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Post by raharris1973 on Sept 24, 2023 0:23:17 GMT
What if the Ottoman Empire had better foreign protection and foreign policy luck after the Crimean War?
Within Austria-Hungary in the early 1870s, after the Franco-Prussian war clearly establishes Prussian hegemony in Germany and excludes Austria-Hungary from Germany and converts German-Austrians largely over to the concept of alignment with the new German Reich, Austria-Hungary debates its future as a great power.
Austria-Hungary is excluded forever from its historic playgrounds of Italy and Germany, thanks to events since 1859. Vienna's freedom of action is circumscribed by its own financial and political weakness, amplified by the Dual Monarchy system, France's weakness, its dependence on Germany, and Germany's commitment to remain on cordial terms with Russia.
The substantive question raised in Vienna is whether or not Austria-Hungary should take on, as its new geopolitical "mission", territorial and strategic expansion in the only direction left to it, southeast, toward the Balkans. The KUK Army General Staff, led by Beck, Viennese industrialists, senior Austrian diplomats, Croatians, and Catholic clerical figures in Cisleithania favor this, and expanding into Bosnia is their immediate focus. However, the Magyar nobility of Hungary, and the political and clerical and military classes of the Kingdom, all strongly oppose any territorial augmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire that would, through acquisition of Ottoman lands, add to the Empire's Slavic or Orthodox populations, and thereby dilute Magyar influence.
At the end of the day, the Hungarians win the debate and the idea 'political' expansion/territorial acquisition in the Balkans is rejected, to the disappointment of its proponent factions. This is divergent from OTL, where Hungary could slow down or impede Viennese expansionist projects, but not halt them entirely. Here they do. However, to placate the Austrian/Cisleithanian commercial and military interest groups, the Hungarians endorse Austro-Hungarian commercial expansion and strategic infrastructure investment within the Ottoman Balkans.
Where both the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the Empire have an unforced, genuine consensus, is their violent agreement that the status quo of Ottoman rule over the Balkan peninsula is superior to any expansion of Russian influence over the region, either direct, or by Orthodox or Slavic proxy states. Generally, Vienna and Budapest views emergence of any new Orthodox or Slavic state, like a Bulgaria, by revolt, as a gain for Russia, or any expansion of existing ones, like Romania, Serbia, Montenegro or Greece, as a gain for Russia and injury to itself.
From Austrian and Hungarian interlocutors, Bismarck, the German Kaiser Wilhelm I, and other leading Germans are all aware of the contours of the internal Austro-Hungarian debate and how it is being resolved. As a result of this, by early 1874, Bismarck is fully convinced that his earlier vision of resolving Russo-Austrian tensions through an outright partition of the Ottoman Balkans into eastern and western halves, which he saw as an ajunct to his Three Emperors League of 1873, is an unworkable solution, undesired by any of its supposed beneficiaries.
It is unworkable for the following reasons:
a) Under Hungarian pressure, the Habsburgs simply fear the consequences of being 'poisoned' by additional Slavs too much to actually be interested in annexed their supposed share of the Balkans.
b) Instinctively, the Hungarians *and* Austrians are unable to think of the Balkans and the Russians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They both value denying all the Balkans, east and west, to the Russians, more than they value getting any of the Balkans.
c) The Russians even have difficulty viewing the Balkans, Austrians and themselves in 'win/win' terms. They have a jealousy of the idea of *anyone* gaining territory at Ottoman expense except themselves and certain allies they think they can control, like the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. The Greeks are independent enough of them that the Russians are even jealous of their potential gains.
Therefore, by default and elimination of alternatives, Bismarck's Germany, as well as Austria-Hungary, comes around to the viewpoint that the best map for southeast Europe is the current one, where the Ottomans rule most of it, and it should be upheld, without change. Meanwhile, the region can and should be developed as a single economic unit by Austro-Hungarian and German business.
This may not be pleasing with some romantic rebels among Ottoman Christians, but they don't hold the power and the guns. It may not be pleasing to circles in Russia with romantic sympathies for Orthodox Christians and Slavs under Ottoman rule, but Berlin and Vienna can be quite confident in the 1870s, and a considerable period beyond, that if relay their lack of approval for a Russian war of expansion, the chronically cash-poor Russians, humiliated in their last major war in the 1850s, are no fools, and will not launch a new one.
