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Post by raharris1973 on May 18, 2023 1:32:22 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943?
To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment.
How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world?
There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender.
The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one.
So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed.
So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944?
With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign?
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 18, 2023 12:17:18 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943? To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment. How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world? There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender. The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one. So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed. So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944? With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign?
Well it greatly speeds up the ending of the Pacific war, possibly very quickly if the down-time forces in China, SE Asia and elsewhere are willing to accept orders from the emperor to lay down their arms. Since they haven't seen the OTL devastation of 44/45 some might well be determined to fight on but their going to be pretty isolated from the main industrial centres of Japan while the UP US possessions mean that a lot of Japanese forces in the region have disappeared.
One interesting question is how things differ in the Far East. With N Korea and Manchuria still in Japanese hands I could see MacArthur seeking to liberate both those areas, which would drastically improve the position of Korea and would have big impacts on events in China. The KMT are markedly better positioned if the US hold Manchuria and hence its not handed over to Mao's communists along with access to Soviet weapons.
I didn't realise that the US had such large forces in Japan at this time considering how quickly they demoblized in Europe. By the time the Korean war started there was very little US strength in the region. Mind you this was within a year of the ending of the war in the Pacific. Not sure what sort of equipment they might have and whether some of it would be too new to be supported easily by 43 US - such as if they have any B-29's in the theatre that could be an issue.
In terms of the war in Europe it gives the allies the ability to switch forces from the Pacific earlier rather than going the other way after the fall of Nazi Germany. Plus the UT people will be able to tell the DP military what happened in the intervening period and also in at least some cases what not to do. There is the danger that some information might leak to the Nazis or probably more likely the Soviets but relatively little should be passed to hostile [or potentially hostile ] powers compared to what the allies will learn. The big issues might be whether the allies follow the same approach for D-Day and what to tell/not tell allies, especially Stalin.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 18, 2023 18:58:34 GMT
stevep said: I think the surrender of downtime Japanese forces will happen pretty consistently and speedily, if you look into the the details of the techniques I suggest the Allies and postwar Japanese would use to convince them (which are sort of modeled on what it took to get some diehards out of the Filipino jungle in the 1970s). One effect of this though is that there will be 100s of thousands of Japanese soldiers and many civilians to repatriate to an already hungry Japan, and what’s more, a few 100,000 of them will be younger copies of people who still lived in Japan in 1946! While the 10s of thousands of ‘resurrections’ will be more joyful than sorrowful occasions, duplicates cause problems with two individuals with claims to the same limited property, or wives! Of course several 100,000 duplicate American soldiers, sailors and airmen, contractors and a small number of dependents will be a problem too!
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Post by raharris1973 on May 18, 2023 19:15:23 GMT
stevep said: The US, really uptime MacArthur as much as downtime FDR, will have dominating influence over mainland East Asia, and the Soviets, practically none, since the latter are still struggling to win Stalingrad. The Americans determine who the Japanese turn over authority to in Korea - won’t be Communists there. Also in Manchukuo and China -won’t be Communists there, but KMT troops. Also Indochina, even if FDR didn’t like the French, the US had no ties/contacts with the the Viet Minh and Ho in 1943. The Vichy guys were still there in Indochina. They would proclaim themselves loyal Gaullists the moment Japan surrenders, and the Americans who need Gaullists for the anti Hitler fight, will go for it. Good question on US weapons. Copies of 1946 weapons probably can’t be manufactured immediately. The B-29s would be super useful because of their range, even though lacking atomic munitions. There’s probably no reason 1943 British and North African airfields can’t be used to base them. But 1946 technicians and pilots and crews would have to be used until downtime replacements can be trained. These vets have a good case for demanding triple combat hazard pay and the best fighter escort available to fly Europe’s unfriendly skies.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 18, 2023 19:19:56 GMT
Well the Allies could try to get D-Day and serious bombing going earlier - on D-Day I don’t know how much. And they can try to handle the surrender of Italy better, so less territory, people, fall into Nazi hands.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 18, 2023 23:02:53 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943? To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment. How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world? There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender. The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one. So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed. So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944? With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign? Where did the other Japan go? and Kaboom? because you know TWO "stage actors" cannot occupy the same light cone at the same time, for that is a violation of the Pauli exclusion principle? |
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Post by raharris1973 on May 19, 2023 2:53:05 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943? To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment. How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world? There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender. The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one. So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed. So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944? With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign? Where did the other Japan go? and Kaboom? because you know TWO "stage actors" cannot occupy the same light cone at the same time, for that is a violation of the Pauli exclusion principle? I'll respond the way I usually do, and say that the 'other Japan' the wartime one from February 1943, along with the occupied Philippines, South Korea, occupied Guam and various islands and atolls like Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima are all 'swapped' to the other timeline where the February 1946 Japan (& various lands) came from. So that other timeline is a mirror image world that I'm choosing not to write about. But the USA is a little effed up in the early Cold War needing to re-nuke Japan into a second defeat and losing its occupation force and having to deal with Soviet forces in northern Korea occupying 1943 southern Korea (and maybe Hokkaido) in a matter of days because of self-defense against mad time-displaced Japanese. |
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lordroel
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Post by lordroel on May 19, 2023 12:51:10 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943? To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment. How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world? There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender. The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one. So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed. So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944? With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign? The Universe is going to explode because there are now two General Macarthur's. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 19, 2023 14:22:48 GMT
Trying to reply to your three posts together as I find it a bit easier.
