stevep
Fleet admiral
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Post by stevep on Jul 31, 2023 19:43:55 GMT
A question about the impact of the WNT building limits on the British ship and warship building industry and overall industrial base in the interwar era: So which is it? Did the the British shrink down their warship building industry disastrously as part of the Washington Treaty, to their detriment in countering the rise of 1930s aggressors? Or did the Washington Treaty allow Britain to benefit economically from avoiding a naval arms race that would have been ruinous to Britain? Or was there a happy medium, some limit that Britain would have needed to avoid to economic ruin, that could have been negotiated, but the limits of the Washington Treaty as written amounted to an 'excessive' crippling of naval production lines?
Catching up on this there was always going to be a contraction after WWI because both of the strained economy and that the fleet had been large due to both the pre-war naval race with Germany and then the war itself. However the WNT prevented the RN building to what it needed due to the international circumstances. This was more important for the UK because while Japan and the US really only had one concern, i.e. each other and for the US it was largely immune by this stage to naval threat for the UK it had to consider both Japan and a number of potential European powers even if it was willing to assume that the US would never be a threat.
As such Britain could neither maintain a balanced fleet nor the necessary facilities to rebuild the fleet fairly rapidly. It would have been better for Britain - ignoring the fact we can't know for sure what permutation might result - if either a) There had been a treaty that allowed new construction but with a limit on both ship size and the rate at which new ships could be construction - to space out such expense. Or b) No treaty and Britain built at a steady pace to maintain a balanced fleet and also supporting industry.
On another site, specializing in naval history I've suggested that if talks had broken down Britain could have largely ignored a US-Japanese naval race with say 4 G3's in the early 20's and probably 4 updated ships 4-5 years later which a 3rd class at a similar time afterwards which if other events had gone largely as OTL would probably have been killed by the great depression. Japan might have built say as many 8 new capital ships before growing economic and political strains - compounded by the 1923 earthquake caused it to be terminated. A number of those ships are likely to not be completed until say ~1930. The US might produce a few more but is likely to stop as soon as Japan does if not before.
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 1, 2023 0:49:38 GMT
Barbara Tuchman's 'The Zimmerman Telegram' discussed American beliefs and accusations about alleged Japanese aspirations for a Japanese naval base in Mexico. Not sure if it came out and credited it as an objective historic fact. Also discussed American beliefs and accusations about alleged German aspirations for German naval base in Mexico - she did tend to write write as if she took any alleged impulse or desire of the Kaiser at face value as true. I wasn't a big footnote reader when I read it, so I don't remember if it was well footnoted at all. Barbara Tuchman's treatment of history (The Guns of August) is more "popular" than rigorous. She noted from newspaper sources and popular "yellow peril" journalism, "the beliefs" about Japanese business dealings in Mexico. Like modern Chinese business dealings in Panama, Tuchman never convinces as to whether a military presence was possible or viable. It never was. Sort of like secret German U-boat bases in the Caribbean, which was a similar rumor of the era. Based on my readings since, I would have to agree on Tuchman. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 1, 2023 15:13:42 GMT
1.) We are dealing with alternate history aficionados here. It can be assumed that they understand prices and indeed are interested in the minutiae of them. 2.) Largely irrelevant. The key figures were the length of the designs, constrained by British dockyards to ~860ft, which is the G3 (856) and longer than the N3 (820). The reason for the length constraints on the KGVs were from treaty compliance 3.) 1 flotilla per battleship doesn't lead to numbers which break the camel's back, as it were. I agree on the relatively low value of both the RN and USN destroyers of the Great War for subsequent conflicts and use; by existing, they allowed bean counters to defer destroyer production In any event, my view on RAHarris's 'happy medium' is 4 ships in the early 1920s (Orion replacement) and a further four in the late 1920s/early 1930s (KGV replacement). That would be followed in the early-mid 1930s by the Iron Duke replacements. That size of programme would be sufficient to preserve capacity, industrial capacity, skill and experience through the @ locust years. Thank you @simondarkshade for your constructive response on what a British “happy medium” building plan could have been in the absence of the WNT. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 1, 2023 15:15:45 GMT
A question about the impact of the WNT building limits on the British ship and warship building industry and overall industrial base in the interwar era: So which is it? Did the the British shrink down their warship building industry disastrously as part of the Washington Treaty, to their detriment in countering the rise of 1930s aggressors? Or did the Washington Treaty allow Britain to benefit economically from avoiding a naval arms race that would have been ruinous to Britain? Or was there a happy medium, some limit that Britain would have needed to avoid to economic ruin, that could have been negotiated, but the limits of the Washington Treaty as written amounted to an 'excessive' crippling of naval production lines?