Bismarck and his Austrian counterparts may develop a new appreciation for Metternich, his Karlsbad decrees, and his principles of no changes to the European territorial status quo, no matter what. After all, with German national aspirations satisified, who cares if the ladder is pulled up without the Bulgarians, other South Slavs, Greeks, or Armenians being fully satisfied.
In the mid-1870s, the still likely Hercegovinian and Bulgarian revolts with test the German-Austrian pro-Ottoman status quo policy. So will probable Serbian and Montenegrin interventions, which those states may find are irrepressible domestic reflexes. But those states will be defeated, and Russia without getting any perceived 'permission' from either Austria or Germany, will not go to war with the Ottomans.
Bismarck and the Austrians will find Gladstone of Britain their most surprising and annoying critic, lambasting them as shields and enablers of the bloody Turk in the Bulgarian horrors.
Nevertheless, without external aid, I expect the Ottomans to pacify the Balkan Christian rebellions of the 1870s in a long, ugly counterinsurgency.
This leaves Berlin and Vienna feeling vindicated in their policy, even if Socialists and left-leaning liberals and liberals in countries to the west and Russia criticize it.
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The Ottoman Empire, while trading with all western states, appreciates more Vienna and Berlin's 'no [political] strings attached' approach. Berlin and Vienna position themselves, de facto, as the guarantor of the Ottomans' European borders against external aggression, and the armorer, banker and trainer of its forces against rebels. Note I said only European borders. Not wanting to commit themselves to potential conflict with France or Italy in North Africa, nor Britain in the Persian Gulf, Berlin and Vienna make it clear to the Ottomans that they are on their own defending their African and Asian borders.
What are the likely effects of this altered geopolitical situation, where the Ottoman Empire is not defeated by Russia in a war, and retains a European border on the Sava and Danube rivers, on the internal conditions of the larger Ottoman empire, in the latter decades of the 19th century? In particular, what about in the lands that are still Ottoman as a result of the PoD, like Thessaly, Bosnia, Sanjak of Novi Pazar, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, Dobruja?
Are there any knock-on effects of significance from this change in the Balkans to British electoral politics, or to what France ends up doing in Tunisia in 1881, or Britain in Egypt in 1882, or Russia in Central and Eastern Asia in the 1880s or 1890s?
Are the developments of, attractions, and antagonisms of the different powers within Europe altered in any way as we wrap up the 19th century and move into the 20th, beyond the existence of fewer, smaller Balkan players, and a somewhat closer alignment of Germany and Austria-Hungary with the Ottomans?
When is the next round of Balkan Christian and national revolts after the failed 1870s ones, if they come at all?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 24, 2023 17:16:48 GMT
My gut feeling would be an earlier Franco-Russian alliance as they would both be unhappy with the German-Austrian dominance and the common threat to Russian desires in the Balkans and French to regain Alsace-Lorraine and pre-emenence in western Europe.
Britain and Italy would be the question marks here. Under the Liberals there would be a strong hostility towards Ottoman brutality towards their Christian citizens, which under those conditions is likely to be worse and after the crushing of unrest in the 1870's probably a prolonged guerilla war with massacres on both sides. Russia and possibly some western private sources might seek to aid the rebels with arms and press their case. Under the Tories Britain is likely to be more interested in maintaining its influence in the Ottoman empire and seek to prevent it falling too much under the control of other powers although until Wilhelm II fouls things up too much relations with Germany are pretty good.
Italy is an uncertain factor as its primary aims are still in the Adriatic and Balkans so its at odds with Austria but it also has clashes with the French and is still pretty weak and under-developed itself.
I'm not sure how much Germany can contribute financially as it didn't have massive fiscal reserves and most of what it did have was involved in its own industrial development and the heavy military spending. However possibly, at least unless/until tensions between Britain and Germany develop it could be that Britain supplies loans to the Turks and naval support while Germany helps it develop its army.
If Egypt falls into disorder and breaks away from the Khadive's rule then Britain and probably France are likely to intervene as they have too much invested in the region, both economically and especially for the British strategically in terms of the canal to allow it to drift away. Egypt will probably continue to be a token Ottoman subject, paying tribute as OTL so its not likely to be a source of tension with the Turks. Whether it still leads to tension with France depends on how things develop. Without Bismarck brokering the 1878 agreement to settle differences Cyprus might not come under British occupation however. The other issue is possibly Greece. Will Britain or another power give it guarantees against Ottoman attack? Your still likely to see the scramble for Africa which will ease tensions in Europe a little because its diverted to external areas.
