WI: no October Revolution, impact on ww2?

The new democratic government of Russia, led by Prince Lvov, feared German hegemony and therefore wanted to continue the war, while the Workers' and Soldiers' Council was calling for peace. This led to very mixed messages from Russia in the following months. On 22 March 1917, the new Foreign Secretary, Pavel Milyukov, declared: 'For us, a decisive victory is essential: the annihilation of Imperial Germany, without whose defeat our ideals cannot be truly established, is today more necessary and important than ever.'12 The idea of continuing to fight on the side of the Allies thus didn't immediately lose its credibility in the following months. It also seemed possible that the Russian revolution and the new style of government, which in its political ideals was now strongly aligned to the west, could even revive the Russians' motivation to fight. Many Russian liberals hoped that the new democratic spirit of the nation would inspire its soldiers in the same way as the revolutionary movement in France had done at the end of the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, it also seemed possible that Russia would exit the war and leave Germany with one fewer opponent. The new government wanted peace, partly because it could not simply ignore the wishes of the population. On 9 April 1917, only three days after the USA's declaration of war on Germany, the provisional Russian government announced that it wanted to establish a long-term peace on the basis of the right to self determination and that it did not want to rule over any other peoples.13This was followed on 14 April by a resolution of the Workers' and Soldiers'Council in favour of a broad peace agreement without annexations or war indemnities – this was also adopted for the official programme of the German Social Democrats on 19 April.14

However, the desire for peace did not result in immediate peace negotiations, because the Russian government could not bring itself to make a clear and open peace offer. One significant reason for this was that the western Allies were doing everything possible to keep Russia in the war and continued to reject any suggestion of peace negotiations. This had various implications, as seen for example in the disastrous advice provided to the American Foreign Secretary, Lansing, by the American expert on Russia,George Kennan. Kennan said that the USA should not support the Workers'and Soldiers' representatives, who advocated the idea of a 'peace without annexations or war indemnities', but rather should side with those who wanted to continue the war to a victorious conclusion.15 A further factor was the Russians' fear of becoming diplomatically isolated in the case of a peace agreement with the Central Powers, as it was clear that such a development would lead Russia's former allies to turn their backs on it. Germany would then be able to concentrate its efforts in the west and would stand a good chance of winning there, leaving Russia standing alone on the continent against the intimidating and arrogant German colossus.16

This assumption gave the Russian leaders pause for thought. At times,however, it looked as if peace would be pushed through from below. In spring 1917 the battles on the Eastern Front mostly abated and there was some fraternisation between the soldiers. During the weeks around Easter 1917, the action along large sections of the front practically came to a stop.17 At the same time, a concerted propaganda effort on the part of the Central Powers to promote peace was very well received by the Russian soldiers.18 This state of affairs continued until 23 April, when Ludendorff gave the command to resume the practice of firing on any Russian soldiers who left their trenches,19 most likely with the aim of increasing pressure on the Russian leaders to enter into conventional peace negotiations.

Nonetheless, the parties that had come together to form the cross-party coalition were able to pass the peace resolution and had thus achieved their main objective.32 The resolution was passed with a majority of 212 to 126, with 17 abstentions.33 The new Chancellor committed himself to the resolution and expressed his conviction that the aims of reconciliation and international economic cooperation could ‘be achieved within the bounds of this resolution, as I understand it’. This was met with ‘Bravo!’ and ‘Very good!’ from the Centre Party, the Progress Party and the Social Democrats.34

Hugo Haase, leader of the USPD, savagely criticised the concession that Michaelis felt obliged to make (‘as I understand it’).35 His view was that the parties should have stuck to the Russian formulation of ‘without annexations or war indemnities’ and, like the Russians, should have advocated the right to self-determination as a central criterion. Haase thought the resolution was ‘weak’ and that comments like that of Michaelis left it open to interpretation, limiting its value. He had hit the nail on the head here, since this was exactly Michaelis’ intention. The Chancellor wrote to the Crown Prince that he had sought to use this comment to ‘rob the resolution of its greatest danger. It should now be possible to use the resolution to make whatever sort of peace seems best.’36 However, events would show that Michaelis was mistaken. In Germany, the peace resolution was seen as binding by all those involved, although it would later be spectacularly contradicted in spirit, if deliberately not in letter.

In his speech, Haase made some very interesting suggestions, most of all the proposal that the Alsace-Lorraine question be decided once and for all via a referendum. This would indeed have strengthened the impact of the Reichstag’s peace note, as would a clear and unambiguous commitment to relinquish any claim on Belgian territory. And yet, despite his shrewd objections and suggestions, Haase’s speech had a catastrophic effect. Outside Germany, his criticisms were received enthusiastically by the ‘international movement to prolong the war’ as evidence of the cynicism and insincerity of the Reichstag’s peace offer. Bethmann Hollweg, they claimed, had been toppled by the OHL, and Michaelis was merely the puppet of the military. The peace resolution did provoke parliamentary consultations in France and Britain, but in both cases there was a strong majority against the idea of engaging with it.