lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 9, 2016 3:21:42 GMT
That's a fair question - given the dysfunctionality of the rebellion as a pseudo-nation, and the deeply factionalized nature of what passed for "national" institutions in the rebellion, the answer has to be no, or close to it. Also has the Confederacy ordered any new warships from the United Kingdom now the the Confederacy does not have to be so secretive about buying ships. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 10, 2016 20:30:11 GMT
Definitely a good question, and one that will be answered in a future chapter. The thing to remember, however, is that with the British in the most challenging naval war they have faced since 1815, they need as many ocean-going vessels as they can scare up, and the rebels, on the other hand - as long as Plamerston and Somerset are willing to expend British blood and treasure on the behalf of the slavers' rebellion - don't need any. What the rebels do need, of course, are riverine warships.  Best, |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 11, 2016 2:56:00 GMT
Definitely a good question, and one that will be answered in a future chapter. The thing to remember, however, is that with the British in the most challenging naval war they have faced since 1815, they need as many ocean-going vessels as they can scare up, and the rebels, on the other hand - as long as Plamerston and Somerset are willing to expend British blood and treasure on the behalf of the slavers' rebellion - don't need any. What the rebels do need, of course, are riverine warships. Best, Will CSS Alabama still be use as a commerce raider as i think with the Royal Navy also being used CSS Alabama can be used as regular warship instead of being deployed to hunt for Union ships who in this universe might have taken over the role in commerce raiders. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 11, 2016 4:04:53 GMT
Alabama wasn't launched until the summer of 1862; in BROS, since the Anglo-American conflict is going strong by the end of March, she's probably taken over by the RN to serve as a warship. She's 1,000 tons, so roughly equivalent to one of the British steam sloops she was modeled on.
Best,
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 11, 2016 13:52:26 GMT
Alabama wasn't launched until the summer of 1862; in BROS, since the Anglo-American conflict is going strong by the end of March, she's probably taken over by the RN to serve as a warship. She's 1,000 tons, so roughly equivalent to one of the British steam sloops she was modeled on. Best, Why does the Royal Navy need the Alabama she is already the largest navy on the planet and surely she build enough of here own ships to compensated any losses it might suffer, and if the Royal Navy takes over the Alabama will the Confederacy some compensation a they can order some replacement let say in the 2nd French Empire. Also can we assume that the Union Navy is no the one that needs commerce raiders instead of the Confederacy Navy who no can focus on aiding the British blockade of the Northern States or even focus on hunting in a revers of OTL any Union ships that is still out there. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 11, 2016 20:16:23 GMT
She was a usefully-sized cruising vessel - essentially a steam sloop of war, smaller than a corvette and larger than a gunboat. Good for convoy escort, littoral operations, distant blockading, chasing commerce raiders, and serving as an armed dispatch vessel.
As to why the RN would need all the cruisers they could scare up, the reality is if one looks at the 1861 and 1862 Navy Lists (which are available on-line for free through Google books), and sorts out what ships were in commission, what the peacetime deployments required, and what ships were in reserve, and then compares those numbers to what Milne, Dunlop, Washington, Somerset, and the rest of the RN naval commanders and planners/administrators expected to be necessary for operations in the western Atlantic in the event of an Anglo-American conflict, it rapidly becomes clear the RN would need significant reindorcements in the event of a lengthy conflict.
If you go by the numbers the British expected to need for active operations in 1862 in the Western Atlantic, as reported by KD Bourne and sourced to the various planning documents he cites, the reality is the British could have managed the initial deployments they planned using the ships they had on station and reinforcements, but losses and the need for reliefs means those are essentially wasting assets; the British had a lot of ships, but they did not have enough to maintain the deployments they planned absent additional procurement.
