Dark Earth: Imperial Defence

Cabinet Office Briefing Room, Whitehall
December 15th 1964

“How many meetings like this have you done before, Sir Richard?”

Now there was a bit of irony, even if it was unconscious thought Hannay.

“Not many at all, Prime Minister. The Special Full Meeting has tended to be more of a extraordinary measure in times of war and crisis, so the first one came in 1950, then ‘56 and 60. The other full meetings have come during the Imperial Conferences as part of the general roundtables.”

“Well, this is far from the likes of those three years. Hopefully it gives us the means to avoid a fourth one of them.”

“Indeed Prime Minister.” He gave a quick look around the Cabinet Office Briefing Room. This would be the last time that the Committee of Imperial Defence met in this particular chamber, as it’s larger and more secure successor had been completed in the new bunker beneath their current level. The four crystal screens on the opposite wall showed the participants from North America, India, the Levant, Southern Africa, Australasia in attendance, so, with a nod to Sir Obo and without further ado, Sir Richard Hannay began the meeting.

“Good morning, Your Royal Highness, Prime Minister, My Lords and gentlemen. We shall commence this Special Full Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It has been called by Prime Minister Barton to discuss and review the coordinated defence policy and strategy of the Empire in the light of the war in Viet Nam and the other significant changes that have occurred since the Defence Review of 1961. Prime Minister?”

“My thanks to you, Sir Richard. We are on the cusp of the midpoint of this decade. What we set ourselves to here today will guide us forward for the rest of it. We shall set our the challenge, our response, how we need to go forward together on land, sea and in the air and how and where we can coordinate our production and resources. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom wishes to provide the best possible picture of our intent and design to our great Commonwealth Dominions over the seas so that, together, we can be united and victorious, as we ever have been before.

That’s the aim. To put it simply, we need to rearm and to rearm efficiently. We’ve got to modernise our armed forces, paying for the new generation of weapons and equipment whilst building up the capacity needed in crisis and, heaven forfend, wartime. In Britain, we’re going to reverse the course we’ve taken since 1961. The Chancellor of the Exchequer can expand upon the economic and fiscal basis for our policy.”

“Yes Prime Minister. The decision made by the last government in 1960 has reduced defence spending from 12.5% to 9.9% of gross domestic product over these last four years. That managed to achieve their goal of funding the key strategic weapons programmes in that period, but at the cost of part of our conventional capacity, funding of our reserves and not keeping up with the effects of inflation. We don’t face an inordinate problem with the latter, but in broad terms we have a 10% reduction in the true value of the budget over that time. This is the first facet of the issue that confronts us - we get slightly less power for our pound.

Compounding this is the rising unit cost of our basic types of equipment - tanks, guns, armoured personnel carriers and small arms are all costing noticeably more and this is writ large in flaming letters for aircraft and ships. What’s new is two additional factors - the guided missile, which we are told by the services that we need in ever larger numbers; and replacement of our wartime and Korean War fleets of support vehicles. To accomodate these needs, we will have to boost defence spending on an annualised basis in real terms over the next five years. In combination with our programme for growth and investment, this will deliver a definite rise in what we can afford to procure and what we can afford to do. In the absence of a major war in that time, such a policy will deliver considerable growth whilst working under the hard cap of 10% that we at the Treasury have agreed upon.”

Healey delivered his analysis in a flat voice that was almost forced. The Treasury had lost this particular battle, having proposed far more measured increases in raw funding, even if there was a useful benefit of increased tax receipts from the profits made by the major defence conglomerates. In Britain, arms and the state were very closely entwined in a multiplicity of ways and the electoral and political utility of increased orders for the shipyards, steelworks and arsenals of the North and the aircraft and automotive factories of the Midlands had been too popular in the Cabinet, at least this time. Barton’s Grand Design was a logical one, albeit very ambitious, and carried in it the prospect of being able to do more with less once the engines of national growth were turning fully.

“Right. That’s what we are going to be spending. We need to increase what we are doing as the international threat has grown faster than we have over the last 4 years. Whilst we are much better off in terms of what the Americans are doing and willing to offer, we cannot base the entire security of the Empire on the goodwill and interests of Washington, as those can change. Prior to the last Defence Review, the previous government did countenance that the Soviets had a larger economy than we estimated and that they would grow faster than expected. In that, they were right. The consequences of us treading water in that time are problematic, but not insoluble. Admiral Mountbatten, would you provide us with the strategic picture as it currently stands and how we are positioned?”

“Yes, Prime Minister. As of the beginning of 1965, the Soviets will have an arsenal of well over 10,000 nuclear warheads, with an estimated quarter of those being strategic or semi-strategic. They outnumber the Empire in long range ballistic missiles by over 150 and their current production is focused on the heavyweight SS-9 Scarp and SS-10 Scrag. There are indications that they have a solid fueled LRBM under development and that they are studying the possibility of mobile missiles. The Soviet Long Range Cruise Missile programme is the most advanced in the world and of their 180 Buryas and 120 Burans, perhaps 60 present a threat to Britain, whilst the bulk of their numbers are focused on North America. Our main defence against the LRBM is to be Violet Friend, but our current deployment is limited to 40 missiles at this point. Once our full defensive force is in place, we project that we can successfully intercept up to 200 inbound targets with our ground based weapons; we are planning on upgrading our newer battleships with improved versions of the Triumph that can assist in the anti-ballistic missile role plus a potential airborne component.

