1967 Biafra takes Dark deal Others consider it

Just saying that they will be ‘instructed’ doesn’t provide expertise overnight, nor does it address the issues of fuel, logistics or having a functioning electricity grid.

The size of the initial ‘Biafran Army’ is insufficient to even use the 2450 tanks, nor are there airfields sufficient to support and operate sophisticated attack helicopters and advanced jet fighters.

This fails the first limb of any timeline, even for ASB.

Chucking on modern politics and attitudes just doesn’t work.

1.) Unfortunately, your numbers on the Biafran Army are way off.

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biafran_Armed_Forces
web.archive.org/web/20081014013306/http://www.canit.se/~griffon/aviation/text/biafra.htm

3000 in 1967

www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nigerian_Civil_War
Discussion of the sizes of the Nigerian Army divisions, which doesn’t amount to the size of Western divisions

100,000 soldiers at the end of the conflict is also a very big claim, given the nature of the Biafran defeat and the aftermath. The two maximal estimates of Biafran Army sizes on Wikipedia are suspect, with the 110,000 claimed figure for 1968 in particular being a misuse of evidence, given that the source refers to a ‘political army’

There is this:
“ From the summer of 1967 to the spring of 1969, the Federal Army grew from a force of 7,000 to a force of 200,000 men organised in three divisions.[108] Biafra began the war with only 240 soldiers at Enugu, which grew to two battalions by August 1967, which soon were expanded into two brigades, the 51st and 52nd which became the core of the Biafran Army.[109] By 1969, the Biafrans were to field 90,000 soldiers formed into five undermanned divisions together with a number of independent units.[109]”

(240 men is not 50,000)

en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War

Reference 109 is an unverifiable book called ‘The Military Effectiveness of Postcolonial States’ by Professor Pradeep Barua. It doesn’t strike me as the absolute best source for orbat data and estimates.

www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1969/10/nigeria-and-biafra/660429/
Reference is made to 85,000 to 30,000 in 1969; a source from the time is of comparatively greater utility.


A modern tank of the type discussed requires 4 men per tank, or just under 10,000 crewmen alone. 350 tanks is also pushing above the maximum strength of a 1980s armoured division, which had at least 15,000 men. If organised in such a fashion, then there is a need of 105,000 men, without counting support units, maintenance workshops and more. Just for tanks.

2.) Such levels of conscription in the Nigerian Civil War were never possible.

3.) It does take training to fire anything, with a Javelin taking a fair bit more than an AK-47. It also requires a firing crew of 2 (another 12,000 men).

4.) Completely irrelevant.

5.) Inaccurate. They can operate in the field, but need actual base facilities to maintain and service them.

6.) I’m not even starting on that part, as it is political bait.