stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 8, 2024 20:09:19 GMT
Some interesting arguments and information and I would agree that the US is likely to have less immigrants, although possibly more from Latin America compared to OTL to make up some of the shortfall from other areas. However a number of questions.
a) The US could go the way you suggest, although it could also go different ways. Adapting the policies and viewpoints of a bitter rival could occur but it could go other ways. Your likely to have a more interventionist government with a stronger social involvement but that could also be more in the British or Scandinavia form of social services than going the Nazi type route. As you say OTL they went for a more liberal international stance and related immigration policy to gain general international support against their prime opponent of the USSR. They could do a similar process here to differentiate themselves from a markedly more powerful totalitarian threat and win support in what we term the 3rd world.
b) If the allies make peace with the European Axis in 43 which would free up huge amounts of resources for them I can't see Japan lasting until 47. It could still last into 45 given the need to build up the infrastructure for the USN to wage war across the Pacific to devastate the Japanese heartland but its likely that it would still go down in 45 or late 44. Its possible that this could be costlier for the allies and especially the US as the earlier ending of the war might mean that there's no time to develop nukes - although there could be an even greater incentive for working on it here with fears about what the Nazis are doing - or the B-29 so it could end up with a very bloody invasion of Japan and also of other areas such as Malaya and parts of the DEI or FIC. However don't see any incentive for Japan to last any later than OTL let alone to 47.
c) If Germany and the western powers were to make peace in 43 and given how well Germany has done in your proposal I doubt that Hitler would be willing to make peace with the Soviets given his racial and political views. He might be persuaded ultimately or things go on until his death and then the sheer logistical problems of pushing beyond the Urals and controlling territory. I would expect any rump Soviet/Russian state to while territoriality large be relatively weak in terms of population and industrial base. It could well lose much of Central Asia even without German occupation of those regions because its too weak to oppose independence movements in those areas.
d) I'm also doubtful of European colonization lasting markedly longer, unless you mean that under the agreement pro-German states, i.e. Vichy and other puppet governments taking over their colonies and those being supported by German military power to last longer. I doubt this would be accepted by the western allies and especially not by the US. Its always opposed European colonialism, if often for national economic interests and its unlikely to tolerate such puppet governments obtaining power over large areas of Africa. [E Asia being out of the view anyway as FIC and the DEI are under Japanese occupation and they wouldn't be willing to allow the transfer to the former colonial rulers of those regions, especially if Germany has made a separate peace that leaves them hanging].
As such the US would see no reason to allow any rump governments in exile for France, Belgium or the Netherlands to try an restore control over their colonies once Japan was defeated. Its much better politically and in their economic interests to support decolonization and seek to win favour in most of the non-developed world as well as make a comparison between their liberal stance and the savage brutality of the fascist ruled regions.
The only possible exception would be the British colonies because Britain is seen as an important if not vital ally. However even here there would be doubts and by this time the situation in India is getting impossible in terms of maintaining any imperial rule. Once Churchill goes, which could be in 43 here after a disastrous war in which Britain has barely maintained it independence I could see an incoming Labour government also quickly recognising that the bulk of the empire is a huge drain on resources while the primary aims are rebuilding Britain's strained economy after the war and maintaining a strong enough military to in alliance with the US secure British independence.
There will be a basis for maintaining a presence in key strategic areas such as parts of the ME and in small areas not yet ready for independence, such as the Caribbean plus the difficult issue of areas in Africa with a significant white settler minority will be a problem. However I could see the bulk of the empire going as fast as OTL and possibly somewhat earlier.
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ewellholmes
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Post by ewellholmes on Aug 9, 2024 5:36:35 GMT
Some interesting arguments and information and I would agree that the US is likely to have less immigrants, although possibly more from Latin America compared to OTL to make up some of the shortfall from other areas. However a number of questions. a) The US could go the way you suggest, although it could also go different ways. Adapting the policies and viewpoints of a bitter rival could occur but it could go other ways. Your likely to have a more interventionist government with a stronger social involvement but that could also be more in the British or Scandinavia form of social services than going the Nazi type route. As you say OTL they went for a more liberal international stance and related immigration policy to gain general international support against their prime opponent of the USSR. They could do a similar process here to differentiate themselves from a markedly more powerful totalitarian threat and win support in what we term the 3rd world. As I said, I think the Post-War United States would pursue a planned system and welfare state like that of the United Kingdom in order to mollify the population. It is on social policy I'm less sure of how things will shake out; it's worth noting the UK even IOTL had very major Anti-Semitic Riots in the 1940s, so keep that in mind. In terms of immigration policy, there is no "push factor" for the United States to do that, which IOTL was forty countries with a quarter of the world's population gaining their independence between 1945 and 1960 and asserting their influence at international forums like the United Nations General Assembly. Most of those nations are going to remain in colonies and, for the ones that do achieve independence in the same timeframe, it's unlikely the UNGA exists, at least as we know it. Furthermore, while increasing their diplomatic outreach in the Third World was the goal of American politicians, the liberalization of immigration laws was sold domestically implicitly on the understanding it would increase skilled immigration from White Europeans given that was where the majority of immigrants up to that point had come from. Given Europe is behind an ATL Iron Curtain, that line is not possible and it would be obvious to American voters such a liberalization would result in increased immigration from places like Latin America or Asia, which was not popular at all. The U.S. didn't commit the majority of its resources into Europe until 1944 IOTL, so that's unchanged here. American planners thought it would take a year to meaningfully shift forces to the Pacific IOTL and their expected timetables for invading Japan expected conflict to continue into 1947. Here too there is no Soviet entry to eliminate the Japanese bastions in Manchuria and Korea, which were still supplying the Home Islands with troops and resources in August of 1945 IOTL. American planners were deeply concerned even historically that they would be enable to bring the war to a decisive close: In one way or another, George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, had long been expecting a sharp reduction in military morale. He had witnessed, as aide-decamp to General John J. Pershing, America's mood after World War I. Once Germany asked for an armistice (and before it signed a surrender), Congress and the public had demanded a swift demobilization. This indelible memory of November 1918 shaped Marshall's resolve to minimize military responsibilities after the Nazi capitulation. In Europe, this meant an end to operations in the eastern Mediterranean, where internal political conflicts and instabilities might require a large and long-term occupation by an army about to be drastically reduced in size. In the Pacific, the Japanese would have to be beaten into a position where their surrender would occur shortly after V-E Day. Otherwise, there might not be a capitulation at all, something Marshall predicted in 1943: "the collapse of Germany would impose partial demobilization and a growing impatience ... throughout the United States." This mood could lead to a compromise settlement along the lines the Japanese Army was hoping to obtain: that is, the retention of the core empire it still occupied (Formosa, Manchuria, and Korea) and no change in the political institutions of Japan.2 America's military timing was exceptionally good, considering the enormous perplexities of the war. When Germany surrendered in May, the United States had already made what Marshall called the "preparation for the final kill." Its armed forces surrounded the home islands of Japan from the south and the east. It had also obtained from Russia a pledge to attack the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, thereby completing the ironclad blockade that the U.S. Navy once planned to execute alone. However, the denial of imports of strategic items, from oil to coal and protein, did not mean that a mere mop-up operation was in the works, Most of the U.S. military, especially the Army, conducted planning on the premise "that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender." Even before Japan strongly reinforced Kyushu, the first home island the United States would invade, the American military calculated that America would still have to conduct the toughest landings and follow-up battles seen in World War II --- actions that would likely result in some 200,000 casualties and 50,000 fatalities.3 Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate of the blockade strategy, would later complain that "the Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan." The flaw in Leahy's argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that orderedwounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4 Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5 Hitler's vision was a border on the Urals, given its natural defensive terrain and the ability to fight constant skirmishes with the Soviets along it to keep the German Army sharp. Whether or not the Soviet Union collapses totally I don't know, but it's outside the scope of this thread I would argue. I precisely mean the German aligned states would keep their colonies and the U.S. has little say in this matter unless it is willing to prolong the war and accept the complete collapse of the Allied position in the Middle East with all that implies. Furthermore, what you're suggesting for the European colonies outside the grasp of Germany and its allies, is the greatest strategic dilemma of the Cold War for the United States with neither options great for Washington: 1) They could take the Anti-Colonial position, which would decisively turn the European allies of Germany against the United States. The UK's actions against Vichy France IOTL had this exact same effect, bringing the two nations to the brink of war and deepening Nazi-Vichy collaboration. Besides increasing German political influence, this would also increase economic control by Berlin, given the only economic option now available for Europe would be a German led trading bloc. 2) They could not take the bait, which would increase their influence in Europe and with the British, but at the cost of support in the Third World. As earlier stated, the Germans had a lot of influence in Latin America and the Middle East historically, so they would be on a level playing field here. For a time, sure. Ultimately, this course is unsustainable for Britain; they would have no captive markets in the form of the Empire nor trade with Europe they sought historically after the collapse of their Empire. Ultimately, they must have one of the other. Hence why I think the long term end result is detente with all that implies for American politics. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 10, 2024 12:05:30 GMT