a) Good point on the duplication of assorted people. Including a certain MacArthur! That's going to cause a lot of personal, legal and other complications. Also how does FDR react to news of his 'short' future? Might he step down rather than standing in the 44 election and if so who's the new Democratic party candidate?
b) With the B-29's a lot depends on their actual performance, see the parallel discussions on this. Wouldn't like trying the initial solutions in Japan i.e. going in fairly low and with most defensive guns removed over 43 or even 44 Germany! However if they can keep their armament and/or go a lot higher than OTL then that could make them pretty effective. The best bet might be realising that the 'Battle of Berlin' was an error and stretched the allied bomber forces too far. Continue the attacks on targets in western Germany which were more effective until the priorities switch to isolating N France by logistical attacks in time for the invasion?
c) Possibly even more importantly the UTers will have knowledge of tactics and the relative importance of assorted aspects of the war 'to come'. How well those are identified - since different people will have different interpretations - and how much is passed to allies could be issues here. However even with possibly some substantial hold-out their not going to last that long so a lot of resources, especially air and naval will be freed up fairly quickly. It could be that forces in China might be left longer to whither on the vine so to speak since the US prefers committing as much as possible against the European Axis now and the KMT will look secure to take them out themselves.
d) On D-Day I suspect it wouldn't be advanced much, although a landing in May 44 may be practical. Would expect better planning, especially for Omaha beach and then fighting through the bocage especially. Possibly they could make up the necessarily resources for the landings in S France to go ahead at the same time which might speed things up somewhat?
e) Just had one thought. In Feb 43 the IJN still has a lot of its ships left, including those two small gunboats  Yamato and Musashi in action. I doubt they would find much use in allied hands if obtained - rather than possibly the IJN sinking them to avoid them being handed over but if one survived for a while it could be interesting for naval history addicts.
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miletus12
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Post by miletus12 on May 19, 2023 21:58:04 GMT
What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943? To the surprised 1943 American public in the US and in Britain and the North African theater, and surprised downtime Japanese forces in Sakhalin, the Kuriles, northern Korea, occupied Manchuria, China, and Southeast Asia, various Pacific islands, and IJN units at sea, and remainder of the downtime world, the surprising news begins to filter through that Japan has surrendered to the Americans, its Emperor has submitted to American occupation, ordered Japanese armed forces to lay down their arms, and said he is not divine. MacArthur is the ruler on the ground in Japan, to the astonishment of 1943 MacArthur and the rest of the US military establishment. How does the 1943 world react to this situation? And how do the downtime lands and the deployed out-of-time forces fit in to the 1943 world? There will be shock and disbelief to get past, but I imagine MacArthur's priority will be establishing a line of food supplies for his forces and for Japan in general, and American commanders throughout the Pacific would be seeking to reestablish communications and supply flows. 1946 American-occupied central and western Pacific territorities hosting American commanders and forces would have to coordinate with 1943 Washington and Honolulu and Sydney to reestablish safe sea routes, and secure the surrender of or destroy at-large IJN fleet units. The Allies would have to radio out recordings of the imperial surrender message to downtime Japanese forces Asia and Pacific wide to secure those forces capitulation and obedience to MacArthur's commands. This would have to be backed up likely by air-dropping film reels or landing mixed Japanese-Allied teams where the Japanese members consist of the classmates, superior officers or uptime versions of the downtime commanders they are trying to persuade to surrender. The American forces in the Pacific and the Japanese population will know that atomic bombs were used in the defeat of Japan, so that knowledge will not be contained and will spread to downtime people. But without CONUS, the laboratories, and the scientists, nobody, uptime or downtime, has an an atomic bomb on hand or the recipe to make another one. So the atomic bomb is not around as an automic war ender, or 'easy button' for the United States against Hitler and Mussolini. Knowledge that it *would be possible* to make and deliver two atomic bombs by two methods in 30 months, along with whatever fragmentary details that people may remember can spur both the Manhattan Project and adversary programs. But with the Americans knowing that the Germans now know it can be done, the Americans cannot follow the temptation of just waiting for it to be