What if the Soviets were cocky about Greek or Chinese Communism at or near the end of WWII?
Jun 27, 2023 1:25:02 GMT
stevep likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Jun 27, 2023 1:25:02 GMT
At and near the end of WWII the Soviet Union under Stalin was quite cautious about the prospects of Communist revolution in both Greece and China, despite the existence of powerful armed movements which had greatly expanded during World War Two dedicated to the cause.
Among other things, Stalin surmised Greece was very strategically important to British capitalists and China was very important to American capitalists. While the countries were relevant to the Soviet Union, other countries likely were also more vital.
But what if the Soviet leadership were cockier and more confident about this situation. I could imagine this coming about in one of two ways.
The first could be from Stalin dying, for example during or after the fantastic success of the July-August 1944 Operation Bagration offensive that destroyed Army Group Centre, and the Soviet succession works out fairly smoothly over a couple months to lead to dominance of Leningrad Party Boss Andrei Zhdanov as leading figure or first among equals among the leading group and solidly in charge of relations with foreign Communist Parties and an influence over foreign policy matching or surpassing Molotov's.
Andrei Zhdanov was known as an ideological hardliner and in much of the 40s seen as a potential successor to Stalin until his health gave out and he died near the end of the decade.
If you do not want to go this route and wish to retain Stalin, maybe he has a personality or lifestyle change that makes him less cautious or more confident. Perhaps through his doctors or somesuch he takes up a cocaine habit, or speed/amphetamines, or he takes up a young mistress, and part of their thing is for him to 'show off'.
Anyway,
1. For the Greek scenario: The leadership or personality change happens by around July-August 1944. As a result of it, when the Soviets going through Romania in August-September detour southward through Bulgaria, they detour a little further south still across the Greek border to brush along the Gteek coast of Thrace and Macedonia, turning over towns and abandoned German weapons and fortifications to the Greek Communist KKE fighters. The Soviets leaders also do not sign any Balkan 'percentages' agreement with the British, and do nothing to discourage KKE fighters in 1944 and 1945 from trying to purge their Greek noncommunist enemies (accusing them of collaboration, often fairly, sometimes not) and trying to hold onto urban centers and docks at places like Salonika, Athens, and Piraeus, and failing that, at least remaining in arms with units mobilized, in the face of British troops and Royal Greek troops trying to return from exile. What happens from there? What happens to Greece in terms of public opinion about all the factions, ultimate power there, intra-Allied collaboration for the rest of the European War and then the Pacific War, and then the Cold War?
2. For the China scenario: The leadership or personality change does not happen until about June-July 1945. As a result of it, upon Japan's surrender in August 1945, when Mao is instructing his armed Communist guerrillas to seize a maximum amount of territory weapons for surrendering Japanese, including the maximum number of cities like Wuhan and Shanghai and Beijing, all of which he has shadowed with guerrilla bases, Moscow, unlike OTL, does not try to discourage him. Instead it allows Mao and the CCP to try its luck at taking over the cities, rails and countryside of north and east-central occupied China. The Chinese Communists are present near these metropolitan areas in much greater numbers than any central government Nationalist units loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, which are concentrated mainly in the southwest, other parts of south China, some of northwest China, and Burma. This is helpful for initial CCP territorial expansion, even though the Chinese Nationalists, both those personally loyal to Chiang, and those under warlords usually nominally obedient to Chiang and anti-communist, signicantly outnumber the Communists and have more firepower. What happens from here, with the CCP trying a broad, urban 'Tet offensive' in occupied China's major cities from at least the Yangtze Valley (Wuhan and Nanjing and Shanghai on north, possibly also Changsha and Nanjiang - almost certainly not Guangzhou or Amoy or Fuzhou or Chongqing) on north? The CCP have potential to gain much fame and recruits and weapons and can rattle many small Japanese garrisons, and deny easy landing spots for KMT forces to be flown into by fighting hard in these areas instead of retreating into the countryside or northwards like OTL through successive river lines. But, as KMT and aligned warlord forces advance by ground and sea, the CCP are exposing their forces to heavy attrition in urban combat if they try hard to hold out. And it is not as if the KMT does not have networks of supporters in the Yangtze and coastal regions. Also, by brazenly leaping forward to seize power, the CCP could catch more of the blame from the Chinese public (and international audiences) for provoking a Civil War the average person doesn't want and making a hoped for peaceful solution impossible. Plus, with more CCP cadre fighting for cities and villages in central and northern China, fewer are infiltrating and organizing the cities and countryside of Manchuria, establishing Communist administration and recruitment like OTL. However, their overall aggressive strategy is hardly leaving the KMT much time or force to spare to do much with Manchuria either.