We estimate they field 608 MRBMs, made up of 480 SS-4s and 228 SS-5s, with a new mobile missile, the SS-14 expected to be deployed next year; between 160 and 250 of these are targeted on . There are indications that they will start phasing out the older SS-4s deployed in soft sites over the next few years, which will dramatically increase their relative protection and decrease their reaction time. Currently, we have a two hour warning that they are being fueled, which is sufficient time for a pre-emptive strike with our Black Arrows and White Knights or with the TSR-2s. With silo basing, that figure is cut to perhaps 15-20 minutes if they are in high alert condition, which they can hold for 48 hours. That in itself is a considerable escalation of the Soviet threat to the British Isles, albeit measured by our missile defences. Our information indicates that up to 50 missiles are positioned to target India from the Uzbek SSR, but these are of the older type on soft sites and countered by our proposed Black Arrow deployment and sales, in addition to the extension of the defensive missile shield. There are no indications of Soviet targeting of medium ranged missiles on any of the other Commonwealth Dominions at this time, although it is expected that as their production rate increases, some of their newer weapons would be targeted on Israel.

In terms of bombers, the Soviets have over 500 intercontinental Tu-95 Bears and 360 Bounders, which are primarily aimed at North America, and a residual force of approximately 250 Bisons for use against Western Europe, China and India. The Bears are in the class of the Vulcan and B-52, the Bounders in that of the Vengeance and B-58 and the Bisons are akin to the Valiants and B-47s. The Bisons are on their way out by the end of the decade on current indications, but the other two are our ongoing worries. All three can be effectively engaged by our RAF and Commonwealth fighter forces, but their newer supersonic developments are more concerning. The Sukhoi Su-100 is entering production this year and is a supersonic reconnaissance/strike bomber with a very long range; at this stage, only a limited deployment is planned, indicating some potential issues with it. The Tupolev Tu-100 'Barbarian' is our most vexing concern, as it straddles the line between a theatre weapon and a strategic one by virtue of its combat radius of over 2000 miles, and it combines this with a challenging top speed of 1700 mph; there is also a naval strike version under development which we and the Americans have given the reporting code name 'Backfire'. Their theatre bomber force of Blinders and Badgers is decisively outmatched by our fighters and surface-to-air guided missile defences in Europe and the British Isles; as our Continental allies modernise their fighter forces, this deficiency will only be exacerbated. The Soviets know this as well and are looking to replace them with the Barbarian, shifting the legacy force to their Naval Aviation, and with a new Sukhoi interdiction strike bomber in the class of the F-111 and Thunderbolt. This will lead to a decline in the numbers of the medium bomber threat against Britain, but an increase in its complexity.

Their strategic submarine force has advanced rapidly over the last few years, but remains fundamentally behind us and the Americans. Their 25 Golf class boats are obsolete and are equipped with the SS-N-4, which has a range of 300 nautical miles. The Reds did plan on upgrading them to their new SS-N-5s, which can be launched from underwater, but their range is also limited to 700 nautical miles and was apparently seen as of limited utility. They will start to leave service in 1967. Their more substantive threat is the 16 Hotels, 10 Indias and particularly the two new Yankee class bombers. The former two carry the SS-N-5, which by virtue of its range is going to be of less utility against the US and thus could well be redeployed against us and the Japanese. It is considered decidedly unlikely that they would deploy far enough south in the Atlantic or Pacific to threat Southern Africa or Australasia, as moving to those areas would take them through some of our key chokepoints, and we are yet to allow a Soviet submarine into the Indian Ocean without a tail. As of this morning, the four Red bombers at sea in our area each have one or more of our attack boats stalking them in addition to surface ships, aircraft and airships on station within striking distance. Currently, their SSGN fleet is primarily focused on anti-surface warfare and even their vestigal efforts to threaten us with their Whiskey class conversions have come to a halt as they've conceded that they can't slip a wartime diesel boat down into the North Sea, surface and spend 20 minutes preparing to fire. The Floating Fortresses have similarly killed them off on the North Atlantic flank. If they build new dedicated land attack submarines, we will have a substantial strategic warning prior to their commissioning to allow for development of a response.

We thus largely have the measure of the Soviet strategic threat at this time, with the caveats of their evolving medium range missile force and the limited shield against their longer range weapons.

Their next major threat comes from their tactical forces. The Red Army has increased its strength to 284 divisions, a rise of 28 since 1960, and are expected to rise to 300 by 1969. They now field a dozen airborne divisions and have 12 rifle divisions, raised as light infantry with a deliberate reduction mechanised transport; intelligence on their TOE suggests that they do not lack in artillery or helicopter support and are fairly lavishly supplied with modern light support vehicles. This new unit is intended for air or sea deployment beyond the immediate region of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, suggesting their envisaged use in Asia and Africa alongside their airborne and naval infantry forces. They are also in the process of modernising four cavalry divisions, although we have conflicting reports on their equipment and use. In direct terms, the Soviets are raising a Tank Army to the Leningrad Military District and a further Combined Arms Army in the Archangelsk Military District. This, in combination with preparation for the formation of a Murmansk Military District, suggests a renewed Soviet emphasis on the Scandinavian theatre. There has been significant debate inside Stavka regarding the role of their mechanised corps. Their mechanised divisions were amalgamated with their old rifle divisions in the reforms of 1957/58, but the separate corps have been maintained, each being the approximate equivalent of two divisions. It does seem now that they were intended for use as mobile front level assets in the manner of cavalry-mechanised groups in the last war, but doctrinal shifts are putting them somewhat out of favour as the great wartime commanders begin to retire and die off. It is entirely possible that they may be reorganised as motor rifle divisions, which would present an apparent rise in numbers of Soviet divisions whilst not increasing their actual troop numbers.

