A True and Better Alamo Redux (Rewrite)

Part III: The War Begins…



Captain Wilson, manning an Army Airways Communication Service van, was the first to hear of the attack on Pearl Harbor in a panicked communique from Hickam Airfield. Immediately, he ran over and informed Major Devereux who was shaving at the time. Devereux in turn, sprang into action, contacting Commander Cunningham, his superior, before telephoning the base communication shack and learning that a coded priority message was being deciphered. This was all Devereux needed, a call to arms was sounded, Wake was going to war.

One of Devereux’s first calls was to Teters to activate the civilian volunteer companies. Within a few hours these men had joined their soon to be brothers in arms and were aiding in defensive preparations be they on the Anti-Aircraft batteries, on the airfield with VMF-211, or on the coastal fortifications. Clever logistical maneuvering had ensured that though the Marines weren’t able to issue gas masks or helmets to any of the civilians, they did have enough rifles for not only the Army and Navy personnel on the island, but most of the civilians as well. None of these rifles were the new M-1 Garands, but they still served their purposes well enough.

While the men of Wake were busy preparing the island for the upcoming attack, VMF-211, though having been on the island for only 4 days, one of which was a holiday, already had a 4 plane combat patrol in the air at the time of the attack on Pearl. This initial patrol would return to base at 0900 and promptly be replaced by a second patrol. Shortly after this patrol launched, Captain Hamilton from Pan-American airways received orders to take the Philippine Clipper on an escorted scouting mission to the south in the afternoon. (1)

All of these preparations, indeed the preparations of the past four months, gained a new urgency when the first reports from the Radar sets arrived at the island command post at 1115. A cluster of contacts was detected coming in from the south and it didn’t take anyone long to guess that they were Japanese aircraft. Within seconds of hearing the report from the radar operators, the remaining 8 planes of VMF-211 were being scrambled, the current patrol was vectored in to intercept, and the AA batteries were being hurriedly manned.

The first shots of the Battle for Wake Island were fired at 1158 as First Lieutenant Lewis manning the 3-inch AA battery on Peale Island sighted the formation of Japanese bombers. Shrewd piloting on the part of the Japanese coupled with the inexperience of VMF-211 had prevented the Americans from intercepting the bombers before they emerged from a rain squall at 2000 feet, right on top of the island. Yet as the bombs fell from the Japanese bombers, they received in response, a withering barrage of AA fire. Wake’s obsolete 3-inch guns managed an impressive barrage that would have been even more effective if they had been equipped with modern ammunition. (2)

Just as the men and machines of the 24th Air Flotilla faced a withering barrage of AA fire in front of them, they were jumped by all 12 Wildcats of VMF-211. Major Putnam, using his squadron’s advantages of altitude and the position of the sun, led the attack with his aircraft’s .50 caliber guns cutting a destructive swath through the Japanese formations. (3) Completely unarmored and unescorted, the 27 Nell bombers suffered heavy losses in their initial attack on Wake. American reports listed 12 planes shot down with a further 7 damaged. 9 kills and 5 damaged from the fighters of VMF-211, with the remainder being credited to the AA guns. A similar comparison of Japanese sources report that of the 27 bombers dispatched to Wake, only 10 returned to Roi. (4)

The success of the Americans can be attributed to a number of factors. First and foremost being the actions of VMF-211. Led by Major Putnam, the squadron’s diving attack at the outset of the battle resulted in 7 of the squadrons’ 9 aerial victories that day. By utilizing not only altitude but the position of the sun, Putnam and his men were able to catch the Japanese completely by surprise and complete the attack with no losses of their own. The men of the AA batteries meanwhile had enough time with the advance warning provided by the radar sets and enough ammunition on hand to lay out a withering barrage against the Japanese.

Yet that success came at a price. By using the low level rain squall to mask their approach, the Japanese had succeeded in dropping their bombs on the American positions. The airfield at Wake suffered a considerable amount of damage. However, though impressive, the massive explosion caused by the destruction of a 25,000 gallon aviation gas storage tank accomplished little as most of the fuel had already been pumped into barrels and stored in protected revetments. The Japanese attack destroyed anything that it could touch including VMF-211’s stock of tools and spares. Fortunately for the Americans, casualties from the attack on the airfield were fairly light, only 5 Marines and 9 civilian volunteers dying in the sudden attack. VMF-211 would suffer its only casualty when the Wildcats began to land and Henry Elrod, having just scored 2 aerial victories and another probable, inadvertently struck a piece of debris with his propeller, damaging the fighter. (5)

The secondary targets of the Japanese attack, chiefly the Pan-Am facilities, were only lightly touched due to the intervention of VMF-211 and heavy AA fire. Minor fires had been started throughout the civilian camp, including the luxury Pan Am hospital. Several Chamorro Pan-Am workers died during the attack as well. Despite having a number of near misses, the Martin M-130 flying boat the Philippine Clipper was largely untouched, suffering from only a handful of bullet holes. Shortly after the attack Captain Hamilton took the flying boat on a series of scouting missions to the south under escort from 2 Wildcats and ensured that no Japanese invasion force was immediately inbound. Having completed this mission, he and the Clipper took off for Hawaii carrying as many civilian personnel as they could.