ready, even if they try to accelerate that program to maximum speed. So how will the rest of the war be fought, with the Pacific turning into mainly a relatively lower intensity round-up of fugitives, occupation, and humanitarian situation, while Allied combat power can be concentrated against Europe for most of 1943 and all of 1944? With the Pacific War winding down, is there enough assault shipping and supply shipping and troops to go around for everybody, from Churchill to Marshall, to get their wish? A lavishly supplied Overlord and a wide-ranging Mediterranean and Balkan campaign? The Universe is going to explode because there are now two General Macarthur's. Kaboom? because you know TWO "stage actors" cannot occupy the same light cone at the same time, for that is a violation of the Pauli exclusion principle? He is the "stage actor". |
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Post by raharris1973 on May 20, 2023 4:29:30 GMT
c) Possibly even more importantly the UTers will have knowledge of tactics and the relative importance of assorted aspects of the war 'to come'. How well those are identified - since different people will have different interpretations - and how much is passed to allies could be issues here. Yes, SCAP occupation forces personnel in Japan will be busy between occupation duties and other assignments passing lessons learned on to the downtime forces, with some of them volunteering or being assigned to unique combat missions downtimers cannot perform [although there would be equity issues depending how much time in combat service individuals had]. I can imagine *some* personnel swaps between uptime and downtime personnel, but with the bulk of the forces keeping their temporal integrity and exchanging knowledge on business trips. The best bet might be realising that the 'Battle of Berlin' was an error and stretched the allied bomber forces too far. Continue the attacks on targets in western Germany which were more effective until the priorities switch to isolating N France by logistical attacks in time for the invasion? Although, over the course of 1943, actions against Italy may provide air basing options in southern Europe, possibly improved over OTL, that make Berlin more accessible to Allied Air Forces. However even with possibly some substantial hold-out their not going to last that long so a lot of resources, especially air and naval will be freed up fairly quickly. Oh, we're still talking about downtime Japanese hold-outs. I guess that could happen but you are correct, a lot of combat power, especially air and naval, will be freed up fairly quickly for the European and African theaters, especially because even hold-out Japanese forces will be very lacking in strategic mobility and striking power. With Japan gutted at home, the Soviets can pretty much strip the Far East of combined arms formations and send them west to augment the Stalingrad counter-offensive. Maybe they could make their Operation Mars major envelopment to the Sea of Azov actually work. As shipping needs for combat and reinforcement type supplies across the Pacific and to India diminish, they will to an extent be replaced by significant shipping needs to sustain the occupation force, for the humanitarian support of occupied and liberated peoples, and for deliveries through the now basically hazard-free Pacific Lend-Lease route. It could be that forces in China might be left longer to whither on the vine so to speak since the US prefers committing as much as possible against the European Axis now and the KMT will look secure to take them out themselves. Sure, if there is some prolonged Japanese holding out, the Americans don't need to rush to crush, and can let it be contained and 'wither on the vine' a bit. China will need some help to avoid the famine of 1943 though. Areas where MacArthur can't ignore hostile holdouts would be in the nearest northern islands of Japan like the Kuriles and Sakhalin, or if Japanese forces in northern Korea try holding out and being noncompliant and hostile towards General Hodge's American occupation force in southern Korea. There's no way to 'live and let live' on the 38th parallel. If the Japanese don't make trouble, the Korean populace will, wanting to free their country and all. Of course, when Japanese surrender in China-Manchuria happens, it opens up China to 'interesting' political complications and also 'opportunities'. As remarked earlier, the Soviets aren't having any troops to spare to occupy (or loot) Manchuria. MacArthur is likely ordering the Japanese in Manchuria to turn over their positions and weapons in occupied territory to the KMT and not Communists, which should eventually happen, unless there is a total Japanese command breakdown at all levels. So the KMT inheritance will include Japanese manufacturing complexes in Manchuria, which, for the moment, can actually export Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR now that they have no Japanese war effort to support. Washington while trying to support a unification of China under Chiang, would also want to prevent the outbreak of Civil War, or open civil war, and keep KMT-Communist talks going, certainly at least for the duration of the European War. So Washington will