What if the Philippine Islands are teleported from the South China Sea to Bay of Bengal on 8 Dec, 19
Sept 7, 2024 17:49:09 GMT
Post by raharris1973 on Sept 7, 2024 17:49:09 GMT
What if our mischievous ASBs teleported the Philippine Islands from the South China Sea to Bay of Bengal on 8 Dec, 1941, as the third wave of attack at Pearl Harbor in in Hawaii (local time/date, Dec. 7th) was being completed?
The Philippine Islands, not attacked just yet - just targeted for attack by Japanese air groups fueling up and getting on runways in Japanese held Taiwan at this moment, are now far to the west of their location by longitude and by hours of the day, in the Bay of of Bengal, between India, Sri Lanka, Burma, and the Andaman Islands, but at the same latitude as always in north-south terms. They are "rotated" a little northeast to occupy the sea space without overlapping with any existing land.
It looks like this on the map:
www.flickr.com/photos/22187058@N03/53977792756/in/photostream/lightbox/
Just a couple hours later, Japanese air wings, expecting to fly over and bomb targets on Luzon find to their fixed targets, to their astonishment, elusive, with only open ocean water below them. Also, American ships of the Asiatic fleet on the most distant patrols, outside of Filipino waters but in the waters of DEI British Malaya-Borneo, and the Spratlys, find radio comms with Subic and Manila Bay more distant and scratchy.
Within a few hours after that, British Raj routine traffic runs into Filipino fishermen and American Asiatic fleet traffic coming out of Manila Bay, leading to awkward radio traffic discussions along the lines of "what are you doing here?" and "how did you get here?"
The complete absence of the Philippine Archipelago is a spooky omen for the IJNAF and IJN landing forces expecting to launch bombing and landing operations. At the same time, the die of war has been cast with the massive air raid on Pearl Harbor, the *later*, vague "war declaration" on the USA by diplomats in Washington, the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong, the Japanese invasion and occupation and realignment of Thailand, and breaching of the land borders of Malaya, long-range bombing of Singapore, and operations against British Borneo and Guam. The Japanese note that nothing else is geographically amiss or odd about any of their targets.
The Americans are reeling from the attacks on Pearl Harbor and then Guam, the British from the Japanese onslaught on Hong Kong, and the Australians from the Japanese onslaught they know is on its way to them. The Americans have a bright spot to report in the early days from the repulse of the first Japanese invasion of Wake Island.
However, the Americans above all, but the British as well, and all people as they learn of it through leaks and rumors in a censored media environment, have a major supernatural event to process, the apparent movement of the, admittedly obscure to most people Philippine Islands, from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. However little thought people devoted to those islands.........land just DOES NOT DO THAT!
The situation is spookiest of all in the Philippines itself. The residents of the islands, General MacArthur and the American forces gain an unexpected advantage of time, multiple days and weeks, possibly more than a month, before having to deal with Japanese force attacks of any kind. This is far different from the frontline and instantaneous combat role anticipated in any US-Japanese fighting. However, on December 8th, the winds and weather abruptly change along with the angle of sunlight, due to the change in longitude and "tilt" in the land, and nightfall happens several hours early, which is then followed by all the reporting of strange contacts at sea with British/British Empire related shipping.
MacArthur, unable to explain anything, with his lieutenants unable to explain anything, probably does not allow himself to accept a frank explanation of the new realities in the first 24 hours, nor report anything to Washington indicating any new realities, or that there are any new uncertainties on the island. He'll probably just send out vapid happy talk to press and Washington about sending aggressive reconnaissance to find, target and strike Japanese forces, ignoring any geographic uncertainties.
Thankfully for him and his command, he won't be able to hurt himself and the Japanese enemy won't be in range to hurt him while he is in the denial phase.
Over the first week of hostilities in December, as continued Japanese reconnaissance reveals no presence of Philippine islands, but longer distance reconnaissance shows the Malayan-Borneo targets still in place, and Papua and outer East Indies still in place, the Japanese will adjust the force allocations to press on against the objectives within the reach. Initially, this will mean largely forward deploying many of the Taiwan-based air groups to southern Indochina, and most of the landing units and logistics intended for General Home's operations in the Philippines, and using them to reinforce the Kra Isthmus and Malaya campaigns, and *especially* the campaign in British Borneo/Brunei to speed it up and conduct follow-on seizure operations against other parts of the DEI more quickly than originally intended. Some of the originally Philippine intended aircraft and and landing units will also simply be redeployed east in the weeks of December 1941 to the Japanese mandated islands, mainly the Palaus and western Carolines, to accelerate the pace somewhat of Japanese operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, northern Papua/New Guinea, and the eastern and northeastern islands of the Dutch East Indies.
