General Timeline from Russian victory in Russo-Japanese War
Jan 13, 2024 3:36:01 GMT
stevep and Max Sinister like this
Post by raharris1973 on Jan 13, 2024 3:36:01 GMT
What if Russia won the Russo-Japanese War? What consequences might flow from that?
Part 1. - How Russia wins/"wins" the war: Like in the real world, the war opens up in February 1904 with the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur.
The differences start in that while the initial Japanese attack is effective at damaging, disabling and sinking multiple Russian ships, the sinking of the flagship Petropavlovsk is slower, and this allows Russian Admiral Makarov to escape the sinking ship rather than go down with it after assisting with the rescue of as many crew members as he can. He competently commands the remaining, surviving inferior Russian Pacific fleet vessels in the port, using a fleet-in-being strategy, significantly impeding Imperial Japanese Army maritime resupply to the area right around the port d drawing out the siege of Port Arthur while awaiting the arrival of help from outside.
The second difference is that during the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese siege operations on land are even slower and less optimal than in real life, and General Kodama never makes the key recommendation to field force commander General Nogi to focus on seizing 203 Metre Hill, leading to continued frittering away of the Japanese besieging force on indecisive operations around the port.
Fear of Makarov's 1st Pacific Squadron being able to sortie (to attack Japanese transports, bombard Japanese forces ashore, escape) forces the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet to keep a constant guard around Port Arthur in the East China Sea/Yellow Sea, preventing the fleet from getting the four months of rest and refit it got historically between the surrender of Port Arthur in January 1905 and the battle of Tsushima in May 1905.
In this scenario, the Russian Baltic Fleet, renamed the "Second Pacific Squadron", under Admiral Rozhestvensky would be arriving to the China Seas by April-May after final refueling stops in Cam Ranh Bay, French Indochina.
The more exhausted and less nimble Japanese Combined Fleet under Admiral Togo is unable to catch the Rozhestvensky's fleet (or much of it) at the Tsushima Straits, force it to battle, "cross the T" and destroy it, allowing the clear majority of the force to proceed into the Yellow Sea/Gulf of Zhili, very close to Port Arthur and potential junction with Makarov's First Squadron.
About the same time, Russian General Stoessel's garrison is still holding out in the Port Arthur perimeter against General Nogi's besiegers, but Russian General Kuropatkin is riding down the South Manchuria railway via Shenyang/Mukden with a large army of reinforcements.
[Credit for these tactical/operational points of departure goes to users Captain Seafort and Sekhmet_D from AH.com]
The lack of dramatic defeats or military failures so far has prevented isolated strikes and urban and rural unrest from coalescing into anything that could be called a "revolution" so far in 1905, with no notable events called "Bloody Sunday" in January of that year (spawned by demonstrations effected by the impending/just accomplished fall of Port Arthur). Certainly, the Russian people found the boldness and audacity of the Japanese in their initial attack a bit shocking, and their tenacity thereafter troubling and worth a grudging respect, but the Russians remained confident of victory in the end, while remembering the rule that Russia wins, but seldom wins its victories *fast*, so this "Japanese war" is nothing outside the norm or cause for doubt.
While the Japanese Combined Fleet retains the advantage of an interior position of concentration and unified command, the nearby 1st and 2nd Russian Pacific Squadrons they are sandwiched between in the waters around Port Arthur now *outnumber* the Japanese Combined Fleet. Brutal naval melee fighting and gun duels commence as the Russian Squadrons seek a sortie/break-out and relief of Port Arthur while the Japanese Fleet fights to keep the harbor sealed and the enemy fleets divided.
Japanese maneuver and gunnery is generally better, with them getting better exchange ratios. But the ratios are not very uneven, Crews on many of the Russian ships in both squadrons are both professional and deadly, causing significant damages and irrecoverable losses to Japanese ships that the Japanese, already bleeding blood and treasure, can ill afford.
In the midst of this naval gunnery slugfest, the Japanese are unable to keep their blockade airtight, and some small batches of Russian-chartered blockade running vessels are able to run the blockade to get vitally needed supplies to the Russian garrison, a boost to their well-being, and above all, their morale, by May 15th.