Some interesting arguments and information and I would agree that the US is likely to have less immigrants, although possibly more from Latin America compared to OTL to make up some of the shortfall from other areas. However a number of questions. a) The US could go the way you suggest, although it could also go different ways. Adapting the policies and viewpoints of a bitter rival could occur but it could go other ways. Your likely to have a more interventionist government with a stronger social involvement but that could also be more in the British or Scandinavia form of social services than going the Nazi type route. As you say OTL they went for a more liberal international stance and related immigration policy to gain general international support against their prime opponent of the USSR. They could do a similar process here to differentiate themselves from a markedly more powerful totalitarian threat and win support in what we term the 3rd world. As I said, I think the Post-War United States would pursue a planned system and welfare state like that of the United Kingdom in order to mollify the population. It is on social policy I'm less sure of how things will shake out; it's worth noting the UK even IOTL had very major Anti-Semitic Riots in the 1940s, so keep that in mind. In terms of immigration policy, there is no "push factor" for the United States to do that, which IOTL was forty countries with a quarter of the world's population gaining their independence between 1945 and 1960 and asserting their influence at international forums like the United Nations General Assembly. Most of those nations are going to remain in colonies and, for the ones that do achieve independence in the same timeframe, it's unlikely the UNGA exists, at least as we know it. Furthermore, while increasing their diplomatic outreach in the Third World was the goal of American politicians, the liberalization of immigration laws was sold domestically implicitly on the understanding it would increase skilled immigration from White Europeans given that was where the majority of immigrants up to that point had come from. Given Europe is behind an ATL Iron Curtain, that line is not possible and it would be obvious to American voters such a liberalization would result in increased immigration from places like Latin America or Asia, which was not popular at all. The U.S. didn't commit the majority of its resources into Europe until 1944 IOTL, so that's unchanged here. American planners thought it would take a year to meaningfully shift forces to the Pacific IOTL and their expected timetables for invading Japan expected conflict to continue into 1947. Here too there is no Soviet entry to eliminate the Japanese bastions in Manchuria and Korea, which were still supplying the Home Islands with troops and resources in August of 1945 IOTL. American planners were deeply concerned even historically that they would be enable to bring the war to a decisive close: In one way or another, George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, had long been expecting a sharp reduction in military morale. He had witnessed, as aide-decamp to General John J. Pershing, America's mood after World War I. Once Germany asked for an armistice (and before it signed a surrender), Congress and the public had demanded a swift demobilization. This indelible memory of November 1918 shaped Marshall's resolve to minimize military responsibilities after the Nazi capitulation. In Europe, this meant an end to operations in the eastern Mediterranean, where internal political conflicts and instabilities might require a large and long-term occupation by an army about to be drastically reduced in size. In the Pacific, the Japanese would have to be beaten into a position where their surrender would occur shortly after V-E Day. Otherwise, there might not be a capitulation at all, something Marshall predicted in 1943: "the collapse of Germany would impose partial demobilization and a growing impatience ... throughout the United States." This mood could lead to a compromise settlement along the lines the Japanese Army was hoping to obtain: that is, the retention of the core empire it still occupied (Formosa, Manchuria, and Korea) and no change in the political institutions of Japan.2 America's military timing was exceptionally good, considering the enormous perplexities of the war. When Germany surrendered in May, the United States had already made what Marshall called the "preparation for the final kill." Its armed forces surrounded the home islands of Japan from the south and the east. It had also obtained from Russia a pledge to attack the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, thereby completing the ironclad blockade that the U.S. Navy once planned to execute alone. However, the denial of imports of strategic items, from oil to coal and protein, did not mean that a mere mop-up operation was in the works, Most of the U.S. military, especially the Army, conducted planning on the premise "that defeat of the enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender." Even before Japan strongly reinforced Kyushu, the first home island the United States would invade, the American military calculated that America would still have to conduct the toughest landings and follow-up battles seen in World War II --- actions that would likely result in some 200,000 casualties and 50,000 fatalities.3 Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an advocate of the blockade strategy, would later complain that "the Army did not appear to be able to understand that the Navy, with some Army air assistance, already had defeated Japan." The flaw in Leahy's argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that orderedwounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4 Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5 Hitler's vision was a border on the Urals, given its natural defensive terrain and the ability to fight constant skirmishes with the Soviets along it to keep the German Army sharp. Whether or not the Soviet Union collapses totally I don't know, but it's outside the scope of this thread I would argue. I precisely mean the German aligned states would keep their colonies and the U.S. has little say in this matter unless it is willing to prolong the war and accept the complete collapse of the Allied position in the Middle East with all that implies. Furthermore, what you're suggesting for the European colonies outside the grasp of Germany and its allies, is the greatest strategic dilemma of the Cold War for the United States with neither options great for Washington: 1) They could take the Anti-Colonial position, which would decisively turn the European allies of Germany against the United States. The UK's actions against Vichy France IOTL had this exact same effect, bringing the two nations to the brink of war and deepening Nazi-Vichy collaboration. Besides increasing German political influence, this would also increase economic control by Berlin, given the only economic option now available for Europe would be a German led trading bloc. 2) They could not take the bait, which would increase their influence in Europe and with the British, but at the cost of support in the Third World. As earlier stated, the Germans had a lot of influence in Latin America and the Middle East historically, so they would be on a level playing field here. For a time, sure. Ultimately, this course is unsustainable for Britain; they would have no captive markets in the form of the Empire nor trade with Europe they sought historically after the collapse of their Empire. Ultimately, they must have one of the other. Hence why I think the long term end result is detente with all that implies for American politics.
a) On possibly US internal policies post-war:- Your rather at sea here. For one thing "a planned system and welfare state" is actually and definitely social policy. For another antisemitism even if it occurs and its likely to continue at low levels doesn't equate to a love of all things fascist. The US may go along a closed nationalist loop where anyone not WASP is viewed as an outsider and possible an enemy but it could quite easily take other routes, which would be reinforced by the drivers of needing more resources and to win support outside Britain and the white dominions.
b) On the allocation of US forces OTL:- The USN especially did steal resources from the European theatre but it never matched that sent to the latter theatre. For logistics reasons among other far less military resources were sent to the Pacific compared to the European theatre. The former did include the big flashy naval battles and amphibious operations but compared to defeating the U boats, the build up in Britain for two years before Overlord was launched, the massive resources put into the strategic bombing campaign and the operations in NW Africa and then Italy.
Plus here your suggesting much of that would be freed up from some time in 43. Furthermore peace with Nazi Germany, even a guarded one, means no actual fighting in the west and hence no losses. No bombing of Britain or need to escort merchant shipping. No blackout or other restrictions. That means a hell of a lot more resources to go to the war against Japan.
Also some of those resources freed up will go to the bomb as there will be fear about the Germans getting it 1st - the mess that were the multiple conflicting nuclear projects in Germany and the gross over-estimation of how much fissile material that would need needed weren't known then. At the very least its going to come at the historical time and coupled with the also historical mass fire-bomb attacks and the mining campaign that meant Japan was facing mass starvation as well as economic collapse. The only factor from OTL to speed up Japanese collapse that won't occur here would be a Soviet attack in strength.
As I said the dramatically more advanced allied position against Japan could mean it ends up more costly for the allies, especially the US. If it means an invasion of Japan in say late 44-early 45 then you could possibly not have the B-29 bombing campaign and very likely nukes but then the US would have avoided its OTL losses in Italy and western Europe.