I think Japan's overall Southeast Asian mission priority, in terms of importance would still be Dutch East Indies/Borneo oil. The vanishing of the Philippines from the pathway is a double-edged sword in that. It removes an armed obstacle and source of friction slowing Japanese progress toward seizing that objective. But it also removes some convenient air and naval bases logistic stepping stones, channelling the Japanese advance to the DEI through narrower paths.
Singapore-Malaya will be the main military-naval center of gravity the Japanese will want to overcome, and I do not think anything about this scenario will make it *harder* for Japan to take, even though Britain certainly could have put up a better show for a hundred reasons, there's nothing about changing the conditions of the dice-roll *in this way* that makes it more favorable for Britain. Japan will have more strength dedicated to the Malay-Singapore direction, earlier, not less [Japanese southward operations are often said to be on a shoestring, and thus vulnerable, here the shoestring to Malaya widens to a "necktie"], and the British will have no extra strength on hand at the point of British-Japanese front line contact.
Japan's campaign against the Dutch East Indies, on net, should meet OTL's level of success and speed, or exceed it a bit, in the absence of preliminary operations seizing the Philippines and combating American and Filipino forces and US Asiatic Fleet units. Dutch Borneo/Kalimantan and adjacent territories may go down faster in particular. A possible exception is Sumatra, which may enjoy more support in holding out from the relocated Philippines and India.
I would expect the Japanese to to put major emphasis on their push from Thailand into Burma and against the Burma Road at about the same pace as OTL, with their treating the peninsula and island seizure campaigns for natural resources as a higher initial priority. But maybe I am wrong, and with more "free" Army divisions not engaged in the Philippines besieging Americans there, perhaps they start Burma offensives earlier.
Now what are the Philippines' prospects? On the one hand, in the Bay of Bengal, it may be, by some measures, even further from the continental USA. It is undoubtedly further from Hawaii and Samoa. So their supply/isolation problems would *seem* to be worsened, not improved.
At the same time, the Philippines are also *much* further from Japan's starting positions at the outset of the war, not subject to the immediate bombing and air suppression they were in OTL, and the fairly short order amphibious invasions. The greater warning time for the Americans, and don't forget the Filipinos, before Japanese can get the islands in air range or invade, should blunt Japanese surprise advantages and enable a more prepared defense. Could/would MacArthur screw things up? I'm sure he would make some mistakes, some borne out of arrogance or overconfidence, but no matter the quality of the commander or his temperament, it is better to not be surprised than to be surprised and for people throughout a command to have more time to prepare. There may not be much of any opportunities for reinforcement or equipment to arrive in the Philippines before the Japanese can attempt an assault, but there will be more time to mobilize Commonwealth of the Philippines troops. And while no equal to Japanese or American troops, numbers of infantry should be helpful in any defense. Also it should be helpful to not have the bomber aircraft squadrons smashed on the ground the first day of the war.
Indeed, the Philippine situation in the war may be better than this. At least initially, it is ensconced between friendly, British Empire territories, rather than surrounded on three sides by hostile Japanese-occupied territories. So, while supplies from the USA are far away, mutual support from and with British territories is more available.
The ultimate American supply route to the Philippines would be a *very* long one, but it could go either way around the planet, across the Pacific and the south of Australia, up northwest to the Bay of Bengal, long without so many stops, but with hardly any enemy threads, or through the Atlantic around the African Cape up the Indian Ocean to Bay of Bengal, more stops and repair and resupply facilities, but more Axis submarines en route.
By the time the Japanese attain their objectives in Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies (DEI), they may be "out of juice" and see the Philippines as too hard and distant a target with their overworked forces to try to take. But they would have to weigh that against a near-certainty that it would grow into a platform for attacks against their occupied "southern resource area". If the Allies are fortunate enough though, things could go even better for them. The relocation of the Philippines, along with the salvaging of the US Army forces there, and more importantly most US Asiatic fleet units there and US bomber power there, could do more than just deter or soundly repulse any Japanese invasion of the Philippines themselves. These increments of military power, combined with British Raj military units and Royal Navy Indian Ocean units and RAF forces, might prevent the Japanese seizure of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands or a successful landing op in Rangoon/southern Burma or occupation of Burma, thus keeping the Burma Road open. In the most optimistic case of all, this Anglo-American synergy in the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean allows the Allies to even hold on to Sumatra or keep a perpetual attrition fight going there.