Over the last two weeks of May, with massive casualties on both the Japanese and Russian sides, Kuropatkin's forces are able to break through portions of the IJA siege lines and establish a land corridor to Port Arthur, breaking the Japanese siege.
With the siege broken, unacceptable force attrition levels, increased popular questioning of the war effort and war related sacrifices and taxes, and foreign (British and American) creditors running out of willingness to generously extend yet more credit, the Japanese Cabinet reluctantly sues for peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.
End result - Japan is is utterly exhausted with nothing to show for it, while the Russians have a big pyschological boost, no revolution, a navy, and a much stronger position in the Far East. The big effect will be on the UK. The China Fleet's battleships probably stay there and the Anglo-Russian Entente doesn't happen, which is going to generate a bloody big flock of butterfflies.[credit goes to Captain Seafort for this description]
After hemming and hawing in negotiations for a few months and making demands, everybody keeps their original territory - Russia keeps all Sakhalin and the Port Arthur leased territory, it keeps its timber concession in Korea -- it *does not* get the demand it advanced for the Kurile islands. Japan keeps the Kuriles, *does not* get the exclusive rights over Korea it demands. Both sides exchange POWs unconditionally. Both sides reluctantly accept that the other side will not be paying the indemnity or damage claims they advanced.
[credit goes to Captain Seafort for this description]
----
Part 2. – The Aftermath of the War
Since readers are probably super-curious about what this means for Japan and its militarism, I will answer that first. Japan’s military and naval confidence is much dimmed, as is its confidence in the Emperor system. There is much more political discontent, questioning, and instability. Japan is certainly not going full “third world”, going “de-industrial” or getting colonized, but it’s international status is getting knocked down a couple pegs, not quite down to (just) independent Siam status, but along the lines of say definitely independent, but not a major power, like the interwar Turkish Republic, or Argentina, or Brazil, level.
Japan has its home islands, Ryukyus and Taiwan and continues to try to dominate Korea, and it maintains modern Army and Navy forces despite the costs. But it has a heavy debt burden to Britain and the USA at the same time it needs to modernize and replenish many of its ships and weapons. It exports silks, pearls, seafood, and cheap, labor-intensive manufactures, wherever there is a niche and an open market, plus many Japanese work abroad.
The defeat of Japan in the Russian war dims its luster in Asia as an example, but only slightly. No one really expected Japan to win. It is still admired for adopting industry and technology, for having the guts to attack Russia, and for surviving to tell the tale as an independent country.
Japan keeps its alliance with Britain. Japan still wants it, Britain doesn’t want it to sink into oblivion.
Despite the desires of radical militarist/navalist factions, there is *not* a broad/wide *popular* and elite consensus on preparing for a war revenge on Russia or anyone else in this generation. But there is support for strong national defense and for continuing to assert the national interest in Korea.
Korea remains the most vexing foreign policy problem. Really as much, or more because of Korean initiative rather than Russian, Russia remains heavily involved in Korea as a counter-vailing influence to Japan and this is a check on any ambitions to outright annex Korea or make Japanese influence exclusive of all others.
With Japan deflated by its loss in the war, Russia is responsive to Korean outreach and patronizes the Korean monarchy with aid and investment. Lacking the full suite of financial and technological tools, Russia permits and encourages countries considered pro-Russian/anti-Japanese, like France and Germany, to invest in Korean development, while Russia takes its profits and Japan seethes. Like in OTL, American Protestant missionaries have gradually building success among Koreans that, per capita, outstrips their success among the Chinese or Japanese peoples.
………..but Japan’s loss in the war really does relegate Northeast Asia to the geopolitical backdrop and shadows, and puts much more of the spotlight on other regions of the world soon…
For Russia, spared defeat and revolution, autocracy can happily proceed without “silly” innovations like a Constitution, Duma, or reforms to the communal landholding system. Some marginal improvements can be made to the Army, and the Navy, and Trans-Siberian railway communications, based on revealed shortfalls, but pressure for reforms is less than in the real world. Without OTL’s revolutionary disturbances continuing from 1905 through 1907 in Russia’s cities, towns, factories, mines, and rural areas (and Poland), numbers of men held in military service in European Russia should be a bit less.
