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Post by raharris1973 on Feb 7, 2024 2:15:24 GMT
In terms of a German extension of any commitment to the Ottoman empire would 1st require that Germany exists, so wouldn't be until at least the 1870's. I would say if the Arabi revolt still occurs on time its likely to prompt Anglo-French reaction before any such extension and quite possibly prior to any German promises to the Ottomans on any boundary other than in the European and Caucasus regions. Anglo-German relations didn't really cool until Wilhelm II and possibly even the death of Victoria prior to which his respect for his grandmother seems to have muted his hostility. Certainly sounds fair, and more likely than not. You could see some co-operation still after such an agreement between Germany/Austria and Britain until the German threat, especially via the fleet challenge as until then both viewed Russia as a threat and similarly had concerns about France until 1904. Britain, while concerned about Turkish massacres and abuse of Christian populations in the region could be happy with such an agreement and also continued operations in the Far East as neither wanted Russian adventurism in the Far East. Absolutely. The turning point seemed to be both growing German hostility to Britain and Wilhelm's deep hostility toward East Asians which prompted his leadership of an alliance, including France and Russia it should be recalled to prevent Japan making the gains it expected after its defeat of China in 1895 and then the violent language during the Boxer Uprising. Both these turning points, the hostility to Britain, and the hostility to East Asians were genuinely reflecting German or Wilhelmine feelings to some extent, but were also significantly instrumental. The first was helpful in keeping coalitions of pro-government parties together and pulling funds from the Reichstag for Naval modernization and expansion. The hostility to Japan, when expressed in 1895, was very convenient for the Kaiser and German Foreign Ministry's quest to win back the favor of Russia and try to upstage French influence. Some of these agendas may be operable in an alternate scenario....quite possibly naval expansion, but others may not, like hostility to Japan...if Germany has written off Russia as incorrigibly hostile for a decade or more. Also if the alliance looked offensive what would Germany's reaction be? Could it still commit to a massive offensive in the west - which only dated from ~1905/06 and might also have been influenced by the weakness of Russia after its defeat by Japan and then the internal turmoil that prompted. So if an earlier Franco-Russian alliance what would be the German plan for war if/when war broke out? Great set of questions. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Feb 7, 2024 9:16:57 GMT
On the naval aggression I have read that one factor, apart from Tirpitz's grandstanding appealing to Wilhelm's dislike of Britain was that Tirpitz also found some vested interest, in big business in heavy naval spending as it was good for their companies, especially in areas like steel, munitions and the like.
Of course this all ignored the huge costs of such a policy, both in much higher naval spending that was really necessary for Germany's need and even more so in alienating a major trading partner and still significant power which really came back to bite them in 1914-18.
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Post by raharris1973 on Feb 7, 2024 13:50:05 GMT
On the naval aggression I have read that one factor, apart from Tirpitz's grandstanding appealing to Wilhelm's dislike of Britain was that Tirpitz also found some vested interest, in big business in heavy naval spending as it was good for their companies, especially in areas like steel, munitions and the like.
Of course this all ignored the huge costs of such a policy, both in much higher naval spending that was really necessary for Germany's need and even more so in alienating a major trading partner and still significant power which really came back to bite them in 1914-18.
In addition to the “naval orders as kickbacks to heavy industrial concerns” domestic German motive, there were other domestic motives- the Navy was building a unified Reich tradition, as opposed to the Army/Armies, which carried forth state separatism. And, the German middle-classes could see the Navy as their own, with their sons given a chance to rise the officer ranks unimpeded, without diluting the traditional domination of the titled aristocracy over the Army officer corps. So, domestic “self-pleasuring” concerns went against the soundest strategy. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Feb 7, 2024 15:46:53 GMT
On the naval aggression I have read that one factor, apart from Tirpitz's grandstanding appealing to Wilhelm's dislike of Britain was that Tirpitz also found some vested interest, in big business in heavy naval spending as it was good for their companies, especially in areas like steel, munitions and the like.
