What if all Axis occupied territories and their maritime EEZs from July 15th, 1943 are ISOT to July

Great points on the global economic factors. That is such a big issue I will return to that later.

Also great point about the unusual position independent uptime powers like India (and Pakistan) find themselves in.

I agree about the Europe-first orientation of the Allies like the USA and Russia, with the vital exception of the PRC.

While Pacific territories are not a priority for Yeltsin, I think Clinton wouldn’t see denial of any of those russo-Japanese disputed territories from Russia as any sort of priority, or even objective, even if stranded uptime Japanese diplomats and American naval staff whisper it in his ear.

For Russia, the 1st military priority is relieving the siege of St. Petersburg. It might have to be a liberation and revenge for massacre, in case the St. Petersburg police department and national guard equivalent, caught by surprise, is unable to withstand being overrun by a Nazi bum-rush.

On the southern front, modern NATO, 6th Fleet and Allied Fleet units in the Med would have to figure out quickly how to provide continuing support to Patton and Monty on Sicily, and to the 1943 Allied fleet and air units close offshore. No Tunisia based support is available anymore.

For the western/ Atlantic front, Jersey and Guernsey will be lost.
The uptime western Allies will not strictly speaking have to do an opposed beach landing in France. As a NATO member, Spain should be granting all the Allies permissive access through northern Spanish ports for two operations in fairly close succession, Pyrenean Shield and Pyrenean Storm.

Depending on the amount of forces available and Turkish receptivity under the Ciller-Demirel regime, this could be complemented by Op Thracian (or Balkan) Storm. The Turks may insist on feigning neutrality for a bit while evacuating civilians from the Axis border.

One thing Clinton and Major will be compelled to do by political outcry whether it is operationally effective for hastening German surrender or for reducing civilian killings, or not, is long range bombings and missile strikes on Auschwitz and other death camps and rail lines leading to them.

One other area neglected in this discussion so far is the interplay between the downtime war and the uptime Middle East and North Africa. The Israelis will have an objective of punishing Nazis and rescuing Jews while protecting home neighborhood security. Meanwhile, Hitler and Mussolini on the one hand, and Qaddafi, Hafiz Assad, Saddam Hussein and the Islamic Republic of Iran and Bashir of Sudan and his guest, Osama Bin Laden, will see the USA, UK, Israel, and Russia as common enemies and each other as possible Allies of convenience.

stevep said: “importantly the allies have lost control of N Africa so all the bases used to support Husky have gone. Also of course the allies how have no control over the Suez Canal which means the reactions of Egypt will be very important.”

Egypt’s government has every incentive to stay on the USA NATO good side because of its high dependence on annual US aid for paying military salaries and supplying American wheat to subsidize bread prices. They’d want want Mediterranean Sea lanes as open as possible. That government consensus would remain under Mubarak, even if the US aid program was regarded by grassroots Egyptians as a morally bankrupt bribe their corrupt and cowardly leaders were taking for keeping peace and diplomatic relations with Israel and not fighting for the Palestinians and brother Arab states like Syria and Lebanon.

Let's look at economic consequences - For the Axis, already under blockade, fewer direct ill effects, except those that come from impact of alterations to military operations of their besieged economies. However, In the case of Germany, its borders with several 1943 neutral nations see those neighbors replaced with their 1993 uptime equivalents and alter trading relationships accordingly. So this changes Nazi, Italian, and minor Axis trade with Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, and Turkey.

All four of the uptime versions of those countries have decent arguments that any 1943 delivery contracts or payment contracts with the Axis are void or expired, and vice versa. The only thing moderating thing in this is any potential fear of getting invaded, which is most severe for Switzerland. So Switzerland, and possibly the others, may do some trade with the Axis under implicit duress for some days while evaluating and preparing their defenses. People who have discussed Sweden ISOTs on boards in the past have pointed to sheer limited quantity of modern Swedish forces and lack of martial attitudes hobbling Swedish ability to successfully resist a hypothetical Nazi invasion, despite the vastly more advanced technology of the modern Swedes. These have all been from discussions I've sampled in the 2010s and beyond. I do not know if the quantitative disadvantage and loss of martial sharpness would have been quite so lopsidedly severe for 1993 Sweden. For Spain and Portugal and Turkey, the moral repugnance all uptime countries will have for any trade/diplomatic relations with the Axis powers will be compounded by the NATO obligations of their modern incarnations and post-WWII abandonment of neutrality. Even here, the three may not blindly jump into declared hostility with the Axis for a few days as they assess their vulnerabilities, exposure, and capabilities, and plans of other uptime nations they find have come with them.

The Pacific theater is far less affected by neutrals. The only new neutral added to the borders of the Japanese Empire is 1993 Portuguese Macau. Given its isolation and small size, the Portuguese authorities will not try to make themselves anti-Japanese heroes by picking fights with them, and will parley cautiously with the Japanese across the wire to the extent the latter are prepared to reciprocate, for the few days or week it takes for the uptime PLA to blast the Japanese occupiers out of the adjoining portion of China's Guangzhou city and Guangzhou province.

The uptime global economy of the 1993 world, in relative terms, takes a huge hit, and is thrown into trade and financial chaos, or at least disruption. Ultimately, mass disruption and disorder may be a better term than chaos, because the latter implies an inability to reorder things. But there are strong actors with the ability to organize and settle a revised order of things, no matter how different, incomplete, and painful adjustments to the new order is.