Russia should be a bit more confident abroad on all fronts, while not having a specific, immediate, aggressive/expansive agenda, in the circa 1906-1907 timeframe. It may not be particularly embittered against Britain, but it doesn’t see much reason to sacrifice anything for her friendship, it is doing alright on its own and with France’s friendship.
--Western Europe – France and Britain –
During the Russo-Japanese War, France and Britain each cheer their respective ally, but neither want to get drawn into war on behalf of those allies. So they stay in close diplomatic communication. The French, with aspirations to expand in Morocco, and the British, who would like people (France) to stop questioning their role in Egypt, also have colonial matters to discuss, and since Britain is already concerned about imperial frontier conflict with Russia in Asia, it would really like to close the book on similar conflicts with France in Africa and elsewhere.
Like OTL, this all leads to the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale.
The fact that in this scenario, Russia rather than Japan wins their mutual war does not change the motives and outcome for each Anglo-French side.
With Japan weakened and Russia unchecked in the Pacific, Britain has just as much need of a pacified France as ever. While France can be confident in its Russian ally’s strength, removing British obstacles in Morocco is still handy, there’s nothing more to be gained by badgering Britain, and its aware potential hostility with both Britain and Germany is a poor fit with France’s aging/shrinking demographics.
--Western Europe – Germany and Austria-Hungary –
The Japanese attack seems to vindicate the Kaiser and German government’s policy going back to 1895 of encouraging Russia to focus on the Far East. The Russians stood guard against the “yellow peril” over the last decade. British ‘race traitors’ armed and encouraged the Japanese, and they sneaked attacked the Russians, but the Russians held them off and triumphed in the end. It was only a pity that the Dogger Bank incident did not bring Britain and Russia to blows, which only would have further increased German influence and opportunities. The global outlook remained generally positive. Investments in colonies were paying off, the fleet was growing, the economy and German science was growing. Russia’s status quo agreements with the Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans appeared to be holding, and Russia’s work in the Far and Middle East (Persia) appears undone. Japan was wounded but able and Russia needed to continuing armoring up its Far East and Manchuria, develop Korea, and work with Germany on the uplift of China.
In 1905 a dark spot was the French jostling themselves to an exclusive preferred position in Morocco, against international treaties, and most powers being indifferent to it. French Foreign Minister Delcasse seemed to be making side deals with everyone to get acquiescence to his dirty game. The Germans didn’t know whether to be insulted (for not being important enough?) or flattered (for being known to be too honorable for crooked deals?) for the French not approaching *them* about a side deal.
Germany voiced some diplomatic protests over France’s moves in Morocco, and held discussions with other powers. It found a remarkable lack of interest in Russia (no surprise), Britain (odd), Italy (odd), Spain, the USA in applying joint pressure on France to respect the Sultan’s sovereignty. Only the usual suspect (Austria-Hungary) lined up right behind Germany. Without a broad diplomatic coalition Germany mainly responded with complaints, protests, some forwarding of claims for compensation in other colonial spheres for any French unilateral advantage, and scarcely publicized commercial/financial/tariff counter-measures against the French. The Moroccan matters were resolved for the year with the French increasing their de facto control, while providing some rhetorical pledges to Germany, and all the other powers, about respecting the Sultan’s ultimate powers and commercial opportunity for all, and scarecely any real concrete compensation for anyone else. The Moroccan issues/discussions could scarcely be called a ‘crisis’ and did not involve German threats of war, menacing naval deployments or troop mobilizations on the French border. Delcasse happily remained the French Foreign Minister throughout.
The reason the Morocco affair was such a relatively low-tension ‘nothingburger’ compared to the crisis of real world 1905 is simple. Without Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War (notably first Port Arthur, then later Tsushima) and internal revolution and disorder, it simply never occurs to the German government that this diplomatic dispute is rendering Russia helpless in Europe and thus providing a golden opportunity to put unprecedented pressure on France to force concessions undermining her diplomatic position. On the contrary, Russia may be slightly distracted, but she is seen as standing strong and fully capable of helping France in Europe in this scenario. So, no temptation to play brinkmanship with France.