probably support for the moment various compromises for military amalgamation, and administrative power sharing between the parties, maybe on a varied regional basis. One "solution" to Chinese demobilization after the Japanese are gone that would not be to Mao's liking but might receive consensus support from Chiang Kai-shek, FDR, and Stalin could be the following- out of the oversized Chinese 'United Front' Armies, the major Communist ones, the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army, get single out to be China's 'expeditionary force' serving for the United Nations alliance under Soviet command in the Soviet theater. Chiang gets Communist troops out of the way and Stalin gets more cannon fodder...a win-win as far as they're concerned. d) On D-Day I suspect it wouldn't be advanced much, although a landing in May 44 may be practical. Would expect better planning, especially for Omaha beach and then fighting through the bocage especially. Possibly they could make up the necessarily resources for the landings in S France to go ahead at the same time which might speed things up somewhat? With the amount of freed up shipping I have no doubt the Anvil invasion of southern France could be pulled off simultaneously with a May 1944 D-Day, if not *before* a May '44 D-Day. The availability of more shipping and AirPower should honestly have a substantial impact by mid-1943 at the latest. So I would imagine there are the resources on-hand to occupy central and northern Italy, Italian-occupied Greece, Albania, Montenegro, and the Dodecanese upon Italian surrender in September 1943 or consecutively, and then to work on partisan support and political pressure to turn the minor Axis allies. Europe should be feeling it from all sides. |
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stevep
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Post by stevep on May 20, 2023 11:10:17 GMT
c) Possibly even more importantly the UTers will have knowledge of tactics and the relative importance of assorted aspects of the war 'to come'. How well those are identified - since different people will have different interpretations - and how much is passed to allies could be issues here. Yes, SCAP occupation forces personnel in Japan will be busy between occupation duties and other assignments passing lessons learned on to the downtime forces, with some of them volunteering or being assigned to unique combat missions downtimers cannot perform [although there would be equity issues depending how much time in combat service individuals had]. I can imagine *some* personnel swaps between uptime and downtime personnel, but with the bulk of the forces keeping their temporal integrity and exchanging knowledge on business trips. The best bet might be realising that the 'Battle of Berlin' was an error and stretched the allied bomber forces too far. Continue the attacks on targets in western Germany which were more effective until the priorities switch to isolating N France by logistical attacks in time for the invasion? Although, over the course of 1943, actions against Italy may provide air basing options in southern Europe, possibly improved over OTL, that make Berlin more accessible to Allied Air Forces. However even with possibly some substantial hold-out their not going to last that long so a lot of resources, especially air and naval will be freed up fairly quickly. Oh, we're still talking about downtime Japanese hold-outs. I guess that could happen but you are correct, a lot of combat power, especially air and naval, will be freed up fairly quickly for the European and African theaters, especially because even hold-out Japanese forces will be very lacking in strategic mobility and striking power. With Japan gutted at home, the Soviets can pretty much strip the Far East of combined arms formations and send them west to augment the Stalingrad counter-offensive. Maybe they could make their Operation Mars major envelopment to the Sea of Azov actually work. As shipping needs for combat and reinforcement type supplies across the Pacific and to India diminish, they will to an extent be replaced by significant shipping needs to sustain the occupation force, for the humanitarian support of occupied and liberated peoples, and for deliveries through the now basically hazard-free Pacific Lend-Lease route. It could be that forces in China might be left longer to whither on the vine so to speak since the US prefers committing as much as possible against the European Axis now and the KMT will look secure to take them out themselves. Sure, if there is some prolonged Japanese holding out, the Americans don't need to rush to crush, and can let it be contained and 'wither on the vine' a bit. China will need some help to avoid the famine of 1943 though. Areas where MacArthur can't ignore hostile holdouts would be in the nearest northern islands of Japan like the Kuriles and Sakhalin, or if Japanese forces in northern Korea try holding out and being noncompliant and hostile towards General Hodge's American occupation force in southern Korea. There's no way to 'live and let live' on the 38th parallel. If the Japanese don't make trouble, the Korean populace will, wanting to free their country and all. Of course, when Japanese