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Post by raharris1973 on Mar 9, 2024 22:45:33 GMT
What if there was no Korean War? This should be pretty doable with a narrow, surgical, PoD that does not disrupt the initial establishment of the two Koreas and other parallel Cold War developments globally. Let's say that when Kim Il-Sung pitches his invasion of the south plan, assisted by his Soviet liaison Colonel-General Terence Shtykov, to Stalin, saying, "a firm military counterattack is all that is needed to break down the facade of the Rhee puppet regime and unleash the suppressed South Korean revolutionary proletarian forces", Stalin is not buying it. Stalin simply is not seeing this in the same way as a guaranteed success, nor as low risk. Kim and Shtykov seem overconfident to Stalin, who remembers friction upsets even expertly made plans of well-quipped and trained forces, and enemy forces and hostile countries do not smoothly respond only as predicted. Therefore, Stalin refuses to authorizes any more than continued support for North Korean guerrilla infiltration of the south and support for defenses and fortification. The Soviet advisory group in the months after the refusal and after running the North Koreans through field maneuvers and live fire training actually refuses to replenish North Korea with enough battle-ready replenishment stocks of ammo, spare parts and POL for the armor corps to allow for a sustained North Korean offensive to be done unilaterally without a deliberate Soviet resupply decision, by holding some of these stocks on the Soviet side of the border, or in Soviet diplomatic facilities. This restrains Kim Il-Sung from offensive action in 1950 and after, and that is the purpose of Soviet restraints, it is not a broader hostility to the North Korean regime or Kim's leadership of it. Stalin's policy remains one of caution in Korea for the remaining three years of his life, while not really changing his policy anywhere else. Stalin modernizes Soviet conventional and atomic forces and keeps pace with the USA on the hydrogen bomb. The United States through 1950 is still absorbing shocks from 1949 including both the fall of China to Communism, and the subsequent formal Sino-Soviet alliance, and the Soviet testing of the atomic bomb, which signals the end of the American atomic monopoly. In April 1950, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSC_68 is released, providing the United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. It calls for a stark reversal of the post-WWII military drawdown, and instead a conventional forces build-up and for the US to diplomatically and militarily rally to the defense of all parts of globe on the frontiers of the Communist world. President Truman did not reject the assessments out of hand, but wanted further study of how to achieve the objectives of a strengthened defense, further definition of costs, and a definable limit on costs. Without the Korean War, what happens to the US defense budget and defense posture? Does Louis Johnson remain in place as SecDef, with force cuts continuing, at this extreme resulting possibly in further reductions of the Navy and elimination of the Marine Corps? Are defense and force cuts halted with force levels stabilized and the conventional force modernized? Or, is are the cuts turned around and reversed into a build up as called for in NSC-68, with the US increase strategic and operational air power, and ground power to back up its NATO commitments in Europe in particular, and an increase in share of GDP to defense, although likely not as much as the Korean War increased the US defense share and spending? In turn, how are Soviet, Chinese, and East Bloc spending priorities affected in 1950-1953? How much economic growth do Japan and West Germany *lose* by not getting a "military Keynesian" boost from Korean War spending and American war orders? Do Japan, Western Europe, or the USA actually fall into any genuine recessions for lack of war stimulus? How does the Cold War situation evolve after Stalin's death in 1953 and the shift to collective leadership in the near-term. I presume the Soviet collective leadership would have no turn to aggressive or adventurous policy and not turn to quickly endorse renewed proposals by Kim Il-Sung to attack the south. On the other hand, in the post-Stalin years, sooner or later, collective Soviet leaders may have a more difficult time justifying denying North Korea's material requests, and North Korea may be more prone to unilaterally launch an southward attack that is not explicitly authorized by Moscow. If it turns out that the USA keeps its conventional forces, especially ground forces, relatively small without the occurrence of a Korean War, 1950-1953, and there is also no Korean War later, or no similarly conventional regional local limited war microcosm of Cold War, and only guerrilla wars, is it possible that the entire Cold War struggle is conducted with much more lightly militarized blocs, especially the western one? |
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Mar 10, 2024 0:07:57 GMT
If North Korea never invaded South Korea, the immediate effect would be that Japan doesn't get its economic miracle, prolonging the instability that was happening after WWII, making it more vulnerable to political extremism. However, this may also mean that the two Korean states would gradually recover from the post-colonial period that may make them economically on par with each other, as in they'd have the economic level of a Second World country
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 10, 2024 17:33:10 GMT
Interesting idea. One factor you haven't mentioned is the impact on China and Mao of no Korean war. Does he chaff at Stalin's restraint and hence tensions cool between the two earlier? If so and with Kim Il-Sung frustrated then I could well see a northern attack, quickly supported by China if necessary say in the mid-50's. Especially if Khrushchev - or some similar successor - starts to openly criticism Stalin's actions. In which case a lot would depend on how S Korea has developed as well - or not - and how committed the US is to supporting it. [One side issue here is that would the USSR be boycotting the UN because if not it might be in a position to veto any UN declaration against the communist attack?]