I could also point to the note you posted about the idea of 250,000 casualties to capture Kyushu - which is still way below that suffered in Europe - ended with a comment:
I could also point out that its the nature of commanders, at least sensible ones, to be cautious in their predictions. Eisenhower himself had a memo planned for reporting the failure of the D-Day landings.
c) Status of Nazi-Russian relations after the west makes a separate peace. Hitler is a very unreliable source as he was all over the place apart from his habitual lying. However he was driven largely by emotions and especially hatred of both communism and Slavs, as well as Jews who in his deluded mindset he thought were the hidden power inside the USSR, as well as elsewhere. Plus for all the Nazis were crap at waging war their ideology glorified it so there is another incentive here for a refusal of any lasting peace - or the pseudo peace your suggesting above. Also the army and air force could well welcome continued fighting in the east as a reason to push for further funding and prestige for their arms.
Also you seem to be ignoring the Russian side of things. Especially if as you say above its not an actual peace but a establish defensive lines just east of the Urals and continually raid into the rump Russian state the latter have neither a chance for peace and plenty of reasons to continue fighting. Coupled with the massive unrest that will be prompted by Nazi occupation policies west of the line you going to have a massive garrison need with continued losses even apart from losses further east. The Russians aren't going to win and liberate their lost territories but the latter and the continued war in Siberia will be a substantial resource sink, possibly most noticeably in terms of manpower, given that Germany is formally at peace.
d) Delays in decolonization:- I suspect the issue here is that your assuming that Axis forces will overrun large areas of Africa and be able to establish their rule over much of it including many former/current European colonies. That they might also establish a pretend control by their subject states over the former colonies rather than simply annex them to German rule.
I would see this as unlikely. Even if Germany largely clears up the western USSR in 1942 their going to struggle to push far into the ME and its going to be pretty much impossible for them to capture Egypt, let alone push south into the Sahara. Neither Britain nor the US will allow colonies south of this position to be handed over to Germany - even if the latter pretends their going to be controlled by their puppet regimes in Europe. Those regions are beyond Axis control and the allies aren't going to pass them to the Axis given the bases that would supply to the latter. This would definitely include the former Italian empire in E Africa. I expect that as OTL Ethiopia would have its independence restored and Britain would control all of Somalia. Similarly Iceland is going to get its independence as the allies won't accept a German base there.
Similarly in the Far East colonies taken back from Japan won't be 'returned' to French and Dutch puppet regimes in Europe and I think they will be put on a fast path for independence as the rump exile governments would be clearly unable to restore control in those regions. Coupled with the establishment of a KMT government in China and Indian independence there's going to be very little scope for restored colonial run in Asia other than Britain in Malaysia I suspect.
The only non-British colonies outside Axis control in Africa would probably be the Spanish and Portuguese but I would expect that the allies would make clear to those governments that any move towards allowing German - or other Axis forces - to operate in those regions would be a casus belli.
While a serious attack into the ME through the Caucasus region is pretty much impossible because of the logistics its possible that the Germans might invade Turkey and despite the terrain push through it and occupy parts of Syria and Iraq although they would be operating at the end of very long supply lines even then and allied tactical air, especially as it grew in numbers would make this increasingly impossible, as would aid to Turkish and other resistance movement in occupied areas. However its quite possible that the Germans end up with control of some of this region, possibly also the Azeri or Kurdish parts of Iran. Those regions are likely to stay under German military government which would prompt the west powers to maintain a strong presence in bordering region.
As such, outside the British, Spanish and Portuguese empires there's no colonies with a European power to govern them - other than German puppets, which the allies will NOT allow. I can't see the governments in exile having anything like the resources to govern and administer those areas and hence they will fall under UK-US control but with those additional burdens the desire will be to get rid of them ASAP.
I suspect the driver here will be the situation in India. Hopefully the election after the peace will see Labour take over, as OTL given the added incentive that Churchill has failed to win the war and seen a fair number of disasters and that since the primary threat is fascism rather than communism he won't be able to argue with any weight that a Labour government would be a threat to Britain's security and the rights of people. From this there will not be any basis for an insane attempt to hold the Indian sub-continent. I fear that partition and the bloodshed that came with it can't be avoided but it will set the basis for the idea that independence will come to other colonies over time. Only those of strategic importance or great wealth or with a powerful white minority are going to cause issues here although given the bloodshed in India and possible later chaos in Burma there will be pressures to try and ensure a decent level of self-government for the new states. I suspect that decolonization won't be greatly speeded up simply because of the practicalities but, other than possibly in the ME, because of the Nazi threat which means de-facto rather than de juri independence is likely to come earlier.
Under this situation the US will take a clear position opposed to the European puppets regaining control of their colonies outside the areas of Axis rule not so much because their anti-colonial as because they realise those states have no independent themselves being under Berlin's heel.
e) For most of the last century of the empire Britain's strict addiction to free trade meant they had no 'captive market' as you put it. It was only in the early 30's faced with further growths in protectionism, most noticeably in the US that it introduced the imperial trade zone with a relatively low tariff level and made deals with other nations including the dominions. Britain is likely to have decent relations with colonies after they gain independence, especially considering the primary alternatives would be the despotic German empire or the US - especially if your suggestion that the US swings far to the right came to pass. Its likely to continue close relations with the existing dominions here, especially since they have interlocked economic as well as political interests.
Britain will be facing a substantial military burden, both in the homeland and in threatened regions, especially in the ME but it will have suffer a fair amount less damage and destruction given the shorter war and avoiding the costly fighting in Europe in 43-45. It won't be administering a large chunk of Germany that needs rebuilding from rubble and its likely to maintain a significant trading position in China nor is there going to be the Korean war. Possibly Germany will try testing the allied determination somewhere but unclear where they could. The US is going to realise a threat that at least appears markedly more dangerous than the OTL Soviet one but won't have the same land garrisons either, at least in potential war zones.
The two powers and other allies, especially the dominions, are going be tied together by common interests, economic and defense as well as political. The US will clearly be the dominant member of the alliance but will also realise that lacking substantial other allies it needs Britain and the dominions and will seek as many others as it can find.
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Post by Max Sinister on Aug 11, 2024 15:37:35 GMT
ewellholmes, thanks for your posts, welcome on AT. Your approach to a "Nazis win" TL is certainly not the worst one. Some may find it hard to swallow that Stalin really wouldn't transport the Siberians to Europe even if Moscow was threatened, but he did wait awfully long to do so IOTL. Personally, I think that European Russia is too big to be held down by a Nazi occupation forever, but let's leave this aside for now. True, Nelson Rockefeller and his Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs did a lot since 1941 to destroy Axis influence in LatAm. One thing is for sure: The US may lose markets, thus money. They would have to find replacements in the smaller free world. Hence, earlier credits for LatAm. But also probably more taxes. And thus a bigger state sector. Pretty concerning that antisemitism actually grew around 1940. But it's true. I also read up that NYC at that time had antisemitic gangs like the Amsterdams and the Shamrocks who beat up Jews. But it was "just" a mob, not an organization with the whole state behind it. A horrible thought indeed to think about what'd happen from there. But if people don't know the truth about the Holocaust... Later decolonization may well happen in your TL. In the TL I'm currently writing, the SU survives however, having lost some lands from the Baltic to Crimea, but still standing strong. (After all, I want to explore how a three-sided Cold War would look like. Which admittedly is a very different situation from the one you are painting.) As Steve said, I also suspect that the Allies would finish Japan earlier. Didn't the Pacific get only 15-30% of the spent resources IOTL? As for the French colonies, I like the idea that de Gaulle builds an empire in Western and Equatorial Africa, Frenchifying the Africans. But that's already in my TL, you don't have to copy it if you don't like to. "an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war" - I know that the Japanese mindset considered surrendering as shameful beyond any measure (which is why they treated their PoWs that badly), but even wounded soldiers? Did they ran out of resources even to care for their wounded? Whether this Nazi Empire would end along the Volga or the Urals - most often it's stated that he wanted the AA line, to be able to bomb the Urals' industry to pieces. And at some earlier time he claimed to want "only" Byelorussia and Ukraine for "Lebensraum". The Volga line was to make sure that the Soviets couldn't bomb Germany. BTW: Supposedly the "führer" claimed that one day, there'd be a war between the US and the Empire, and the winner would absorb the loser. Except that there's no literal war, that'd become true here.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 11, 2024 16:36:56 GMT
ewellholmes , thanks for your posts, welcome on AT. Your approach to a "Nazis win" TL is certainly not the worst one. Some may find it hard to swallow that Stalin really wouldn't transport the Siberians to Europe even if Moscow was threatened, but he did wait awfully long to do so IOTL. Personally, I think that European Russia is too big to be held down by a Nazi occupation forever, but let's leave this aside for now. True, Nelson Rockefeller and his Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs did a lot since 1941 to destroy Axis influence in LatAm. One thing is for sure: The US may lose markets, thus money. They would have to find replacements in the smaller free world. Hence, earlier credits for LatAm. But also probably more taxes. And thus a bigger state sector. Pretty concerning that antisemitism actually grew around 1940. But it's true. I also read up that NYC at that time had antisemitic gangs like the Amsterdams and the Shamrocks who beat up Jews. But it was "just" a mob, not an organization with the whole state behind it. A horrible thought indeed to think about what'd happen from there. But if people don't know the truth about the Holocaust... Later decolonization may well happen in your TL. In the TL I'm currently writing, the SU survives however, having lost some lands from the Baltic to Crimea, but still standing strong. (After all, I want to explore how a three-sided Cold War would look like. Which admittedly is a very different situation from the one you are painting.) As Steve said, I also suspect that the Allies would finish Japan earlier. Didn't the Pacific get only 15-30% of the spent resources IOTL? As for the French colonies, I like the idea that de Gaulle builds an empire in Western and Equatorial Africa, Frenchifying the Africans. But that's already in my TL, you don't have to copy it if you don't like to. "an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war" - I know that the Japanese mindset considered surrendering as shameful beyond any measure (which is why they treated their PoWs that badly), but even wounded soldiers? Did they ran out of resources even to care for their wounded? Whether this Nazi Empire would end along the Volga or the Urals - most often it's stated that he wanted the AA line, to be able to bomb the Urals' industry to pieces. And at some earlier time he claimed to want "only" Byelorussia and Ukraine for "Lebensraum". The Volga line was to make sure that the Soviets couldn't bomb Germany. BTW: Supposedly the "führer" claimed that one day, there'd be a war between the US and the Empire, and the winner would absorb the loser. Except that there's no literal war, that'd become true here.
