Kaiserschlacht: Imperial Germany's Last Chance
Sept 25, 2024 0:57:37 GMT
Max Sinister and nomommsen like this
Post by ewellholmes on Sept 25, 2024 0:57:37 GMT
Following the failure of peace overtures in the Winter of 1917-1918 and the removal of Russia from the war as a result of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, it was clear that the mother of all battles in the Great War was approaching in the West. The entire purpose of the ill-fated Hindenburg Programme had been to amass the material necessary to launch a grand, decisive offensive and now this effort was being coupled with the transfer of dozens of divisions from the East. German (and indeed Austro-Hungarian) morale was high among both the forces and on the home front, despite the food shortages of recent times, as it appeared victory was in sight. The German Army had defeated Russia, had nearly done the same to Italy in the Fall of 1917 and had successfully defended against the Anglo-French all throughout 1917, with the latter of that duo having suffered mass mutiny in her Army too. It was thus reasonable for the Central Powers to expect victory was at hand, but ultimately this (obviously) failed to pan out.
It did not have to be that way, however, and the German Army very nearly did achieve the decisive victory it expected and desired. German forces came within seven miles of Amiens and four miles of Hazebrouck, the two key choke points in the British logistics network. The loss of either would cripple the British logistics network, rendering the BEF incapable of offensive operations, but the loss of Amiens would in particular be especially disastrous. It's loss would mean the separation of the Anglo-French armies as well as the loss of the daily 45 trainloads of coal from the Bethune coal mines to the French munition factories to the south in Paris. If both Amiens and Hazebrouck were lost, however, the result would be unquestionably fatal according to Haig's Q Staff. As the German offensive developed in late March, they began drawing up contingency planning in this regard and by April had come to the conclusion that in this eventuality the BEF would destroy 85% of its supplies in place and evacuate from the continent.
In other words, a "1918 Dunkirk" that would leave France alone to face the German armies, with an exposed flank and collapsing industrial production. As David T. Zabecki notes in his magisterial The German 1918 Offensives:
So, what went wrong for the Germans? In short: Ludendorff was extremely indecisive and repeatedly disrupted operational planning by switching goals throughout the course of Operation Michael. Had he stuck consistently with one operational plan and committed to it, it is likely the German 2nd Army could've taken Amiens in late March:
Even with this fatal diversion and unfavorable attack plan, the 2nd Army's advance came close to taking Amiens, so reinforced with nine divisions and over 1,000 artillery guns, it's almost certain they would've taken it:
The loss of Amiens would result in roughly 40% of the BEF's logistics being cut, meaning that the follow on defense of Hazebrouck during Operation Georgette would be seriously complicated by a lack of supplies. In April of 1918, the British moved over 700 ammunition trains along their rail system in order to fight off the Germans, so the loss of a significant chunk of these supplies would be a heavy blow, especially in the context of the Germans IOTL advancing to within four miles of the city. I thus think it is likely the British fail, and the Germans take Hazebrouck too. This would mean, as stated earlier, the evacuation of the BEF off the continent by sometime in May, with 85% of their supplies destroyed in place to prevent their capture by the Germans:
With the British removed from the picture, the Germans could then turn their focus fully onto the French. Foch's planning, in the event of the loss of Amiens and the rupture of Allied communications, was to fall back on Paris. With the British withdrawing from the continent, this would be impossible to avoid, less the French Army be caught over-extended, outnumbered and with an exposed flank for the Germans to hit. Withdrawing on Paris would allow Foch to create a cohesive line again, but it would come at the cost of surrendering Northern France to the Germans, which has obvious morale complications, particularly in light of the BEF being defeated. France didn't survive this in 1940 IOTL, and here is far more exhausted after four years of war.
Even if they do survive the short term, in the medium term they definitely won't. As mentioned before, 45 coal trains daily moved south to the munition works of Paris through Amiens. Haig's Diary reveals the depths of the looming crisis here:
Meaning that, just five days after the fall of Amiens, French war production begins to collapse. A.M. Henniker's Transportation on the Western Front also reveals there was no solution to this either; the capacity to source a replacement simply did not exist.