Much would depend on world events elsewhere. I could see some rearmament in the west and especially the US but probably, nuclear matters aside, not as much as OTL without the war as OTL. If tensions are less then does the intervention in Iran occur as OTL? Do we still have the Suez crisis and if so how does the US respond? Are there still uprisings in E Germany [1953] and Hungary [1956]? What happens in Vietnam as well?
My gut feeling is that tensions would still be rising but probably not by as much, at least until some conflict occurs. If there's an armed clash in say 1956/57 in Korea a lot would depend on how the conflict goes and also how relations are between China and the USSR.
I would agree that Japan's OTL economic miracle would be markedly reduced but not sure it would disappear totally. Its still going to be an important military base for US forces, although without the OTL dating of the war the continued occupation of Japan will prompt tension and without a clear aggressive communist threat internal politics there could be more left wing.
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Post by American hist on Mar 13, 2024 2:13:34 GMT
Before communist aggression in Korea US President Harry S, Truman, put great cuts on defense spending to maintain a balance budget, which he did until the Korean War when he stop cutting the defense budget and increase it by quadruple lean spending on the armed forces. Well, I hadn’t really thought of Japanese postwar recovery not happening because of no Korean War.
Well, I have not watch the YouTube video whether it’s good or not here you go he is at least an academic
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Post by raharris1973 on Mar 14, 2024 0:42:52 GMT
Interesting idea. One factor you haven't mentioned is the impact on China and Mao of no Korean war. Does he chaff at Stalin's restraint and hence tensions cool between the two earlier? I don't see why Stalin having an objection to the North Korean attack on South Korea would add an element of additional tension to the Stalin-Mao relationship. If this were like the 1959 situation or early 1960s situation where Mao was trying to prove he was the worthy boss of the Communist world, bravely leading world revolution, and Khrushchev and cronies were cowards, it would be a different story, but that is not how things were in 1950 and the early 50s while Stalin still lived. If anything, Korea added a little more tension, because while Mao stepped up and fought the battle for the bloc, Stalin may have provided less AirPower support to Mao than Mao thought Stalin implied he would give, and also after China committed to fight in North Korea, Stalin who offered generous arms shipments, did clarify China needed to pay for them in trade goods, they would not be gratis. If there is no North Korean attack happening and thus no Korean War, Mao's China may go ahead in late summer 1950, or more likely in 1951 or later, with its own invasion attempt against Taiwan, to finished its unfinished civil war. Now if Stalin vocally tried to discourage that or put his foot down insisting it was too dangerous for China, USSR, the world, *that* would have pissed off Mao, big time, because that would have messed directly with a core Chinese national interest. I don't think Stalin would have put his foot down that way, even a Stalin willing to boss around North Korea and tell Kim Il-Sung "no", because China is obviously a bigger and more important country that can do more on its own than North Korea so it isn't smart to talk to it the same way, but you can't rule it out absolutely. Stalin wouldn't hesitate share that if you want to do something as complicated as an amphibious invasion, you want to make sure you're ready, but Mao already knew he had technical training and equipping he needed to do, and was not trying to skate by on revolutionary banzai spirit alone to make the "1 million man swim" work. Regarding a possible later North Korean attack, possibly after Stalin's death, or possibly after a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. [I would note that a Chinese invasion attempt in the very early 50s could either succeed or fail, and failure could happen whether the USA stands completely aside [which was the formal policy at the time] or not]. [One side issue here is that would the USSR be boycotting the UN because if not it might be in a position to veto any UN declaration against the communist attack?] Even if the USSR is not boycotting the Security Council (and it would not be, if the Taiwan issue was previously resolved by a Chinese conquest), and the USA could not get a UNSC resolution through, the USA could get a second best UN General Assembly Uniting for Peace resolution through the larger body. If tensions are less then does the intervention in Iran occur as OTL? Iran was already