surrender in China-Manchuria happens, it opens up China to 'interesting' political complications and also 'opportunities'. As remarked earlier, the Soviets aren't having any troops to spare to occupy (or loot) Manchuria. MacArthur is likely ordering the Japanese in Manchuria to turn over their positions and weapons in occupied territory to the KMT and not Communists, which should eventually happen, unless there is a total Japanese command breakdown at all levels. So the KMT inheritance will include Japanese manufacturing complexes in Manchuria, which, for the moment, can actually export Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR now that they have no Japanese war effort to support. Washington while trying to support a unification of China under Chiang, would also want to prevent the outbreak of Civil War, or open civil war, and keep KMT-Communist talks going, certainly at least for the duration of the European War. So Washington will probably support for the moment various compromises for military amalgamation, and administrative power sharing between the parties, maybe on a varied regional basis. One "solution" to Chinese demobilization after the Japanese are gone that would not be to Mao's liking but might receive consensus support from Chiang Kai-shek, FDR, and Stalin could be the following- out of the oversized Chinese 'United Front' Armies, the major Communist ones, the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army, get single out to be China's 'expeditionary force' serving for the United Nations alliance under Soviet command in the Soviet theater. Chiang gets Communist troops out of the way and Stalin gets more cannon fodder...a win-win as far as they're concerned. d) On D-Day I suspect it wouldn't be advanced much, although a landing in May 44 may be practical. Would expect better planning, especially for Omaha beach and then fighting through the bocage especially. Possibly they could make up the necessarily resources for the landings in S France to go ahead at the same time which might speed things up somewhat? With the amount of freed up shipping I have no doubt the Anvil invasion of southern France could be pulled off simultaneously with a May 1944 D-Day, if not *before* a May '44 D-Day. The availability of more shipping and AirPower should honestly have a substantial impact by mid-1943 at the latest. So I would imagine there are the resources on-hand to occupy central and northern Italy, Italian-occupied Greece, Albania, Montenegro, and the Dodecanese upon Italian surrender in September 1943 or consecutively, and then to work on partisan support and political pressure to turn the minor Axis allies. Europe should be feeling it from all sides.
If the US is willing then a lot more could be done in Italy in 43 now, although N Italy being so close to Germany could be tough as no easy location for landing. However definitely in a better position with the forces available and also UT knowledge to get far more of Italy liberated when the country surrenders. Which would also save a lot of destruction there from the prolonged fighting OTL Due to the Alps being in the way more a/c and bases in Italy may not have a big impact on Germany, especially as far north as Berlin but would make attacks on Polesti and also infrastructure targets in the Balkans and Hungary a lot easier.
Not sure about liberating much of the Balkans as while a possibility the US was strong hostile to the idea and its still 1943 FDR in charge so I suspect the prime initial allocations of the new resources would be in Italy and also crushing the U boats earlier. Possibly some effort to clear Crete as a potential forward base to secure traffic through the eastern Med but wouldn't expect much else I'm afraid.
The reason why I'm expecting some hold-outs is that the forces in eastern Asia haven't experienced the OTL success of allied forces in 43-45. As such some are likely to be unwilling to surrender even after a proclamation from the emperor. They could even refuse to accept the idea that the Japan they know has been magically replaced by a US occupied one. - which is real life I suspect is the stance that many people in such a situation would at least initially take. Plus in China especially I suspect many Japanese would be unwilling to surrender to Chinese forces, whether KMT or communist given the brutality of their behaviour there. Many probably would give up and other than resources in Manchuria their now cut off from any supply so resistance would crumble but I could see some groups fighting to the end against the Chinese rather than surrender.
Not sure that the collapse of Japanese threat would had much of an initial impact on the Soviet war with Germany. Apart from Stalin's paranoia it would require shipping the forces along the Trans-Siberian which is already fairly heavily loaded with L-L so by the time some are shipped west and then attached to existing units its probably reaching the spring thaw and everything grinding to an halt. Possibly they might reach the front in time to help stop von Manstein's counter attack that retook Kharkov. - Better might be the UTers giving information on what happens and possibly hence avoiding some of the OTL mistakes but then would Stalin listen?