The results of the initial attack on Wake spread like wildfire through both Japanese and American militaries. In America such a resounding aerial victory shone out like a ray of hope to a nation beset by news of grievous casualties. The pilots of VMF-211 became immediate celebrities with nicknames like “Pounding Paul Putnam” and “Hammering Hank Elrod”. Meanwhile, in Japanese circles it quickly became apparent that Wake would be no push over as initially planned. Without aerial superiority a landing would be incredibly difficult and likely the 450 troops allocated to the mission would not be able to accomplish the task of overwhelming the American garrison adjustments needed to be made.

Footnotes:

1). All OTL, the Philippine Clipper was a flying boat with Pan-American Airlines and was at Wake at the time of the attack. In both TLs it launched towards Guam and was recalled after the arrival of news regarding Pearl Harbor. The planned scouting mission is also from OTL…

2) In OTL, no Radar meant that that the defenders of Wake were almost completely unprepared for the attack. Only a handful of AA guns were manned and able to return fire. Those that did often did so without the aid of adequate gunnery directors. In TTL all of the guns are manned and possess the requisite gunnery equipment at the time of the attack. However just like OTL they are firing hopelessly obsolete ammunition.

3).In OTL none of the Wildcats were in the right position to attack the initial Japanese air raids. Only 4 were aloft and the remainder were destroyed on the ground. In TTL they are off the east coast of the island at around 12,000 feet.

4) In OTL the Japanese raid took no casualties. The defender’s readiness at Wake coupled with the long distances involved both contributed to the heavy casualties suffered by the Japanese.

5) In OTL VMF-211 lost 60% of its strength in the attack with 23 men killed and 11 injured. The damage to the tools and spares is OTL. Less fuel is destroyed in TTL as, more of it had been pumped into drums in TTL due to the presence of civilian workers.

Part IV: Adjustments

”That’s all?”

-The reported remark of Admiral Kajioka upon hearing of how many bombers returned from the first raid on Wake.

As commander of the 4th fleet, Admiral Inouye was a busy man on December 8th 1941. His command was responsible for operations throughout the Central Pacific ranging from the capture of Guam, to Makin, Tarawa and finally, Wake Island. Though seen as little more than a formality, the surprisingly large number of casualties taken by the 24th Air Flotilla called into question the trivial nature with which the Japanese had assigned the Wake garrison’s defensive forces. Heavy, accurate AA fire, coupled with at least 12 fighters would make further aerial attacks difficult. At the time the A5M Claude fighters currently at Kwajalein, in addition to being obsolete and probably no match for the Wildcats at Wake, did not have the range to accompany the remaining G3M bombers. Even the Navy’s vaunted A6M fighter would not be able to engage in combat operations over the island due to range constraints.

The failure of a second air raid on December 9th to do significant damage, coupled with the loss of another 5 bombers, forced a change in Japanese tactics. Inoue decided that without air superiority, an attack on the island would be foolish. The attack was postponed and instead naval units earmarked for supporting the amphibious assault on Wake were tasked with the nighttime bombardment of the island. Inoue and Kajioka hoped that by bombarding the airfield they could even the playing field for their bombers and ultimately the invasion. On December 11th Kajioka arrived off the southern shore of Wake Atoll and ordered his force consisting of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers to open fire on the American positions. For two hours the Imperial Japanese peppered the island with no response. Unbeknownst to them, Devereux and Cunningham had agreed to issue an order to the batteries not to return fire. Believing their mission to be a success, Kajioka proceeded to reverse course and make for Kwajalein in order to be out of range by daybreak to avert a potential American strike.

