AHC/WI: the continental system survives

Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 6
CORBETT AND LIMITED WAR
Corbett advocated limited war for insular maritime powers because it permitted
the use of defensive positions without surrendering the strategic initiative,16 which
echoed Von Moltke’s belief that in war, the strongest position is the strategic offensive
combined with the tactical defensive.17
Nevertheless, Corbett qualified his support of
limited war by noting that it presupposes the ability to acquire the territorial objective
before one’s opponent is strong enough to prevent the acquisition.18
Fortunately for
Japan, its proximity to the theater of operations gave it time to secure its territorial
objectives before Russia could concentrate its forces. If it could control the Yellow Sea,
Tokyo believed it could secure not only the Korean Peninsula for military operations, but
also protect Japan itself from attack, although the latter belief failed to consider the
threat posed by Russia’s Vladivostok squadron.
In contrast, Russia was poorly situated to fight a limited war. While Japan’s
forces were located in the operational theater, Russian forces had to travel thousands of
miles by rail and sea to engage the enemy, which stretched its command and control,
supply lines and logistics to the breaking point.19
The presence of hostile Chinese tribes
willing to conduct guerilla operations in Manchuria only exacerbated Russia’s dilemma.
Russia was also poorly positioned to take the offensive in the Yellow Sea, since Port
Arthur had little to recommend itself as a base of operations other than being a warm
water port. With its small and shallow harbor, ships could not enter at low tide, and
there was no room for maneuvering. The outer anchorage was exposed to torpedo
attacks, and tall hills ringed the harbor, which if seized would allow the Japanese to
bomb both fortress and fleet into oblivion. Finally, the Baltic Fleet was over 15,000
miles away and in no position to prevent a rapid Japanese seizure of Port Arthur.

16 Corbett, Classics of Sea Power, 68.
17 Ibid.,69 (Von Moltke’s theory is a restatement of Clausewitz’s theory that the defensive position is inherently stronger in war
than the attack) (see von Clausewitz, On War, 84, 379).
18 Ibid.
19 Ironically, Russia encountered many of the same “space, time and force” difficulties that Napoleon experienced during his
invasion of Russia.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 7
THE GATHERING STORM
The animosity between Russia and Japan grew from the Sino-Japanese War of
1894-95, and its aftermath. Fought in Manchuria and Korea, Japan won the war and
acquired Taiwan and the Liaotung Peninsula – which contained Port Arthur – through
the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, shortly after the war ended, Russia, Germany
and France “advised” Japan to restore the Liaotung Peninsula to China in exchange for
an indemnity.20
Angry and humiliated – but in no military position to refuse – Japan
complied but resolved to build a military strong enough to prevent such extortion from
ever repeating itself.21

A major crisis arose in 1895, with the assassination of the pro-Japanese Korean
queen. Tokyo was concerned that Russia would use the incident to intervene and
destroy Japan’s chance to influence Korea’s future.22
Tokyo’s concern proved
prescient, when in 1896, the Russians landed a force of Marines that marched to Seoul
and precipitated a coup, which caused the King to flee to the Russian Legation for
protection. With the King as an official “guest” of the Tsar, the Russians steadily
expanded their influence in the country, and the King soon gave the Russians control of
Korea’s financial system. Much to Tokyo’s dismay, Russia had displaced it as the
preeminent power in Korea.23
Tensions worsened in 1898, when Russia received a lease for Port Arthur, which
meant that the Tsar might one day have a fleet in Korea’s backyard. Japan could not
risk a military confrontation, however, due to internal political turmoil. Therefore, Tokyo
initiated a diplomatic discussion with Russia that resulted in a protocol wherein the two
countries confirmed Korea’s independence and Russia agreed not to interfere in
Japan’s economic relations. The protocol improved Japan’s strategic position in Korea,
and it cost the Russians nothing, since there were no terms limiting St. Petersburg’s