Definitely like the idea of simultaneous attacks on north and south France, especially a month earlier and with markedly more firepower support. Hopefully with also some up-time knowledge could also ensure a breakout quicker than OTL although its going to attract a lot of German attention once they get rolling across France as its so close to the Reich compared to how distant the Soviets would appear to be.
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Post by raharris1973 on May 20, 2023 17:54:57 GMT
If the US is willing then a lot more could be done in Italy in 43 now, although N Italy being so close to Germany could be tough as no easy location for landing. However definitely in a better position with the forces available and also UT knowledge to get far more of Italy liberated when the country surrenders. Which would also save a lot of destruction there from the prolonged fighting OTL Due to the Alps being in the way more a/c and bases in Italy may not have a big impact on Germany, especially as far north as Berlin but would make attacks on Polesti and also infrastructure targets in the Balkans and Hungary a lot easier. Sure - Not sure about liberating much of the Balkans as while a possibility the US was strong hostile to the idea and its still 1943 FDR in charge so I suspect the prime initial allocations of the new resources would be in Italy and also crushing the U boats earlier. Possibly some effort to clear Crete as a potential forward base to secure traffic through the eastern Med but wouldn't expect much else I'm afraid. Well the question is fundamentally what is the root of the American objection? Is it an emotional and irrational belief the region or its geography is poison? Or a more rational belief that expending units and shipping there per Churchill's 'good ideas' robs Peter to pay Paul and delays concentrations of shipping and aircraft and units to accomplish the vital Overlord landings in France and supporting landings in southern France? If it is the latter, not the former, by summer 1943, with the fade-down of the Pacific War, the US (and British Empire) may have an embarrassment of riches in in terms of available shipping, ground units and aircraft, and not all of them may *fit* into axes of attack against France or through Italy, so the Americans may have the choice of having units enter Europe via the Balkans by some point in '43 or '44 or sit idle away from any combat fronts. The two most efficient ways of getting forces a bridgehead in the Balkans involve doing so by getting forces onshore in places where they do not need to fight alerted Germans resisting on the beach or coastline. So Crete and Athens/Attica, always occupied directly by the Germans, make for an unattractive landing spot in that respect. Getting onshore of Italian held sectors of Greece (Peloponnese, Rhodes & Dodecanese, Albania) while they are surrendering and before they can be assaulted, disarmed, and often massacred by the Italians is more efficient early on than attacking German held coasts later. The second more efficient way to get bodies of ground forces into the Balkans without rough landings, Balkan D-Days, and storming sometimes mountainous shores, is to get a Turkish DoW coordinated with a massive secret airlift and sealift of Allied forces into Turkish Thrace for an assault on Bulgaria, liberation of additional Aegean and Black Sea ports, and pushing against minor Axis allied dominoes. This requires diplomacy and getting the Turks to play ball of course, but possibly could be done, using 'future knowledge' to augment American and British diplomacy, showing how Japan is done, Germany inevitably loses, how in the old history Germany evacuated weakly from Greece and the southern Balkans, how the Soviets occupied Bulgaria because Turkey was so late to join the war, how the Allies embargoed Turkey to make it get into the war, and how by the end of 1945 and early 1946, the Soviet Union was pressing Turkey for the straits and other territories and western support wasn't clear. The message is 'help us [Anglo-Americans] get into Bulgaria through your country sooner, or have a second Soviet-dominated border, now in Europe, and not just in Asia. The reason why I'm expecting some hold-outs is that the forces in eastern Asia haven't experienced the OTL success of allied forces in 43-45. As such some are likely to be unwilling to surrender even after a proclamation from the emperor. I get the theory behind this. The thing is the experience of the forces throughout East Asia in the early 1943 timeframe compared to the end of the war in 1945 would have varied. In China proper, ironically, Japanese forces probably would have more respect for Chinese Nationalist fighting power in February 1943 than they did by August 1945, because it was only after 1943, during 1944 and 1945, that the Japanese made sweeping, unprecedented territorial gains in southern China, shoving aside previously tenacious Nationalist