuba, or Algeria to teach the Third World it can defy Western military power with guts, numbers, and guerrilla (ITTL the EDC wins the Algeria War, although Europe comes to realize the necessity of a compromise to prevent another rebellion). So it shall likely take the Islamists' special brand of insanity before a Muslim or for that matter Third World power dares challenge the West to a fight again, even with potential Soviet support (which ITTL does not look so trustworthy).

Make no mistake, if Egypt stays reasonably quiet and nice for a decade or two, and gets a Sadat figure in charge, America and Europe may eventually become willing to talk about a reasonable compromise about control of the Suez Canal, given how important Egypt is and how valuable the Canal is for the Egyptians, and the Sinai may get involved in the settlement. Of course, if Egypt again turns too hostile, instable, or unreliable, the post-war status quo is going to stand. As it concerns the other territories annexed by Israel, odds are the Western powers simply don't care about Arab irredentist claims. The UAK has a lot of land and resources to use and develop, it doesn't really need these border areas, they are more valuable strategically and economically to Israel, it was the Arabs' fault if they lost them, and demographic facts on the ground are going to support the Israeli claim after a while. Sure, Israel is going to have to defend its new borders from an UAK attack, but they are very well suited for defence, and Israel can deal with Arab guerrilla raids just like OTL. Basically speaking, it is going to be the OTL Golan Heights situation writ large, only with international recognition of the Israeli annexations.

TTL international situation is much more favorable to Israel than OTL. America and Europe are stronger and have Israel's back, Russia is weaker if more threatening and a genocidal pariah, China is a wreck, it shall be decades before India is able to do anything but empty words about its anti-imperialist stance, there is no UN to act as an anti-Zionist, anti-Western soapbox for the Third World, and international law is basically what the consensus of the great powers says it is. Perhaps most importantly, there is no large captive and unruly Arab minority within Greater Israel's borders to gather sympathy for the Arab cause and taint/destabilize the status quo, and the ethnic situation validates Zionist sovereignty. After a while, the Arabs are going to look to international public opinion like stubborn sore losers that can't accept reality.

Sure, if things turn real bad, Israel, America, and Europe reap the full measure of blowback for their imperialist arrogance vs. the Arabs, and the Turks and the Persians learn the wrong lessons from Communism, most of the Middle East may well fall in the hands of the likes of Khomeini, Bin Laden, and Al-Baghdadi, which would be an existential nightmare for Israel. But that would be an existential threat for the Western world as well, and its superpowers would react accordingly by all means necessary.

In the meanwhile, the Americans and the Europeans may well try and sweeten the post-Suez deal for the Arabs by throwing some serious money their way to finance infrastructure, such as the Aswam Dam, the Qattara Depression Project, Tigris and Euphrates hydraulic projects, oil pipelines, and stuff.