considered an important spot in the Cold War by the Americans, so if they are persuaded, like in OTL, that the slow motion economic crisis over oil in Iran is making the country vulnerable to Communism, they may still support a coup. However, if there is no Korean War, it might *possibly* [or might not] mean Truman's reelection and forestall the Eisenhower Presidency. And in Truman's time, he was still trying to work with President Mossadegh and saw him as anti-communist, although in an unfortunate dispute with the British. It seemed it was only Eisenhower and Dulles who came round to the view that the economic chaos of the oil crisis, caused by Iranian oil nationalization, and Britain's counter oil embargo of oil, to keep Iran's oil off the market, meant economic chaos, and that meant regime change was going to happen automatically, Mossadegh was automatically going down, and it was a binary choice between either the Tudeh Communist Party picking up power when he went down, or the Shah and the military picking up power. So they preemptively backed the latter. When the Ike and Dulles people shared their theory with the British, the British nodded their approval*, and handed over their coup plan in favor of the Shah. The British were unable to implement it themselves since their diplomats and attaches had been kicked out since the oil nationalization crisis started in 1951. *The British by the way did not at all believe in the Communist threat to Mossadegh's Iran theory. They wanted Mossadegh gone to punish him for oil nationalization of the AIOC and to prevent others from getting the wrong idea, pure and simple. In fact, their belief that the Communists were a negligible factor and basically harmless was used to support their internal view that it was "safe" and "risk-free" to try and try again to overthrow Mossadegh, even if it failed once or twice, because the Communists couldn't benefit. So, ironically, the British and Americans cooperated on the coup plot to get rid of Mossadegh, and reinstall the Shah, because they viewed the Communist threat in exactly opposite ways, the Americans thought the Communists could so easily take over the country (without ever articulating exactly how in any intelligent way) that they had to do something preemptive, and the British thought the Communists were so irrelevant that they could do something they wanted to do anyway against Mossadegh, and no matter what, the Communists wouldn't come out winning. Do we still have the Suez crisis and if so how does the US respond? I see no reason for the Suez Crisis to change, especially with regard to Nasser's aims and Eden and Ben-Gurion and Mollet's instincts. Probably Truman or Stevenson would have done the same as Ike, despite Nixon criticizing what Ike did----in retrospect. |
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michelvan
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Post by michelvan on Mar 14, 2024 7:55:57 GMT
How much economic growth do Japan and West Germany *lose* by not getting a "military Keynesian" boost from Korean War spending and American war orders? For Germany it will not hamper there Economic grow (Wirdschaftswunder)is already running for Japan its disaster because Korea war was the kickstart for their industry, letting to more Political turmoil and revolution. i could imagine that authoritarian Japan get it economic kickstart during Vietnam War in 1960s From this would US economic profit, who face in 1960s to 1980s, cheaper better Japanese products that drive out US products like TV, Radios, and Cars... Do we still have the Suez crisis and if so how does the US respond? That depends if certain Prime-minster is on Speed... if yes the USA must interviewe |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 14, 2024 18:19:00 GMT
Interesting idea. One factor you haven't mentioned is the impact on China and Mao of no Korean war. Does he chaff at Stalin's restraint and hence tensions cool between the two earlier? I don't see why Stalin having an objection to the North Korean attack on South Korea would add an element of additional tension to the Stalin-Mao relationship. If this were like the 1959 situation or early 1960s situation where Mao was trying to prove he was the worthy boss of the Communist world, bravely leading world revolution, and Khrushchev and cronies were cowards, it would be a different story, but that is not how things were in 1950 and the early 50s while Stalin still lived. If anything, Korea added a little more tension, because while Mao stepped up and fought the battle for the bloc, Stalin may have provided less AirPower support to Mao than Mao thought Stalin implied he would give, and also after China committed to fight in North Korea, Stalin who offered generous arms shipments, did clarify China needed to pay for them in trade goods, they would not