In terms of a general European war its likely to happen at some date with almost certainly a German-Austrian and Franco-Russia core to the conflict. What part Britain and Italy play would be difficult to tell but assuming the alliance with the Ottomans continue their almost certain to be on the German side.
How well the Ottomans reform their society and military could be important issues. They have more opportunity in this scenario with greater resources but arguably less incentive as their not under the same pressure with areas managing to break away and clear defeats for Ottoman forces. Also the army could be increasingly orientated towards policing actions - albeit probably with a very heavy hand - and hence relatively light mobile forces are more useful than better equipped regular forces.
Your saying that Germany and Austria are only guaranteeing the Ottoman borders in Europe which means that the Russians might at some stage seek a conflict in the Caucasus region, possibly prompted by a round of massacres or simply unrest in Armenia. How that develops could be influential in wider events.
Anyway initial thoughts on the scenario.
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Post by raharris1973 on Sept 25, 2023 1:08:21 GMT
My gut feeling would be an earlier Franco-Russian alliance as they would both be unhappy with the German-Austrian dominance and the common threat to Russian desires in the Balkans and French to regain Alsace-Lorraine and pre-eminence in western Europe. How much do you think it might accelerate the start of the Franco-Russian alliance, which in OTL formed in stages from 1891-1894? Do you think that the diplomatic shielding of the Christian-massacring Turks by the Germanic powers in the 1870s may send the Russians off hunting for a French alliance in a fit of pique a full decade earlier than OTL -so 1881-84, or even earlier, starting in 1877-78? We're not thinking conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance, by itself, would panic the Germans under Bismarck and Wilhelm into preemptive war, are we? The geopolitical effects of an early Franco-Russian alliance by 1884 or so could be interesting. As would its reflection back on the internal politics of European states. For example, French success in breaking its diplomatic isolation and achieving alliance with Russia could encourage greater involvement and power plays within Europe, at the expense of the colonial priorities of Jules Ferry. Alternatively, France could be left feeling more secure in Europe, and free to indulge in Ferry's overseas colonialism. The course of European and world diplomacy in OTL might be instructive here. After the firm establishment of the Franco-Russian treaty by 1894, contrary to intuitive expectations, French tensions with Germany and aggressive moves in that direction did not immediately increase. Nor did Russian tensions with Austria nor aggression toward Austria and the Balkans. Rather, for about a decade-long period, 1894-1904, French and Russian tensions with Germany and Austria relaxed a bit and went on the back burner, while France and Russia focused again more on the colonial sphere and Asia than on Europe. That benign trend (from a Central Powers point of view) of easing focus on Central Europe reversed itself in 1904-1906 with the first Morocco crisis and the Russian defeat in the war with Japan, but it is interesting the decade long interlude of detente took place at all, during which time, it often felt to London that Franco-Russian cooperation was more aimed at Britain than Germany. Also, assuming Ottoman rule is reconsolidated over the Balkans by the end of the 1870s, that area should quiet for awhile, not making headline news in Russia, the west or Central Europe. That could remove some of individual Balkan and Bulgarian crises of the 1885-1887 that in OTL raised Russian tensions and fears of war (and vice versa) with multiple players in OTL like Britain, Austria, and Germany. However, there is nothing in the altered situation that should calm the Boulangiste fever growing in France from 1885 on, nor prevent the Schnaebale crisis of 1887, which threatened to bring about Franco-German war. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Sept 26, 2023 13:57:21 GMT
My gut feeling would be an earlier Franco-Russian alliance as they would both be unhappy with the German-Austrian dominance and the common threat to Russian desires in the Balkans and French to regain Alsace-Lorraine and pre-eminence in western Europe. How much do you think it might accelerate the start of the Franco-Russian alliance, which in OTL formed in stages from 1891-1894? Do you think that the diplomatic shielding of the Christian-massacring Turks by the Germanic powers in the 1870s may send the Russians off hunting for a French alliance in a fit of pique a full decade earlier than OTL -so 1881-84, or even earlier, starting in 1877-78? We're not thinking conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance, by itself, would panic the Germans under Bismarck and Wilhelm into preemptive war, are we? The geopolitical effects of an early Franco-Russian alliance by 1884 or so could be interesting. As would its reflection back on the internal politics of European states. For example, French success in breaking its diplomatic isolation and achieving alliance with Russia could encourage greater involvement and power plays within Europe, at the expense of the colonial