BOTOP: A Little-Known Fact About US "Isolationists" in 1941--Many Supported FDR's Tough Actions Agai
Oct 9, 2022 22:55:36 GMT
stevep likes this
Post by raharris1973 on Oct 9, 2022 22:55:36 GMT
BOTOP - an acronym of my invention. Stands for: best of "the other place"
From David T
And my reply to his post:
Very interesting! Especially the use of contemporary, summer of 1941 content. It's reasonable to assume all the facts and quotes to be accurate, although I would note that TIME was a Henry Luce publication, and he had been a Nationalist China booster since the mid-1930s. (so hey, whatever racial angle many Japanaphobes had, many also did not see Asians as a monolith)
This makes one wonder if FDR would have had a carte blanche and static-free reaction (or non-reaction) from isolationists like Wheeler, Lindbergh and others had applied this mull measure of economic embargo on Japan in say January 1940, when the abrogation of the 1911 US-Japan Trade Treaty went into effect after the mandatory 6 month waiting/warning period after the abrogation announcement in July 1939?
There is not any particular reason for isolationists in January 1940 to be more oppositional to Roosevelt then, other than it being an election year. And since almost every year is an election year, they apparently didn't think it would be a winner to go after FDR on the campaign trail over it in 41, and so probably would not in 1940 either. No reason factors 1,, 2, and 3 [1) the U.S. can probably lick the Japanese; 2) this would be a Navy job primarily, and the U.S. is prouder and surer of its powerful Navy than of its half-equipped Army; 3) many isolationists are rabidly anti-Japanese. ] wouldn't already be true for American Isolationists by then. And the fact that European war related tie-ins, like occupation of a French colony, Japan's Tripartite Pact with Germany, and the invasion of the USSR hadn't happened yet, would be a feature, not a bug, for Isolationists considering whether or not to support a hardline with Japan.
A harsh sanctions regime on Japan from the beginning of 1940 surely would have left the US underprepared compared to December 1941. But the underpreparedness gap and strategic position for fighting would have been incomparably even worse for Japan in January 1940 than in December 1941. I don't know what its raw materials stockpiles were in Jan 1940, but I suspect less than in Jul or Dec 1941. They could well have had higher Gold, Dollar, or Sterling balances, but that's just more paper rendered worthless by a financial freeze and not exchanged for real goods the earlier embargo happens. If they contemplate fighting their way out of embargo like in OTL 1941, they are dealing with an unencumbered USSR at peace to the north, even worse, one that has a non-aggression pact with Germany. They are also dealing with not only the USA and Netherlands, but with a France at war, but unoccupied, and a Britain at war, but at this moment not intensely threatened or engaged at home. Strike South is a far riskier operation, and particular technical platforms like Mitsubishi Zeroes and two or three of the Carrier decks used for Pearl are not available.
How far back could we stretch FDR's relatively free hand with regard to making anti-Japanese economic moves? For example, by deciding to abrogate the US-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911 at some point earlier than July 1939, allowing the six-month warning window to become complete and sanctions to be imposed even before 1940? There were some advocates of this in Executive Department and Foreign Policy Lobbies.
However, I strongly suspect there would be a strong political opposition if FDR pushed back such measures too early, to the first year or 18 months of the Sino-Japanese War.
Why? Based on the strong isolationist and anti-war and anti-escalation reaction to the Panay Incident, where political Isolationists like Maury Maverick, and press outlets associated with an Isolationist point of view, like the Hearst Papers, were quite emphatic that China was *not* worth risking a war over.
So make of the contradictory, or evolving, opinion of Isolationists or Anti-Interventionists, what you will.