At this point, the war is over. The only question is if the Entente sue for peace before the French can be fully defeated or not; the French gave up in 1940 before Paris could be reached, so that's the most likely outcome and preserving their Army would give them more bargaining power at the peace table. IF they attempt to hold out, they'll be crushed in the Second Battle of the Marne and Paris either besieged or taken as in 1870 due to ammunition shortages and being outnumbered by the German Army. At that point, the only Entente member still in the field in significant numbers is Italy so it's beyond obvious the war is lost and the Americans will not arrive in time. The Kaiser's Germany would stand victorious as the dominant power on the continent with an unassailable position.
It did not have to be that way, however, and the German Army very nearly did achieve the decisive victory it expected and desired. German forces came within seven miles of Amiens and four miles of Hazebrouck, the two key choke points in the British logistics network. The loss of either would cripple the British logistics network, rendering the BEF incapable of offensive operations, but the loss of Amiens would in particular be especially disastrous. It's loss would mean the separation of the Anglo-French armies as well as the loss of the daily 45 trainloads of coal from the Bethune coal mines to the French munition factories to the south in Paris. If both Amiens and Hazebrouck were lost, however, the result would be unquestionably fatal according to Haig's Q Staff. As the German offensive developed in late March, they began drawing up contingency planning in this regard and by April had come to the conclusion that in this eventuality the BEF would destroy 85% of its supplies in place and evacuate from the continent.
In other words, a "1918 Dunkirk" that would leave France alone to face the German armies, with an exposed flank and collapsing industrial production. As David T. Zabecki notes in his magisterial The German 1918 Offensives:
In mid-January 1918, General Sir Henry Wilson, the British representative to the Allied Supreme War Council at Versailles, had used his staff to wargame a 100-division German attack at the British–French juncture, driving toward Amiens.90 Rejecting the results of Wilson’s wargame, Haig continued to deploy the main weight of his forces behind his center and northern wing.91 Nonetheless, the British did understand just how fragile their transportation network was, and once Operation MICHAEL started, they were quicker than the Germans to recognize the critical vulnerability at Amiens. So was Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who wrote in his memoirs: “From the outset all were unanimous in recognizing that Amiens had to be saved at all costs, and that the fate of the war depended on it.”92 After he took command of the Fifth (re-designated as the Fourth) Army, General Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote to Wilson: “There can be no question but that the Amiens area is the only one in which the enemy can hope to gain such a success as to force the Allies to discuss terms of peace.”93
So, what went wrong for the Germans? In short: Ludendorff was extremely indecisive and repeatedly disrupted operational planning by switching goals throughout the course of Operation Michael. Had he stuck consistently with one operational plan and committed to it, it is likely the German 2nd Army could've taken Amiens in late March:
By 26 March the three-pronged attack had given way to a two-pronged attack against the British and the French. But in deciding to launch the two MARS attacks and WALKÜRENRITT in the north two days hence, Ludendorff seemed to be trying to return to the original operational concept he abandoned late on 21 March. Those additional attacks in the north only further dissipated the main effort, and expended resources for no gain. Operationally they made no sense at all. MARS originally was supposed to facilitate the pivot of the Seventeenth Army. But the Seventeenth Army's direction of advance already had been changed from northwest to west, and its main effort was now supposed to be on its left wing. So just what was MARS supposed to accomplish? MARS was launched without forces sufficient for even a chance of its success. But what if the Germans had committed that nine division and 1,250-gun force against Amiens?
In the south, the Eighteenth Army was given no direct role in the capture of Amiens, other than pivoting to block off the French--a movement away from Amiens itself. But directly in front of Amiens was a solid defensive position of wire systems and concrete bunkers. Built by the French in 1915, the Amiens Line ran eight miles from Demuin on the Luce River to Sailly le Sec on the Somme 319 The Eighteenth Army was supposed to pass just to the south of the Amiens defenses, and could have made a flanking attack against the British positions. Instead, the Second Army was given the mission of making a frontal attack, something that was supposed to be anathema to German tactical doctrine.
In the south, the Eighteenth Army was given no direct role in the capture of Amiens, other than pivoting to block off the French--a movement away from Amiens itself. But directly in front of Amiens was a solid defensive position of wire systems and concrete bunkers. Built by the French in 1915, the Amiens Line ran eight miles from Demuin on the Luce River to Sailly le Sec on the Somme 319 The Eighteenth Army was supposed to pass just to the south of the Amiens defenses, and could have made a flanking attack against the British positions. Instead, the Second Army was given the mission of making a frontal attack, something that was supposed to be anathema to German tactical doctrine.
