Complex question on conventional escalation possibilities in the Korean War
Mar 7, 2024 22:19:46 GMT
gillan1220 likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Mar 7, 2024 22:19:46 GMT
After the retreat from Pyongyang, how much non-WMD escalation could the US-ROK side have done in tactical and operational ROE and schemes of maneuver in Korean land, waters, airspace, achieving how much additional gain defined as either a) more Korean land under US-ROK occupation at the time of the ultimate armistice or peace treaty, or b) earlier enemy agreement to historic armistice terms, or better (in terms of territory, and POW repatriation management) in a lesser amount of time, without counter-vailing enemy escalation in the combat theater, or outside the combat theater, partly negating the US side’s advantage from escalation, entirely negating it, or entirely negating it and then confronting the US-western alliance with a net negative global position compared to pre-war?
To unpack that monstrosity of a question, I will define some examples.
First for the overall question, then for its specific components.
For the overall question, one legit answer could be: “No, under the conditions described, the US-ROK side got the best deal it could have gotten, period. The deal it got could not have been made to “ripen” any earlier than it did, summer 1953, without US-ROK diplomatic concessions to the other side. Any attempts to force an “improved” outcome, or a faster outcome, by greater investment of US conventional military effort and/or more unrestrained US offensive operations in the theater, would have been entirely negated, if not worse, by matching escalation by the Chinese Communist side with its unlimited manpower, if not by the Soviet Union, with its own ability to intervene inside or outside the Korean theater.”
Or, another legit answer might be: “Yes, under the conditions described, continued northward-directed ground offensives to complement US-ROK air offensives and peace talks after the restoration of South Korea in spring 1951 would have put greater pressure than OTL on the hard-pressed Chinese Communists than the OTL situation of stopping attempts to take ground as soon as peace talks began. While monthly US-ROK casualties would have remained higher, the Communist side likely had fewer unplayed cards left to commit to the fight with risking higher level US responses. The most likely result of a continued offensive approach, including reinforcement on the ground if necessary, would have been either more North Korean terrain seized, and held, by US-ROK forces for the duration of the war, or the Communist side soon agreeing to an armistice on the US’s preferred terms regarding POW repatriation”
Breaking down the original components in more detail:
Some examples of escalated tactical ROE, not pursued, could be, permission to bomb bridges over the Yalu river.
Examples of operational schemes of maneuver, not pursued, could be, continued campaigns of maneuver to advance against and destroy Chinese Volunteer forces and residual forces by ground offensives with deep maneuver as well as air and artillery delivered firepower, even after the US-ROK forces reached front-line north of Seoul and the 38th parallel in early 1951.
Additional example of escalation simply could be use of additional available maneuver units at that time, assuming greater risk in inactive theaters around the globe, or incrementally adding more ground force and tactical air as long as the war continued and forces could be generated.
More Korean land under US-ROK occupation/control at time of armistice or peace treaty is pretty self-evident, with the range including minor northward movement of the front line a few miles, tens of miles, or up to artillery range of Pyongyang, or up to just past Pyongyang, or up to the ever-hankered for “narrow-waist” of the Korean peninsula, or the Yalu and Tumen rivers, basically the entirety of North Korea.
Achieving armistice or peace treaty in a shorter amount of time is also pretty self-evident. The important thing is to not gain it by making any diplomatic concessions (on issues beyond Korea, or promises related to Korea’s future, or on the US presence in Korea, on the voluntary POW repatriation issue) that were not made in OTL.
The Communist side had escalatory options too. While not publicized during the Truman Administration, during the JCS – MacArthur hearings, the Joint Chiefs challenged the view, publicly espoused by MacArthur and his supporters, that in the Korean War, *only* the United States was restraining itself from using all powers at its disposal and the Communist powers, North Korea, Communist China, and the USSR, simply were not, committing all available power. Or at least that only America restraining “relevant” or effective power, with the Communists only not doing things because they would be militarily ineffective, or quickly overmatched by superior US response.
Many discussions of the early Cold War by pop history enthusiasts in the USA, proceed on this assumption, which, to be fair, if you allow for a nuclear war, of unlimited duration and national capabilities of both the western and eastern world in 1950-1953, the west *is* favored to win, if your value of winning is to damage the other guy more than vice versa.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed back on the MacArthur narrative of dismissing Communist ability to counter-escalate in operationally or strategically relevant ways.
-The Chinese could, as a first step, simply add more men and weapons, although at some point that might hit diminishing returns.
-The Communists could lift their restraints on flying aircraft over, past Allied lines, and conducting air to ground attacks on forces and force HQs and operational logistics in Korea.
-The Communists could mount air attacks on the visible and known limited number of port and airfield facilities the whole US and Allied operation in Korea depended on, through Pusan, Inchon and Seoul.
-Now the above might be difficult or highly attritional of the number of aircraft and pilots the Chinese and North Koreans were currently engaging, but the number of Soviet aircraft in the Far East that could be painted over in Chinese markings, accompanied by Soviet pilots, was a much larger number, with a higher degree of training.
-With Soviet air support, disguised or undisguised, targets in Okinawa and Japan, important for US forces in Korea logistics could be attacked.
- The Chinese, using large available forces on other frontiers, could widen the war to other theaters, like Taiwan – though that would be a dumb one, heavily to their disadvantage, or to Indochina in Southeast Asia, playing more to their advantages
- The sizeable, well-armed, well-trained, professional maneuver Soviet forces in the Far Eastern military district, and large tactical air forces could intervene in the Korean battlefield in a manner that would probably tip the conventional balance there, before major US reinforcements or replacement could reach the peninsula
-This is not even mentioning Soviet conventional and tactical air superiority in Central Europe and the Middle East.