Their equipment is also increasingly catching up on Western weapons systems in quality and lethality. They have replaced the T-55 with the T-62 in their frontline motor rifle divisions and the T-64 in their tank divisions in Eastern Europe, which shifts the general balance somewhat. Whereas one of the later model Centurions could match half a dozen T-55s and a Chieftain easily take on ten, their newer tanks even the odds markedly. Their new T-68 heavies further alter the equation and from what we can tell about their current pair of future tank projects, they will feature further incremental improvements. We are in front of them with tanks, but cannot afford to stand still even a day further. Their new armoured personnel carriers and mechanised infantry fighting vehicles constitute a much larger improvement to their current weapons and represent a considerable threat. In artillery and helicopters, they are also catching up, whilst they lead us in sheer numbers of tactical battlefield rockets. The Red Army is receiving more tactical nuclear weapons systems every year and countering these is an increasingly complex task.

The Red Air Force presents a mounting tactical threat but they are still markedly behind in the air. Their Frontal Aviation is undergoing what for the Soviets can be considered rationalisation on a reduced number of planes - the MiG-21 in the general fighter role, the Su-21 strike fighter, the Su-17 fighter-bomber, the Il-42 sturmovik attack jet, their Yakovlev Yak-36 VSTOL attack fighter, the Il-54 strike bomber and the Yak-26 light bomber. With the exception of the Forger, Moscow is looking to export as many of these types as possible. However, all of those are established aircraft that we are confident we have the measure of. It is their newest planes that are raising our greatest concern. Biggles, could you expand?”

“The Reds are now developing or fielding what our intelligence has dubbed their ‘Big 4’. The MiG-23 multirole fighter is assessed as broadly in the class of the F-4 Phantom and superior to our Spectre. In operations over North Vietnam, it has proved formidable against escort fighters and our information is that it will be equally a handful over the battlefield. Sukhoi are working on an advanced swing-wing strike/interdiction fighter, tentatively classified as the Su-24, to match the Western Tornados, F-111s and Orages. Yakovlev have their Yak-27 single engine fighter-Bomber, which will augment rather than replace the Fitter and represents the Soviets’ first foray into the ‘battlefield fighter’ concept. However, the most concerning is the MiG-25 super fighter/interceptor. Initial reports and indications are that it is a world leader in performance power and the most agile Soviet fighter to date. Whilst we expect the interceptor variants for PVO Strany to have initial production priority, it will be coming to Frontal Aviation air superiority fighter regiments within two to three years. The general characteristics of these planes as known to use at the moment indicate that the current gap will be bridged by this next generation. We can counter them, but it will be costly. The other factor to take into account is the larger Soviet aircraft production capacity. Facing increased quality and quantity is a concern.”

“Thank you, Air Chief Marshal, a concern indeed.” Mountbatten shuffled his notes and continued. “Now, at sea, the Red Navy is making a concerted effort to catch up or even exceed us in numbers. Their foremost threat comes from their 58 active atomic subs and the two dozen under construction; our intelligence indicates they want a force of 120 fast attack boats in addition to their bombers and cruise missile subs. They have moved on in production from their first generation November and Echo class boats to the new Victor and Charlie classes and have a new design underway which we have assigned the code name Bravo. The latter are thought to be near equivalents to the early Drakes. They have 38 nuclear subs in the Northern Fleet and a further 9 in the Baltic, together comprising their major naval component that seriously concerns us due to its proximity.

Their older conventional boats are far less threatening in capacity against our current ASW forces and the Romeos and Whiskys still make up the bulk of those numbers. Their 118 Foxtrots present a greater challenge but are not a significant qualitative threat to our North Atlantic escort forces. Their newest design, the Tango class, appears to represent a great leap ahead of their predecessors. From the little we know so far, they are far larger and longer ranged, but have tear drop hulls and some sort of new auxiliary power for underwater endurance. Should they enter service and have that full range of characteristics, then they will present an additional threat. Our own monitoring operations suggest that the Quebec coastal boats would be employed in a defensive role, representing a shift from their intention to try and break into the North Sea.

They have a further two nuclear aircraft carriers nearing completion and a further two being built as well as the eight Minsk class CVAs. That gives them a current force of 12 modern carriers compared to our 15 British and 6 Commonwealth supercarriers, counting the five Maltas as frontline carriers. There are indications that they are going to dispose of their light fleets, but whether that takes the form of conversion to commando carriers, something else or just scrapping them remains to be seen. Their ship based aircraft remain inferior to our own, but they can deploy decent numbers.

Their battleline remains the core of their surface strength, with three new battlewagons and a further four on the ways or projected, in addition to the two incomplete Sovetsky Soyuz class that have recommenced work since 1962. They have retired the old Cominterns at last, freeing up their manpower for their modern fleet, but we know the Reds have a funny way of never considering a ship truly disposed of whilst it is still afloat. The Soviet amphibious battleship-carriers remain something of a curiosity mixed with threat. They have commissioned two new vessels since 1960, Svoboda and Proletarskiy, and assigned them to the Baltic and the Pacific Fleets; they seem to be somewhat averse to deploying them in the Mediterranean to date.

The Red battlecruiser fleet is large and they don’t seem to be in any great hurry to increase it, but there are indications that they are proceeding with the design of a class of nuclear battlecruisers to match their new supercarriers. There is construction underway in Poland, Romania and the GDR that is concerning to the regional balances of power. In terms of other cruisers, there are two new guided missile types under construction to replace the Chapayevs, one roughly Sverdlov size and one smaller that seems analogous to our proposed Town class DLGs. The Soviet cruiser force has always been an area of some concern due to their numbers, armament and relative modernity.