Max - some quick thoughts: a) I think he actually suggested that Stalin orders a lower level of mobilization in April 41 - see here
That seems a bit odd and would be unrelated to forces being moved from east of the Urals to counter the invasion once he decides that the Japanese aren't going to attack Siberia.
b) Its an interesting idea but I suspect that the bulk of the population would sooner or later insist on an African rather than a French identity. Coupled with the wide range of cultures involved across the French African empire I suspect a lasting unity whether under a 'French' flag or otherwise would be unlikely. OTL Britain tried a couple of federations in its east African colonies but those were rejected and the colonies eventually became independent as smaller states - i.e. 'Rhodesia' as Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi and the E African Federation as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Your also added another reason why the US is likely to encourage faster decolonization than OTL. While the markets for those states aren't larger they are something and they also supply raw materials - although that could mean competition with US miners/farmers - so there's an economic as well as strategic and diplomatic ones.
c) For Hitler and the Nazis even more than most politicians their word mean what they want them to mean at that time and often are highly mutable.
Steve
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Post by Max Sinister on Aug 13, 2024 17:11:19 GMT
ewellholmes , thanks for your posts, welcome on AT. Your approach to a "Nazis win" TL is certainly not the worst one. Some may find it hard to swallow that Stalin really wouldn't transport the Siberians to Europe even if Moscow was threatened, but he did wait awfully long to do so IOTL. Personally, I think that European Russia is too big to be held down by a Nazi occupation forever, but let's leave this aside for now. True, Nelson Rockefeller and his Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs did a lot since 1941 to destroy Axis influence in LatAm. One thing is for sure: The US may lose markets, thus money. They would have to find replacements in the smaller free world. Hence, earlier credits for LatAm. But also probably more taxes. And thus a bigger state sector. Pretty concerning that antisemitism actually grew around 1940. But it's true. I also read up that NYC at that time had antisemitic gangs like the Amsterdams and the Shamrocks who beat up Jews. But it was "just" a mob, not an organization with the whole state behind it. A horrible thought indeed to think about what'd happen from there. But if people don't know the truth about the Holocaust... Later decolonization may well happen in your TL. In the TL I'm currently writing, the SU survives however, having lost some lands from the Baltic to Crimea, but still standing strong. (After all, I want to explore how a three-sided Cold War would look like. Which admittedly is a very different situation from the one you are painting.) As Steve said, I also suspect that the Allies would finish Japan earlier. Didn't the Pacific get only 15-30% of the spent resources IOTL? As for the French colonies, I like the idea that de Gaulle builds an empire in Western and Equatorial Africa, Frenchifying the Africans. But that's already in my TL, you don't have to copy it if you don't like to. "an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war" - I know that the Japanese mindset considered surrendering as shameful beyond any measure (which is why they treated their PoWs that badly), but even wounded soldiers? Did they ran out of resources even to care for their wounded? Whether this Nazi Empire would end along the Volga or the Urals - most often it's stated that he wanted the AA line, to be able to bomb the Urals' industry to pieces. And at some earlier time he claimed to want "only" Byelorussia and Ukraine for "Lebensraum". The Volga line was to make sure that the Soviets couldn't bomb Germany. BTW: Supposedly the "führer" claimed that one day, there'd be a war between the US and the Empire, and the winner would absorb the loser. Except that there's no literal war, that'd become true here.
Max - some quick thoughts: a) I think he actually suggested that Stalin orders a lower level of mobilization in April 41 - see here
That seems a bit odd and would be unrelated to forces being moved from east of the Urals to counter the invasion once he decides that the Japanese aren't going to attack Siberia.
b) Its an interesting idea but I suspect that the bulk of the population would sooner or later insist on an African rather than a French identity. Coupled with the wide range of cultures involved across the French African empire I suspect a lasting unity whether under a 'French' flag or otherwise would be unlikely. OTL Britain tried a couple of federations in its east African colonies but those were rejected and the colonies eventually became independent as smaller states - i.e. 'Rhodesia' as Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi and the E African Federation as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Your also added another reason why the US is likely to encourage faster decolonization than OTL. While the markets for those states aren't larger they are something and they also supply raw materials - although that could mean competition with US miners/farmers - so there's an economic as well as strategic and diplomatic ones.
c) For Hitler and the Nazis even more than most politicians their word mean what they want them to mean at that time and often are highly mutable.
a. The reservists aren't mobilized, but they're still there if you need them. Also, soldiers who aren't mobilized can't be surprised and captured. Hence, it's a mixed bag. Furthermore, Sorge wasn't the only one warning Stalin: Churchill had contacted him, Birger Dahlerus (informed by Göring), and many other people. Feel free to blame Kolikov.
b. I've decided that as long as de Gaulle aka "uncrowned emperor of French Africa" is alive, his system will hold. The natives will get more power with time, so the anticolonialists in the US should consider it bearable.
c. Absolutely true - of course, this isn't one of his promises, but more a prognosis.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 13, 2024 17:51:43 GMT
Max - some quick thoughts: a) I think he actually suggested that Stalin orders a lower level of mobilization in April 41 - see here
That seems a bit odd and would be unrelated to forces being moved from east of the Urals to counter the invasion once he decides that the Japanese aren't going to attack Siberia.
b) Its an interesting idea but I suspect that the bulk of the population would sooner or later insist on an African rather than a French identity. Coupled with the wide range of cultures involved across the French African empire I suspect a lasting unity whether under a 'French' flag or otherwise would be unlikely. OTL Britain tried a couple of federations in its east African colonies but those were rejected and the colonies eventually became independent as smaller states - i.e. 'Rhodesia' as Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi and the E African Federation as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Your also added another reason why the US is likely to encourage faster decolonization than OTL. While the markets for those states aren't larger they are something and they also supply raw materials - although that could mean competition with US miners/farmers - so there's an economic as well as strategic and diplomatic ones.
c) For Hitler and the Nazis even more than most politicians their word mean what they want them to mean at that time and often are highly mutable.
a. The reservists aren't mobilized, but they're still there if you need them. Also, soldiers who aren't mobilized can't be surprised and captured. Hence, it's a mixed bag. Furthermore, Sorge wasn't the only one warning Stalin: Churchill had contacted him, Birger Dahlerus (informed by Göring), and many other people. Feel free to blame Kolikov.
b. I've decided that as long as de Gaulle aka "uncrowned emperor of French Africa" is alive, his system will hold. The natives will get more power with time, so the anticolonialists in the US should consider it bearable.
c. Absolutely true - of course, this isn't one of his promises, but more a prognosis.
a) That's something that's occurred to me as well although that could mean their either overrun before their mobilized or thrown into a battle with less support so it could go either way. Also I'm struggling to see how the lack of Sorge giving information over Japanese intentions in late 41 would change a mobilization in European Russia in April 41.
b) He might try and it might seem the best way to maintain order - and a pro-western alignment for the French colonies in Africa but I can't really see it lasting for more than a decade without things getting unstable.