priorities of Jules Ferry. Alternatively, France could be left feeling more secure in Europe, and free to indulge in Ferry's overseas colonialism. The course of European and world diplomacy in OTL might be instructive here. After the firm establishment of the Franco-Russian treaty by 1894, contrary to intuitive expectations, French tensions with Germany and aggressive moves in that direction did not immediately increase. Nor did Russian tensions with Austria nor aggression toward Austria and the Balkans. Rather, for about a decade-long period, 1894-1904, French and Russian tensions with Germany and Austria relaxed a bit and went on the back burner, while France and Russia focused again more on the colonial sphere and Asia than on Europe. That benign trend (from a Central Powers point of view) of easing focus on Central Europe reversed itself in 1904-1906 with the first Morocco crisis and the Russian defeat in the war with Japan, but it is interesting the decade long interlude of detente took place at all, during which time, it often felt to London that Franco-Russian cooperation was more aimed at Britain than Germany. Also, assuming Ottoman rule is reconsolidated over the Balkans by the end of the 1870s, that area should quiet for awhile, not making headline news in Russia, the west or Central Europe. That could remove some of individual Balkan and Bulgarian crises of the 1885-1887 that in OTL raised Russian tensions and fears of war (and vice versa) with multiple players in OTL like Britain, Austria, and Germany. However, there is nothing in the altered situation that should calm the Boulangiste fever growing in France from 1885 on, nor prevent the Schnaebale crisis of 1887, which threatened to bring about Franco-German war.
I wouldn't like to say how much sooner but if Bismarck's OTL support for the Three Emperors League is ended earlier or simply doesn't come into existence then Russia is isolated and realises this, along with the fact that Germany is responsible for the alliance with Austria and Turkey that prevents them advancing their interests into the Balkans or their dream of gaining Constantinople and the straits. That coupled with the military power of Germany, which will grow rapidly with its industrialization will leave Russia vulnerable and frustrated. The obvious ally here is France albeit that reactionary Russian and republican France are otherwise uneasy bedfellows.
My suspicion is that the relative relaxation of tension OTL after the Franco-Russian was partly due to the fact that both France and Russia felt more secure against possible German attack but not strong enough, or confident enough in their allies reliability to consider attacking themselves. Especially here its likely to be stronger as the German-Austrian alliance is boosted by Turkey, which while not a formidable offensive power is a significant defensive one and also in a position to close the straits to Russia while Germany can close the Baltic. That might prompt an earlier seeking of developments of railway to Vladivostok or Archangel/Murmansk, although neither could really replace the loss of the western and southern posts for access to the rest of the world.
However if there is an earlier Franco-Russian alliance then you would see France possibly more secure and hence one of the crisis you mention might lead to a Franco-German war, although who would be taking the offensive and what other powers might be involved would be uncertain.
One other problem for the Russians here is without the OTL Russian victory in 1877/78 they might still be banned from operating warships in the Black Sea, which would further hinder their abilities to expand their interests in the region or even defend their existing ones.
Another butterfly is does Frederick III still suffer from throat cancer and die in 1888, barely 3 months after succeeding his father Wilhelm I? If he does then things probably go as OTL although with an earlier Franco-Russian alignment pressure for more offensive actions could see him replaced somewhat earlier. If Frederick III lives longer then things will take a different route but the emperor because of his more liberal viewpoint would still clash with Bismarck which could end again with Bismarck falling as OTL or a bit earlier. However a Frederick III Germany that defeats Bismarck would be considerably different to one dominated by Wilhelm II. It would be more likely to strengthen links with Britain and possibly be urging Austria for social/political reform. Then again how long would Frederick last as he was 57 when he came to the throne and how much would Wilhelm seek to roll back on any of his father's policies?
It might be that an earlier ending of French isolation could mean a shorter period of eased tension so the chances of a major war between the two blocs say in the 1880's or 1890's. In turn this could mean less tension in terms of colonial expansion. possibly with it being pushed by some of the smaller powers or individual figures in the French and British colonies. Coupled with an earlier great war this might mean a fair chunk of Africa especially stays outside formal European control for the moment.
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Post by raharris1973 on Jan 27, 2024 16:38:55 GMT
The TLDR, final result of the scenario I am proposing, is that there is no Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and thus no Treaty of San Stefano, nor Treaty of Berlin.