From there, the quality of the Red Fleet falls off. The Samarkands are decent ships, but the Skoryys are obsolete, just as the Kolas and Petyas don’t really compare to even our second class frigates. Moscow has elected for quantity over quality here and that has made them vulnerable to subsurface warfare just as much as aerial weapons. This principle extends on down to their light surface combatants and coastal forces, which are numerous and possessed of not inconsiderable firepower but with a glass chin. We have the ways, means and devices to handle them comfortably. Their Naval Infantry is sizeable and heavily equipped, but does not present a direct threat against Britain or the Dominions at this time due to distance and their lack of forward bases. They are a big issue for our Scandinavian allies as they are right on their frontline.

That then brings us to the final element of the Soviet Armed Forces and the newest - their Airborne Troops. They are an issue, as they have a dozen divisions plus a further four being raised and the air fleet to deliver them. They present a threat in every theatre as well as being theoretically capable of long range deployment into the likes of Africa. They have both numbers and firepower, as the Soviets were the first to start hardening and mechanising their airborne units, and present the only real force that can realistically threaten the British Isles with incursion.

In all, the USSR presents a multi-spectrum military threat to Britain and the entire Empire insofar as their conventional or tactical forces are concerned. This has increased dramatically since the end of the last war and particularly since the death of the elder Stalin.”

“Thank you, Admiral.” said Hannay with a gracious nod. “Russia is far from the only threat confronting us, but is unquestionably the largest and most significant - in short, it is the only global threat to the British Empire as a whole. China does present a regional challenge in the Far East and to India, but it is yet to project force beyond those areas in a meaningful fashion. We do know they have been increasingly supplying North Vietnam with some of the older equipment and materiel as it has been replaced in order to counterbalance Soviet influence. At sea, they currently deploy 9 carriers, having commissioned the Chiangsu and Yunnan in the last three years, with Kansu due to join them next year and 12 battleships; a new modern ship remains under development. They have 10 atomic submarines, broadly equivalent to the Soviet Novembers in performance, and an estimated 74 conventional boat based on the Whiskey, so not a particularly egregious or long range threat in either case. Similarly in the air, they have 260 Hong-3 and Hong-4 heavies and perhaps 580 Hong-2 medium bombers, but only the former would present a major threat to our position in India and South East Asia, but is their focus is divided between the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States. The nature of the problem in the Far East is that China plays a role analogous to Italy in the last war - a real threat, but a regional one rather than a global one. The Reds are the greater danger than the Yellows.

On the next tier down, we have Indonesia. They threaten Australia and Malaya in a limited fashion, albeit with the direct support from Moscow behooving one of their key satellites, and it is countered by forces in theatre and strategic deterrence at present. Beyond that, we enter into the realms of potential threats, such as the Turks and the Arabs, which would accord us a decent degree of strategic warning should they shift in that direction. In all of those three cases, we can measure and quantify what is needed to counter them and add these factors to the calculations we must make regarding Moscow. Aside from these specific threats, it is the considered view of the Committee of Imperial Defence that no other major military threats can or will emerge within the next 10 years.”

“That’s the other side laid out, then. If we put in place the forces and structures to counter Russia globally, then they will also provide for the ability to deal with any of the minor players; for the time being, our best and most economic means to cover China is the combination of our strategic forces and what is in place in the Far East. If we examine Appendix J in the briefing document, we can see that the forces required for a full war against China without the use of strategic weapons are quite beyond our scope at the moment or indeed in the future.” Barton said tersely.

There was a momentary silence across the room as the men flipped through the pages before them, followed by a single low whistle.

“60 divisions? Hell’s teeth! What of India?” Sir Alexander Spencer, the Canadian Defence Minister, was one not normally given to exclamation, but did seem shocked.

“That estimate is in addition to the Indian Army not in substitute of it, but is a worst case scenario. It breaks down to one field army on the North East Frontier, one on the neck of the Malay Peninsula, one up on the Tibetan border and a mobile reserve in Central India to reinforce any sector, in addition to reinforced garrisons in Malaya and Borneo. The Indians would have one reinforced field army on each of the Frontiers and another up in the Himalayas. The Chinese would be able to take Tibet, most of Burma and all of Indochina and Siam before we could stop them in a purely conventional campaign.” Field Marshal Sir Charles Keightley reeled off the list of losses dispassionately.

“And in one that was not conventional?”

“With our forces in the Far East and our land based missiles, in a bit over half an hour, we would be able to destroy over 500 targets in China Proper and Manchuria, eliminating their ability to support aggressive military action and removing them as a threat.” said Air Chief Marshal Sir John Grandy, AOC-I-C of Bomber Command.

“Give us ten years and the modern weapons we need and we will be able to do most of the job ourselves at home and be free to deploy forces beyond our immediate region.” Chief of the Indian Defence Staff Field Marshal Sir Sanjay Ramakrishnan said, adjusting his rakish eye patch. “I have 80 divisions marching on paper at the present, but can put perhaps half of those in the field with the weapons of the Korean War. In the air, we can more than match the Chinese right now; but on land, the matter is not as clear, at least until we get the right weapons.”

“You’ll get them. That much and more we will do. As it stands, though, we need to reach agreement on the best means to do so. In Britain, we are going to be increasing funding overall as a first step towards that. Now, we are committed together to increase our presence in South Vietnam and that could well last several years, but our principles are that the British deployment will be not be a limitless one, either in numbers or expenditure. We will fund our Vietnam operations separately from the defence budget with specific drawings from the Sinking Fund and other sources, in addition to the American subsidy. Our increased spending and rearmament will then focus on what we really need. Minister of Defence?”