be gratis. If there is no North Korean attack happening and thus no Korean War, Mao's China may go ahead in late summer 1950, or more likely in 1951 or later, with its own invasion attempt against Taiwan, to finished its unfinished civil war. Now if Stalin vocally tried to discourage that or put his foot down insisting it was too dangerous for China, USSR, the world, *that* would have pissed off Mao, big time, because that would have messed directly with a core Chinese national interest. I don't think Stalin would have put his foot down that way, even a Stalin willing to boss around North Korea and tell Kim Il-Sung "no", because China is obviously a bigger and more important country that can do more on its own than North Korea so it isn't smart to talk to it the same way, but you can't rule it out absolutely. Stalin wouldn't hesitate share that if you want to do something as complicated as an amphibious invasion, you want to make sure you're ready, but Mao already knew he had technical training and equipping he needed to do, and was not trying to skate by on revolutionary banzai spirit alone to make the "1 million man swim" work. Regarding a possible later North Korean attack, possibly after Stalin's death, or possibly after a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. [I would note that a Chinese invasion attempt in the very early 50s could either succeed or fail, and failure could happen whether the USA stands completely aside [which was the formal policy at the time] or not]. [One side issue here is that would the USSR be boycotting the UN because if not it might be in a position to veto any UN declaration against the communist attack?] Even if the USSR is not boycotting the Security Council (and it would not be, if the Taiwan issue was previously resolved by a Chinese conquest), and the USA could not get a UNSC resolution through, the USA could get a second best UN General Assembly Uniting for Peace resolution through the larger body. If tensions are less then does the intervention in Iran occur as OTL? Iran was already considered an important spot in the Cold War by the Americans, so if they are persuaded, like in OTL, that the slow motion economic crisis over oil in Iran is making the country vulnerable to Communism, they may still support a coup. However, if there is no Korean War, it might *possibly* [or might not] mean Truman's reelection and forestall the Eisenhower Presidency. And in Truman's time, he was still trying to work with President Mossadegh and saw him as anti-communist, although in an unfortunate dispute with the British. It seemed it was only Eisenhower and Dulles who came round to the view that the economic chaos of the oil crisis, caused by Iranian oil nationalization, and Britain's counter oil embargo of oil, to keep Iran's oil off the market, meant economic chaos, and that meant regime change was going to happen automatically, Mossadegh was automatically going down, and it was a binary choice between either the Tudeh Communist Party picking up power when he went down, or the Shah and the military picking up power. So they preemptively backed the latter. When the Ike and Dulles people shared their theory with the British, the British nodded their approval*, and handed over their coup plan in favor of the Shah. The British were unable to implement it themselves since their diplomats and attaches had been kicked out since the oil nationalization crisis started in 1951. *The British by the way did not at all believe in the Communist threat to Mossadegh's Iran theory. They wanted Mossadegh gone to punish him for oil nationalization of the AIOC and to prevent others from getting the wrong idea, pure and simple. In fact, their belief that the Communists were a negligible factor and basically harmless was used to support their internal view that it was "safe" and "risk-free" to try and try again to overthrow Mossadegh, even if it failed once or twice, because the Communists couldn't benefit. So, ironically, the British and Americans cooperated on the coup plot to get rid of Mossadegh, and reinstall the Shah, because they viewed the Communist threat in exactly opposite ways, the Americans thought the Communists could so easily take over the country (without ever articulating exactly how in any intelligent way) that they had to do something preemptive, and the British thought the Communists were so irrelevant that they could do something they wanted to do anyway against Mossadegh, and no matter what, the Communists wouldn't come out winning. Do we still have the Suez crisis and if so how does the US respond? I see no reason for the Suez Crisis to change, especially with regard to Nasser's aims and Eden and Ben-Gurion and Mollet's instincts. Probably Truman or Stevenson would have done the same as Ike, despite Nixon criticizing what Ike did----in retrospect.