The principal consequence of that for the map of Europe is that the Ottoman Empire keeps its borders of 1876, unchanged.
This means it keeps actual administrative and military control over Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar (so no Austro-Hungarian occupation of these areas), and no creation of independent or autonomous Bulgaria. Turkey keeps Dobruja and its border on the Danube with Romania. Since Romania makes no gains at Ottoman expense, the Romanians maintain that small sliver of southern Bessarabia they got at the end of the Crimean War that gave them access to the Black Sea, instead of ceding it to Russia, like happened in OTL. Since the Ottomans did not require British help while facing the distress of war with Russia, Britain does not get the cession of Cyprus.
What are the logical knock-on consequences of Turkey keeping status quo on its borders through the 1870s?
Having dodged territorial losses in Europe in the 1870s, should we expect the Ottomans to also dodge territorial losses in the 1880s, and avoid western occupation of Tunisia (by French in 1881), Egypt (by British in 1882), and Greek occupation of Thessaly (early 1880s), and still be in charge of these regions by 1890s?
Or do we expect the western and Greek takeover to be accomplished on time or by 1890?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on Jan 28, 2024 13:45:11 GMT
The TLDR, final result of the scenario I am proposing, is that there is no Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, and thus no Treaty of San Stefano, nor Treaty of Berlin. The principal consequence of that for the map of Europe is that the Ottoman Empire keeps its borders of 1876, unchanged. This means it keeps actual administrative and military control over Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Sanjak of Novi-Pazar (so no Austro-Hungarian occupation of these areas), and no creation of independent or autonomous Bulgaria. Turkey keeps Dobruja and its border on the Danube with Romania. Since Romania makes no gains at Ottoman expense, the Romanians maintain that small sliver of southern Bessarabia they got at the end of the Crimean War that gave them access to the Black Sea, instead of ceding it to Russia, like happened in OTL. Since the Ottomans did not require British help while facing the distress of war with Russia, Britain does not get the cession of Cyprus. What are the logical knock-on consequences of Turkey keeping status quo on its borders through the 1870s? Having dodged territorial losses in Europe in the 1870s, should we expect the Ottomans to also dodge territorial losses in the 1880s, and avoid western occupation of Tunisia (by French in 1881), Egypt (by British in 1882), and Greek occupation of Thessaly (early 1880s), and still be in charge of these regions by 1890s? Or do we expect the western and Greek takeover to be accomplished on time or by 1890?
Looking over the OP again you were saying that the Austro-German guarantee would only apply to their European lands, and possibly their position in the Caucasus region then I could see French or possibly Italian encroachment in Tunisia and a probably British-French intervention to suppress unrest in Egypt. The latter could end up with a joint Anglo-French co-dominion as according to one source Gladstone offered that to the French but for some reason they rejected it. If Egypt proves beyond Ottoman control the canal will prompt British intervention. - The if is here because an Ottoman empire that doesn't get pressed in the north, provided that doesn't make it more complacent and corrupt - might end up being strong enough to suppress such revolts itself. However your likely to have increasing unrest in the main Ottoman colonies as western ideas spread and Egypt is probably the most likely example given its size, history and distance from Constantinople.
The key questions I think are: 1) How the empire handles this option and whether you get real reform, which in the longer run might be even more dangerous as the assorted non-Turkish groups both Christian and Muslim might want social and political change but that would probably be at least a generation or two down the line, or whether it gets too complacent and repressive. If the latter expect some very bloody massacres, especially of Christian groups in Europe and Anatolia. Which in turn is likely to anger people in Britain especially but probably also France and Russia and to some degree in Germany especially
2) Might Germany as its industrial development steadily increases it power seek to extend the guarantee to the empires Asian lands? This or Wilhelm still goes the naval threat route and alienates, which would probably prompt British ententes with France and then Russia as OTL. - If the latter happens earlier then it might leave Japan isolated although I'm not sure how happy Britain would be at further Russian advances into northern China.
3) Does an earlier Franco-Russian alliance prompt an earlier war, either pre-emptive by Germany or possibly by the Franco-Russian alliance as they feel more confident. Which would make Britain more likely to be neutral, possibly with a pro-German stance. Italy might be against Austria here, especially if Britain was neutral as its desires from Austria and Turkey would be greater than what it desires from France.