“We are basing our force and equipment requirements on the principle of a heavy mechanised army in Europe with more mobile troops on the Scandinavian and Mediterranean flanks, smaller light and medium forces in the Middle East and Orient and a rapid deployment force at home that can go to any of our four planned contingency areas - India, the South Pacific, North America and Africa. In contrast to this focus, both the Navy and the RAF are to function as global forces, with an emphasis on missiles and multirole aircraft. Our stocks of weapons, equipment, fuel and matériel are all to be boosted, both to increase the reach and striking power of the Air Force and the Navy and to cement the staying power of the Army. Our ability to project large ground forces beyond Europe and the Mediterranean will be dependent on our reserve forces and being able to sustain their mobilisation.”

“And sustain it we will. Britain will keep her commitments to each of our Commonwealth Dominions and our kith and kin over the seas. Absolutely. Our position is more strained than in 1961, but we shall do what we need to do, together. The current system of regional Imperial commands and responsibilities is a sound one as it currently stands, but one plan we wish to raise today is the introduction of an intermediate force level between the local and the Imperial Strategic Reserve. Admiral Mountbatten can expand.”

“Yes, Prime Minister. Aside from the large reserves in the Middle East and Orient we currently have our system of Imperial Commands in Atlantic, Pacific, West Indies, Africa and other key areas, with a joint Fleet Unit, aerial strike wing and a regional brigade on stand by. These work effectively and provide for a first response force. What our studies have shown is a gap between this level of force and the multiple reinforced corps level of the ISR that would be filled by a rotational Commonwealth Division supported by a composite air group and a naval strike force based around an aircraft carrier battle group. This would not be entirely forward deployed unless operationally required, but the framework to constitute and support it would be put in place. Structurally, it would follow the pattern of the current unit in Singapore of rotating brigade headquarters and assigned battalions from the Dominions and colonies, whilst operational funding would be drawn from the British Commonwealth Reserve Fund. The notion is that we would be able to have East Africa Command dealing with an internal disturbance in Tanganyika and Pacific Command carrying out deterrence operations in New Guinea in support of the Aussies whilst a division remains ready to reinforce either or to go to Central America or even Alaska on short notice. This still preserves the main part of our established reserve for their contingency mission, but if heavier support is needed, it can be provided by the British airborne, infantry or Royal Marine division currently in the spearhead role within days.”

“That level of flexibility with regard to emerging or regional conflicts will permit us in Britain in turn to focus on our major priorities: a large land army and air force in Europe for Continental warfare and home defence, naval forces for control of the Atlantic, and smaller combined forces for holding the Middle East, supporting India and defending our position in the Far East. These are informed by the needs of the Dominions and Britain alike, but particularly for the frontline states - Australia and Israel. In turn, it determines our goals and collective priorities as an Empire. What follows from Sir Richard is an initial draft, as it were, subject to further refinement.”

“Thank you, Prime Minister. For the European and Mediterranean theatres, there is a requirement for a full army group of 24 heavy and 8 light divisions in Germany and 2000 aircraft plus a Royal Marine force; a home defence force of 12 divisions and 1800 fighters; 8 divisions and 600 tactical aircraft for Scandinavia; two carrier battle groups in the North Sea to cover the Baltic Exits; two divisions each to reinforce Iceland and Denmark; 200 ASW aircraft in the Mediterranean and 400 for the North and Norwegian Seas; 60 convoy escorts in the Med; and garrison forces in Malta and Gibraltar equivalent to a division and 200 aircraft. The Austrians and Greeks have indicated that they would welcome further commitments of forces. Our forces in the Atlantic are almost all naval and air units, with garrison brigades for the Azures and Greenland and mobile defence battalions for the Floating Fortresses being the only significant land elements. We have a requirement for 240 escorts for convoy protection and general patrol in the North Atlantic and Western Approaches, 96 escorts and 8 light carriers for ASW Hunter/Killer Groups and four light carriers and 64 escorts for the GIB ASW Barrier Force, and 1200 assorted ASW patrol aircraft. For the North American theatre, there is a requirement for 8 divisions and 4 independent brigades and 1200 fighters for Continental defence across Canada and Newfoundland; 1 division and 200 planes each in New Avalon and West Indies; a brigade and 100 ASW planes in Bermuda; 100 local ASW patrol aircraft in Newfoundland; 20 coastal escorts in the Canada/Newfoundland littoral; and a carrier battle group or equivalent to cover Alaska and Western Canada. The Atlantic provides the link between the forces in the British Isles and North America and is the most significant sea in our defence against the Soviets and other global threats.

In the Middle East, we require 12 divisions and 1000 aircraft in Israel, Sinai and Jordan; 8 divisions and 800 aircraft in Southern Mesopotamia and Persia; two mobile divisions to be based in Cyprus; two divisions and 400 aircraft in Suez and Egypt; 100 ASW patrol aircraft; and garrison forces in the Gulf States. The Mediterranean Fleet of six carrier groups and two in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea would support these forces, deploying a total of 8 fleet carriers, 8 battleships, 20 cruisers and 100 escorts. The African theatre has a requirement for 6 divisions and 500 aircraft for the defence of Southern Africa, based on the current alignment of Portuguese Africa on its flanks; 2 divisions and 200 aircraft each for West Africa and Tanganyika; 200 patrol planes; and 4 divisions to secure the Congo. We have always planned for and worked towards a strong degree of support and interchangeability of forces between the Middle East and Africa given their close proximity and one cannot be held without the other. Our fulcrum here is Suez, as ever, with our layers of defence projecting outward.