20 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988), 96.
21 Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (London: Longman, 1985), 28.
22 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 113.
23 Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War, 33-34.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 8
involvement in Manchuria. Over the next two years, Russia expanded its economic
influence in Manchuria by extending the Trans-Siberian Railroad and building naval
bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok.24
In 1901, increasingly alarmed over Russian meddling in Korea, Tokyo decided to
establish the country as a protectorate – which would permit a military response to any
Russian intrusion or occupation – and would allow Japanese advisers to assist in the
reformation of the Korean government.25
By 1903, tensions reached new heights when
Russia reneged on a promise to withdraw troops from Manchuria and began
constructing an economic enclave on the South Bank of the Yalu River. Upon learning
that Russian troops had also established a camp along the Yalu border with Korea,
Tokyo girded for war. Russia’s duplicity regarding Manchuria was bad enough, but a
potential invasion of Korea struck a raw nerve in Tokyo, where the leaders saw Korea
as a “strategic dagger” pointed at its heart.
Japan strengthened its military presence in Korea, and soon its strategic position
was virtually unassailable except through force.26
St. Petersburg and Tokyo were on an
apparent collision course, and repeated diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation
peacefully were ineffective. Japan’s foreign minister even offered recognition of
Manchuria as a Russian sphere of influence if the Tsar would renounce ambitions in
Korea.27
However, with visions of an Asian empire in his head, and a profound hatred
of the Japanese in his heart, Nicholas refused the offer.28
Its patience at an end, Japan
decided to settle the “Korea question” through force of arms, anticipating that military
victory would create its own diplomatic solution. Bismarck would no doubt have
approved of Japan’s fighting a war for such a limited political purpose.

24 In 1860, Russia acquired the Ussuri region of China – which contained what would become Vladivostok – pursuant to the
Treaty of Peking.
25 Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, 172.
26 Richard Storry, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1979), 59.
27 Constantine Pleshakov, The Tsar’s Last Armada: The Epic Voyage to the Battle of Tsushima (New York: Basic Books, 2002),
22.
28 Ibid., 11 (When Nicholas was a young man visiting Japan, he was attacked and severely wounded by a sword-wielding
samurai. Nicholas recovered but never lost his hatred for the Japanese, to whom he referred as “Macaques”).
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 9
LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR
Japan’s political and territorial objectives were well suited to fighting a limited
war. Seeking neither to conquer Russian territory nor to topple its government,29 Japan
intended to drive the Russians from Korea and Manchuria and establish its hegemony
in northeast Asia. Numerous factors beyond Japan’s limited objectives combined to
ensure that the War would be a regional one. First, the physical remoteness of Korea
and Manchuria virtually guaranteed the theater of operations would not expand beyond
northeast Asia. Second, Japan isolated Russia diplomatically by signing an alliance
with the British, who were only too happy to support Japan in its efforts against the Tsar.
Britain’s neutrality also guaranteed that France, a Russian ally with Asian bases, and
Germany, another Asian imperial power, would remain neutral, since neither wanted to
risk offending their powerful neighbor. Third, neither Japan nor Russia had worldwide
command of the sea. Finally, neither combatant possessed significant maritime
colonies, nor conducted sufficient oceanic trade to make commerce raiding strategically
worthwhile.30

Notwithstanding its geographic advantage, Japan understood that sea power
alone would not drive Russia from Manchuria and Korea, and that joint operations
would be necessary. Consequently, Tokyo’s strategy required establishing command of
the Yellow Sea and using the navy to support joint operations on the Korean peninsula.
Tokyo planned to insert two armies at Inchon, the first of which would capture Seoul,
while the second marched north across the Yalu River into Manchuria. The key to this
strategy was the destruction of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, since this “fleet in
being” posed a significant threat to Japan’s joint operations. By attacking Port Arthur
without warning, Japan took a page more from Corbett’s book than Mahan’s by