Catching up on this there was always going to be a contraction after WWI because both of the strained economy and that the fleet had been large due to both the pre-war naval race with Germany and then the war itself. However the WNT prevented the RN building to what it needed due to the international circumstances. This was more important for the UK because while Japan and the US really only had one concern, i.e. each other and for the US it was largely immune by this stage to naval threat for the UK it had to consider both Japan and a number of potential European powers even if it was willing to assume that the US would never be a threat.
As such Britain could neither maintain a balanced fleet nor the necessary facilities to rebuild the fleet fairly rapidly. It would have been better for Britain - ignoring the fact we can't know for sure what permutation might result - if either a) There had been a treaty that allowed new construction but with a limit on both ship size and the rate at which new ships could be construction - to space out such expense. Or b) No treaty and Britain built at a steady pace to maintain a balanced fleet and also supporting industry.
On another site, specializing in naval history I've suggested that if talks had broken down Britain could have largely ignored a US-Japanese naval race with say 4 G3's in the early 20's and probably 4 updated ships 4-5 years later which a 3rd class at a similar time afterwards which if other events had gone largely as OTL would probably have been killed by the great depression. Japan might have built say as many 8 new capital ships before growing economic and political strains - compounded by the 1923 earthquake caused it to be terminated. A number of those ships are likely to not be completed until say ~1930. The US might produce a few more but is likely to stop as soon as Japan does if not before.
Thank you stevep for your constructive response on what a “happy medium” British building plan could have been in the absence of the WNT. |
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Post by raharris1973 on Aug 1, 2023 15:19:51 GMT
@simondarkshade and stevep - given what you suggest about possible British naval building programs in the absence of WNT restraints, is it possible that instead of the treaty’s failure causing anticipated bad or catastrophic outcomes, it’s failure could have led to one or more of the following *positive* alterations to the timeline of the 20th century occurring? - Possible good consequences - -Stabilization of employment and infrastructure in British shipbuilding sector, maintenance of mechanical, engineering, design skills; much less decline in sector than in OTL 1920s -No adoption of Churchill's '10 year rule' defence and naval budget limitations assuming no war for ten years, a larger and more advanced British fleet in the early 1930s -As a consequence of busier British shipyards and a larger existing British fleet, and greater British naval lead, possible greater willingness to be politically and economically firm with Japan in the early 1930s if like OTL it still chooses to be aggressive against China in Manchuria and especially Shanghai. Or if it gets into all-out war with China later in the 1930s. -As a consequence of the same factors, possibly little or no British interest in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1934 or 1935, which in OTL helped delegitimize armament restrictions on Germany and undermined the confidence of France and Italy in taking German-containing positions on the continent -As a consequence of the same factors, possibly greater willingness to be politically and economically firm (in the form of sanctions or Suez closure) with Italy during its aggression against Abyssinia in 1935, due to Britain's probable greater naval lead over Italy. -As a consequence of a stronger shipbuilding sector sustained by government warship contracts in the 20s, perhaps a wide sector of the working class have a greater buffer of saving when the Wall Street crash and American and German banking collapses occur, and a more heavy industrially focused Britain has invested smaller sums in pure financial speculation. -If the naval race has broken straitjackets of balance budget orthodoxy and the gold standard, Britain may be able to have a more nimble, Keynesian, New Deal or Bruning-Schacht-like plan response to an emerging Great Depression than OTL's response. |
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stevep
Fleet admiral
Posts: 24,832
Likes: 13,222
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Post by stevep on Aug 1, 2023 19:44:34 GMT
@simondarkshade and stevep - given what you suggest about possible British naval building programs in the absence of WNT restraints, is it possible that instead of the treaty’s failure causing anticipated bad or catastrophic outcomes, it’s failure could have led to one or more of the following *positive* alterations to the timeline of the 20th century occurring? - Possible good consequences - -Stabilization of employment and infrastructure in British shipbuilding sector, maintenance of mechanical, engineering, design skills; much less decline in sector than in OTL 1920s -No adoption of Churchill's '10 year rule' defence and naval budget limitations assuming no war for ten years, a larger and more advanced British fleet in the early 1930s -As a consequence of busier British shipyards and a larger existing British fleet, and greater British naval lead, possible greater willingness to be politically and economically firm with Japan in the early 1930s if like OTL it still chooses to be aggressive against China in Manchuria and especially Shanghai. Or if it gets into all-out war with China later in the 1930s. -As a consequence of the same factors, possibly little or no British interest in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 1934 or 1935, which in OTL helped delegitimize armament restrictions on Germany and undermined the confidence of France and Italy in taking German-containing positions on the continent -As a consequence of the same factors, possibly greater willingness to be politically and economically firm (in the form of sanctions or Suez closure) with Italy during its aggression against Abyssinia in 1935, due to Britain's probable greater naval lead over Italy. -As a consequence of a stronger shipbuilding sector sustained by government warship contracts in the 20s, perhaps a wide sector of the working class have a greater buffer of saving when the Wall Street crash and American and German banking collapses occur, and a more heavy industrially focused Britain has invested smaller sums in pure financial speculation. -If the naval race has broken straitjackets of balance budget orthodoxy and the gold standard, Britain may be able to have a more nimble, Keynesian, New Deal or Bruning-Schacht-like plan response to an emerging Great Depression than OTL's response.