For the Far East, we need 4 divisions and 800 planes for Malaya and Singapore; divisions in Borneo and Burma; a mobile expeditionary force of 2 divisions and 500 tactical aircraft for Thailand and Indochina; a reinforced division and 200 aircraft for the defence of Hong Kong; and a theatre reserve division up on the Kra. The main force of the Far Eastern Fleet, some six carriers, four battleships, 12 cruisers and 48 escorts, is to be mobile in the South China Sea and at least 60 escorts and 250 ASW patrol aircraft for regional convoy protection. India’s requirements against a Soviet threat, as distinct from the Chinese one outlined previously, are for two reinforced field armies on the North West Frontier and Eastern Command supported by 2400 tactical aircraft and a central reserve field army. The exigencies of India’s geography are such to preclude an absolute need for carriers in support of either flank. The Pacific theatre requires fewer forces, with the defence of Australia and New Zealand being our primary focus in the South Pacific. The former requires 6 divisions across the North of Australia and New Guinea and two brigades in Timor, 500 aircraft and three carrier groups, whilst New Zealand can be covered by four brigades and 100 planes; anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft in this theatre come to 250 and escorts to 30.

Finally, we have our global forces in the form of the Royal Navy and RAF - the Grand Fleet and Bomber Command. Each has the capacity to project power within any of the above major areas, whether it be with conventional, nuclear or chemical means for the bombers or the sheer firepower of our main carrier force and battlefleet. Optimal strength of the latter is projected as 8 fleet carriers and 4 ASW carriers, 12 battleships, 36 cruisers and 120 escorts. The Imperial Strategic Reserve in Britain is currently projected as two reinforced corps and 800 tactical aircraft and operates in conjunction with the aforementioned elements across the world. Further to these, we have the four integrated commands in the North Pacific, South Atlantic, West Indies and East Africa would each have a brigade, 100 aircraft and a carrier battle group as previously outlined, acting as regional reserves and direct augmentation of the larger joint commands, and 50 assorted escort ships on Imperial trade protection. Total target global force requirements come to 15,000 tactical fighters, 2800 patrol aircraft, 28 fleet and 16 ASW carriers, 32 battleships, 100 cruisers, 800 escorts and 160 divisions. "

"Very good, Sir Richard. How far back from those requirements are we currently, Minister of Defence?”

“It depends whether we include India or not, Prime Minister, as it is both a theatre of requirement and a source of troops thereof. With them, we are short 12 divisions, 1200 tactical aircraft and 800 patrol planes, 11 cruisers and 12 light carriers, but those numbers are deceptive, as approximately 6000 tactical aircraft require modern replacement. In the non-India variant, the divisional deficit rises to 40, based on 120 divisions in total - 52 for Europe, 20 in the Middle East, 14 for Africa, 10 in North America, 16 for Australasia and the Far East and 8 for the ISR. Of that total, though, 40 can be considered as home defence for the British Isles and the Dominions. In practice, that would be effectively covered by reserve forces upon mobilisation; on that count, we have a nominal total capacity of 72 divisions (26 British, 12 Canadian, 10 Australian, 8 Israeli, 6 South African, 6 Rhodesian, 4 New Avalon and 2 New Zealand). However, they are divided into different mobilisation categories and only our British first line TA and Reserve formations, 6 Canadian, 4 Israeli and 4 Australian divisions can currently be considered as Category B units, or ready for nominal deployment in 14 to 20 days - on paper, we have 32 Category B divisions. Thus, without the need for a full deployment in India, we have a nominal requirement for 80 divisions for expeditionary purposes from a current force pool of 72 regular divisions. We're eight short in regulars and sixteen in total including home defence units, disregarding whatever we will need to deploy to Vietnam."

“Eight. That can potentially be covered with small increases across the Commonwealth. The West Indians will provide 4 divisions towards that when they complete their modernisation effort in the next two years. I would prefer us to have some additional margin of flexibility of perhaps 8 divisions, which would raise it to a total level of 128 Category A and B divisions.” said Barton. "That would entail 96 divisions, up from 76 once Kingston is in order, so if that is agreeable, we would need to increase the regular and reserve ground forces of the Empire and Commonwealth by 20 divisions over the next 5 years."

“That sounds quite achievable, Prime Minister and we'd support it in principle.” Edward Rogers, the Australian Minister of Defence, was never backward in coming forward, reflecting the confidence that his own Prime Minister held him in. “We’re up on the frontline next door to the Indonesians and we need something tangible in that light to allow for us to deploy substantive forces away from home.”

“Any requests that Canberra makes of us will be answered, above and beyond the 9th Division, the two RAF wings and the carrier task force at Fremantle.”

“In that case, Mr. Barton, Prime Minister Menzies has authorised me to pledge a rise in our budget of 2% of GDP over the next four years and an increase in our frontline strength of 20% by 1970. In addition, we have begun discussions for the formation of two joint Anzac formations with New Zealand, one airborne and one amphibious.”

Barton silently thanked Rogers and the Aussies. They were already raising their budget on account of the situation with Djakarta, but now the others would hopefully feel somewhat pressured to follow suit. Their agreement had already been secured before the meeting, but the steps in the dance could not be skipped.

"A welcome beginning from Australia. If it can be matched by other Dominions of similar or greater capability, then we move further towards our force targets and the accompanying flexibility that gives us."