The lack of this Morocco Crisis of 1905 (in which France was frightened, but ultimately came out feeling supported and like a winner) is France is not so patriotically enthused confident with its anti-German sentiments given renewed fuel. Additionally, without the German threatening tone that year, France is a little more militarily complacent*, somewhat reducing draft intakes and modernization budgets over 1906, 1907, 1908. In OTL 1906 Germany had 24,353 more peacetime effectives than France, France was 4% inferior to Germany, in OTL 1908 Germany had 8,083 more effectives than France, France was 1.3% inferior to Germany. In this ATL, because of the differences, in 1906 Germany has 34,612 more effectives than France, making France 5.4% inferior to Germany, and in 1908 Germany has 42,712 more effectives than France, making France 7% inferior to Germany
*An equal or larger reason for relative French military complacency is the apparent greater Russian strength overall.
Austria-Hungary –
To whatever degree Austro-Hungarian military spending was responsive, up or down, to perceived fluctuations in Russian military/threat or strength here, there is a lack of complacency and greater seriousness and potentially more funding of Austro-Hungarian forces in 1906-1910 because of it.
But it is not that clear how responsive the dual monarchy’s defense budget *was* to external threat, it remained pretty low, and Hungarian unwillingness to pay tax was a major limiting factor that was fairly constant.
Southern Europe – Italy and the Ottoman Empire –
For the moment, this is similar to OTL from 1905-06 on. Italy is formally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it made an Entente with France in 1902, promising to support France over Morocco in return for French support for eventual acquisition of Libya. Italy does not make immediate haste to seize Libya however, and in either 1908 or 1909 it will face the devastating Messina earthquake in Sicily.
For the moment the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdulhamid II has decent relations with the Russians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians and the French who loan him a great deal of money. His relations with the British are not exactly terrible most of the time as in the 1905-1908 timeframe the Armenian issue is relatively quiet. The Akaba/Straits of Tiran Crisis/Affair is a relatively small dispute with Britain where the two sides posture over the border between Ottoman Palestine and Egyptian Palestine, but it is settled by compromise without fighting.
The Great Game – Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia – 1905-1908
Russia is too powerful and assertive in East Asia and South Asia and on the seas for Britain’s comfort, and its victory in the Russo-Japanese War only confirms this. The Dogger Bank incident of accidental Russian firing on British fishing trawlers during the Russo-Japanese War didn’t help matters. The Russians didn’t appreciate all the tech help and loans from Britain to Japan.
Britain sees Russia as a threat to the China market and India, nervously watching Afghanistan and Persia. Britain dislikes Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II for two reasons, he’s a bloody tyrant and he gets along too well with the Russians. In a more ideal situation for Britain, both Turkey and Russia would be more internally liberal, friendly with Britain, but antagonistic with each other.
Russia lacks any urgency to make a compromise with Britain, it would like to increase its influence in Korea and China, including locations on the margin of China like Tibet – it at least doesn’t want to leave it a British monopoly. Likewise Russia is loath to leave Afghanistan a British monopoly, and Russia would like to extend its economic, military, naval influence over its Persian neighbor and its commercial and diplomatic influence somewhat into the Persian Gulf to emirates like Kuwait.
These clashing aspirations forestall any Anglo-Russian Entente like the one in OTL.
They also re-color Britain’s whole global perspective on European security and naval threats.
While the German fleet is technologically more sophisticated, and growing, the Russian fleet is still large, combat experienced, basically professional, and at least in combination with the French almost as menacing as any German threat.
In terms of risk of continental hegemony, Europe seems far more at risk of Russo-French hegemony than Austro-German, with the Russians having the largest, and thus far, demonstrably unchecked, Army.
While not throwing away its colonial compromise Entente with France, Britain will be inclined to view the Triple Alliance powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Germany as a vital balance to excessive (Franco)-Russian power.