From David T
An old post of mine at www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/real-history-question-did-congress-play-any-role-in-fdr’s-sanctions-on-japan.479211/#post-19860611:
***
Even though Congress was not directly involved in FDR's July 1941 decision for sanctions on Japan, there does not seem to have been much congressional opposition to it. In fact, the actions (which it must be remembered were provoked by Japan's insisting on bases in southern Indochina, portending a further southward drive) don't seem to have been nearly as controversial as some of the steps FDR took against Germany. As Richard Leopold writes in The Growth of American Foreign Policy, pp. 586-7:
"After June 22, 1941, Roosevelt felt freer to stand firm in Asia. The invasion of Russia took some pressure off England and exposed some strains in the Tripartite Pact. In March, Hitler had been unable to persuade Japan to attack Singapore and unwilling to reveal his own plans. On April 13 Matsuoka signed in Moscow a five-year neutrality treaty that outraged the Nazis, displeased his own government, and contributed to his downfall. Yet this disunity did not preclude a Japanese ultimatum to France on July 12 demanding the right to occupy airfields in southern Indochina and to use Saigon harbor and Camranh Bay for their fleet. Unlike the concessions obtained in June, 1940, these sites could not be justified as vital to the blockade of Chiang Kai-shek. They portended rather a drive south against the Anglo-Dutch possessions.
"This new advance spurred Roosevelt and Hull into action. On July 24, 1941, the President proposed that the United States, England, Japan, and the Netherlands agree to keep hands off Indochina, but the suggestion was not seriously considered. On July 25 the commanders at Hawaii and other Pacific outposts were told that economic sanctions were imminent and that they should take "appropriate precautionary measures." That same day Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in charge of a new Far Eastern force. On July 26 an executive order froze Japanese assets in America, subjected Japanese commercial transactions to government control, and barred Japanese vessels from the Panama Canal. Oil exports were drastically curtailed, and a total ban seemed likely.
"Such was the climax to the trade restrictions begun in June, 1938. Roosevelt's advisers were split. Some felt economic retaliation to be the sole weapon the United States could wield in the Pacific while it was preoccupied in the Atlantic. Others feared that so sweeping an embargo might precipitate the clash it was designed to avert. Public and congressional opinion were overwhelmingly favorable. There were almost no complaints of executive usurpation or warmongering. [my emphasis--DT] The President knew that the step involved some risk, but he believed that Japan could be checked for a little more time by economic pressure. He was eager to win that respite, since he shared MacArthur's view that the Philippines, long considered indefensible, could now repel a Japanese assault if they had a requisite number of the new type of heavy bombers..."
Growth of American foreign policy: a history : Leopold, Richard William : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
***
Since writing that, I have become aware of an interesting fact: some of the staunchest "isolationists"--including Burton Wheeler!--approved of the sanctions against Japan. From TIME, August 4, 1941:
"But with unusual unanimity the press and the public upheld the President's act, illustrating several facets of the U.S. feeling about foreign policy: 1) the U.S. can probably lick the Japanese; 2) this would be a Navy job primarily, and the U.S. is prouder and surer of its powerful Navy than of its half-equipped Army; 3) many isolationists are rabidly anti-Japanese. Even Montana's acidulous, 100% critic Burton K. Wheeler said: "I think the President did the right thing. You may say for me that I agree with him—for the first time."" THE PRESIDENCY: THE PRESIDENCY The Last Step Taken
TIME incidentally was under no illusions about what might come next: "The U.S. and the Japanese were now face to face at the shortest distance yet. Each had encircled the other in the South Pacific (see p. 20). *The next major move on either side would mean war.* [emphasis added] THE PRESIDENCY: THE PRESIDENCY The Last Step Taken
Of course one motivation TIME only partly alludes to is the belief among some isolationists that Germans and Anglo-Saxons were "brothers" and wars between them were unfortunate and certainly not things Americans, racially akin to both belligerents, should get involved in--whereas the "Japs" were racailly alien, unscrupulous, etc. In any event, this helps explain why after Pearl Harbor, many former isolationists advocated a "Japan first" policy--it was actually consistent with their pre-Pearl Harbor views.
This is of course not a "what if" question in itself but it is relevant to some "what if" quesrions, such as whether it was plausible that atni-interventionists would have the political strngth to block FDR's anti-Japan moces.