Best,
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 11, 2016 20:23:52 GMT
She was a usefully-sized cruising vessel - essentially a steam sloop of war, smaller than a corvette and larger than a gunboat. Good for convoy escort, littoral operations, distant blockading, chasing commerce raiders, and serving as an armed dispatch vessel. As to why the RN would need all the cruisers they could scare up, the reality is if one looks at the 1861 and 1862 Navy Lists (which are available on-line for free through Google books), and sorts out what ships were in commission, what the peacetime deployments required, and what ships were in reserve, and then compares those numbers to what Milne, Dunlop, Washington, Somerset, and the rest of the RN naval commanders and planners/administrators expected to be necessary for operations in the western Atlantic in the event of an Anglo-American conflict, it rapidly becomes clear the RN would need significant reindorcements in the event of a lengthy conflict. If you go by the numbers the British expected to need for active operations in 1862 in the Western Atlantic, as reported by KD Bourne and sourced to the various planning documents he cites, the reality is the British could have managed the initial deployments they planned using the ships they had on station and reinforcements, but losses and the need for reliefs means those are essentially wasting assets; the British had a lot of ships, but they did not have enough to maintain the deployments they planned absent additional procurement. Best, I also would assume that the Royal Navy needs to keep a strong enough presence in European waters in case Russia has any plan or is Russia not going to do something that might effect the war. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 15, 2016 22:24:31 GMT
Not just Russia, actually.
As far as the strength of the RN, you are correct; the fleet was the largest by far, but the reality is that if one digs around in the 1861 and 1862 Navy Lists (which are both available on-line, thanks to Google Books), although would have been possible to come up with the number of screw steam frigates, corvettes, sloops of war, and ocean-going gunboats requested (historically) by Milne and Dunlop et al at the time (using Bourne as the source for those numbers, for example) there are not enough of the same types, even in reserve, to provide reliefs at some point and maintain the existing "peacetime" numbers in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific ... And so the numbers have to be made up by new construction or ships taken up from trade, which adds additional costs beyond construction and new crews.
And the realities are that despite the Franco-British alliances of convenience against Russia and China, it is pretty clear both countries were engaged in a naval arms race, beginning with steam battleships (Napoleon) and continuing through ironclads (Gloire)...
The British weren't building their responses to those ships to face the Russians.
Best
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 16, 2016 3:06:15 GMT
Not just Russia, actually. As far as the strength of the RN, you are correct; the fleet was the largest by far, but the reality is that if one digs around in the 1861 and 1862 Navy Lists (which are both available on-line, thanks to Google Books), although would have been possible to come up with the number of screw steam frigates, corvettes, sloops of war, and ocean-going gunboats requested (historically) by Milne and Dunlop et al at the time (using Bourne as the source for those numbers, for example) there are not enough of the same types, even in reserve, to provide reliefs at some point and maintain the existing "peacetime" numbers in the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific ... And so the numbers have to be made up by new construction or ships taken up from trade, which adds additional costs beyond construction and new crews. Best But it will take the British some years to build new ships, is it that why they are taken over other countries ships that are under construction in their country. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 17, 2016 21:47:28 GMT
Correct.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 18, 2016 3:10:40 GMT
Are they going to plan to build more than the original 2 Warrior-class ironclads. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 22, 2016 1:57:55 GMT
Historically, the British regarded the 9,000-ton Warrior class ironclad frigate design as overly expensive, and the next pair after Warrior and Black Prince were Defense and Resistance, about 6,000 tons and closer to a corvette in terms of armament.
In BROS, given the need for inshore types, the focus would be on smaller ships - the 1500 and 2000 ton steam batteries, and similar ships that could be converted quickly, especially in British North America - and ships in the UK that could be quickly converted; I'd expect some of the wooden hulled steam ships of the line on the stocks would be razeed (cut down) and converted to "emergency" ironclad frigates.
Some of this will come up in upcoming chapters on Warships1. Going to try and post today.