4) As you mentioned with France does the alliance with Russia prompt make it concentrate on Europe or feel free to be more aggressive overseas. This also apply to Russia as does it desire an earlier removal of its limitations in the Black Sea and some resolution of issues in the Balkans and Caucasus regions or does it still feel blocked there and look for expansion in the Far East and/or Central Asia with possibly a push into Persia if they think they can get away with it.
The key issues I think are what happens in the Ottoman empire and whether there is an earlier major European conflict and if so what is the political stance of Italy [probably pro-France] and Britain [could be anywhere depending on events]
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Post by Max Sinister on Jan 31, 2024 13:05:09 GMT
Some different idea: If A-H fell apart, the Austrian threat would disappear, leaving "only" Russia as a threat.
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Post by American hist on Jan 31, 2024 21:35:51 GMT
I’m not saying that this is impossible this discussion. However, when I was a school boy often asked the question who seriously likes the ottoman empire in Europe? (Back then during time of European powers) the people who were raised at least culturally Christian disliked the Ottoman Empire for a number of different reasons, including their oppression toward minorities were often Christian. In the Ottoman Empire, they persecuted Jewish people, and eventually Zionist. There were times the Ottoman Empire where Jewish people weren’t persecuted, but I know I am stress in the time. Over 300 years long from the founding till the collapse. In most respects, although I was raised in a Christian home school environment, my opinion would not be to different from what a lot of Europeans might’ve thought during that time why you should Great Britain and France help Europe’s enemy who took over Constantinople and help defeat the other crusades. It was the Ottomans who encouraged piracy, and arguably Europe have the manpower, but was too soft on their protection toward Christian being slaughtered,kidnapped and sold as slaves even raped during their enslavement.
My point is, is that Europe has a lot of ground to be bitter at the Ottoman Empire. During WW1 in joined a league made up of some of the most hated, or disliked nations. Bulgaria had conflict with the Balkans, Austria was the only country that didn’t rub others the wrong way.. although back on topic to the Ottomans unreligious people in Europe, would not care for the Ottomans Islamic culture or care for the Islamic state impose religion. By the age of rifle musketry the Ottoman Empire was the sick man of Europe and wasn’t getting any better. Muslims generally liked the Ottoman Empire and people in World War I did like to romanticize their historical ties during the crusades, and that they were arguably fighting another one under less religious zeal and dogma(point is the Ottoman Empire wasn’t popular internationally by the early 1900s and outside of the Muslim world
In most respects, the ottoman empire only serves as the balance of power.
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Post by raharris1973 on Feb 1, 2024 1:30:37 GMT
Austria was the only country that didn’t rub others the wrong way Ironically, Austria-Hungary seemed to match the Ottoman Empire for being unpopular and having as many enemies, including its own ally!--Italy. Austria-Hungary had Serbia and Russia as initial enemies, then little Montenegro, then additional Italy and Romania. All of them literally wanted a piece of Austria-Hungary. And then they had the enemies within Serbs and some of Ukrainians/Ruthenians sympathetic to the country across the border, ethnic Italians in Trentino and Romanians in Transylvania, and then other groups like Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and Croats who wanted to do their own thing. Not to mention Austria and Hungary wanting a divorce, from each other. |
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Post by American hist on Feb 1, 2024 1:49:05 GMT
raharris1973, thanks I didn’t realize that Austria-Hungary was that unpopular among different powers besides Italy the central powers were the league of unlikable nations. The Crimean war was arguably a just war for Russia , but it’s the British and French who became victorious ass goes the phrase the victors write the history books.
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Post by simon darkshade on Feb 1, 2024 2:23:35 GMT
Nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. The Eastern Question arose not because of Britain “liking” the Ottomans, but because it was in their interests to do so in order to counterbalance Russian influence in the Eastern Med, threatening the route to India.
The Crusades did not factor into the calculations of any nations in the post Westphalian era or even beforehand; consider the Franco-Ottoman Alliance of the 16th century, among earlier factors.
Given that the most democratic nation amongst the European powers in Britain was not particularly democratic in any modern sense until the 1860s/70s, the opinions of ‘the people’ mattered very, very little.
As for Austria, her deteriorating relations with the Russians were a thing of the 1870s forward; Italy as a Johnny come lately was directly opposed the previous generation of Austrian interests. The little states don’t matter in and of themselves.