29 H.W. Brands, T.R.: The Last Romantic (New York: Viking, 1997), 531 (During a visit to the White House, the Emperor of Japan
personally told Theodore Roosevelt that Japan had limited aims in Northeast Asia, and that once satisfied, it would go no
further).
30 David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie (Contributor), Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1887-1914 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 86.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 10
exploiting the advantage of already being in the theater of operations.31
Tokyo believed
a quick strike was necessary, given that its formidable fleet was still numerically inferior
to Russia’s combined Far Eastern Fleet. Therefore, if Japan could destroy the Port
Arthur squadron, the Russians would have only the Vladivostok cruisers in theater.
On paper, it all seemed rather straightforward. However, even the simplest thing
in war is difficult.32
Once the fighting begins, plans often fail to survive the first
encounter with the enemy, and Japan’s was no exception. Despite giving Russia a
“bloody nose,” the Port Arthur attack did not deliver a knockout blow, and the Russian
squadron continued to threaten Japan’s joint operations in Korea. A second torpedo
attack and an attempt to seal the harbor with sunken ships at the entrance were also
unsuccessful. Frustrated – but unwilling to risk ships he could not replace – Togo chose
to blockade Port Arthur instead of pressing the attack. Failing to achieve its decisive
victory, Japan embarked upon a prolonged siege of Port Arthur, a type of warfare for
which it was unprepared and one that pressured its centers of gravity – manpower and
materiel. Tokyo knew it could not afford a long war, but made a costly strategic error in
assuming that Port Arthur would fall as quickly as it did during the Sino-Japanese War.
Several months and almost 58,000 casualties later, Japan learned that incorrect
strategic assumptions in warfare can lead to severe tactical misfortune.
THE YELLOW SEA
The pivotal event of the War occurred in 1904 at the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
After seizing the hills surrounding Port Arthur, the Japanese began shelling both fortress
and fleet, and the Tsar personally ordered his ships to make for Vladivostok – a task
easier said than done.33
Admiral Vitgeft, commander of the squadron, disagreed with
the Tsar’s order, since the fortress was not in imminent danger of capture.
Nevertheless, on August 10th, the fleet left Port Arthur and steamed southeast.

31 The success of the attack on Port Arthur factored into Tokyo’s decision to bomb Pearl Harbor in 1941. Thinking that such an
attack would work twice, Japan made a strategic blunder in assuming that America would react as Russia did in 1904.
32 Von Clausewitz, On War, 119 (Explaining that “friction” is what separates war in theory from war in reality).
33 Warner and Warner, The Tide at Sunrise (New York: Charterhouse, 1974), 325.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 11
Onboard his flagship Mikasa, Togo received the message that the Russians were
on their way, and he knew that his chance had come. If the Japanese could destroy the
Russian squadron, it would help break the siege of Port Arthur and demonstrate to
Tokyo the indispensability of Togo’s fleet. The Admiral also understood that if the
Russians escaped, it might mean the destruction of Vice Admiral Kamimura’s Second
Division, which Togo dispatched to the Sea of Japan to hunt down the Vladivostok
cruisers.”34
The loss of Kamimura’s ships would be a disaster, and Togo could not
allow it to happen. Although Togo had lost two battleships and could not unreasonably
risk his remaining four, he knew that he had to fight.
The battle began in the early afternoon with the fleets exchanging fire at a range
of several miles.35
Vitgeft shifted course several times, however, and the fleets ended
up on a parallel course but heading in opposite directions with the Russians moving
east and the Japanese moving west. By choosing to fight a long-range action, Togo
made a rare tactical error36 and moved his fleet too far west to overtake the Russians
without placing his own ships in grave danger. Togo had to decide whether to pursue
the Russians for a “fight to the death,” or to chase them back to Port Arthur. He chose
the latter, changed course and steamed directly towards the Russian ships. For the
next several hours, the fighting continued sporadically as the stokers on both sides
worked furiously to give their ships all the speed they could muster.
As sunset approached, the Russians were close to breaking through when “the
most critical minute of the war”37 occurred in the form of two direct hits on the Russian
flagship Tsarevitch. One of the shells tore through the pilothouse, killing Admiral Vitgeft,
disabling the ship’s steering and throwing the entire Russian formation into disarray.
After a chaotic interval, Admiral Uktomsky reestablished control and ordered the fleet
back to Port Arthur. As darkness fell, Japanese torpedo boats continued the attack but