a) On the Sino-Soviet relations issue you might be right but since Mao was markedly more gung-ho for expanding communism even at risk of war with the western powers I was thinking he would be less than happy with this.
Mao, especially if a bit disgruntled with Mao might try such a move but I can't see it succeeding. They failed OTL to seize one of the Taiwanese islands just off the Chinese coast so an invasion over ~100 miles of water even if the US stood aside. If the US doesn't its going to be a massacre and could prompt serious US counter-action against China.
b) I was under the impression that the 5 permanent members veto's applied to all votes in the UN?
c) Interesting.
d) It might depend on actions elsewhere and how bad relations between the communist and western blocs are. For instance if this is during or shortly after a later Korean war crisis then it might prompt the US to decide to oppose Soviet influence in Egypt rather than the OTL path.
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Post by kasumigenx on Mar 14, 2024 20:38:24 GMT
That depends on what prevents the Korean War.
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Post by raharris1973 on Mar 14, 2024 23:58:24 GMT
d) It might depend on actions elsewhere and how bad relations between the communist and western blocs are. For instance if this is during or shortly after a later Korean war crisis then it might prompt the US to decide to oppose Soviet influence in Egypt rather than the OTL path. Oh, oppose Soviet influence in Egypt, by competing with it? Meeting Nasser's needs for weapons and Aswan Dam funding before the Soviets do, and diverting them from seizing the Canal for its revenues? |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 15, 2024 0:04:37 GMT
Taking Naguib and Nasser as absolute givens in a dramatically changed strategic situation might not be the only options.
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Post by kasumigenx on Mar 17, 2024 23:07:08 GMT
I actually prefer a world where China and Russia only trade with their allies and US only trade with their allies, I think it is a better scenario because US does not even share the same values as China and Russia.
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 18, 2024 0:47:33 GMT
That isn’t a realistic world. Even in the Cold War, there were never hermetically sealed blocs.
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Post by kasumigenx on Mar 18, 2024 9:10:19 GMT
That isn’t a realistic world. Even in the Cold War, there were never hermetically sealed blocs. Not really sealed but I at least prefer if trade is discouraged between blocs, I think China and Russia should have their own computing/semiconductor business as well so they don't have to deal with any sanctions that NATO or any coalition led by America have against them. |
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Post by simon darkshade on Mar 18, 2024 9:58:50 GMT
That is moving from the circumstances of history (discussing the Korean War and Cold War) into current politics.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Mar 18, 2024 10:25:15 GMT
d) It might depend on actions elsewhere and how bad relations between the communist and western blocs are. For instance if this is during or shortly after a later Korean war crisis then it might prompt the US to decide to oppose Soviet influence in Egypt rather than the OTL path. Oh, oppose Soviet influence in Egypt, by competing with it? Meeting Nasser's needs for weapons and Aswan Dam funding before the Soviets do, and diverting them from seizing the Canal for its revenues?
The ironic thing was that Britain refused Egyptian approaches for funding for the dam because of pressure from the US who wanted Egypt punished for buying arms from the USSR. Then we were back-stabbed us when Egypt seized the canal and we tried to oppose that illegal move.
Given the hostility displayed by Nasser's government in the preceding years its likely that there would have been an attack on the commercial status of the canal sooner or later.
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