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Post by TheRomanSlayer on Feb 1, 2024 6:32:48 GMT
Here's another question that I wanted to add: would Russia still try it's luck at gaining parts of eastern Anatolia with significant Armenian populations? Or would a difficulty in going for another round against the Ottomans force Russia to look towards the Pacific instead? In such a scenario, having the Ottomans stick around in Europe might initially be a net benefit for Russia's rivals, only for the Russians to benefit at another area instead. So a German-Austro-Hungarian-Ottoman Three Emperors League arising instead of the one with Russia in it, and possibly a Russian rapprochement with Qing China instead of trying to expand into Xinjiang and Mongolia.
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Post by American hist on Feb 4, 2024 22:24:02 GMT
Could the Ottomans enlist the help of other Muslim nations? I do not think so because of religious and cultural differences accompanied by a lack of modernization. What about Japan forming a coalition against Russia 🇷🇺 with the Ottomans? The Ottomans could potentially have a lot of trade with the United States.( At least buying weapons.) well, I do recall both sides wanted to have the Ottomans side with them during World War I the Ottomans joined the central powers, and the central powers were desperate enough. However, existing hatred between Turkey and the Balkans people and with Russia what’s going to happen
The Ottomans probably couldn’t enlist other. Is Linux support due to modernization issues
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Post by raharris1973 on Feb 5, 2024 10:00:36 GMT
1) How the empire handles this option and whether you get real reform, which in the longer run might be even more dangerous as the assorted non-Turkish groups both Christian and Muslim might want social and political change but that would probably be at least a generation or two down the line, or whether it gets too complacent and repressive. If the latter expect some very bloody massacres, especially of Christian groups in Europe and Anatolia. Which in turn is likely to anger people in Britain especially but probably also France and Russia and to some degree in Germany especiallBeing on the edge of this was the permanent Ottoman condition, it seems. 2) Might Germany as its industrial development steadily increases it power seek to extend the guarantee to the empires Asian lands? This or Wilhelm still goes the naval threat route and alienates, which would probably prompt British ententes with France and then Russia as OTL. - If the latter happens earlier then it might leave Japan isolated although I'm not sure how happy Britain would be at further Russian advances into northern China. Possibly Germany & Austria could eventually extend their guarantees to the Asian, or possibly even African lands of the Ottoman Empire as you suggest. The former would be consistent with an anti-Russian containment policy, the latter would be a response to an early emergent Triple Entente if Egypt and Tunisia were not already under Anglo-French protectorates. Early, precocious Triple Entente leave Japan out in the cold, sure. And China, as you suggest.And there are potential risks of things that Britain wouldn't like, for example, "excessive" Russian advance into northern China, or Korea. Well, too bad. Can't get everything you want all at once, sometimes you need to choose. The Germans might be saying to Britain "we'd be willing to work with you on the Far East, if you didn't work against us in Europe and the Near East, but while the latter is your policy, we can't do you any favors.". 3) Does an earlier Franco-Russian alliance prompt an earlier war, either pre-emptive by Germany or possibly by the Franco-Russian alliance as they feel more confident. Which would make Britain more likely to be neutral, possibly with a pro-German stance. Italy might be against Austria here, especially if Britain was neutral as its desires from Austria and Turkey would be greater than what it desires from France. The only sensible answer is "maybe"? There is a chance of that Italy alignment with a Franco-Russian combination, but for it to work, it has to not get cancelled out by the Tunisia dispute, and then later tariff and immigration disputes with France. 4) As you mentioned with France does the alliance with Russia prompt make it concentrate on Europe or feel free to be more aggressive overseas. This also apply to Russia as does it desire an earlier removal of its limitations in the Black Sea and some resolution of issues in the Balkans and Caucasus regions or does it still feel blocked there and look for expansion in the Far East and/or Central Asia with possibly a push into Persia if they think they can get away with it. Maybe, with the Franco-Prussian War a more recent memory, and possibly coinciding with the era of Boulangisme, an early Franco-Russian alliance would lead to greater French concentration on Europe over colonial expansion. However, by way of analogy with OTL, I would note that the *opposite* occurred in the dozen years after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in the early 1890s. Franco-German crises actually receded to less than what they had been the previous twenty years, and France went into colonial overdrive, and its rivalry with Britain in Africa (Fashoda) and Southeast Asia (Siam) peaked. |
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Post by stevep on Feb 5, 2024 15:57:25 GMT