Mind you Vichy - or whatever post war collaborationist government is called - could well hold onto FNA longer, in part because they would have avoided much of the OTL devastation on 44-45 and also not be pressed by the US and others to give independence and because they could well get German support. Which is likely to make things very, very bloody in FNA.
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Post by Max Sinister on Aug 13, 2024 18:01:52 GMT
a. Wait a moment, ITTL Sorge is already dead in 1941, so he can't warn about the Germany attack threat either.
b. If the Commies are still around, the Anglos will prefer stability in French Western/Equatorial Africa - and de Gaulle guarantees it, because if not him, who does?
You're right about Vichy. And if we're talking about "ugly", it'll start with Rauff and his einsatzgruppen agitating the "Nafris" (that is, Muslims) against the local Jews. At least when Rommel isn't watching.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 13, 2024 19:04:43 GMT
a. Wait a moment, ITTL Sorge is already dead in 1941, so he can't warn about the Germany attack threat either. b. If the Commies are still around, the Anglos will prefer stability in French Western/Equatorial Africa - and de Gaulle guarantees it, because if not him, who does? You're right about Vichy. And if we're talking about "ugly", it'll start with Rauff and his einsatzgruppen agitating the "Nafris" (that is, Muslims) against the local Jews. At least when Rommel isn't watching.
a) Very true.
b) Don't forget this is a Nazi win big scenario, with them getting at least to the Urals and at least raiding beyond them. The rump Soviet state, if it stays communists which it might not, is going to be a lot less threatening and the Nazis are going to be the overwhelming threat. With their views on race that also makes them pretty unattractive to most rational people south of the Sahara.
As I understand it Rommel is at least complicit in the use of Jews in Libya for forced labour and possible deportation to Europe. Although how much was his active role and how much might have been actions of subordinates he might not have known about or did not interfere with. |
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Post by Max Sinister on Aug 13, 2024 19:59:46 GMT
a. Wait a moment, ITTL Sorge is already dead in 1941, so he can't warn about the Germany attack threat either. b. If the Commies are still around, the Anglos will prefer stability in French Western/Equatorial Africa - and de Gaulle guarantees it, because if not him, who does? You're right about Vichy. And if we're talking about "ugly", it'll start with Rauff and his einsatzgruppen agitating the "Nafris" (that is, Muslims) against the local Jews. At least when Rommel isn't watching.
a) Very true.
b) Don't forget this is a Nazi win big scenario, with them getting at least to the Urals and at least raiding beyond them. The rump Soviet state, if it stays communists which it might not, is going to be a lot less threatening and the Nazis are going to be the overwhelming threat. With their views on race that also makes them pretty unattractive to most rational people south of the Sahara.
As I understand it Rommel is at least complicit in the use of Jews in Libya for forced labour and possible deportation to Europe. Although how much was his active role and how much might have been actions of subordinates he might not have known about or did not interfere with. b. Yes, I've been thinking of a different "Nazis win" TL where it'll happen like that.
Of course, if TTL's nazis really get as far as to the Urals, they will have less soldiers left for African adventures.
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ewellholmes
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Post by ewellholmes on Aug 14, 2024 6:04:29 GMT
a) On possibly US internal policies post-war:- Your rather at sea here. For one thing "a planned system and welfare state" is actually and definitely social policy. For another antisemitism even if it occurs and its likely to continue at low levels doesn't equate to a love of all things fascist. The US may go along a closed nationalist loop where anyone not WASP is viewed as an outsider and possible an enemy but it could quite easily take other routes, which would be reinforced by the drivers of needing more resources and to win support outside Britain and the white dominions. American planning in the Summer of 1940 imagined going Fortress America, with the Americas itself as its economic sphere sufficient to meet its current and future economic needs in terms of both markets, resources and defense. If they want to compete Globally with the Germans, then yes, they would need to figure out how to prop the British up but they're not required to do so and American planners are very much restricted by public whims here. I don't think there is any set path, but I have yet to see evidence what you're suggesting is the most likely, in terms of Liberal outcomes. No, the Pacific remained the predominant theater of resources until the first half of 1944, this isn't in dispute: As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[17] In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. Rather, I said there would be an Armistice in the Spring or Summer of 1943. According to the U.S. Military's own planning, to switch forces to the Pacific on a large scale would take at least a year, meaning the Summer of 1944 at the earliest before things could be felt differently in the Pacific. Furthermore, as you said, it is a guarded peace; a division in East Anglia isn't a division at Okinawa, and certainly said division will still require shipping to keep it armed and fed, thus diverting shipping from the Pacific. What specific programs are you assuming a diversion of resources to and how exactly will that money increase the speed of the Atomic Bomb? The lack of the Soviet intervention also means the Japanese retain control of Korea and Manchuria, which means no economic collapse nor threat of starvation. In the worst case, the Japanese lose up to 10 million to starvation, a number comparable to that which the Soviets endured and survived during the war in terms of population. I do not see anyway more Allied divisions in the Summer of 1944 meaningfully speeds up the war against Japan. They will still have to attack the same island chains in order to acquire the logistical bases necessary to approach closer to Japan. The increased divisions will be compensated for by the Japanese being able to withdraw more divisions from Manchuria, since there is no Kwantung Army tied down by Soviet forces in the Far East. 250,000 KIA on Kyushu alone in Operation Olympic would imply over a million casualties total, including WIA, MIA, and PoWs. This alone is more casualties than the U.S. took in 1944-1945 in Europe. This is also just for the southernmost island of the Japanese Home Island chain, with Operation Coronet IOTL planned for the Spring of 1946 against Central Honshu expecting an even higher casualty rate. To really drive this home, I'd highly recommend you read U.S. planning for Olympic and pay special attention to mentions of the U.S. Marine Corps in said planning. Noticeably, mentions of the USMC almost disappear after roughly D+30 in their planning. Why this occurs it not directly stated, but was widely understood among planners as a reflection of the fact there would be very few Marines left by that point who were not a casualty during the fight for Kyushu. As for Leahy's statement, the very next paragraph states he did not believe unconditional surrender was possible in 1945: "The flaw in Leahy's argument was that the Japanese Imperial Army refused to accept the fact that it had lost the war, at least by the standard of unconditional surrender. That demand was completely unacceptable to an institution that ordered wounded soldiers to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.4 Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". We don't have to rely on Hitler's ideas then, since the only firm planning the Germans did was for the A-A Line in Operation Barbarossa. I was assuming a Urals Line due to Hitler's statements and agreements other German officials made to that, but the only concrete planning they did IOTL was for the A-A Line. Oh, certainly the rump Soviet state across the Urals may formally continue fighting; it just won't achieve anything of note. They have 40 million people with very little farming or industry of note, and mass ethnic unrest in Central Asia.They're also dependent on the Trans-Siberian Railway which German bombers alone can render inoperable and thus doom what's left of the USSR to starvation the following winter. I don't have to assume that because most of the French African Empire was in Vichy hands in 1941. I assume the Italians and Vichy will get back whatever they lost at the peace deal. Except British planning documents in 1941-1942 reveal that: A) They had no means or forces on hand to defend against a German offensive out of Turkey, the expectation was their position in most of the Middle East would collapse should this eventuality come to pass. B) The Turkish railway network was sufficient to supply and sustain around 40 German divisions into the region. With the USSR knocked out, Turkey is on its own and likely to join in with the Germans as a jackal if the Anglo-Americans don't make peace. With the Eastern Front over, the Germans can easily afford to dispatch up to 40 divisions into the region, while the United States in 1943 can only respond with 10 and that's by completely eliminating its shipping to other sectors of the Globe. Sure, and that's exactly the downfall of this strategy as I said. You've just turned the French and Dutch publics firmly against the Western Allies, a firm propaganda coup for the Germans in fact. The United States can either gain the support of colonial peoples or it can undermine German support in the European homelands, but not both. Which joins said governments to the German hip at a minimum, and possibly results in the Wehrmacht bathing in the Persian Gulf. There are no Allied air forces in this region to do that and no logistical capacity to sustain them without collapsing Anglo-American positions elsewhere. The Turks are likely to throw their hat into the ring to gain territory (Oil rich Kurdistan, for example) and their railway network is more than sufficient to meet German needs. The Italian and French colonies at a minimum are returned. As for the others, as I said, Berlin says thank you given those European nations are now inflamed with Anti-American sentiments. I do agree the British Empire will rapidly collapse here. Long term as I said, this will force them to seek accord with the Germans on economic conditions. Berlin says thank you. The United States during WWII displaced them economically from their dominions, and was doing such in their colonies as well, in particular the Middle East which had become the focal point of British strategy in the 1920s. With Europe behind a German trade barrier-eliminating the main trade partners of the UK until the 2010s historically-and the Dominions preferring the United States, whom is Britain to trade with on equal footing? The damage to the British countryside has already been done by 1943 and manpower shortages had already started, and by 1944 they were insolvent financially. Now, you've cut them off from their main trading partners and added a far higher military burden than they experienced during the Cold War to boot. Sure, but intentions don't pay the bills and they were more than happy to take Britain to the cleaners, so to speak, during WWII. This was commented on extensively by the British diplomats and officials at the time, the extreme treatment they received at the hands of the Americans. |