resistance, during the Ichigo offensive. On the other hand, in line with your surmise, Japanese forces in mainland Southeast Asia, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies in February 1943 had only known triumph so far, whereas by August 1945, forces had been driven from Burma, and survivors in Thailand and Indochina and Malaya had tasted defeat, as had some Japanese forces in sections of Borneo British forces reinvaded. Also, the Japanese forces in Manchukuo and northern Korea in February 1943 were undefeated [except for the Nomonhan check in 1939] and only just starting to get 'robbed' for replacement units, a great contrast to their smashed condition as the Soviets plowed through them in August 1945. As I noted earlier, the most volatile uptime/downtime point of contact will probably be the 38th parallel in Korea. The US occupation force in Korea only numbered 45,000. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Blacklist_Forty The Japanese in northern Korea from 1943, not having experienced the late war atmosphere of privation, Japanese defeats, and Allied bombings, could be all full of 'piss and vinegar' and on a hair trigger trying to assault and retake Seoul and Inchon. MacArthur will probably have to muster his AirPower resident in Japan, Okinawa, the PI and carriers nearby, and his most combat ready formations, to reinforce General John Hodge's occupation force in Korea and definitively crush the Japanese challenge in North Korea, and liberate it. That process should start to have salutary effects on Japanese attitudes in northern Korea, Manchuria, and China that have been in denial, fairly quickly. The Americans will have to arm up southern Koreans and liberated Koreans with captured Japanese arms to quickly augment infantry, and they won't be able to afford to be picky. This sudden reemergence of the Japanese threat to Korean Seoul won't solve everything, but should hopefully have some salutary effects on some of the nasty political divides that were roiling southern Korea by early 1946 and poisoning US-Korean relations. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Military_Government_in_KoreaI think the renewed, even if only brief, Japanese threat to Seoul and the south, and the project of liberating northern Korea from *Japanese* would logically have the effect of papering over right-left Korean divides and improving US-Korean relations in the moment. The Korean leftists would obviously know they would be screwed with a Japanese comeback, but Korean rightists and landlords, even those who had previously been collaborators with the Japanese, would have to fear that Japanese returning to control would have no patience for their explanations for why they stepped in and took over government roles 'above their station' and would butcher them the same as anyone else. So all Koreans would have to fight a Japanese comeback, and even past collaborators could earn some redemption in that fight [though domestic enemies could be loath to admit it]. Meanwhile Americans and conservative Koreans won't be able to afford to mercilessly pick on leftist and Communist Koreans, and will have to let them enroll in the fight to drive the Japanese out of North Korea or get them to surrender there. And the Communists, whatever reforms and changes they would want, would know things aren't geopolitically favorable for them to bid for monopoly power considering the absence of a Communist North Korean zone and inability of the Soviet Union to act in the region. Not sure that the collapse of Japanese threat would had much of an initial impact on the Soviet war with Germany. Apart from Stalin's paranoia it would require shipping the forces along the Trans-Siberian which is already fairly heavily loaded with L-L so by the time some are shipped west and then attached to existing units its probably reaching the spring thaw and everything grinding to an halt. Possibly they might reach the front in time to help stop von Manstein's counter attack that retook Kharkov. - Better might be the UTers giving information on what happens and possibly hence avoiding some of the OTL mistakes but then would Stalin listen? You're right, I guess the effects won't be instant. Anything coming from the Far East only comes through the limited TSR, and it's a delicate balance how to apportion Lend-Lease versus combat units. Future info can be useful, if believed. I imagine Stalin would be skeptical but willing to test out tactical, operational, and technological information handed over. He may or may not understand butterfly effects and how after a bit, reactions change, so future history isn't true, without it being a lie. Whatever the net effect is, it should be helpful to the Soviet war effort, sooner or later, even if we are not talking about something as quick as a few weeks. |
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miletus12
Squadron vice admiral
To get yourself lost, just follow the signs.