Of course this all ignored the huge costs of such a policy, both in much higher naval spending that was really necessary for Germany's need and even more so in alienating a major trading partner and still significant power which really came back to bite them in 1914-18.
In addition to the “naval orders as kickbacks to heavy industrial concerns” domestic German motive, there were other domestic motives- the Navy was building a unified Reich tradition, as opposed to the Army/Armies, which carried forth state separatism. And, the German middle-classes could see the Navy as their own, with their sons given a chance to rise the officer ranks unimpeded, without diluting the traditional domination of the titled aristocracy over the Army officer corps. So, domestic “self-pleasuring” concerns went against the soundest strategy.
True those were definitely factors but meeting those requirements didn't need the massive naval build-up and diplomatic/economic problems its stated purpose caused.
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Post by raharris1973 on Feb 8, 2024 1:04:26 GMT
In addition to the “naval orders as kickbacks to heavy industrial concerns” domestic German motive, there were other domestic motives- the Navy was building a unified Reich tradition, as opposed to the Army/Armies, which carried forth state separatism. And, the German middle-classes could see the Navy as their own, with their sons given a chance to rise the officer ranks unimpeded, without diluting the traditional domination of the titled aristocracy over the Army officer corps. So, domestic “self-pleasuring” concerns went against the soundest strategy.
True those were definitely factors but meeting those requirements didn't need the massive naval build-up and diplomatic/economic problems its stated purpose caused.
Well it would have required a decade and a half of patience to wait on the development of aircraft technology or application to solve the second concern of a national combat service open to the middle class while not diluting the Army and keeping the Navy down to a reasonable size if Germany can be made to wait until an Air Force becomes a focus for middle-class patriotic aspiration. Given the relatively small engines of early aircraft, light armament, and mostly wood and canvas construction, it won't stimulate the metallurgical industries all that much unless those industrial barons can wait 3 or 3 and a half decades to the mid-40s for all metal monoplanes to be in mass demand.  Of course, the Germans could get creative, and apply Naval principles to ground combat platforms, creating a new combat service, open to middle-class and technically trained men of talent, centered around vehicular platforms that Germany, along with its neighbor France, was a world leader of: automotive road (and occasionally off-road) vehicles! The new service would be the automotive fleet controlling trucks and cars for ground forces supply and mobility, APCs for personnel protection, vehicle borne artillery, with some innovations methodically being made for off-roading.....especially once trenches are encountered, increased armoring up, and firepower. Of course, coordinating Command and Control and combined arms tactics and campaigns with all the old school Army and its traditional combat branches, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, would be a chore...but fun for all.  |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Feb 8, 2024 22:02:33 GMT
True those were definitely factors but meeting those requirements didn't need the massive naval build-up and diplomatic/economic problems its stated purpose caused.
Well it would have required a decade and a half of patience to wait on the development of aircraft technology or application to solve the second concern of a national combat service open to the middle class while not diluting the Army and keeping the Navy down to a reasonable size if Germany can be made to wait until an Air Force becomes a focus for middle-class patriotic aspiration. Given the relatively small engines of early aircraft, light armament, and mostly wood and canvas construction, it won't stimulate the metallurgical industries all that much unless those industrial barons can wait 3 or 3 and a half decades to the mid-40s for all metal monoplanes to be in mass demand. Of course, the Germans could get creative, and apply Naval principles to ground combat platforms, creating a new combat service, open to middle-class and technically trained men of talent, centered around vehicular platforms that Germany, along with its neighbor France, was a world leader of: automotive road (and occasionally off-road) vehicles! The new service would be the automotive fleet controlling trucks and cars for ground forces supply and mobility, APCs for personnel protection, vehicle borne artillery, with some innovations methodically being made for off-roading.....especially once trenches are encountered, increased armoring up, and firepower. Of course, coordinating Command and Control and combined arms tactics and campaigns with all the old school Army and its traditional combat branches, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, would be a chore...but fun for all.
All possible options I suppose and not sure if any of them would be as bad for Germany as a whole that the OTL course was.
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