1) How the empire handles this option and whether you get real reform, which in the longer run might be even more dangerous as the assorted non-Turkish groups both Christian and Muslim might want social and political change but that would probably be at least a generation or two down the line, or whether it gets too complacent and repressive. If the latter expect some very bloody massacres, especially of Christian groups in Europe and Anatolia. Which in turn is likely to anger people in Britain especially but probably also France and Russia and to some degree in Germany especiallBeing on the edge of this was the permanent Ottoman condition, it seems. 2) Might Germany as its industrial development steadily increases it power seek to extend the guarantee to the empires Asian lands? This or Wilhelm still goes the naval threat route and alienates, which would probably prompt British ententes with France and then Russia as OTL. - If the latter happens earlier then it might leave Japan isolated although I'm not sure how happy Britain would be at further Russian advances into northern China. Possibly Germany & Austria could eventually extend their guarantees to the Asian, or possibly even African lands of the Ottoman Empire as you suggest. The former would be consistent with an anti-Russian containment policy, the latter would be a response to an early emergent Triple Entente if Egypt and Tunisia were not already under Anglo-French protectorates. Early, precocious Triple Entente leave Japan out in the cold, sure. And China, as you suggest.And there are potential risks of things that Britain wouldn't like, for example, "excessive" Russian advance into northern China, or Korea. Well, too bad. Can't get everything you want all at once, sometimes you need to choose. The Germans might be saying to Britain "we'd be willing to work with you on the Far East, if you didn't work against us in Europe and the Near East, but while the latter is your policy, we can't do you any favors.". 3) Does an earlier Franco-Russian alliance prompt an earlier war, either pre-emptive by Germany or possibly by the Franco-Russian alliance as they feel more confident. Which would make Britain more likely to be neutral, possibly with a pro-German stance. Italy might be against Austria here, especially if Britain was neutral as its desires from Austria and Turkey would be greater than what it desires from France. The only sensible answer is "maybe"? There is a chance of that Italy alignment with a Franco-Russian combination, but for it to work, it has to not get cancelled out by the Tunisia dispute, and then later tariff and immigration disputes with France. 4) As you mentioned with France does the alliance with Russia prompt make it concentrate on Europe or feel free to be more aggressive overseas. This also apply to Russia as does it desire an earlier removal of its limitations in the Black Sea and some resolution of issues in the Balkans and Caucasus regions or does it still feel blocked there and look for expansion in the Far East and/or Central Asia with possibly a push into Persia if they think they can get away with it. Maybe, with the Franco-Prussian War a more recent memory, and possibly coinciding with the era of Boulangisme, an early Franco-Russian alliance would lead to greater French concentration on Europe over colonial expansion. However, by way of analogy with OTL, I would note that the *opposite* occurred in the dozen years after the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in the early 1890s. Franco-German crises actually receded to less than what they had been the previous twenty years, and France went into colonial overdrive, and its rivalry with Britain in Africa (Fashoda) and Southeast Asia (Siam) peaked.
In terms of a German extension of any commitment to the Ottoman empire would 1st require that Germany exists, so wouldn't be until at least the 1870's. I would say if the Arabi revolt still occurs on time its likely to prompt Anglo-French reaction before any such extension and quite possibly prior to any German promises to the Ottomans on any boundary other than in the European and Caucasus regions. Anglo-German relations didn't really cool until Wilhelm II and possibly even the death of Victoria prior to which his respect for his grandmother seems to have muted his hostility.
You could see some co-operation still after such an agreement between Germany/Austria and Britain until the German threat, especially via the fleet challenge as until then both viewed Russia as a threat and similarly had concerns about France until 1904. Britain, while concerned about Turkish massacres and abuse of Christian populations in the region could be happy with such an agreement and also continued operations in the Far East as neither wanted Russian adventurism in the Far East. The turning point seemed to be both growing German hostility to Britain and Wilhelm's deep hostility toward East Asians which prompted his leadership of an alliance, including France and Russia it should be recalled to prevent Japan making the gains it expected after its defeat of China in 1895 and then the violent language during the Boxer Uprising.
As you say the actions of both France [especially] and Russia could go either way in the event of an earlier alliance against Germany. The extensive colonial expansion concerned Britain OTL but the alliance pushing for a general war against Germany earlier would also cause at least some concern in London. Also if the alliance looked offensive what would Germany's reaction be? Could it still commit to a massive offensive in the west - which only dated from ~1905/06 and might also have been influenced by the weakness of Russia after its defeat by Japan and then the internal turmoil that prompted. So if an earlier Franco-Russian alliance what would be the German plan for war if/when war broke out?
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