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ewellholmes
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Post by ewellholmes on Aug 14, 2024 6:22:15 GMT
Thank you very much! I assume the "Siberians" still get moved to Europe, the main issue is that without Sorge's intelligence the Red Army is missing almost one million troops at the start of Operation Barbarossa. Historically these forces were critical in derailing the German operation planning via the Battle at Smolensk as well as defending the three critical cities of the USSR-Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad-until Soviet mobilization could generate fresh forces to sustain the war effort. As for holding the European USSR, allow me to bring up only 40,000 German soldiers died due to partisans out of the ~4.5 million who died on the Eastern Front in total. Averaged out, that's just 10,000 a year. Assuming it takes two million KIA to achieve the Urals Line by 1943-a liberal assessment, I would argue-and that casualties due to partisans double to 20,000 a year given the scale of the territory conquered, it would take until roughly the year 2065 for German casualties to match those experienced IOTL from 1941-1945 on the Eastern Front. T Largely agreed. One route the U.S. could go is using the historical Marshall Aid funds to develop Latin America in order to generate markets sufficient to consume American excess production. Here's a big one: what happens with the Jews of the World, since Israel seems unlikely here, at least as we know it? Further, with victory likely in the Spring of 1942, do the Germans go with Madagascar instead of the Final Solution of IOTL? Or does it still happen and on a worse scale, since the Germans can get to most of the Soviet Jews? If you want a three sided Cold War, this is very doable with PoDs in 1943 if you'd like to create a thread to discuss those? The Germans and Soviets had informal diplomatic talks in 1943 concerning a separate peace, which would've had Pre-Barbarossa borders restored. The majority of Army personnel were in the Pacific until at least January of 1944, I quoted it in my reply to Steve above if you check that one. Basically, this is the biggest American dilemma in the Early Cold War in my opinion. 1) They can either support the Free European governments in their colonies, thus keeping them viable, and thus avoid inflaming Anti-American sentiments in the European homelands too. OR 2) They can support Anti-Colonial movements and give the Germans free propaganda to use in Europe. Where's that quote drawn from? I've never encountered it before, and would love to read more; it's a very interesting find! |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 15, 2024 18:23:49 GMT
American planning in the Summer of 1940 imagined going Fortress America, with the Americas itself as its economic sphere sufficient to meet its current and future economic needs in terms of both markets, resources and defense. If they want to compete Globally with the Germans, then yes, they would need to figure out how to prop the British up but they're not required to do so and American planners are very much restricted by public whims here. I don't think there is any set path, but I have yet to see evidence what you're suggesting is the most likely, in terms of Liberal outcomes.
Sorry about the late response but things have been rather busy here. Not to mention some hot and humid weather that's make it bloody draining as well as my old PC distinctly unhappy.
a) I think that as you said earlier substantial social reforms are a distinct possibility and if so their going to be real ones, as in Britain or much of OTL western Europe rather than fake ones as in Nazi Germany and the USSR were such reforms were largely to ensure tighter control and exploitation of the population. As such I think those such reforms are likely to be a possibility. It would win wider internal support for what's seen as a prolonged struggle between societies which could, at least for a couple of decades be distinctly more threatening that the OTL cold war.
Also I think the US in such a position is going to look for both allies and trading partners where it can. Since your saying that the peace with the Nazis doesn't include imperial Japan that will go down and its likely that much of eastern and southern Asia will be in the western sphere of influence but the Us is a poor economic ally for Latin America due to its own production of primary goods and protectionism, which I suspect is unlikely to change here. As such apart from the considerably economic and military support the UK can supply it would have a considerable interest in having the UK and its own allies as allies as well. Your not going to get NATO and its likely to be more US centred than OTL but you will get some sort of bloc.
b) You may be correct with your figures, at least for OTL but as you say that changed quickly. Also a lot of the numbers in the Pacific were tail rather than teeth forces, both because allies supplied a lot in the western theatre and also because the distances were much shorter. Definitely there were more USN personnel in the Pacific because they were very much on their own, the forces involved such as the CVs especially were larger and more manpower intensive and the much greater logistical burden but in other areas the reverse was the case.
It seems strange that the US military is so convinced of its incompetence? The big issue would be supplying bases for additional forces and supplies to them and the cross-Pacific offensive couldn't really start until late 43 when plenty of Essex class CVs and supporting vessels are available but options in the south would be distinctly simpler as there are local resources for a fair number of needs, such as existing infrastructure and local food supplies as well as if areas in the Indies are retaken local oil supplies. Actually moving even large ground forces, especially with the additional shipping available and then acclimatizing troops would take probably 3-4 months at most. Aircraft and ships would take markedly less time. Plus given the probable nature of the war there might be assets that could be used from closer locations.
Yes if their any sense it will be a guarded peace but that's a hell of a lot different from a shooting war. For instance, even if the allies continued convoy use for all shipping in the Atlantic and neighbouring waters and also maintain blackouts and other such policies for a prolonged term, i.e. more than a year they won't be taking losses. Nor will there be the huge build up in the UK that occurred OTL in 43-44 for offensive operations against NW Europe. Your likely to see the US ground forces in Britain considerably reduced as there's no purpose for them being there and their a drain on allied resources. Ditto with the bulk of heavy and tactical bomber force.
Similarly say a US division in E Anglia will take SFU from US operations in the Pacific compared to OTL. They will take some resources from the massive amount released by the ending of the fighting in Europe and N Africa. Much of the land forces built up OTL for operations in Europe are likely to be decommissioned anyway as there's no great need for so many, especially heavy units in the Pacific/Far East theatre, at least unless the US makes far more effort to drive through SE Asia, or at least its island regions. Even then I can't see the same forces required for the Far East as OTL in Europe.
I don't know but since massive resources are freed up from the ending of the war in Europe and a greater fear of an unhindered Germany getting the bomb its extremely likely that some of those resources will be thrown at the Manhattan Project.
Wrong. The Soviet invasion had no significant impact on the level of starvation and economic collapse in Japan as it occurred far too late. The mining programme - appropriately enough named Operation Starvation was responsible for most of this along with less targeted attacks on Japanese shipping and the fire bombing of Japanese urban areas.
What causes the Japanese to surrender is likely to be a combination of factors as OTL. As I suggested one negative side effect is the possibility, and I think its only a possibility that Japan is actually invaded which is likely to cause markedly higher US deaths - which will seem higher as their likely to avoid the bulk of the OTL ground casualties in Europe. I'm not saying this would happen but its a possibility.
On that for reasons I mentioned we have to disagree. The allies will have markedly greater resources available to throw against the Japanese empire and as I said the primary attacks will be by sea and air.
Which is different from what you were arguing before as it involved an advance to occupy the Urals industrial area and at least raid beyond it. I suspect that they will seek to occupy the Urals because of its resources and because of the nature of the region. Along with the occupation of the Caucasus region and your suggested attacks beyond into the ME. That's a hell of a burden for a military after two years of very heavy losses, limited logistics and a malfunctioning government system increasingly detached from reality.