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Post by miletus12 on May 20, 2023 19:40:45 GMT
Yes, SCAP occupation forces personnel in Japan will be busy between occupation duties and other assignments passing lessons learned on to the downtime forces, with some of them volunteering or being assigned to unique combat missions downtimers cannot perform [although there would be equity issues depending how much time in combat service individuals had]. I can imagine *some* personnel swaps between uptime and downtime personnel, but with the bulk of the forces keeping their temporal integrity and exchanging knowledge on business trips. What if American occupied Japan & Okinawa (with its over 430,000 American troops), American-occupied South Korea, American-occupied Micronesian islands and atolls, and the liberated Philippines from Feb.1, 1946, and their surrounding waters out to 200 km, were all ISOT back 3 years to Feb. 1, 1943?  February 1943 with ISOT. Joke mode off. 1. The Japanese are still in the midst of a humanitarian catastrophe, with MacArthur 1946 trying to prevent 5 million of them from starving to death. 2. The IJA in China has about 2.5 million angry soldiers, who can do just about anything they want; including cross back to Japan because the USN in region 1946 is not the USN of 1943. . 3. The USAAF is not that big an air garrison. IOW, if the 1946 Americans do not get their 1943 brethren up to speed and mount DOWNFALL immediately as a relief operation, the minimum outcome is that US forces in South Korea will be destroyed. The maximum is that a lot of people are going to die in China and Japan as Japan descends into civil war, with the American garrison snowed under into the backwash. We lose the American occupation forces and still have to go through the end game as we planned for 1945, but this time inadequate forces and without the air campaign. With Stalin licking his chops. |
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Post by raharris1973 on May 21, 2023 0:01:34 GMT
With Stalin licking his chops. [redacted comment] Stalin in February 1943 and for the rest of the year, is preoccupied with with fighting off and beating up on the Germans in the western part of the Soviet Union, no matter what black magic is happening to the Americans and Japanese in the Pacific, and if its working out as a miracle for the Americans or a mix of a miracle and a curse. AND, he's not praying at the altar of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for it to be mostly a curse for the Americans as if they are his primary problem - the more of a miracle and easy time it is for them, the more supplies he gets and the easier his life is and the more Germans foreigners kill for him. Now: 1. Absolutely correct, Japan has serious food import needs -- and ironically if the IJN and USN can't come to speaking terms, the IJN will become the biggest obstacle to food imports. 2. IJA troops in China can't do just about anything they want, even if they can't be compelled to surrender (just possibly persuaded the war is over and to help in the work of getting the homeland fed) - For instance, the Japanese troops on the mainland weren't showing any ability to succeed in expanding their ground taken from the Chinese that year. They can't invade the Soviet Far East or Mongolia without running into much better mechanized forces and getting buzzsawed. They can attack the occupied zone in southern Korea. Mounting coherent amphibious invasions of lost island territories like Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines is out, even if small landings and seaborne infiltration can happen. 3. The early 1946 USAAF operating out of Japanese, Okinawan, Filipino, South Korean and Micronesian airbases isn't that big, but enough to patrol and see flotillas coming and helping vector uptime and downtime fleet units against them and ground force elements to concentrate around likely landing spots. West of the international date line and a bit north of the equator, the Pacific will be shared by two pretty injured and incapacitated forces- the 1946 American forces will be in scattered, but important locations. Including a non-trivial 400,000 plus in Japan itself, there will be pro-Allied Filipino forces controlling the PI as well with some American units and bases there as well. They of course will be massively stripped down in combat power by Feb 1946 compared with 6 months earlier from when the war ended, with many fewer ships steaming in the adjacent waters, and lacking the 1946 back-up logistic connections to the US. But ships and aircraft will be generally 1946 state of art and crewed by veterans of fighting the Japanese. The uptime Americans will have to connect with the downtime Allied February 1943 infrastructure east of the international and in the south and southwest Pacific, and February 1943 US logistics sources, so that means Hawaii, Port Moresby, newly won Guadalcanal and Henderson Field, and Australia, with the strength on hand of the Allied February 1943 fleets. Opposing these two disparate sets of Americans and Allies, and interfering with their operations would be the downtime Japanese Armies and fleets of Feb 1943. The Japanese fleet would be at its intermediate midwar level, having been damaged greatly in striking power by Coral Sea and Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign, but not yet made into a nullity by the 1944 battles of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. So Japanese naval interference capability will remain substantial, and those portion based out of Truk in Micronesia and Singapore and the Dutch East Indies would still be in supply and have some formidable capability. Manchukuo and northern Korea, and parts of China, would remain important Japanese sites for aircraft production. Still the lack of *all* the home islands manufacturing and repair facilities and command personnel and reserve personnel is going to put a crimp in the scattered Japanese Fleet and Army units' cohesion, maintenance and operational capability and sustainability. Allied SLOCs across the Pacific won't start off exactly continuous, coherent, or orderly. But the Japanese defensive perimeter, such as it was in Feb 1943, will be filled with more holes than Swiss cheese. So, uptime and downtime Allied forces can work together to establish reliable cross-Pacific SLOCs with forces on-hand and entering service. |
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Yamato and Musashi in action. I doubt they would find much use in allied hands if obtained - rather than possibly the IJN sinking them to avoid them being handed over but if one survived for a while it could be interesting for naval history addicts.