"Canada will of course be ready to do our duty to Queen and Empire. We can provisionally agree to a similar increase in funding and troops to Australia." Sir Alexander Spencer was generally seen as the heir apparent to Sir William Richardson in addition to being his right hand man, so was oft want to speaking as if he were Prime Minister already. Barton nodded slightly at him. Ottawa had similarly been approached beforehand to start the ball rolling.

The South African Minister of Defence, one of the Empire's greatest wartime fighter aces, was not one to demur from what is right. "I'll have to take it to Prime Minister Rhodes and the Cabinet, but we are certainly capable and willing to do our bit, both in active troops and preparing some further ready reserve capacity."

"Similarly, I'll present the proposal to our own Cabinet. We have the advantage of our location right next to the US, so we face less direct threat to detract from what can be committed overseas." Francis Longdon, New Avalon's Minister of Defence, was almost a tad apologetic for the exigencies of his nation's relative position and safety. That proximity of the Americans had long driven their defence and foreign policy towards a self conscious assertion of their Imperial identity and it would work well enough here again.

"India is not opposed to appropriate and fair measures, but our capacity will be fundamentally limited for the next decade. In most scenarios, we can provide for our own defence and that of Ceylon, but cannot afford major expeditionary forces beyond that for the reasons previously explained. It is, as ever, also a question of politics." Ramakrishnan left the last words hanging, but every man and monkey in the room perceived their meaning. After de facto Indian independence upon full Dominion status in 1960, there was decidedly less political support for any foreign deployments seen as supporting colonial or non-Indian interests, making the likes of 1956 a non-starter and even the likes of Korea extremely difficult. The forces deployed in the Middle East and Malaya had already by and large been returned home and this process had been one of the factors leading to this very reappraisal.

"Our position is slightly different, coming from our position as what you describe as a 'frontline state'." Field Marshal Sir Moshe Dayan said quietly, his accented tones cutting through the room. "We are a small country with limited resources that are already pushed to cover our defensive needs. We are surrounded by the Arabs on one side and Egypt on the other side of the Canal. We cannot overly commit to a force structure or capacity for operations beyond our area without additional assistance in the form of equipment and funding. Our strategic study has underlined this." Israel, by virtue of its origins, location, circumstances, religion, history and demography had always been the odd man out among the Commonwealth, and this was quite the classic example of it in Barton's view. Their position, as articulated by Dayan, was quite clear and rational - with neighbours who couldn't really be described as friendly engaging in a significant arms build up, the coordination of a global strategy was that little bit more distant. Luckily, he had the response to that card ready.

"That is perfectly understandable. In addition to the steps we're already taking to improve your own and regional security through shifts in force structure, such as moving one of our current heavy divisions from Egypt to Beersheba and establishing a reinforced fighter and air defence wing at Ascalon, we can provide the necessary funding and equipment for the establishment and training of two further Israeli divisions, two full fighter wings and smaller units as required and such weapons as needed."

Barton looked Dayan in the eye and gave an imperceptible nod. Yes, that includes bombs. He received a more noticeable nod in return.

"I'm sure than such undertakings can serve as an adequate basis to move forward, Prime Minister."

“Good. With joint commitments matching what has been proposed here, I believe that the issue of land force strength can be addressed in the timeframe we've envisaged. The cruisers and carriers will be addressed in short order by existing construction plans by ourselves and Canada, before we even factor in any further increases. It would seem from general observation that the best way of addressing the issue of aircraft is to reach a broad agreement in principle for the increase in frontline strength of certain of our air forces, rather than specifying which nations should bear which burdens."

Barton looked around the room and was met with curt expressions of agreement.

"Good. As matters stand from there, I would say there are six main goals for us to set in order to cover the worst case scenarios as outlined here. Firstly, our armies should continue their process of horizontal integration, so that brigades from different nations can easily switch between divisional or higher level commands; that gives us flexibility and speed of response. Secondly, we continue the process of introducing interoperable and compatible Fleet Units and coordinate deployments of the same; and a Commonwealth wide naval construction plan be formulated. Thirdly, that the coordination of air power as recommenced with The Plan be carried on from training to operational units to allow for economies of scale and minimise duplication of effort. This would be also be applied to aircraft production levels and the manufacturing facilities required to meet them. Fourthly, we agree on the principles of joint commands and strategy as appropriate. Fifthly, we set overall goals for production and procurement across the Commonwealth, based on these outlined needs and the build up of war emergency reserve stocks, and provide for expansion of production centres to reduce bottlenecks. Finally, we reach the basis of agreement on funding, joint projects, disbursement of the Imperial Defence Fund and national minimum commitments on spending as a proportion of national wealth. Once these foundations are in place, then we can build upon them further with detailed specifics. The Minister of Defence will discuss the fifth and sixth goals in greater depth."

"Thank you, Prime Minister. Within the next five years, we aim to raise British tank production capacity from just over 2600 to 3500 and military aircraft production to over 3200 per annum. Currently, the latter stands at a theoretical maximum of 2300 and it will take a good three years for new facilities to be built and begin operation, but the Royal Aircraft Factory is ready to take production for any tactical aircraft. We are building a new dedicated plant in Blackburn for construction of the Challenger MAVs, Rootes and Saxon have been contracted to build new manufacturing facilities for the AEC Sentinel and Alvis Centaur and once the MACV winning design has been selected, ROF Dalmuir will begin dedicated production at 10 vehicles a week to augment either Vickers or Armstrong-Whitworth. We will complete our Chieftain procurement programme for the Regular Army in 1965, which will open greater opportunities for export to Commonwealth militaries, including tanks as direct aid.