The only attempt at retaliation against the Japanese during the first bombardment of Wake was the attack of the USS Triton on the obsolete cruiser Tatsuta. The Triton had been south of Wake, recharging her batteries when a lookout sighted Kajioka’s force and alerted her commander “Philly” Lent. Lent dived and proceeded to attempt to gain a firing position on the incoming Japanese force. Opting for a sonar approach in accordance with standard American submarine doctrine, Lent let loose with a salvo of 6 torpedoes before turning and retreating. Fortunately for the Tatsuta out of the 6 torpedoes, all of them missed due to the faulty detonators and gyroscopes that plagued the American Mark XIV torpedo at the beginning of the war. (1)

The next day, the Japanese found that their optimism regarding the previous night’s bombardment was unfounded. Inadequate intelligence and rough seas severely impeded the accuracy of the Japanese attack. This coupled with the sheer ingenuity and determination shown by the American defenders meant that no fewer than 6 F4F Wildcats were scrambled to meet the incoming Japanese attack the next day. Once again the 24th Air Flotilla was forced to limp back to Roi with fewer aircraft than it departed with. The failure of aerial raids and naval bombardment to reduce Wake led Inoue to request further reinforcements in order to provide air cover.

Almost immediately, Japanese High Command recognized the problem posed by a strong American presence on Wake Island. If the garrison there would not succumb to the initial Japanese attack, more resources must be allocated in order to establish a defensive bulwark in the Central Pacific. Seeing that more air assets were required, on December 12th, orders were issued to the Kido Butai now returning from the successful raid on Pearl Harbour. Carrier Division 2, consisting of the carriers Soryu and the Hiryu, the cruisers Tone and Chikuma, and a pair of screening destroyers, was detached from the main body and sent to rendezvous with elements of the 4th fleet. (2)

The importance of Wake also necessitated the allocation of more conventional forces as well. 4 older cruisers from Cruiser Division 6, along with over a thousand additional troops, both fresh from taking the island of Guam were sent to rendezvous with the original invasion force, now deemed insufficient for the task at hand. (3)

Unbeknownst to anyone in the Japanese high command, the Americans were also making adjustments to the unexpected resistance shown by the First Marines and the aviators of VMF 211. As most of the preparatory works that had taken place in 1941 had escaped popular notice, many Americans, even those in High Command positions, were taken by surprise. The fact that a handful of fighters and AA guns could inflict such heavy losses on Japanese aircraft if properly warned stood in stark contrast to the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Had the initial radar reports from Opana point been interpreted properly, perhaps the losses could have been fewer and perhaps the Japanese carrier forces would have been mauled as badly as the strikes above Wake. Ironically, though Kimmel had played a large role in preparing Wake to withstand a Japanese attack, it was precisely this resistance that exacerbated the perception of his failure at Pearl Harbor.

Kimmel quickly became determined to do something, anything, to ameliorate or aid the American situation on Wake. This was only reinforced as news of Wake’s resistance reached the populace. The aerial victories of VMF-211, the cocky swagger of “Hammering Hank” Elrod, and Devereux’s mythological ending to his request for reinforcements and supplies “Send us more Japs!” all became prominent in American discourse despite the latter being a coding error. To leave Wake to “wither on the vine” would have been tantamount to political and popular suicide for Kimmel, and by the same measure, to relieve Wake would allow Kimmel to begin to repair the damage of Pearl Harbor.

Initially, Kimmel had planned to send a carrier taskforce centered around the USS Saratoga to provide not only additional planes to the island, but also reinforcements and spare parts onboard the Tangier. Yet the Saratoga’s delays in arriving at Pearl Harbour prevented Kimmel from moving as quickly as he wanted to. Problems with refueling the Lexington and a lack of modern aircraft to reinforce VMF-211 also inhibited quick action.

During these early hours of the war in the Pacific, Kimmel must be credited with a great deal of prescience. On the 11th, after receiving the latest combat reports from Wake, he surmised, as did Admiral Inoue and Kajioka, that Japanese aircraft carriers were the only way the Japanese could subdue the island and its stubborn defenders. Though he desperately wanted to strike back, Kimmel had no idea how many carriers the Japanese would commit to the invasion. He simply couldn’t risk sending in a single carrier alone at this point, or even a pair of carriers. (4) At some point on the 11th Kimmel and his staff came up with the idea of using destroyers to ferry supplies and reinforcements to Wake. Apparently, a junior officer cited similar British actions in the Mediterranean with Malta and Kimmel seized upon the idea. A group of destroyers might be able to reach Wake before the Japanese if they maintained high enough speeds. In Kimmel’s mind, an infusion of men and equipment might buy enough time for a later relief expedition. Though part of him must have known that in all likelihood he was sending everyone to their death he pressed on nonetheless.