[all this postwar stuff is my own ideas]
Part 1. - How Russia wins/"wins" the war: Like in the real world, the war opens up in February 1904 with the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian naval base at Port Arthur.
The differences start in that while the initial Japanese attack is effective at damaging, disabling and sinking multiple Russian ships, the sinking of the flagship Petropavlovsk is slower, and this allows Russian Admiral Makarov to escape the sinking ship rather than go down with it after assisting with the rescue of as many crew members as he can. He competently commands the remaining, surviving inferior Russian Pacific fleet vessels in the port, using a fleet-in-being strategy, significantly impeding Imperial Japanese Army maritime resupply to the area right around the port d drawing out the siege of Port Arthur while awaiting the arrival of help from outside.
The second difference is that during the siege of Port Arthur, Japanese siege operations on land are even slower and less optimal than in real life, and General Kodama never makes the key recommendation to field force commander General Nogi to focus on seizing 203 Metre Hill, leading to continued frittering away of the Japanese besieging force on indecisive operations around the port.
Fear of Makarov's 1st Pacific Squadron being able to sortie (to attack Japanese transports, bombard Japanese forces ashore, escape) forces the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet to keep a constant guard around Port Arthur in the East China Sea/Yellow Sea, preventing the fleet from getting the four months of rest and refit it got historically between the surrender of Port Arthur in January 1905 and the battle of Tsushima in May 1905.
In this scenario, the Russian Baltic Fleet, renamed the "Second Pacific Squadron", under Admiral Rozhestvensky would be arriving to the China Seas by April-May after final refueling stops in Cam Ranh Bay, French Indochina.
The more exhausted and less nimble Japanese Combined Fleet under Admiral Togo is unable to catch the Rozhestvensky's fleet (or much of it) at the Tsushima Straits, force it to battle, "cross the T" and destroy it, allowing the clear majority of the force to proceed into the Yellow Sea/Gulf of Zhili, very close to Port Arthur and potential junction with Makarov's First Squadron.
About the same time, Russian General Stoessel's garrison is still holding out in the Port Arthur perimeter against General Nogi's besiegers, but Russian General Kuropatkin is riding down the South Manchuria railway via Shenyang/Mukden with a large army of reinforcements.
[Credit for these tactical/operational points of departure goes to users Captain Seafort and Sekhmet_D from AH.com]
The lack of dramatic defeats or military failures so far has prevented isolated strikes and urban and rural unrest from coalescing into anything that could be called a "revolution" so far in 1905, with no notable events called "Bloody Sunday" in January of that year (spawned by demonstrations effected by the impending/just accomplished fall of Port Arthur). Certainly, the Russian people found the boldness and audacity of the Japanese in their initial attack a bit shocking, and their tenacity thereafter troubling and worth a grudging respect, but the Russians remained confident of victory in the end, while remembering the rule that Russia wins, but seldom wins its victories *fast*, so this "Japanese war" is nothing outside the norm or cause for doubt.
While the Japanese Combined Fleet retains the advantage of an interior position of concentration and unified command, the nearby 1st and 2nd Russian Pacific Squadrons they are sandwiched between in the waters around Port Arthur now *outnumber* the Japanese Combined Fleet. Brutal naval melee fighting and gun duels commence as the Russian Squadrons seek a sortie/break-out and relief of Port Arthur while the Japanese Fleet fights to keep the harbor sealed and the enemy fleets divided.
Japanese maneuver and gunnery is generally better, with them getting better exchange ratios. But the ratios are not very uneven, Crews on many of the Russian ships in both squadrons are both professional and deadly, causing significant damages and irrecoverable losses to Japanese ships that the Japanese, already bleeding blood and treasure, can ill afford.
In the midst of this naval gunnery slugfest, the Japanese are unable to keep their blockade airtight, and some small batches of Russian-chartered blockade running vessels are able to run the blockade to get vitally needed supplies to the Russian garrison, a boost to their well-being, and above all, their morale, by May 15th.