As far is artillery is concerned, ROF Nottingham can build the 125mm Light Gun at 12 per week and ROF Cardiff the L121 6" at 6, whilst Vickers, Beardmores, Armstrong-Whitworth and Coventry Ordnance Works can produce 30 guns a week between them at their maximum output and the Royal Arsenal and Royal Ordnance Works two dozen. We've a further four ROF Engineering Factories laid up for activation in the event of mobilisation. Even accounting for the greater complexity involved with the production of self propelled equipments, we can comfortably maintain a yearly rate equivalent to 1200 towed and 600 self propelled guns and 600 SPAAGs over the next five years. This will open considerable capacity for export to the Commonwealth under the British Empire Defence Assistance Programme. One of our major areas of priority is to double our capacity and output of guided missiles of all kinds by 1970 from the current 8000 per year; as a general rule, I am informed that reloads are simpler to produce than actual launchers. We differentiate between guided missiles, be they anti-tank, anti-air or anti-ship, and TBMs, or tactical ballistic missiles, where we have a requirement for a dual role battlefield weapon to replace the Robin Hood, which would be produced in much smaller numbers.

Our domestic small arms production capacity, including autocannon and mortars, is sufficient to provide for our own forces under the plan for the next five years, whilst gradually expanding to support Commonwealth and foreign exports. In addition to these dual requirements of British Empire forces and sales to our various allies and customers, we do wish to build up substantial surplus stocks of all arms above our own Wartime Emergency Reserves, but particularly small arms. Those War Emergency Reserve Stocks are based on updated calculations of wastage, spares, replacements and force expansion requirements as outlined in Appendix 12A. If, in addition to these goals of our own, we can coordinate Commonwealth production, the efficiency savings will be substantial. What we propose therefore is an agreement to raise arms production levels on a yearly basis in order to reach a collective Commonwealth capacity by 1970 of 2000 tanks, 1500 aircraft, 1500 guns and 250,000 small arms, in addition to Britain and India. This would be supported by new joint armaments manufacturing facilities in Canada, New Avalon, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand which have been previously agreed upon in bilateral discussions. That will cater to outfitting of our collective land forces with equipment that is both common and modern, supported by a distributed manufacturing infrastructure and the necessary levels of supporting stocks and ammunition; the British Ministry of Defence has estimated that a good seven years will be needed to build up the latter. There are already joint training facilities in Australia, Canada and India, but we would suggest expanding them with new ones in Rhodesia and Israel for a more effective capacity for preparation and exercises. Whilst there is no Imperial Army in peacetime, it is in our interests to be able to maximise our capacity for joint formations like in Korea and Malaya; it is, to use the American term, a force multiplier.

At sea, the system of Fleet Units, coordinated deployments and joint exercise has long been well supported, but in order to meet the force requirements discussed earlier, we need a few aces in the hole. First of these is the Commonwealth Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigate already well advanced in development; it is to serve as the base hull for anti-aircraft and general purpose versions that will go some way towards addressing the naval block obsolescence issues contained in Appendix 2N, as well as replacing wartime destroyers for many of the smaller Commonwealth fleets. Secondly, the Admiralty is working with several other Commonwealth fleets, including Australia and Canada, for the coordination of construction of larger surface combatants, including new generations of cruiser and capital ship; we will fall well short of the stated requirement for the latter as the RN's earlier prewar battleships are decommissioned, but newer construction is both more flexible and more powerful. Thirdly, expansion and modernisation of patrol aircraft fleets to meet shortfalls will require some redirection of production, but with shifts from various bombers, it is possible to achieve by 1970. Finally, submarine forces require modernisation as the RN's conventional boats are retired and the major Commonwealth navies face similar block obsolescence.

For the air, we will provide the necessary pilots through The Plan, but even with increased British production over time, there will be a necessity for higher domestic Commonwealth production to allow for modernisation and fielding the necessary force size. Through coordination of production and deployment, we can address the projected shortfall in tactical aircraft by 1971; further production can be focused upon reserves, spares, attritional stocks and exports. The principle here will be for joint planning for production coordination and then such aircraft that are built over this amount would go into a general procurement pool. We would aim towards meeting the necessary amount of aircraft between combined British and Commonwealth production, factoring in national requirements and export production. Secondly, we can also move towards maximisation of interoperability of our different air forces under the Tactical Air Force model as outlined in Appendix 7G.

On the basis for agreements on funding, there will be further discussions at a ministerial level on national minimum defence spending commitments as a proportion of wealth for the next five and ten years. That sets up the pot, as it were, to cover the expansion of capacity in the short term and further development programmes when the current rearmament goals are met beyond that. Should there be additional requirements for individual member states, the Imperial Defence Fund can be utilised to disburse necessary assistance. Put simply, the current round of expansion of plants and facilities is to be covered by the relevant Dominions from their own spending, whilst further investment is available to further support and facilitate that. That then gives us a strong productive base for use in future cooperative joint projects and will deliver collective savings from both economies of scale and pooled commitments - effective resumption of The Plan, for example, will save upwards of £250 million next year from British and Commonwealth air force budgets, which can be redirected into research and development and acquisition of new, modern weapons systems."

"Gentlemen, there we have it. If we work towards these goals, then together we can fully compete at the top table, with all that entails, along with properly protecting our countries and interests. Together, we are great; divided, we are but few. Through this process of rearmament without panic, of coordination without rush, we can put ourselves right. We aren't just an alliance of countries joined by convenience, but are more than that. This is what gives us the advantage. Let's get to work."

Barton sat back. It was done.