Though several possibilities were raised, in the end, Kimmel opted to use the 4 obsolete Wickes class destroyers of Destroyer Division 80 as his “fast transports” for the initial Wake Island Relief convoy. They in turn would be escorted by several other destroyers, as, in order to carry as much cargo as possible, they would be stripped of most combat equipment, and be operated by skeleton navy crews. Kimmel’s decisions would be echoed months later as the USN pulled back a number of obsolete destroyers for the same purpose, only giving them far more thorough modifications. (5)

Work proceeded at a breakneck pace on the 4 destroyers as the Wake relief convoy became one of the highest priority tasks at Pearl. Though each destroyer was stripped of features deemed “excessive” such as torpedoes, excess ammunition, and “excess” crewmembers, additional features such as additional AA machine guns were installed. Work began almost immediately and within 48 hours the 4 destroyers were deemed “ready” and loading began. As the Saratoga sailed into Pearl Harbor on the 15th, the “Tin Can Convoy” sailed out making full speed for Wake Island.

Though contemporaries criticized Kimmel for not sending the Saratoga on a similar mission to deliver the aviators and planes of VMF-221 to the island. Later events would prove him right in this regard. Knowing the poor logistical situation on Wake and the supplies sent to the island, he must have known that the impact of sending VMF-221 and its F2A Buffalo fighters to the island would have been minimal. For though the facilities existed on the island to support far more aircraft, requisite levels of fuel, parts, and maintenance staff had not yet reached the atoll making operating anything more than the battered Wildcats of VMF-211 extremely different. Fortunately, the real strength of the island was not in its aerial strength, though that had indeed been prominent in the initial days. Once the Japanese carriers arrived the Marines would need as much help as possible to dissuade or delay a Japanese naval assault.

The first Wake relief convoy would brought valuable reinforcements and supplies to the island even if it was less than what Devereaux had requested. Each converted destroyer left Pearl Harbor with 70 Marines and 5 Navy Corpsmen onboard. In barrels stacked on the decks of the ship and in every nook and cranny were ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts. The latter mostly for the gunnery batteries as Kimmel held no illusions about keeping the fighters of VMF-211 flying much longer.

The real question plaguing the Americans was whether the convoy of destroyers would reach Wake before the arrival of the Japanese carriers. Though not crippling, the loss of 8 destroyers, albeit only half of them being modern combat effective craft, would impede further efforts to pursue offensive operations in the Pacific. In fact, many expected the mission to be recalled after Kimmel’s relief on December 17th. However Kimmel’s replacement, Admiral Pye, also saw the importance of at least trying to relieve Wake. Furthermore, the decision to push the elderly destroyers to their limit and maintain a speed of nearly 25 knots meant that once Pye took command, the convoy had nearly reached its destination.

The Americans’ ingenuity, and sheer determination were aided by indecision on the part of the Japanese. Though it was apparent that Wake would only be able to be subdued by the use of carrier borne aircraft, the Japanese High Command wasted precious time ordering Carrier division 2 to launch a raid on Midway. Japan’s initial offensive was literally running on a shoestring and even the minor reallocation of resources to deal with Wake needed to be couched in efficiency. It was hoped that en-route to its rendezvous with the 4th fleet, Carrier division 2 could launch an aerial raid on Midway Island. Poor weather, coupled with the decision to press on with the attack gave the relief convoy and the defenders of Wake much needed breathing room. Much to the chagrin of the Imperial Japanese Navy, the raid did little to damage the American garrison on the island resulting in only a few casualties and putting some planes out of action for the coming raids against Wake. (6)

On the island of Wake itself, the days preceding the arrival of the relief convoy were oddly quiet. The 24th Air Flotilla was simply in no position to launch major air attacks after the events of December 8-11. The first 3 raids on Wake had resulted in the loss of nearly two thirds of the unit’s prewar strength. Though reinforcements were incoming, any major raids on Wake were delayed until adequate escort could be requisitioned. Instead, only a handful of reconnaissance missions were launched. These too were often the target of American fighters, with several being shot down prior to the arrival of the Japanese fleet.