Even with this fatal diversion and unfavorable attack plan, the 2nd Army's advance came close to taking Amiens, so reinforced with nine divisions and over 1,000 artillery guns, it's almost certain they would've taken it:
The Second Army's left wing, south of the Somme, was too weak to advance the attack on Amiens. Even though Ludendorff had designated it as the main effort, Marwitz had only three front-line and three second-line divisions on that axis. As Crown Prince Wilhelm later wrote, "the left wing for this very preferable undertaking was not strong enough. " 215 From 25 to 27 March the front of the Second Army had fanned out from 25 to almost 40 kilometers. 216 Although the Second didn't capture Amiens, it did get close enough to put the rail center under fire with 150mm guns. 21
The loss of Amiens would result in roughly 40% of the BEF's logistics being cut, meaning that the follow on defense of Hazebrouck during Operation Georgette would be seriously complicated by a lack of supplies. In April of 1918, the British moved over 700 ammunition trains along their rail system in order to fight off the Germans, so the loss of a significant chunk of these supplies would be a heavy blow, especially in the context of the Germans IOTL advancing to within four miles of the city. I thus think it is likely the British fail, and the Germans take Hazebrouck too. This would mean, as stated earlier, the evacuation of the BEF off the continent by sometime in May, with 85% of their supplies destroyed in place to prevent their capture by the Germans:
During Operation MICHAEL the British were very worried about losing Amiens. On 27 March the town came under German artillery fire. The day before, Haig’s Quartermaster-General, Major-General Travers Clarke, convened a meeting to consider the possible courses of action if the Germans succeeded in separating the British and the French, thereby cutting the BEF off from its southern LOCs. On 31 March the Q-Staff issued Scheme X. That quickly evolved into Scheme Y, which had options for evacuating (a) Calais and Dunkirk in the north, or (b) Abbeville, Albancourt, and Dieppe in the south. By April, the Q-Staff issued Scheme Z, a plan for abandoning the entire area north of the Somme. The evacuation plan would require twenty-eight days to execute, with 85 percent of the existing supplies north of the Somme being destroyed in place.89 British contingency planning for losing key segments of their rail network continued through mid-July because Amiens and Hazebrouck both remained subject to German interdicting fire.
With the British removed from the picture, the Germans could then turn their focus fully onto the French. Foch's planning, in the event of the loss of Amiens and the rupture of Allied communications, was to fall back on Paris. With the British withdrawing from the continent, this would be impossible to avoid, less the French Army be caught over-extended, outnumbered and with an exposed flank for the Germans to hit. Withdrawing on Paris would allow Foch to create a cohesive line again, but it would come at the cost of surrendering Northern France to the Germans, which has obvious morale complications, particularly in light of the BEF being defeated. France didn't survive this in 1940 IOTL, and here is far more exhausted after four years of war.
Even if they do survive the short term, in the medium term they definitely won't. As mentioned before, 45 coal trains daily moved south to the munition works of Paris through Amiens. Haig's Diary reveals the depths of the looming crisis here:
"I reached Doullens at noon, and spent 3/4 hour with M Clemenceau in his train - - Clemenceau was anxious about our covering the Bruay coal mines effectively. - - - There are only 5 days reserve [of coal] now at the French munition factories and as 70% of their coal comes from the Bruay district, it is of very great importance to cover the mines as long as possible. I assured him on this point."
Meaning that, just five days after the fall of Amiens, French war production begins to collapse. A.M. Henniker's Transportation on the Western Front also reveals there was no solution to this either; the capacity to source a replacement simply did not exist.
"Great Quantities of coal were being shipped from the United Kingdom to both France and Italy, but the output of the mines at home and the shipping situation were such that if the vital needs of France and Italy were to be met the output of the mines in the north of France was indispensable".
At this point, the war is over. The only question is if the Entente sue for peace before the French can be fully defeated or not; the French gave up in 1940 before Paris could be reached, so that's the most likely outcome and preserving their Army would give them more bargaining power at the peace table. IF they attempt to hold out, they'll be crushed in the Second Battle of the Marne and Paris either besieged or taken as in 1870 due to ammunition shortages and being outnumbered by the German Army. At that point, the only Entente member still in the field in significant numbers is Italy so it's beyond obvious the war is lost and the Americans will not arrive in time. The Kaiser's Germany would stand victorious as the dominant power on the continent with an unassailable position.