Over the last two weeks of May, with massive casualties on both the Japanese and Russian sides, Kuropatkin's forces are able to break through portions of the IJA siege lines and establish a land corridor to Port Arthur, breaking the Japanese siege.
With the siege broken, unacceptable force attrition levels, increased popular questioning of the war effort and war related sacrifices and taxes, and foreign (British and American) creditors running out of willingness to generously extend yet more credit, the Japanese Cabinet reluctantly sues for peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum.
End result - Japan is is utterly exhausted with nothing to show for it, while the Russians have a big pyschological boost, no revolution, a navy, and a much stronger position in the Far East. The big effect will be on the UK. The China Fleet's battleships probably stay there and the Anglo-Russian Entente doesn't happen, which is going to generate a bloody big flock of butterfflies.[credit goes to Captain Seafort for this description]
After hemming and hawing in negotiations for a few months and making demands, everybody keeps their original territory - Russia keeps all Sakhalin and the Port Arthur leased territory, it keeps its timber concession in Korea -- it *does not* get the demand it advanced for the Kurile islands. Japan keeps the Kuriles, *does not* get the exclusive rights over Korea it demands. Both sides exchange POWs unconditionally. Both sides reluctantly accept that the other side will not be paying the indemnity or damage claims they advanced.
[credit goes to Captain Seafort for this description]
----
Part 2. – The Aftermath of the War
Since readers are probably super-curious about what this means for Japan and its militarism, I will answer that first. Japan’s military and naval confidence is much dimmed, as is its confidence in the Emperor system. There is much more political discontent, questioning, and instability. Japan is certainly not going full “third world”, going “de-industrial” or getting colonized, but it’s international status is getting knocked down a couple pegs, not quite down to (just) independent Siam status, but along the lines of say definitely independent, but not a major power, like the interwar Turkish Republic, or Argentina, or Brazil, level.
Japan has its home islands, Ryukyus and Taiwan and continues to try to dominate Korea, and it maintains modern Army and Navy forces despite the costs. But it has a heavy debt burden to Britain and the USA at the same time it needs to modernize and replenish many of its ships and weapons. It exports silks, pearls, seafood, and cheap, labor-intensive manufactures, wherever there is a niche and an open market, plus many Japanese work abroad.
The defeat of Japan in the Russian war dims its luster in Asia as an example, but only slightly. No one really expected Japan to win. It is still admired for adopting industry and technology, for having the guts to attack Russia, and for surviving to tell the tale as an independent country.
Japan keeps its alliance with Britain. Japan still wants it, Britain doesn’t want it to sink into oblivion.
Despite the desires of radical militarist/navalist factions, there is *not* a broad/wide *popular* and elite consensus on preparing for a war revenge on Russia or anyone else in this generation. But there is support for strong national defense and for continuing to assert the national interest in Korea.
Korea remains the most vexing foreign policy problem. Really as much, or more because of Korean initiative rather than Russian, Russia remains heavily involved in Korea as a counter-vailing influence to Japan and this is a check on any ambitions to outright annex Korea or make Japanese influence exclusive of all others.
With Japan deflated by its loss in the war, Russia is responsive to Korean outreach and patronizes the Korean monarchy with aid and investment. Lacking the full suite of financial and technological tools, Russia permits and encourages countries considered pro-Russian/anti-Japanese, like France and Germany, to invest in Korean development, while Russia takes its profits and Japan seethes. Like in OTL, American Protestant missionaries have gradually building success among Koreans that, per capita, outstrips their success among the Chinese or Japanese peoples.
………..but Japan’s loss in the war really does relegate Northeast Asia to the geopolitical backdrop and shadows, and puts much more of the spotlight on other regions of the world soon…
For Russia, spared defeat and revolution, autocracy can happily proceed without “silly” innovations like a Constitution, Duma, or reforms to the communal landholding system. Some marginal improvements can be made to the Army, and the Navy, and Trans-Siberian railway communications, based on revealed shortfalls, but pressure for reforms is less than in the real world. Without OTL’s revolutionary disturbances continuing from 1905 through 1907 in Russia’s cities, towns, factories, mines, and rural areas (and Poland), numbers of men held in military service in European Russia should be a bit less.