Among other things, Stalin surmised Greece was very strategically important to British capitalists and China was very important to American capitalists. While the countries were relevant to the Soviet Union, other countries likely were also more vital.
But what if the Soviet leadership were cockier and more confident about this situation. I could imagine this coming about in one of two ways.
The first could be from Stalin dying, for example during or after the fantastic success of the July-August 1944 Operation Bagration offensive that destroyed Army Group Centre, and the Soviet succession works out fairly smoothly over a couple months to lead to dominance of Leningrad Party Boss Andrei Zhdanov as leading figure or first among equals among the leading group and solidly in charge of relations with foreign Communist Parties and an influence over foreign policy matching or surpassing Molotov's.
Andrei Zhdanov was known as an ideological hardliner and in much of the 40s seen as a potential successor to Stalin until his health gave out and he died near the end of the decade.
If you do not want to go this route and wish to retain Stalin, maybe he has a personality or lifestyle change that makes him less cautious or more confident. Perhaps through his doctors or somesuch he takes up a cocaine habit, or speed/amphetamines, or he takes up a young mistress, and part of their thing is for him to 'show off'.
Anyway,
1. For the Greek scenario: The leadership or personality change happens by around July-August 1944. As a result of it, when the Soviets going through Romania in August-September detour southward through Bulgaria, they detour a little further south still across the Greek border to brush along the Gteek coast of Thrace and Macedonia, turning over towns and abandoned German weapons and fortifications to the Greek Communist KKE fighters. The Soviets leaders also do not sign any Balkan 'percentages' agreement with the British, and do nothing to discourage KKE fighters in 1944 and 1945 from trying to purge their Greek noncommunist enemies (accusing them of collaboration, often fairly, sometimes not) and trying to hold onto urban centers and docks at places like Salonika, Athens, and Piraeus, and failing that, at least remaining in arms with units mobilized, in the face of British troops and Royal Greek troops trying to return from exile. What happens from there? What happens to Greece in terms of public opinion about all the factions, ultimate power there, intra-Allied collaboration for the rest of the European War and then the Pacific War, and then the Cold War?
2. For the China scenario: The leadership or personality change does not happen until about June-July 1945. As a result of it, upon Japan's surrender in August 1945, when Mao is instructing his armed Communist guerrillas to seize a maximum amount of territory weapons for surrendering Japanese, including the maximum number of cities like Wuhan and Shanghai and Beijing, all of which he has shadowed with guerrilla bases, Moscow, unlike OTL, does not try to discourage him. Instead it allows Mao and the CCP to try its luck at taking over the cities, rails and countryside of north and east-central occupied China. The Chinese Communists are present near these metropolitan areas in much greater numbers than any central government Nationalist units loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, which are concentrated mainly in the southwest, other parts of south China, some of northwest China, and Burma. This is helpful for initial CCP territorial expansion, even though the Chinese Nationalists, both those personally loyal to Chiang, and those under warlords usually nominally obedient to Chiang and anti-communist, signicantly outnumber the Communists and have more firepower. What happens from here, with the CCP trying a broad, urban 'Tet offensive' in occupied China's major cities from at least the Yangtze Valley (Wuhan and Nanjing and Shanghai on north, possibly also Changsha and Nanjiang - almost certainly not Guangzhou or Amoy or Fuzhou or Chongqing) on north? The CCP have potential to gain much fame and recruits and weapons and can rattle many small Japanese garrisons, and deny easy landing spots for KMT forces to be flown into by fighting hard in these areas instead of retreating into the countryside or northwards like OTL through successive river lines. But, as KMT and aligned warlord forces advance by ground and sea, the CCP are exposing their forces to heavy attrition in urban combat if they try hard to hold out. And it is not as if the KMT does not have networks of supporters in the Yangtze and coastal regions. Also, by brazenly leaping forward to seize power, the CCP could catch more of the blame from the Chinese public (and international audiences) for provoking a Civil War the average person doesn't want and making a hoped for peaceful solution impossible. Plus, with more CCP cadre fighting for cities and villages in central and northern China, fewer are infiltrating and organizing the cities and countryside of Manchuria, establishing Communist administration and recruitment like OTL. However, their overall aggressive strategy is hardly leaving the KMT much time or force to spare to do much with Manchuria either.