(BTW, I actually first learned of Wheeler's statement from reading the dissident Trtoskyist---specifically Shachtmanite--organ *Labor Action* where it is explained as follows: "What distinguishes Wheeler & Co. from the pro-Roosevelt politicians is simply this: The “isolationists” are willing to fight for American imperialist interests in the Western hemisphere and in the Far East. Intervention there is right up their alley. But they fear that by entering the exhausting European war, American imperialism will be biting off more than it can chew. No little impressed by fascist methods, they would rather make a deal with Hitler on the European front. On the other hand, Roosevelt is willing to take a chance. By going the whole hog he hopes that, as senior victor in the European war American imperialism will sit on top of the whole world." Susan Green: Senator Wheeler - False Crusader (11 August 1941))
***
Even though Congress was not directly involved in FDR's July 1941 decision for sanctions on Japan, there does not seem to have been much congressional opposition to it. In fact, the actions (which it must be remembered were provoked by Japan's insisting on bases in southern Indochina, portending a further southward drive) don't seem to have been nearly as controversial as some of the steps FDR took against Germany. As Richard Leopold writes in The Growth of American Foreign Policy, pp. 586-7:
"After June 22, 1941, Roosevelt felt freer to stand firm in Asia. The invasion of Russia took some pressure off England and exposed some strains in the Tripartite Pact. In March, Hitler had been unable to persuade Japan to attack Singapore and unwilling to reveal his own plans. On April 13 Matsuoka signed in Moscow a five-year neutrality treaty that outraged the Nazis, displeased his own government, and contributed to his downfall. Yet this disunity did not preclude a Japanese ultimatum to France on July 12 demanding the right to occupy airfields in southern Indochina and to use Saigon harbor and Camranh Bay for their fleet. Unlike the concessions obtained in June, 1940, these sites could not be justified as vital to the blockade of Chiang Kai-shek. They portended rather a drive south against the Anglo-Dutch possessions.
"This new advance spurred Roosevelt and Hull into action. On July 24, 1941, the President proposed that the United States, England, Japan, and the Netherlands agree to keep hands off Indochina, but the suggestion was not seriously considered. On July 25 the commanders at Hawaii and other Pacific outposts were told that economic sanctions were imminent and that they should take "appropriate precautionary measures." That same day Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and placed in charge of a new Far Eastern force. On July 26 an executive order froze Japanese assets in America, subjected Japanese commercial transactions to government control, and barred Japanese vessels from the Panama Canal. Oil exports were drastically curtailed, and a total ban seemed likely.
"Such was the climax to the trade restrictions begun in June, 1938. Roosevelt's advisers were split. Some felt economic retaliation to be the sole weapon the United States could wield in the Pacific while it was preoccupied in the Atlantic. Others feared that so sweeping an embargo might precipitate the clash it was designed to avert. Public and congressional opinion were overwhelmingly favorable. There were almost no complaints of executive usurpation or warmongering. [my emphasis--DT] The President knew that the step involved some risk, but he believed that Japan could be checked for a little more time by economic pressure. He was eager to win that respite, since he shared MacArthur's view that the Philippines, long considered indefensible, could now repel a Japanese assault if they had a requisite number of the new type of heavy bombers..."
Growth of American foreign policy: a history : Leopold, Richard William : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive
***
Since writing that, I have become aware of an interesting fact: some of the staunchest "isolationists"--including Burton Wheeler!--approved of the sanctions against Japan. From TIME, August 4, 1941:
"But with unusual unanimity the press and the public upheld the President's act, illustrating several facets of the U.S. feeling about foreign policy: 1) the U.S. can probably lick the Japanese; 2) this would be a Navy job primarily, and the U.S. is prouder and surer of its powerful Navy than of its half-equipped Army; 3) many isolationists are rabidly anti-Japanese. Even Montana's acidulous, 100% critic Burton K. Wheeler said: "I think the President did the right thing. You may say for me that I agree with him—for the first time."" THE PRESIDENCY: THE PRESIDENCY The Last Step Taken
TIME incidentally was under no illusions about what might come next: "The U.S. and the Japanese were now face to face at the shortest distance yet. Each had encircled the other in the South Pacific (see p. 20). *The next major move on either side would mean war.* [emphasis added] THE PRESIDENCY: THE PRESIDENCY The Last Step Taken
Of course one motivation TIME only partly alludes to is the belief among some isolationists that Germans and Anglo-Saxons were "brothers" and wars between them were unfortunate and certainly not things Americans, racially akin to both belligerents, should get involved in--whereas the "Japs" were racailly alien, unscrupulous, etc. In any event, this helps explain why after Pearl Harbor, many former isolationists advocated a "Japan first" policy--it was actually consistent with their pre-Pearl Harbor views.