Of course, all sorts of steps altering the parameters, especially undeniable Soviet combat participation, spread of fighting to new fronts, naturally would bring about reconsideration of no nuclear weapons use strictures. But the list of various forces and options on the Communist side is merely to illustrate that side is not helpless in the face of any or every type of western escalation in Korea or around Korea.
To unpack that monstrosity of a question, I will define some examples.
First for the overall question, then for its specific components.
For the overall question, one legit answer could be: “No, under the conditions described, the US-ROK side got the best deal it could have gotten, period. The deal it got could not have been made to “ripen” any earlier than it did, summer 1953, without US-ROK diplomatic concessions to the other side. Any attempts to force an “improved” outcome, or a faster outcome, by greater investment of US conventional military effort and/or more unrestrained US offensive operations in the theater, would have been entirely negated, if not worse, by matching escalation by the Chinese Communist side with its unlimited manpower, if not by the Soviet Union, with its own ability to intervene inside or outside the Korean theater.”
Or, another legit answer might be: “Yes, under the conditions described, continued northward-directed ground offensives to complement US-ROK air offensives and peace talks after the restoration of South Korea in spring 1951 would have put greater pressure than OTL on the hard-pressed Chinese Communists than the OTL situation of stopping attempts to take ground as soon as peace talks began. While monthly US-ROK casualties would have remained higher, the Communist side likely had fewer unplayed cards left to commit to the fight with risking higher level US responses. The most likely result of a continued offensive approach, including reinforcement on the ground if necessary, would have been either more North Korean terrain seized, and held, by US-ROK forces for the duration of the war, or the Communist side soon agreeing to an armistice on the US’s preferred terms regarding POW repatriation”
Breaking down the original components in more detail:
Some examples of escalated tactical ROE, not pursued, could be, permission to bomb bridges over the Yalu river.
Examples of operational schemes of maneuver, not pursued, could be, continued campaigns of maneuver to advance against and destroy Chinese Volunteer forces and residual forces by ground offensives with deep maneuver as well as air and artillery delivered firepower, even after the US-ROK forces reached front-line north of Seoul and the 38th parallel in early 1951.
Additional example of escalation simply could be use of additional available maneuver units at that time, assuming greater risk in inactive theaters around the globe, or incrementally adding more ground force and tactical air as long as the war continued and forces could be generated.
More Korean land under US-ROK occupation/control at time of armistice or peace treaty is pretty self-evident, with the range including minor northward movement of the front line a few miles, tens of miles, or up to artillery range of Pyongyang, or up to just past Pyongyang, or up to the ever-hankered for “narrow-waist” of the Korean peninsula, or the Yalu and Tumen rivers, basically the entirety of North Korea.
Achieving armistice or peace treaty in a shorter amount of time is also pretty self-evident. The important thing is to not gain it by making any diplomatic concessions (on issues beyond Korea, or promises related to Korea’s future, or on the US presence in Korea, on the voluntary POW repatriation issue) that were not made in OTL.
The Communist side had escalatory options too. While not publicized during the Truman Administration, during the JCS – MacArthur hearings, the Joint Chiefs challenged the view, publicly espoused by MacArthur and his supporters, that in the Korean War, *only* the United States was restraining itself from using all powers at its disposal and the Communist powers, North Korea, Communist China, and the USSR, simply were not, committing all available power. Or at least that only America restraining “relevant” or effective power, with the Communists only not doing things because they would be militarily ineffective, or quickly overmatched by superior US response.
Many discussions of the early Cold War by pop history enthusiasts in the USA, proceed on this assumption, which, to be fair, if you allow for a nuclear war, of unlimited duration and national capabilities of both the western and eastern world in 1950-1953, the west *is* favored to win, if your value of winning is to damage the other guy more than vice versa.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pushed back on the MacArthur narrative of dismissing Communist ability to counter-escalate in operationally or strategically relevant ways.
-The Chinese could, as a first step, simply add more men and weapons, although at some point that might hit diminishing returns.
-The Communists could lift their restraints on flying aircraft over, past Allied lines, and conducting air to ground attacks on forces and force HQs and operational logistics in Korea.
-The Communists could mount air attacks on the visible and known limited number of port and airfield facilities the whole US and Allied operation in Korea depended on, through Pusan, Inchon and Seoul.
-Now the above might be difficult or highly attritional of the number of aircraft and pilots the Chinese and North Koreans were currently engaging, but the number of Soviet aircraft in the Far East that could be painted over in Chinese markings, accompanied by Soviet pilots, was a much larger number, with a higher degree of training.
-With Soviet air support, disguised or undisguised, targets in Okinawa and Japan, important for US forces in Korea logistics could be attacked.
- The Chinese, using large available forces on other frontiers, could widen the war to other theaters, like Taiwan – though that would be a dumb one, heavily to their disadvantage, or to Indochina in Southeast Asia, playing more to their advantages
- The sizeable, well-armed, well-trained, professional maneuver Soviet forces in the Far Eastern military district, and large tactical air forces could intervene in the Korean battlefield in a manner that would probably tip the conventional balance there, before major US reinforcements or replacement could reach the peninsula
-This is not even mentioning Soviet conventional and tactical air superiority in Central Europe and the Middle East.
Of course, all sorts of steps altering the parameters, especially undeniable Soviet combat participation, spread of fighting to new fronts, naturally would bring about reconsideration of no nuclear weapons use strictures. But the list of various forces and options on the Communist side is merely to illustrate that side is not helpless in the face of any or every type of western escalation in Korea or around Korea.