34 Corbett, Maritime Operations in the Russo Japanese War, Vol 1: 138.
35 Newton McCully, The McCully Report: the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, Ed. Richard A. von Doenhoff, (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1977), 142.
36 Edwin Falk, Togo and the Rise of Japanese Sea Power (New York: Longmans, 1936), 333-34.
37 Vice Admiral G.A. Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1921), p.
241.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 12
failed to sink any of the fleeing ships, and the squadron returned safely to Port Arthur
the following morning.38
Despite failing to destroy the squadron, the battle was a
decisive victory for Japan.39
First, none of the Russian ships reached Vladivostok and
would never make another attempt. Second, every Russian battleship had suffered
some damage, and third, Japan had complete control of the Yellow Sea, which meant it
could conduct joint operations without harassment and conserve its limited resources.
On August 14th, the ripples of battle spread to the Battle of Ulsan, where
Kamimura’s ships intercepted the Vladivostok cruisers in the Sea of Japan as they
deployed to Port Arthur. The Russians attempted to flee, but the Japanese sank one
cruiser and severely damaged the other two, which was a significant loss for Russia.
With its three heavy cruisers, armed merchantman and torpedo boats, the squadron
had destroyed dozens of transports, including British and German ships carrying food,
siege guns and locomotives meant for Port Arthur. In the span of just a few days,
Togo’s ships had effectively eliminated the combat capability of the Tsar’s Far Eastern
fleet, and Russia’s hope now resided in the Baltic Fleet.
WHY ARE WE HERE?
Clausewitz wrote that no one with common sense should start a war without a
defined objective and a plan for attaining it.40
Nevertheless, no one ever accused Tsar
Nicholas II of being a sensible man. Thinking that a war abroad might ease his troubles
at home, Nicholas did not have a concrete objective in northeast Asia beyond avoiding
expulsion from Port Arthur and Manchuria. Nevertheless, the Tsar believed that victory
over the inferior Japanese would be swift and glorious,41 not withstanding that he and
his advisors completely underestimated Japan’s resolve and the strategic importance of

38 Warner and Warner, The Tide at Sunrise, 333 (The Tsarevitch – struck by at least 15 shells – limped to Kiao-chou, where the
Japanese interned it for the remainder of the war, along with three Russian cruisers).
39 Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan, 244-45.
40 Von Clausewitz, On War, 579.
41 Warner and Warner, The Tide at Sunrise, 166 (St. Petersburg was largely indifferent towards the Japanese and saw them as
an annoyance, which was unwise, since Japan was completely immersed in Russia’s Korean and Manchurian activity.

CONCLUSION
Corbett’s writings are useful in analyzing the War because they apply Clausewitz
to the maritime theater and introduce to naval strategy the concepts of limited war, the
strategic defensive and the effectiveness of joint operations. Using Corbett’s analytical
framework, it is apparent that Japan maximized its advantages and leveraged its sea
power extremely well, which enabled Tokyo to pursue its political objective with limited
means at its disposal.
Although Mahan offers useful insights regarding the War, his weakness lies in
not appreciating joint operations and their potential impact upon maritime strategy,
which is a significant theoretical “blind spot”, since Japan’s entire strategy hinged upon
the use of joint operations after establishing command of the sea. It is possible that
Mahan’s antipathy towards joint operations resulted from his American perspective on
naval strategy, which did not emphasize joint operations. To his credit, however,
Mahan did change his thinking regarding the existence of navies given the outcome of
the War. Whereas he had previously written that “navies depend upon maritime
commerce as the cause and justification of their existence,” he later wrote that “a navy
may be necessary where there is no shipping . . . [M]ore and more it becomes clear,
that the function of navies is distinctly military and international, whatever their historical
origin in particular cases.”81
Regardless of theories about concentration and limited war, however, at the end
of the day Japan won the War because its admirals and crews – who were more
experienced, better trained and “never left their ships”82
– simply outfought their Russian

81 Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy, 81 (citing A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), 445-6.
82 Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol 1: 241.
.
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 3 22
counterparts. Nevertheless, Japan’s tactical victories would not have been strategically
significant without a well-matched strategy and policy. Tokyo understood that victory
hinged not upon defeating Russia in a worldwide conflict, but rather only in Northeast
Asia. To the world’s astonishment, Japan played David to Russia’s Goliath and
established itself as a legitimate power destined to influence affairs in Asia and beyond
for decades to come.

As a result of the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916, the U.S. began building a navy “second to none,” with the ability to protect both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This plan called for 10 battle cruisers, 10 cruisers, 50 destroyers, and 72 submarines; only two of the battle cruisers would be completed—as aircraft carriers—but 200 more destroyers were added to the strategic enlargement. The destroyer fleet enlargement was completed in three phases, separated into Calwell, Wickes, and Clemson classes, with the Wickes and Clemson classes composing the majority of U.S. Navy destroyer capacity after 1917. Improved from the 1901 models, World War 1 battleship destroyers had characteristic “flush decks,” or a level deck which ran the length of the keel, steam turbines, four 4-inch deck guns, twelve 21-inch torpedo tubes, one 3-inch anti-aircraft gun, and two stern-mounted depth charge racks. The latter upgrade would be crucial armaments in combating German U-boats.