This is of course not a "what if" question in itself but it is relevant to some "what if" quesrions, such as whether it was plausible that atni-interventionists would have the political strngth to block FDR's anti-Japan moces.
(BTW, I actually first learned of Wheeler's statement from reading the dissident Trtoskyist---specifically Shachtmanite--organ *Labor Action* where it is explained as follows: "What distinguishes Wheeler & Co. from the pro-Roosevelt politicians is simply this: The “isolationists” are willing to fight for American imperialist interests in the Western hemisphere and in the Far East. Intervention there is right up their alley. But they fear that by entering the exhausting European war, American imperialism will be biting off more than it can chew. No little impressed by fascist methods, they would rather make a deal with Hitler on the European front. On the other hand, Roosevelt is willing to take a chance. By going the whole hog he hopes that, as senior victor in the European war American imperialism will sit on top of the whole world." Susan Green: Senator Wheeler - False Crusader (11 August 1941))
And my reply to his post:
Very interesting! Especially the use of contemporary, summer of 1941 content. It's reasonable to assume all the facts and quotes to be accurate, although I would note that TIME was a Henry Luce publication, and he had been a Nationalist China booster since the mid-1930s. (so hey, whatever racial angle many Japanaphobes had, many also did not see Asians as a monolith)
This makes one wonder if FDR would have had a carte blanche and static-free reaction (or non-reaction) from isolationists like Wheeler, Lindbergh and others had applied this mull measure of economic embargo on Japan in say January 1940, when the abrogation of the 1911 US-Japan Trade Treaty went into effect after the mandatory 6 month waiting/warning period after the abrogation announcement in July 1939?
There is not any particular reason for isolationists in January 1940 to be more oppositional to Roosevelt then, other than it being an election year. And since almost every year is an election year, they apparently didn't think it would be a winner to go after FDR on the campaign trail over it in 41, and so probably would not in 1940 either. No reason factors 1,, 2, and 3 [1) the U.S. can probably lick the Japanese; 2) this would be a Navy job primarily, and the U.S. is prouder and surer of its powerful Navy than of its half-equipped Army; 3) many isolationists are rabidly anti-Japanese. ] wouldn't already be true for American Isolationists by then. And the fact that European war related tie-ins, like occupation of a French colony, Japan's Tripartite Pact with Germany, and the invasion of the USSR hadn't happened yet, would be a feature, not a bug, for Isolationists considering whether or not to support a hardline with Japan.
A harsh sanctions regime on Japan from the beginning of 1940 surely would have left the US underprepared compared to December 1941. But the underpreparedness gap and strategic position for fighting would have been incomparably even worse for Japan in January 1940 than in December 1941. I don't know what its raw materials stockpiles were in Jan 1940, but I suspect less than in Jul or Dec 1941. They could well have had higher Gold, Dollar, or Sterling balances, but that's just more paper rendered worthless by a financial freeze and not exchanged for real goods the earlier embargo happens. If they contemplate fighting their way out of embargo like in OTL 1941, they are dealing with an unencumbered USSR at peace to the north, even worse, one that has a non-aggression pact with Germany. They are also dealing with not only the USA and Netherlands, but with a France at war, but unoccupied, and a Britain at war, but at this moment not intensely threatened or engaged at home. Strike South is a far riskier operation, and particular technical platforms like Mitsubishi Zeroes and two or three of the Carrier decks used for Pearl are not available.
How far back could we stretch FDR's relatively free hand with regard to making anti-Japanese economic moves? For example, by deciding to abrogate the US-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911 at some point earlier than July 1939, allowing the six-month warning window to become complete and sanctions to be imposed even before 1940? There were some advocates of this in Executive Department and Foreign Policy Lobbies.
However, I strongly suspect there would be a strong political opposition if FDR pushed back such measures too early, to the first year or 18 months of the Sino-Japanese War.
Why? Based on the strong isolationist and anti-war and anti-escalation reaction to the Panay Incident, where political Isolationists like Maury Maverick, and press outlets associated with an Isolationist point of view, like the Hearst Papers, were quite emphatic that China was *not* worth risking a war over.
So make of the contradictory, or evolving, opinion of Isolationists or Anti-Interventionists, what you will.