Well its not without industry, even without further movement of industrial facilities from areas that weren't occupied OTL but your assuming now. Also despite your dubious POD its going to take until late 42, with more heavy fighting to occupy the Urals and Caucasus regions, which will give further time. They can get food from the US via Vladivostok and Persia as OTL. There is likely to be unrest in parts of central Asia but how much and badly we don't know. Coupled with the problems the Germans will have supplying forces that far away from secure bases and the heavier losses almost certain to come from those campaigns. The Russians, who may or may not be Soviets here, are going to be able to be a continuing burr in the side of any German forces operating from the Urals area.
I would be interested to find out where Germany is going to get ULR bombers from to attack the Trans-Siberian long beyond the range of OTL German bombers, let alone fighters to escort them?
d) Delays in decolonization:-
They weren't in 43 OTL and it would be quite an assumption to have no progress for Free French forces in the intervening period. Plus also the allies might well insist that any such areas still in Vichy hands at the peace, south of the Axis occupied areas be neutralised if they haven't already.
That is referring to the ME, not sub-Saharan Africa.
Can the Germans find 40 odd divisions to spare prior to 43 - without interrupting their operations in Eastern Russia and the Caucasus or the garrisons needed in occupying a vast area of European Russia and protecting supply lines through it. Or are you planning on such an offensive instead of one of the others in 42 say? Also its far from certain that the Turks won't fight, at least in part.
If things go right for the Axis they might be able to occupy much of the ME although again at costs and its likely the southern parts of the peninsula will stay in allied hands even then do to their logistical edge. Egypt could well still hold if the US accepts the importance of the region.
What do you think will upset the French and Dutch more. That colonies in allied possession won't be 'returned' to their, actually German control, or that their being brutally occupied and looted by Germany?
Also do you really think either the US or Britain are going to give control of areas like the DEI and FIC, let alone massive areas of Africa to Germany?
Since we're talking here about the attitude to Spanish and Portuguse colonies in Africa and Asia at the time of the ceasefire that's going to have zero effect on any campaign in the ME before then. Also will Portugal be willing to abandon their extensive colonies to cosy up to Germany?
There are substantial allied air forces in the ME region and even if the US doesn't appeciate the importance of the western part of it they will be eager to protect the supply line through Iran to the Russians.
For the reasons stated above I can't see that happening, nor the irrational attitude your suggesting in occupied Europe as they have a much bigger problem, i.e. surviving under increasing German demands.
Not rapidly, although quite possibly a bit quicker than OTL. However its likely to have more connections with the successor states - especially since the chimera of closer contacts with the continent is removed. Britain being brought under German control is only likely if Washington is really, really stupid and eager to cut its own throat. Giving up sizeable areas with considerable mineral wealth, even apart from the bases passed to their only real threat would clearly and considerably worsen both their economic and military position.
Actually not. They displaced them as the primary protector against military threat due to Britain's own problems and a fair amount of mismanagement. However do you think the US is going to welcome with open arms foodstuffs and minerals from Australia, New Zealand and S Africa that will compete with their own products? Britain is the traditional export market for a lot of their goods and that's likely to remain as it did OTL until the UK made the stupid decision to join what was then the EEC in 1971 and cut itself off from those markets because of the EEC's protectionists system. Britain is much the better trade partner here as the two sides complement each other, which is also the case for a fair chunk of Latin America.
Wrong again. We have suffered the 40-41 blitz and the intermittent raids but the V weapon attacks won't be occurring here. Also you will have less valuable land absorbed by US bases and a lot more shipping surviving. Total military casualties will also be considerably reduced compared to OTL. Furthermore the war in Europe ends 18-24 months earlier.
Britain was actually financially insolvent from 41, in large part because that was Washington's policy, which you yourself note. That's the sole reason why L-L came into existence, to maintain Britain as a buffer against the Nazis. This is even more important now given Britain's importance in both contesting German access to the N Atlantic and elsewhere.
Britain will have a considerable military burden yes but that would be seen as required to maintain its independence and in this situation the US could well maintain L-L in some form longer. Actually it will be de-facto compared to OTL as the European war's earlier ending would mean something like a couple of years of active war in the Pacific while the economy in Britain is able to adjust to at least partially peace-time conditions. The forces maintained in the UK would be largely air and naval which are expensive in some ways but are supported by a substantial existing industrial basis with a relatively small permanent army force to hit any attempted landing coupled with a large reserve force. More substantial forces will be needed in whatever of the ME stays outside German control and their eastern flank, although local forces could play a part here. Smaller forces will be required in Africa and parts of the Far East but it should be sustainable given the clear requirement for such until the Nazi empire is gone.
On the positive side there is no need to maintain a large force in Europe against the possibility of a massive conventional attack - the channel is very handy there. Also no costs to rebuild Germany or other parts of western Europe. In the latter case those regions will tend to deteriorate under German domination. Earlier restoration of trade with the free world, as well as some parts of Europe such as Sweden which isn't under direct German control. Also more access to those colonies that were formally controlled by powers who are under German occupation.
Its not going to be easy for Britain but life rarely is an the alternative is much worse. A lot will depend on how the Nazi empire declines and collapses and who takes over after Hitler dies.
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Aug 15, 2024 19:02:17 GMT
Thank you very much! I assume the "Siberians" still get moved to Europe, the main issue is that without Sorge's intelligence the Red Army is missing almost one million troops at the start of Operation Barbarossa. Historically these forces were critical in derailing the German operation planning via the Battle at Smolensk as well as defending the three critical cities of the USSR-Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad-until Soviet mobilization could generate fresh forces to sustain the war effort. As for holding the European USSR, allow me to bring up only 40,000 German soldiers died due to partisans out of the ~4.5 million who died on the Eastern Front in total. Averaged out, that's just 10,000 a year. Assuming it takes two million KIA to achieve the Urals Line by 1943-a liberal assessment, I would argue-and that casualties due to partisans double to 20,000 a year given the scale of the territory conquered, it would take until roughly the year 2065 for German casualties to match those experienced IOTL from 1941-1945 on the Eastern Front. TLargely agreed. One route the U.S. could go is using the historical Marshall Aid funds to develop Latin America in order to generate markets sufficient to consume American excess production. Here's a big one: what happens with the Jews of the World, since Israel seems unlikely here, at least as we know it? Further, with victory likely in the Spring of 1942, do the Germans go with Madagascar instead of the Final Solution of IOTL? Or does it still happen and on a worse scale, since the Germans can get to most of the Soviet Jews? If you want a three sided Cold War, this is very doable with PoDs in 1943 if you'd like to create a thread to discuss those? The Germans and Soviets had informal diplomatic talks in 1943 concerning a separate peace, which would've had Pre-Barbarossa borders restored. The majority of Army personnel were in the Pacific until at least January of 1944, I quoted it in my reply to Steve above if you check that one. Basically, this is the biggest American dilemma in the Early Cold War in my opinion. 1) They can either support the Free European governments in their colonies, thus keeping them viable, and thus avoid inflaming Anti-American sentiments in the European homelands too. OR 2) They can support Anti-Colonial movements and give the Germans free propaganda to use in Europe. Where's that quote drawn from? I've never encountered it before, and would love to read more; it's a very interesting find!
a) I'm increasingly concerned about what Sorge can say in April 41 that stops Stalin's OTL actions? After all he can hardly say Japan won't attack you so you don't need to mobilize less forces in the European parts of the USSR. For one thing he wouldn't know whether the Japanese might attack Siberia because the Japanese themselves hadn't decided that yet and the army was pushing for such a move. For another any comment either way on that would have little impact on factors in Europe. Since as I understand it the Japanese were kept in the dark about Operation Barbarossa - just as to their frustration ~20 months earlier about the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact - its unlikely he could give any information on actual German plans for an attack. Which Stalin ignored repeated warnings about anyway.
b) Losses to partisans may be as low as that but your talking about the occupation of a much larger population and area, much of which with forests and swamps are markedly better for guerilla forces to operate in. Also with much longer logistics lines to guard. Lightly armed guerillas will have much more success against isolated road convoys or railways that assembled military forces. Its going to be far more horrendous for the people in the occupied areas, even without further polices of suppression, forced labour and deliberate starvation. However its not going to be easy for the Germans either.
Coupled with the the huge battlefield and disease/environmental casualties and the Germans are going to see a lot of military strain. If they did get to Moscow before the autumn mud they still have to take it and as Stalingrad showed fighting in a large urban area is a great leveler and Moscow is far larger than Stalingrad. If they haven't conquered it before the mud comes then they have supplies and air support restricted in the midst of a massive battle, giving the defenders a breather and a boost to moral and then a prolonging of the bloodbath. OTL the Germans had lost heavily before the winter mud and then cold caused them further casualties.