Russia should be a bit more confident abroad on all fronts, while not having a specific, immediate, aggressive/expansive agenda, in the circa 1906-1907 timeframe. It may not be particularly embittered against Britain, but it doesn’t see much reason to sacrifice anything for her friendship, it is doing alright on its own and with France’s friendship.
--Western Europe – France and Britain –
During the Russo-Japanese War, France and Britain each cheer their respective ally, but neither want to get drawn into war on behalf of those allies. So they stay in close diplomatic communication. The French, with aspirations to expand in Morocco, and the British, who would like people (France) to stop questioning their role in Egypt, also have colonial matters to discuss, and since Britain is already concerned about imperial frontier conflict with Russia in Asia, it would really like to close the book on similar conflicts with France in Africa and elsewhere.
Like OTL, this all leads to the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale.
The fact that in this scenario, Russia rather than Japan wins their mutual war does not change the motives and outcome for each Anglo-French side.
With Japan weakened and Russia unchecked in the Pacific, Britain has just as much need of a pacified France as ever. While France can be confident in its Russian ally’s strength, removing British obstacles in Morocco is still handy, there’s nothing more to be gained by badgering Britain, and its aware potential hostility with both Britain and Germany is a poor fit with France’s aging/shrinking demographics.
--Western Europe – Germany and Austria-Hungary –
The Japanese attack seems to vindicate the Kaiser and German government’s policy going back to 1895 of encouraging Russia to focus on the Far East. The Russians stood guard against the “yellow peril” over the last decade. British ‘race traitors’ armed and encouraged the Japanese, and they sneaked attacked the Russians, but the Russians held them off and triumphed in the end. It was only a pity that the Dogger Bank incident did not bring Britain and Russia to blows, which only would have further increased German influence and opportunities. The global outlook remained generally positive. Investments in colonies were paying off, the fleet was growing, the economy and German science was growing. Russia’s status quo agreements with the Austro-Hungarians and Ottomans appeared to be holding, and Russia’s work in the Far and Middle East (Persia) appears undone. Japan was wounded but able and Russia needed to continuing armoring up its Far East and Manchuria, develop Korea, and work with Germany on the uplift of China.
In 1905 a dark spot was the French jostling themselves to an exclusive preferred position in Morocco, against international treaties, and most powers being indifferent to it. French Foreign Minister Delcasse seemed to be making side deals with everyone to get acquiescence to his dirty game. The Germans didn’t know whether to be insulted (for not being important enough?) or flattered (for being known to be too honorable for crooked deals?) for the French not approaching *them* about a side deal.
Germany voiced some diplomatic protests over France’s moves in Morocco, and held discussions with other powers. It found a remarkable lack of interest in Russia (no surprise), Britain (odd), Italy (odd), Spain, the USA in applying joint pressure on France to respect the Sultan’s sovereignty. Only the usual suspect (Austria-Hungary) lined up right behind Germany. Without a broad diplomatic coalition Germany mainly responded with complaints, protests, some forwarding of claims for compensation in other colonial spheres for any French unilateral advantage, and scarcely publicized commercial/financial/tariff counter-measures against the French. The Moroccan matters were resolved for the year with the French increasing their de facto control, while providing some rhetorical pledges to Germany, and all the other powers, about respecting the Sultan’s ultimate powers and commercial opportunity for all, and scarecely any real concrete compensation for anyone else. The Moroccan issues/discussions could scarcely be called a ‘crisis’ and did not involve German threats of war, menacing naval deployments or troop mobilizations on the French border. Delcasse happily remained the French Foreign Minister throughout.
The reason the Morocco affair was such a relatively low-tension ‘nothingburger’ compared to the crisis of real world 1905 is simple. Without Russian defeats in the Russo-Japanese War (notably first Port Arthur, then later Tsushima) and internal revolution and disorder, it simply never occurs to the German government that this diplomatic dispute is rendering Russia helpless in Europe and thus providing a golden opportunity to put unprecedented pressure on France to force concessions undermining her diplomatic position. On the contrary, Russia may be slightly distracted, but she is seen as standing strong and fully capable of helping France in Europe in this scenario. So, no temptation to play brinkmanship with France.