The Philippine Islands, not attacked just yet - just targeted for attack by Japanese air groups fueling up and getting on runways in Japanese held Taiwan at this moment, are now far to the west of their location by longitude and by hours of the day, in the Bay of of Bengal, between India, Sri Lanka, Burma, and the Andaman Islands, but at the same latitude as always in north-south terms. They are "rotated" a little northeast to occupy the sea space without overlapping with any existing land.
It looks like this on the map:
www.flickr.com/photos/22187058@N03/53977792756/in/photostream/lightbox/
Just a couple hours later, Japanese air wings, expecting to fly over and bomb targets on Luzon find to their fixed targets, to their astonishment, elusive, with only open ocean water below them. Also, American ships of the Asiatic fleet on the most distant patrols, outside of Filipino waters but in the waters of DEI British Malaya-Borneo, and the Spratlys, find radio comms with Subic and Manila Bay more distant and scratchy.
Within a few hours after that, British Raj routine traffic runs into Filipino fishermen and American Asiatic fleet traffic coming out of Manila Bay, leading to awkward radio traffic discussions along the lines of "what are you doing here?" and "how did you get here?"
The complete absence of the Philippine Archipelago is a spooky omen for the IJNAF and IJN landing forces expecting to launch bombing and landing operations. At the same time, the die of war has been cast with the massive air raid on Pearl Harbor, the *later*, vague "war declaration" on the USA by diplomats in Washington, the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong, the Japanese invasion and occupation and realignment of Thailand, and breaching of the land borders of Malaya, long-range bombing of Singapore, and operations against British Borneo and Guam. The Japanese note that nothing else is geographically amiss or odd about any of their targets.
The Americans are reeling from the attacks on Pearl Harbor and then Guam, the British from the Japanese onslaught on Hong Kong, and the Australians from the Japanese onslaught they know is on its way to them. The Americans have a bright spot to report in the early days from the repulse of the first Japanese invasion of Wake Island.
However, the Americans above all, but the British as well, and all people as they learn of it through leaks and rumors in a censored media environment, have a major supernatural event to process, the apparent movement of the, admittedly obscure to most people Philippine Islands, from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. However little thought people devoted to those islands.........land just DOES NOT DO THAT!
The situation is spookiest of all in the Philippines itself. The residents of the islands, General MacArthur and the American forces gain an unexpected advantage of time, multiple days and weeks, possibly more than a month, before having to deal with Japanese force attacks of any kind. This is far different from the frontline and instantaneous combat role anticipated in any US-Japanese fighting. However, on December 8th, the winds and weather abruptly change along with the angle of sunlight, due to the change in longitude and "tilt" in the land, and nightfall happens several hours early, which is then followed by all the reporting of strange contacts at sea with British/British Empire related shipping.
MacArthur, unable to explain anything, with his lieutenants unable to explain anything, probably does not allow himself to accept a frank explanation of the new realities in the first 24 hours, nor report anything to Washington indicating any new realities, or that there are any new uncertainties on the island. He'll probably just send out vapid happy talk to press and Washington about sending aggressive reconnaissance to find, target and strike Japanese forces, ignoring any geographic uncertainties.
Thankfully for him and his command, he won't be able to hurt himself and the Japanese enemy won't be in range to hurt him while he is in the denial phase.
Over the first week of hostilities in December, as continued Japanese reconnaissance reveals no presence of Philippine islands, but longer distance reconnaissance shows the Malayan-Borneo targets still in place, and Papua and outer East Indies still in place, the Japanese will adjust the force allocations to press on against the objectives within the reach. Initially, this will mean largely forward deploying many of the Taiwan-based air groups to southern Indochina, and most of the landing units and logistics intended for General Home's operations in the Philippines, and using them to reinforce the Kra Isthmus and Malaya campaigns, and *especially* the campaign in British Borneo/Brunei to speed it up and conduct follow-on seizure operations against other parts of the DEI more quickly than originally intended. Some of the originally Philippine intended aircraft and and landing units will also simply be redeployed east in the weeks of December 1941 to the Japanese mandated islands, mainly the Palaus and western Carolines, to accelerate the pace somewhat of Japanese operations in the Bismarck Archipelago, northern Papua/New Guinea, and the eastern and northeastern islands of the Dutch East Indies.
I think Japan's overall Southeast Asian mission priority, in terms of importance would still be Dutch East Indies/Borneo oil. The vanishing of the Philippines from the pathway is a double-edged sword in that. It removes an armed obstacle and source of friction slowing Japanese progress toward seizing that objective. But it also removes some convenient air and naval bases logistic stepping stones, channelling the Japanese advance to the DEI through narrower paths.