Your then talking about that force seeking to advance to either the A-A line and then the Urals or the Caucasus region or both further stretching both the front line and the areas to safeguard as well as the distance from their supply and production bases even. You may avoid a Stalingrad type disaster but casualties are going to be heavy and this is among the core trained and veteran forces, not the less trained and often elderly who made up the vast bulk of the casualties in the last stages of the war.
If Germany gets the early successes your arguing for they could well drive the Russians beyond the Urals but its going to be hugely costly for them.
c) In terms of what happens to the Jews in TTL I suspect the vast majority of European Jewry will be murdered, even more completely than OTL. That seemed to be the end plan all along once Germany was at war and sending large numbers to starve in Madagascar would be seen as a more expensive option. Whether once the Jews are gone the Nazis seek out other targets would depend on the circumstances. Gypsies, homosexuals, the physically or mental 'unfit' very likely. Other detested groups, most noticeably the Slavs possibly although they could decide to keep them for slave labour.
Its a possibility that some will escape during the peace period but where might they find refuge? The only area that might be welcoming could be the British empire with a desire for every pair of hands they can get on, plus for the more conservative minded white[ish] settlers for colonies they might want to control. If details of the ongoing massacres get out then the Us may be more welcoming. Or some could seek to flee eastwards but that would be a very long and dangerous route for many.
d) From what I've read in the past the 43 discussions between the Nazis and Soviets collapsed because the two sides were miles apart. Did read once that Stalin wanted the 1914 Russian empire border while Hitler wanted to give up very little. How serious he was especially as he refused to consider any separate peace when things were far more desperate in 44 & 45 is also an issue.
e) You were saying elsewhere that seeking to keep free European colonial forces in place - or restoring them in Japanese occupied areas which is unlikely to be practical - would be rejected by Germany? Similarly supporting decolonization will be unpopular with right wing elements in the occupied countries but the bulk of the population will be more concerned with a desire for their own independence from German rule.
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ewellholmes
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Post by ewellholmes on Aug 17, 2024 18:54:51 GMT
a) I'm increasingly concerned about what Sorge can say in April 41 that stops Stalin's OTL actions? After all he can hardly say Japan won't attack you so you don't need to mobilize less forces in the European parts of the USSR. For one thing he wouldn't know whether the Japanese might attack Siberia because the Japanese themselves hadn't decided that yet and the army was pushing for such a move. For another any comment either way on that would have little impact on factors in Europe. Since as I understand it the Japanese were kept in the dark about Operation Barbarossa - just as to their frustration ~20 months earlier about the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact - its unlikely he could give any information on actual German plans for an attack. Which Stalin ignored repeated warnings about anyway. ; indeed, if he ignored the warnings, why did he order a partial mobilization at all in April of 1941 (based on Sorge's intelligence work)? ‘Conventional wisdom’ conveyed to the reading public since the end of World War II maintains that, by virtue of his under-estimation of Adolph Hitler or his basic distrust of intelligence sources, Stalin chose to ignore the warnings he received about the impending German invasion. This includes, in particular, the warnings Zorge dispatched to Moscow. Furthermore, the catastrophic effects Operation Barbarossa had on the Red Army during the first several weeks of war generally validate this judgment. However, as is normally the case in any judgment about the Soviet-German War, new evidence indicates that this judgment may be flawed. Soviet and Russian archival releases since 1990 now indicate that the always suspicious Stalin actually acted on the intelligence he received. While displaying distinct passivity along the Soviet Union’s western border during the last few months before Barbarossa commenced, which has been incomprehensible to most observers, Stalin actually acted far more prudently than thought in the Soviet Union’s deep rear. Out of innate paranoia or outright distrust of Hitler’s intentions, beginning on 26 April 1941, Stalin orchestrated a covert mobilization of Red Army forces. After dispatching one mechanized corps (5th from the Trans-Baikal Military District), two rifle corps (31st and 32nd from the Trans-Baikal Military District and the Far Eastern Front, and two airborne brigades (211th and 212th) from the Far East to the West on 26 April, he dispatched four more divisions to the West on 10 May. Stalin capped this effort on 13 May by ordering four armies (16th, 19th, 21st, and 22nd), with 28 divisions organized into nine rifle corps, to mobilize in their parent military districts (Trans-Baikal, North Caucasus, Volga, and Ural respectively) and assemble along the Western Dvina and Dnepr River by 10 June. There they would constitute a second strategic echelon for the Red Army’s forward fronts in the West.9 This directive also mandated the creation by mid-July of a strategic reserve consisting of 20th, 24th, and 28th Armies formed from divisions stationed in internal military districts. Finally, from 1 to 10 June, the Red Army General Staff conducted a covert BUS [Bol’shoi uchebnyi sbor] — a large-scale training exercise, which amounted to a secret partial mobilization of roughly 800,000 conscripts for assignment to existing Red Army formations. You can play with the numbers as you wish; assuming losses triple to 30,000 a year, it would take until the year 2028 for ATL German losses to rival IOTL losses. Likewise, let's be blunt here: if the Germans genocide vast amounts of the population, how are there partisans to resist the Germans? Except there was no Soviet capability to do such nor any plan. There was just 90,000 troops defending Moscow in lines outside the city in October, with the Soviet government evacuating and the NKVD preparing to demolish infrastructure rather than defend it. What made Stalingrad a bloodbath was two entire Soviet Armies-the 62nd and 64th-retreating inside the city and fortifying it, neither of which was being done for Moscow in 1941. In September of 1941, there are no fortified lines outside the city and even fewer troops on hand; it's possible here the Germans could attack as early as August, with even fewer Soviet forces on hand without the prolonged Battle of Smolensk. Over a long enough timeframe, yes, they will make such advances and the costs for doing so will become increasingly easier and easier. For one, this is because the Germans aren't stupid and did the necessary logistical work even IOTL. Secondly, as the Germans advance deeper into the USSR, they will deprive the rump Soviet state of manpower, industry and resources needed to wage war, thus reducing their ability to resist and thus inflict casualties. There is a reason the Allied advance into Germany in 1945 was much less costly than fighting in prior years. As I said, I suspect the Urals line will take about two million KIA to achieve, about 50% of their OTL rate. This is because by the Spring of 1942, the USSR will be about 40% weaker than OTL, reducing its ability to inflict casualties and sustain its forces compared to OTL. This will compound as the Germans drive deeper as I noted above. I'm not sure; the decision to undertake the Final Solution was not made until 1942 and the reason the Madagascar option was discarded IOTL was because of the inability to actually access it to enact the plan. With peace clearly in sight in 1942, I think it's debatable. Those other groups would likely be targeted as well but I personally think what happens to the Slavs is indeed something is debatable. There was never a concrete decision on that; there were seven different versions of the Ost Plan and there were multiple different power blocs on the matter, rather than monolithic planning. Goebbels and Rosenberg were in favor of better treatment, etc. Personally, I've long thought the costs would lead to Germany setting up independent puppet states or going an assimilationist route. Its a possibility that some will escape during the peace period but where might they find refuge? The only area that might be welcoming could be the British empire with a desire for every pair of hands they can get on, plus for the more conservative minded white[ish] settlers for colonies they might want to control. If details of the ongoing massacres get out then the Us may be more welcoming. Or some could seek to flee eastwards but that would be a very long and dangerous route for many. That's something I've considered. The Uganada Plan could be revived, or any other of the various safe harbors that existed IOTL. The Dominican Republic was extremely welcoming and desirous of Jewish immigration in this era. The 1943 offer was Pre-Barbarossa 1941 borders, while later offers (1944 talks) was 1914. I do agree the talks fell apart due to the differences on this, but the issue here being the issue has been decided on the battlefield, rather than being contested between two equal powers. No, I'm saying the U.S. has two choices on this: A) It can support the colonial peoples and thus alienate the populations of their European homelands. We don't have to speculate on this because this happened exactly in Vichy France in 1940-1941 and nearly brought them to war with the UK then. France and Britain than nearly went to war again in the Summer of 1945 over Syria. B) Maintain the colonial empires in order to keep the exile governments viable, both materially and politically, and thus alienate the colonial populations. The Germans had extensive influence in the Middle East and Latin America historically, so they would be no strangers in taking advantage of this situation in Africa and Asia. |
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