I think all of those events are possibilities, although probably unlikely all would occur in the same scenario.
Definitely a better maintenance of production and skill levels in the military related shipyards in the 20s. This is likely to drop significantly if the depression still occurs and is as bad as OTL but possibly not as much and from a higher base level
Possibly something like the 10 year rule might still occur given the reaction against the devastation and losses resulting from WWI and in may eyes to military spending in general. However assuming a shortish but intense spurt in US and Japanese spending on naval production there will be seen by many to be a need for some construction, coupled with the historical support for the navy as the primary protector of the UK and its interests.
A lot would depend on international reactions in the Far East but Britain is likely to be as unhappy as OTL over Japanese aggression against China, especially with its large economic interests there. However here there is a decent probability that this will be listened to by elements in Japan, given both possibly better relations between the two powers and that the larger modern RN and geography would be a serious threat to Japan, especially if the US was willing to listen to say sanctions against Japan in such a scenario. A Britain not tied up with Nazi Germany and looking to defend its interests is going to be a much more difficult opponent if Japan tries to seize the 'southern resources' especially since Japan won't have access to FIC either.
If Hitler still gains power a lot would depend on what happens and how people, especially in Britain are viewing the world. However with a much stronger fleet with say 8G3s and possibly Hood reaching the final stages of an extensive upgrade plus new construction probably at least being planned is far less likely to see any point in an agreement with Germany, a naval minnow - unless it involves some treaty to restrict German subs which I think would be unlikely.
A stronger line on Italy during the Ethiopia crisis would seem likely. It might not lead to war but at least could mean most of Ethiopia surviving and could make Italian East Africa a lot more vulnerable. Also a butterfly from this might mean less/no Italian intervention in the Spanish civil war. [While Germany has gained the most notoriety over their support the Italians send a lot more forces]. How much difference this might make I don't know.
Given the nature of British economic policy at the time, with the dominance of laissez faire ideas many workers didn't have much in the way of saving at all. As such this might have little impact although if there's more political capital invested in the shipyards, both in terms of larger business interests and a lot more workers who's votes would be desired, plus less believe in the idea that war was obsolete you could see more pressure on governments to support the yards and their workers. - One point that comes to mind here is that with a substantial number of workers involved in warship production/support coupled with the other jobs that rely in turn on them Labour could see less support for unilateral disarmament and pacifism.
Its possible, and I think very good for Britain if those conditions saw more of a swing away from laissez faire/free trade ideas into Keynesian policies. This could help reduce the damage to the shipyards and related activities during the early/mid 30's and also help the economy in general.
PS Of course the biggest butterflies would be likely to be what happens after a collapse of Japan's ability to maintain a rival programme to the US from ~1924 onward. Does this reduce support for the military and strengthen civil society, or weaken the navy but with the army hence gaining even greater power? Is such a Japan, and to a lesser degree the US be willing to invest in radical new ideas like carriers and some of the more 'fanciful' ideas of some of their advocates. [Like the wild idea that they could even supplant battleships as the primary sources of naval strength]. While the scenario could see Britain maintaining a more traditional military stance, and the US after its early burst of construction is probably unlikely to change massively from its OTL policies Japan is going to be the main wildcard which could go in quite a number of directions.
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