Singapore-Malaya will be the main military-naval center of gravity the Japanese will want to overcome, and I do not think anything about this scenario will make it *harder* for Japan to take, even though Britain certainly could have put up a better show for a hundred reasons, there's nothing about changing the conditions of the dice-roll *in this way* that makes it more favorable for Britain. Japan will have more strength dedicated to the Malay-Singapore direction, earlier, not less [Japanese southward operations are often said to be on a shoestring, and thus vulnerable, here the shoestring to Malaya widens to a "necktie"], and the British will have no extra strength on hand at the point of British-Japanese front line contact.
Japan's campaign against the Dutch East Indies, on net, should meet OTL's level of success and speed, or exceed it a bit, in the absence of preliminary operations seizing the Philippines and combating American and Filipino forces and US Asiatic Fleet units. Dutch Borneo/Kalimantan and adjacent territories may go down faster in particular. A possible exception is Sumatra, which may enjoy more support in holding out from the relocated Philippines and India.
I would expect the Japanese to to put major emphasis on their push from Thailand into Burma and against the Burma Road at about the same pace as OTL, with their treating the peninsula and island seizure campaigns for natural resources as a higher initial priority. But maybe I am wrong, and with more "free" Army divisions not engaged in the Philippines besieging Americans there, perhaps they start Burma offensives earlier.
Now what are the Philippines' prospects? On the one hand, in the Bay of Bengal, it may be, by some measures, even further from the continental USA. It is undoubtedly further from Hawaii and Samoa. So their supply/isolation problems would *seem* to be worsened, not improved.
At the same time, the Philippines are also *much* further from Japan's starting positions at the outset of the war, not subject to the immediate bombing and air suppression they were in OTL, and the fairly short order amphibious invasions. The greater warning time for the Americans, and don't forget the Filipinos, before Japanese can get the islands in air range or invade, should blunt Japanese surprise advantages and enable a more prepared defense. Could/would MacArthur screw things up? I'm sure he would make some mistakes, some borne out of arrogance or overconfidence, but no matter the quality of the commander or his temperament, it is better to not be surprised than to be surprised and for people throughout a command to have more time to prepare. There may not be much of any opportunities for reinforcement or equipment to arrive in the Philippines before the Japanese can attempt an assault, but there will be more time to mobilize Commonwealth of the Philippines troops. And while no equal to Japanese or American troops, numbers of infantry should be helpful in any defense. Also it should be helpful to not have the bomber aircraft squadrons smashed on the ground the first day of the war.
Indeed, the Philippine situation in the war may be better than this. At least initially, it is ensconced between friendly, British Empire territories, rather than surrounded on three sides by hostile Japanese-occupied territories. So, while supplies from the USA are far away, mutual support from and with British territories is more available.
The ultimate American supply route to the Philippines would be a *very* long one, but it could go either way around the planet, across the Pacific and the south of Australia, up northwest to the Bay of Bengal, long without so many stops, but with hardly any enemy threads, or through the Atlantic around the African Cape up the Indian Ocean to Bay of Bengal, more stops and repair and resupply facilities, but more Axis submarines en route.
By the time the Japanese attain their objectives in Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies (DEI), they may be "out of juice" and see the Philippines as too hard and distant a target with their overworked forces to try to take. But they would have to weigh that against a near-certainty that it would grow into a platform for attacks against their occupied "southern resource area". If the Allies are fortunate enough though, things could go even better for them. The relocation of the Philippines, along with the salvaging of the US Army forces there, and more importantly most US Asiatic fleet units there and US bomber power there, could do more than just deter or soundly repulse any Japanese invasion of the Philippines themselves. These increments of military power, combined with British Raj military units and Royal Navy Indian Ocean units and RAF forces, might prevent the Japanese seizure of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands or a successful landing op in Rangoon/southern Burma or occupation of Burma, thus keeping the Burma Road open. In the most optimistic case of all, this Anglo-American synergy in the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean allows the Allies to even hold on to Sumatra or keep a perpetual attrition fight going there.
The US may have less desire for a base in the islands as the region is seen as less threatened by communism although they might still keep troops on the islands. If China still goes communist I wonder where the US will look for a major facilities to watch Mao's forces? It could be Taiwan, which could make for a markedly closer relationship between a KMT remnant and the US than OTL. Also with the islands now in the Indian Ocean there's now a sizeable gap in the OTL island chain between Borneo and Okinawa which will have both military/political and climatic impacts.