The lack of this Morocco Crisis of 1905 (in which France was frightened, but ultimately came out feeling supported and like a winner) is France is not so patriotically enthused confident with its anti-German sentiments given renewed fuel. Additionally, without the German threatening tone that year, France is a little more militarily complacent*, somewhat reducing draft intakes and modernization budgets over 1906, 1907, 1908. In OTL 1906 Germany had 24,353 more peacetime effectives than France, France was 4% inferior to Germany, in OTL 1908 Germany had 8,083 more effectives than France, France was 1.3% inferior to Germany. In this ATL, because of the differences, in 1906 Germany has 34,612 more effectives than France, making France 5.4% inferior to Germany, and in 1908 Germany has 42,712 more effectives than France, making France 7% inferior to Germany
*An equal or larger reason for relative French military complacency is the apparent greater Russian strength overall.
Austria-Hungary –
To whatever degree Austro-Hungarian military spending was responsive, up or down, to perceived fluctuations in Russian military/threat or strength here, there is a lack of complacency and greater seriousness and potentially more funding of Austro-Hungarian forces in 1906-1910 because of it.
But it is not that clear how responsive the dual monarchy’s defense budget *was* to external threat, it remained pretty low, and Hungarian unwillingness to pay tax was a major limiting factor that was fairly constant.
Southern Europe – Italy and the Ottoman Empire –
For the moment, this is similar to OTL from 1905-06 on. Italy is formally a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it made an Entente with France in 1902, promising to support France over Morocco in return for French support for eventual acquisition of Libya. Italy does not make immediate haste to seize Libya however, and in either 1908 or 1909 it will face the devastating Messina earthquake in Sicily.
For the moment the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdulhamid II has decent relations with the Russians, Germans, Austro-Hungarians and the French who loan him a great deal of money. His relations with the British are not exactly terrible most of the time as in the 1905-1908 timeframe the Armenian issue is relatively quiet. The Akaba/Straits of Tiran Crisis/Affair is a relatively small dispute with Britain where the two sides posture over the border between Ottoman Palestine and Egyptian Palestine, but it is settled by compromise without fighting.
The Great Game – Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia – 1905-1908
Russia is too powerful and assertive in East Asia and South Asia and on the seas for Britain’s comfort, and its victory in the Russo-Japanese War only confirms this. The Dogger Bank incident of accidental Russian firing on British fishing trawlers during the Russo-Japanese War didn’t help matters. The Russians didn’t appreciate all the tech help and loans from Britain to Japan.
Britain sees Russia as a threat to the China market and India, nervously watching Afghanistan and Persia. Britain dislikes Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II for two reasons, he’s a bloody tyrant and he gets along too well with the Russians. In a more ideal situation for Britain, both Turkey and Russia would be more internally liberal, friendly with Britain, but antagonistic with each other.
Russia lacks any urgency to make a compromise with Britain, it would like to increase its influence in Korea and China, including locations on the margin of China like Tibet – it at least doesn’t want to leave it a British monopoly. Likewise Russia is loath to leave Afghanistan a British monopoly, and Russia would like to extend its economic, military, naval influence over its Persian neighbor and its commercial and diplomatic influence somewhat into the Persian Gulf to emirates like Kuwait.
These clashing aspirations forestall any Anglo-Russian Entente like the one in OTL.
They also re-color Britain’s whole global perspective on European security and naval threats.
While the German fleet is technologically more sophisticated, and growing, the Russian fleet is still large, combat experienced, basically professional, and at least in combination with the French almost as menacing as any German threat.
In terms of risk of continental hegemony, Europe seems far more at risk of Russo-French hegemony than Austro-German, with the Russians having the largest, and thus far, demonstrably unchecked, Army.
While not throwing away its colonial compromise Entente with France, Britain will be inclined to view the Triple Alliance powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Germany as a vital balance to excessive (Franco)-Russian power.
[all this postwar stuff is my own ideas]