Best,
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 22, 2016 3:03:04 GMT
Historically, the British regarded the 9,000-ton Warrior class ironclad frigate design as overly expensive, and the next pair after Warrior and Black Prince were Defense and Resistance, about 6,000 tons and closer to a corvette in terms of armament. In BROS, given the need for inshore types, the focus would be on smaller ships - the 1500 and 2000 ton steam batteries, and similar ships that could be converted quickly, especially in British North America - and ships in enUK that could be quickly converted; I'd expect some of the wooden hulled steam ships of the line on the stocks would be razeed (cut down) and converted to "emergency" ironclad frigates. Some of this will come up in upcoming chapters on Warships1. Going to try and post today. Best, Are British regulars and colonial troops of the same standard of training ore are regulars better due to training and them being professionals. |
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tfsmith121
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Post by tfsmith121 on Aug 28, 2016 16:56:50 GMT
No, the UK's regulars were by far better trained and officered in 1861-62 (and afterward); the colonial volunteers in Upper Canada were reservists with little training and amateur officers, as was demonstrated at Ridgeway in 1866, when they broke and ran when facing a small force of Irish nationalists who were at best irregular non-state actors. It is also worth noting that the entire volunteer force in Upper and Lower Canada numbered some 5,000 men in 1861, organized into three understrength infantry battalions and a mass of separate companies of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At best, they could field 2-3 battalions for field service, plus some batteries and troops, and even that force would have taken weeks to assemble and ready for field service beyond simply garrisoning specific points or facilities.
The volunteers in Lower Canada and the Maritime colonies do not seem to have been any better officered or trained, and the fault lines in Lower Canada between Francophones and Anglophones are obvious. The militia was an entirely paper force, and was little more than a manpower pool. It is also worth noting the volunteers and the militia, even if mobilized and even if they responded, could not be used outside of their "home" colonies absent consent.
It is worth noting that in August, 1862, an official report prepared under the authority of the British Secretary of State for War listed all of 15,000 volunteers and 10,000 militia as what the British Army saw as available in the Province by that date, with another 6,000 or so split between the four Maritime colonies - and that was nine months after the crisis, with the benefit of British funds for arms and equipment for the colonial forces.
The local regulars in the Province of Canada, the Royal Canadian Rifles, were - on paper - equivalent to the UK-recruited regulars - and would have had local knowledge, but would not have had the opportunity to train at the brigade or even much at the battalion level, since they were generally dispersed across the province and the frontier on local security duties in 1861.
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on Aug 28, 2016 16:58:45 GMT
No, the UK's regulars were by far better trained and officered in 1861-62 (and afterward); the colonial volunteers in Upper Canada were reservists with little training and amateur officers, as was demonstrated at Ridgeway in 1866, when they broke and ran when facing a small force of Irish nationalists who were at best irregular non-state actors. It is also worth noting that the entire volunteer force in Upper and Lower Canada numbered some 5,000 men in 1861, organized into three understrength infantry battalions and a mass of separate companies of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. At best, they could field 2-3 battalions for field service, plus some batteries and troops, and even that force would have taken weeks to assemble and ready for field service beyond simply garrisoning specific points or facilities. The volunteers in Lower Canada and the Maritime colonies do not seem to have been any better officered or trained, and the fault lines in Lower Canada between Francopohines and Anglophones are obvious. The militia was an entirely paper force, and was little more than a manpower pool. It is also worth noting the volunteers and the militia, even if mobilized and even if hey responded, could not be used outside of their "home" colonies absent consent. It is worth noting that in August, 1862, an official report prepared under the authority of the British Secretary of State for War listed all of 15,000 volunteers and 10,000 militia as what the British Army saw as available in the Province by that date, with another 6,000 or so split between the four Maritime colonies - and that was nine months after the crisis, with the benefit of British funds for arms and equipment for the colonial forces. The local regulars in the Province of Canada, the Royal Candian Rifles, were - on paper - equivalent to the UK-recruited regulars - and would have had local knowledge, but would not have had the opportunity to train at the brigade or even much at the battalion level, since they were generally dispersed across the province and the frontier on local security duties in 1861. The Are the the colonial volunteers really volunteers who are happy to fight the Union. |
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