Henry “Hammering Hank” Elrod’s destruction of a G3M Nell on December 18th gave him his 5th aerial victory and made him the first American “ace” of the war. Something that was met with considerable celebration in America, and consternation as he later refused to leave his comrades. While the aviators of VMF-211 were busy chasing Japanese reconnaissance planes, Devereux and the men of Wake Island were busily preparing for the inevitable Japanese assault. Like Kimmel, Devereux believed that Wake was simply too important to be left alone. The same Japanese carriers that raided Pearl would eventually arrive and be accompanied by an amphibious landing force. Plans were made and a number of plans were made for the eventual Japanese landing. In a move that would foreshadow later Marine Defense Battalions, at the insistence of Teters, Devereux ordered the conversion of several pieces of heavy equipment into a makeshift armored unit. Though only armed with machine guns, the bolted on pieces of scrap metal provided adequate protection from small arms fire without decreasing their speed too much. (7)

“Where are the transports?” was the whisper going through the garrison as the relief convoy arrived off Wake on the night of December 18th. Though it wasn’t everything they wanted, even the surliest of Marines had to marvel of the ingenuity as barrel after barrel of supplies were rapidly offloaded from the destroyers as one by one they entered Wake’s harbor and disgorged much needed supplies before beginning their journey back to Pearl Harbor. When the final tallies were reached, over 300 Marines, millions of rounds of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition, a 2 thousand modern 3-inch AA shells, valuable spares and supplies had been offloaded. (8)

What followed remains one of the most memorable moments of the Pacific War. From the inception of the convoy, the intent was to evacuate at least some of the civilians from the island. Devereux had made this known to the civilians, though he did not take any immediate action in this regard. An unspoken agreement existed that the wounded received priority on the ships. However, by the 18th this only comprised less than 50 people. A decision had to be made quickly and in the end it was made by none other than Teters. The de facto commander of the civilian contractors, Teters approached Devereux and Cunningham on the airfield, rifle in hand and spoke lines that would go down in history. “We’ve fought with you so far Colonel. I don’t know about you, but my men and I like to finish what we start. If you’ll have us, we’d like to stay and finish the job.” Though remaining on Wake was not a compulsory decision, as demonstrated by the 17 healthy civilian contractors who opted to leave with the convoy, the majority’s decision to remain behind and fight made waves throughout the United States. The civilians would stay, integrating themselves into the Marine battalion and steeling themselves for the coming Japanese assault.

The relief convoy departed as quickly as it had arrived in the hopes of avoiding a Japanese aerial attack. In a stunning display of efficiency, the four primitive APD’s had all been unloaded and were one their way well before sunrise. By dawn of the 19th they had managed to put considerable distance between themselves and the atoll. Though they were theoretically within range of Japanese aircraft from Kwajalein, by the morning of the 20th they had reached a safe distance and reduced speed to a more manageable 17 knots. The relief expedition to Wake Island had succeeded without a single combat casualty.

The Marine reinforcements which arrived on the 18th wouldn’t have to wait long for their first taste of combat. They had barely begun to unpack the supplies brought by the convoy when on the 20th, the report from the radar sets came in. The real battle for Wake was about to begin...

Footnotes

1) The Triton was one of the subs patrolling the area in OTL around Wake and Pilly Lent did make an attack in OTL with similar results though it remains unknown if she really encountered Japanese ships.

2) 3 days earlier than OTL due to the absolute trouncing of the 24th Air Flotilla by VMF-211. In TTL the Japanese see that there’s simply no chance in hell that they’re taking Wake without significant air support.

3) Also requisitioned earlier than OTL. Inoue and Kajioka both knew that the 450 men originally allocated to take Wake was far too few right from the start. Given that the troops are available, needed, and that the invasion date has been pushed back in TTL due to a lack of air support I don’t think this is too farfetched.

4) Perhaps I’m giving Kimmel too much credit. In OTL he launched the relief expedition without knowing that the Japanese were going to send in carriers. Given the fact that in TTL Wake has suffered almost no losses to enemy action, besides a handful of damaged planes. Coupled with the massive losses inflicted on the 24th Aerial flotilla I think his reasoning in TTL is sound.

5) Kimmel’s just jumping the gun here on what the USN would do a couple months later. Mind you, these APD’s aren’t nearly as efficient, but they’ll do in a pinch. I’m thinking along the lines of the infamous “Tokyo Express” brought about by desperation on the American side. Reinforcing Wake would be a huge propaganda coup given the fact that it was an instant bright spot on the rather dim news of Pearl Harbour.

6) The Japanese attempted such a raid in OTL on the 15th but were dissuaded by poor weather. In TTL they arrive earlier and thus the weather is better, they think they have a bit more time, and thus go through with the raid, inadvertently buying the Americans much needed time.

7) No such actions were undertaken in OTL due to the fact that there was a strict separation between the civilians and Marines as previously mentioned, and that Wake was under constant aerial attack. Without radar, or effective AA guns in OTL the Japanese bombers faced far fewer casualties. In TTL the defenders of Wake have over a week of relative peace in which they get to be…inventive.

8) The completion of the ship channel and harbor means that the loading and offloading of supplies is infinitesimally easier in TTL and that a quick drop and dash operation like this one is possible.