Looking at the G7 Economic Powers of 1993 - The USA, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Japan..... -- the last four out of the seven are vanished, along with all their corporate headquarters, central banks, finance ministries (except perhaps some refugee French officials in Caribbean), domestic productive bases, infrastructures, domestic supply chains, ports, etc.

So, the G3, the USA, Canada, and Britain are the dominant advanced economies of the world. "France-1993" is a scattering of tropical islands and some random naval and military forces and companies and properties and financial holdings in the form of the Franc or the Euro (not sure if the switch was complete) and foreign currencies, lacking its metropolitan core, so a deflated 'holding company' of a nation. In place of France, Italy, Germany, and Japan are the 1943 versions which are besieged, more primitive, enemy and enemy-occupied lands, autarkically separated from the uptime world.

The American, Canadian, and British economic concerns, focused on middle-management downsizing, loss of manufacturing competitiveness, and soft 'jobless' recovery from the 1990-1992 recession are immediately replaced by an *entirely* different set of economic problems in this brave new world, often 180 degrees in opposition to their previous problems, with the sudden vanishing of the global export powerhouses of the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the Asian "Tiger Economies" of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and up-and-coming lower end Southeast Asian manufacturing centers like Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Even China was by 1993 starting to make a global impact on very low-end manufacturing and assembly sectors, but its most active 'enterprise' zones of the time like Shenzen are either overwritten by Japanese occupied coastal territory, or have their export and transit routes to world markets closed off.

Suddenly, there is *very little* competition to American, Canadian, and British manufacturing, and a paucity of expected manufactured industrial and consumer imports. And now there are demands for military products, like precision-guided munitions, or even just 'dumb' but adequate 1980s-level military tech, on a truly industrial, rather than boutique scale. Consumer and industrial price *inflation* is indeed the order of the day, and manufacturing employment and wages should indeed *rise* compared to other sectors.

Of course economic planning and forecasting is difficult in this environment.

Presuming the ISOT changes are permanent, the vanishing of continental Europe and the Pacific Rim at their 1993 developmental level should be considered a long-term factor that will take decades to resolve. Even with postwar technological spread and any Marshall Plan like subsidy for technological/educational upgrade and uplift, cultural and full socioeconomic convergence of 1943 Europe and Pacific Rim to a 1993 world is not a task that can be realistically be expected to be accomplished in less than a full generation. It is not the work of a mere decade.

However, since the war to defeat the Axis is of uncertain length, and may be fairly short, likely shorter until the end than it was downtime, many required wartime manufacturing activities are setting up the Allied powers and people around the world for major wartime boom and postwar bust, with the abrupt drop-off of demand.

Immediate demand for consumer and wartime production, and availability of manufacturing jobs, and inflation, removes controversy away from NAFTA, and indeed presents opportunities for any offshoring or re-shoring of lost Pacific Rim manufacturing to occur in Mexico, and from there possibly in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. The disappearance of Pacific Rim export-led growth competitors, and hunger to fill their void, may ironically make the 1990s period of economic neoliberalism and enthusiasm for everyone to try liberalization and export led growth in Latin America, actually work out much better for the region than it actually did.
If Mexican manufacturing growth does well enough, in an optimistic scenario, this might substantially crowd out the informal/criminal/cartel sector and reduce some of the endemic violence in the country, while increasing the breadth of increased national income.

All the Middle East and North African and Sub-Saharan African oil exporters exist in their 1993 incarnations and productive capacity. And they've just lost their European and Pacific Rim industrial consumers. So the 1990s, post Persian Gulf War low energy price trend should be accentuated.

The thing working against it is the oil-hungry Allied war effort. Luckily for the Allies, they should be exercising enough naval supremacy that the Libyans, Iranians, and the like are not going to be getting much in the way of oil trade done with the Axis powers except for some lucky small-scale smuggled shipments.

Long term, the fossil fuel exporters should benefit from nuclear energy not working.

The Chinese retain some of the knowledge to down the line become the workshop for Walmart, but need to run the pesky Japanese out of their country first.

If the Indians and Pakistanis are clever and wise, they can capture a greater share of the offshoring-re-shoring manufacturing pie in this world, if they can only get out of their own way soon enough.

When the Allies ultimately defeat the Axis across the board, in some places there may be more damage from conventional weapons, but there will overall be less damage to physical structures due to smarter bombs and more rapid operations. This will retard European and Japanese 'urban renewal' to the extent that was helpful to postwar rebuilding.

Postwar Europe and Japan will have their social capital, but given worldwide increases in education by the 1990s, to some extent, they may be competing only at the same level as Russia and China and third world countries in the quest for development, attracting foreign investment, and innovation. On the other hand, with their 1940s and wartime experiences, even once exposed to uptime technologies, they won't price themselves out of competition with the third world, Russia, and China with high wage and standard of living expectations, the way 1990s Europeans and Japanese would have.

Absolutely correct on defense deindustrialization, and worse in the short-term, on the naval impact of the loss of nuclear propulsion for uptime navies.

Worst off is easy out of that mob - Canada.

Russia had the basic Soviet equipment and plants, but in a heck of a mess. China was not yet in its manufacturing and exporting stage, nor really possessed of ‘modern’ industry, so they are a maybe. The Yanks get the guernsey on account of their economic size and cash allowing potential retooling of the residual capacity in the Rust Belt and beyond.

Realistically, the last time the Yanks had the military industrial capacity to convert to a WW2 style effort was during Vietnam. The cuts started after then, as well as the ripples.

Another factor at play is that you can’t fight a major war like this with a volunteer army. The anti-draft assumptions just get binned.