Post by ukron on Apr 11, 2024 12:43:13 GMT
In the 1980s, the USN and USMC (by which we mean the Marines and the US Navy) were looking to replace their aging AH-1 Sea Cobra, deemed incapable of being updated.
The Apache program was in full development, prompting the Navy to submit a specification as early as 1984: the Sea Apache or "Gray Thunder" could be a plus for amphibious and anti-ship operations, as well as protecting the "bubble" surrounding a fleet, with a few minor modifications (the addition of anti-corrosion devices, Doppler radar and a blade folding system).
The first version of the Sea Apache would differ very little from its land-based counterpart, but as we've seen previously, if it's not the politicians it's often the engineers who turn something simple into.... a mess.
The ultimate version of the Sea Apache differed so much from the original Apache that the cost of development would break the Navy's piggy bank (and at the same time far exceed the cost of replacing the Sea Cobra with an aircraft specifically developed for the navy): engineers had in fact discovered that the Apache's landing gear could threaten stability, displacing them at the same time on the wing brons, thus making it possible to envisage carrying two AIM-9Ls (provided the 30mm cannon was removed).
But it was felt that the helicopter should have a radome carrying an APG-65 radar (from the F/A-18), to which a third proposal replied that the "Gray Thunder" could take a few Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The Marines took advantage of this opportunity to design a "Gray Thunder" retaining Hellfire and TOW, but with the radome reduced and moved closer to the rotor mast.
In the end, despite the Sea Apache's undoubted improvement over the Sea Cobra, the US Navy abandoned the project and its many iterations in the early 90s.
The irony (and "moral lesson") of this story is that the British will operate "standard" Apaches on Royal Navy ships without encountering the slightest landing gear problem....
Source: www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/mcdonnell_sea_apache.php
The Apache program was in full development, prompting the Navy to submit a specification as early as 1984: the Sea Apache or "Gray Thunder" could be a plus for amphibious and anti-ship operations, as well as protecting the "bubble" surrounding a fleet, with a few minor modifications (the addition of anti-corrosion devices, Doppler radar and a blade folding system).
The first version of the Sea Apache would differ very little from its land-based counterpart, but as we've seen previously, if it's not the politicians it's often the engineers who turn something simple into.... a mess.
The ultimate version of the Sea Apache differed so much from the original Apache that the cost of development would break the Navy's piggy bank (and at the same time far exceed the cost of replacing the Sea Cobra with an aircraft specifically developed for the navy): engineers had in fact discovered that the Apache's landing gear could threaten stability, displacing them at the same time on the wing brons, thus making it possible to envisage carrying two AIM-9Ls (provided the 30mm cannon was removed).
But it was felt that the helicopter should have a radome carrying an APG-65 radar (from the F/A-18), to which a third proposal replied that the "Gray Thunder" could take a few Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
The Marines took advantage of this opportunity to design a "Gray Thunder" retaining Hellfire and TOW, but with the radome reduced and moved closer to the rotor mast.
In the end, despite the Sea Apache's undoubted improvement over the Sea Cobra, the US Navy abandoned the project and its many iterations in the early 90s.
The irony (and "moral lesson") of this story is that the British will operate "standard" Apaches on Royal Navy ships without encountering the slightest landing gear problem....
Source: www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/mcdonnell_sea_apache.php